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Abstract 
 
In this research I investigate the intersection of information and communication technology 
(ICT), contract and knowledge in the networked economy as illuminated by the “life” of 
contract management software (CMS). The failure of CMS to fulfill market expectations 
provides the motivating question for this study. Based on interview, survey and archival data, I 
construct a “biography” of CMS from a market perspective informed by the theory of 
commoditization as well as studies of markets from economic sociology. From the latter, I draw 
upon the theory of performativity in markets to identify in the failure of CMS a series of 
breakdowns in performative assumptions and operations normally at work in the making of a 
packaged software market, ranging from a failure in classification performativity to a 
detachment of marketized criteria, in the form of analyst ratings, from the underlying software 
product and vendors. This catalog of breakdown indicates that packaged software production 
implicates multiple levels of commoditization, including financialized meta-commodities and 
marketized criteria, in a dynamic I theorize as substitution of performance. I explore the 
implications of my findings for packaged software and for process commodities more generally, 
suggesting, inter alia, that process commoditization may revolve around contract and 
information exchange rather than product definition. I go on to propose an open theorization of 
contract as a technology of connectedness, in a relationship of potential convergence, 
complementarity and substitution with ICT, interpenetrating and performative. My contributions 
are to information systems and organizations research on the topics of packaged software and 
the relationship of ICT, contract and organizational knowledge; and to economic sociology on 
the topics of performativity in markets and product qualification in process commoditization.  
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or should be variable or optional but instead are pre-specified and fixed in the software 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research background: ICT, contract and knowledge in the networked economy 
Recent developments in information and communication technology (ICT), in particular the 
internet, have changed the way we do business, and the business that we do. We live in a 
digitally connected economy trading products that are to an increasing degree intangible 
(Asprey and Ceruzzi 2008; Castells 2010) – what I call in this dissertation the “networked 
economy”. While the financial markets are in the vanguard, (see Bátiz-Lazo et al. 2011; 
Chiasson and Davidson 2005; Knorr Cetina and Grimpe 2008; Lepinay 2007a, 2007b; Zaloom 
2006; Zuboff 1988), ICT has also transformed the travel industry, retail commerce, the media 
industry and the IT industry itself (see Asprey and Ceruzzi 2008). In the networked economy, it 
makes more sense to “buy” than to “make” (Ciborra 2007), and organizations become digitized, 
distributed, even “virtual” (the “crisis of the vertical corporation model”; Castells 2010, p. 178). 
Supply chain management, outsourcing and cloud computing evidence this de-composition and 
re-configuration of organizational resources, capabilities and boundaries characteristic of the 
networked economy. 
One way of understanding how ICT is changing the way we do business is through transaction 
cost economics (TCE), a theory of firm formation and governance associated with Coase (1937) 
and Williamson (e.g. 1979, 2010) which at its core hypothesizes an efficiency-optimizing 
function that minimizes the sum of production costs and transaction costs – including the cost of 
contracting. Malone et al. (1987) hypothesized that as ICT makes contracting more efficient, 
market transactions would increase relative to hierarchical governance inside vertical 
organizations. This is the so-called electronic markets hypothesis (EMH) (see Mithas et al. 
2008).  
 
For examples of how ICT is changing the business that we do, we can look to its role in the 
generation of new markets in intangible products (Ciborra 2007; Shapiro and Varian 1999; 
Teece 1998), such as financial products (Lepinay 2007a, 2007b; Stearns 2011), services or 
“process commodities” (Barrett and Davidson 2008; Davenport 2005; Zysman 2006) and 
software (Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz 2007; Ceccagnoli et al. 2012; Sawyer 2000, 
2001). The packaged software industry embodies the logic of buy instead of make, or buy-
versus-build (Brooks 1987), and indeed most organizations today buy, rather than build, much 
of their software (Vitari and Ravarini 2009; see also Howcroft and Light 2006, 2010; Strong 
and Volkoff 2010; Xu and Brinkkemper 2007).  
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The generative effects of ICT on the economy, through the enabling of markets and the creation 
of new markets, are now largely taken for granted. Less well understood are the associated 
implications for organizational knowledge, that is, how the organization understands itself and 
its situation in relation to actions it might take (cf. Clark et al. 2007; D’Adderio 2004; Nonaka 
1994; Weick 1995). Knowledge has been identified as key in firm formation (Nonaka and von 
Krogh 2009) and in inter-organizational economic relations and structures, such as industrial 
clusters (Arikan 2009), production communities (cf. Lee and Cole 2003 regarding Linux kernel 
development), supply chain relationships (Fayard 2012; He et al. 2011; Malhotra et al. 2005; 
Subramani 2004), and outsourcing and offshoring (Cha et al. 2008; Dibbern et al. 2008; Gefen 
and Carmel 2008; Leonardi and Bailey 2008). The increase in contracting predicted by EMH 
puts a premium on contracting as an organizational competence – perhaps the residual 
organizational competence – and on organizational contracting knowledge; Argyres and Mayer 
(2007) identify contracting competence as a differentiating capability for organizations. Nonaka 
(1994) implicitly describes one aspect of contracting knowledge as a key element in 
organizational knowledge creation: 
 
It should be noted that the process of organizational knowledge creation is a never-
ending, circular process that is not confined to the organization but includes many 
interfaces with the environment. At the same time, the environment is a continual 
source of stimulation to knowledge creation within the organization. For example, 
Hayek (1945) pointed out that the essential function of market competition is to 
discover and mobilize knowledge "on-the-spot," i.e., the implicit, context-specific 
knowledge held by market participants. 
 
In the case of business organizations, one aspect of the relationship between knowledge 
creation and the environment is illustrated by reactions to the product by customers, 
competitors, and suppliers. For example, many dimensions of customer needs take the 
form of tacit knowledge that an individual customer or other market participants cannot 
articulate by themselves. A product works as a trigger to articulate the tacit knowledge. 
Customers and other market participants give meaning to the product by their bodily 
actions of purchasing, adapting, using, or not purchasing. This mobilization of tacit 
knowledge of customers and market will be reflected to the organization, and a new 
process of organizational knowledge creation is again initiated. (Nonaka 1994, pp. 27) 
However, research points to gaps in organizational contracting knowledge (Håkansson and Lind 
2004), and financial crises and scandals over the last fifteen years (Enron, Long-Term Capital 
Management, the ongoing financial crisis with origins in 2007-2008, the 2010 “flash crash”, the 
collapse of MF Global, and a major trading loss at JP Morgan in 2012)
1
 suggest that, at least in 
the financial arena, where ICT has arguably had the biggest impact on markets, organizations do 
not understand their contracts. This lack of understanding seems to extend to counterparties, 
                                                          
1
 See Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group III (2008); Murphy (2012); O’Malia (2012); Powers 
et al. (2002); MacKenzie (2006b); Rajan et al. (2010); Staffs of the Securities Exchange Commission and 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (2010); cf. Butler (2010). 
19 
 
investors and regulators, and the failure to understand and manage contractual commitments can 
have systemic consequences. The indications are that the relationship of ICT, contract and 
knowledge in the networked economy can be characterized as evolving, perhaps undertheorized, 
and, in some circumstances, problematic. 
 1.2 The motivating question: what happened to contract management software? 
In this dissertation I explore the relationship of ICT, contract and knowledge in the networked 
economy by examining the “life” of a packaged software product – contract management 
software (CMS) – that promised to support contracting as an organizational competence along 
both process and knowledge dimensions. CMS was introduced toward the end of the dot.com 
era, around 2000-2001, and in 2002, Gartner, a technology research firm, predicted that contract 
management would be a $20 billion software and services market by 2007 (Gartner Inc. 2002
2
). 
Instead, CMS revenues have fallen well short of $1 billion (IACCM 2007, Forrester Research 
Inc. 2011a). This gap between market expectations and market performance provides the 
motivating question and point of departure for this dissertation: “What happened to contract 
management software?” 
In 2002, the prospects for CMS were promising. A few years earlier, in 1999, global 
information technology (IT) and telecommunications companies had established a professional 
organization for contract managers, the International Association for Contract and Commercial 
Management (IACCM), signalling recognition of the growing importance of contracting for 
these major industries. The IACCM was committed to establishing contract management as a 
core organizational function and professional discipline, and strongly supported the use of 
automation tools for contract management. Typical contracting processes in organizations were 
fragmented and inefficient, and in many organizations it was difficult even to locate contract 
documents. By 2001, several packaged software vendors had identified contract management as 
an opportunity.  
Contract management software bridged the gap between enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
systems and customer relationship management (CRM) systems. While ERP systems managed 
the structured data for sales and purchases (e.g. delivery of goods), and CRM systems provided 
a place to store information about customers, neither ERP nor CRM provided an organizing 
technology for the contracting process, contract documents, and contract information. CMS 
filled this need. Automating the contract lifecycle across the enterprise, CMS promised 
efficiency and control in contracting, but also “visibility” into contracting – i.e. organizational 
contracting knowledge. 
                                                          
2
 All Gartner Inc. research is referenced for historical perspective and may not reflect current conditions. 
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Contract management software provided workflow, automated document assembly, and a 
contracts repository, together with alerts, reporting and analytics capabilities, and was designed 
to support the entire contract lifecycle. Bidding, negotiation and approvals would take place 
within the workflow application. Then a contract document would be generated based on the 
key terms agreed. The finalized contract would be filed in an electronic document repository, 
with the key contract terms serving as document metadata (structured data about the contract, 
tagged to the document). These key terms could then be used to feed other IT systems internally 
and possibly external (counterparty) systems as well. CMS modelled contracting as a closed and 
continuous production function, joining up fragmented processes and generating structured data 
that would flow through to transactional databases and analytics applications. With its design 
based on the generic contract lifecycle, CMS would work for all types of contracts, and for all 
types of businesses, in any industry. 
CMS seemed like an appropriate packaged software solution to the contract management 
problem. The concept attracted large amounts of investor funding and benefited from millions 
of dollars in research and development and sales and marketing expenditures. CMS has been 
successfully adopted by many customers, and did not fail in a technical sense. Instead, the case 
of CMS is about a failure to meet expectations (Pollock and Williams 2010; cf. Lyytinen and 
Hirschheim 1987) – specifically the failure to meet market expectations. In this dissertation I 
refer to this as the “market failure” of CMS or as the failure of CMS as a packaged software 
product or market. 
To understand what happened to CMS, I first consider whether there was a “generic” failure in 
making a packaged software market – not specific to contract, contracting or contract 
management. In this regard, the case of CMS can be expected to contribute to our understanding 
of packaged software from a market perspective (cf. Sawyer 2001). Second I consider how the 
failure of CMS was related to contract, taking the case of CMS as an opportunity to study the 
nexus between ICT, contract and knowledge.  
1.3 The research questions; overview of the thesis 
To summarize, my research questions are:  
(1) How can we account for the failure of CMS from a market perspective on packaged 
software? What are the implications for packaged software? 
(2) To what extent did the market failure relate to contract? What are the implications 
for ICT, contract and knowledge in the networked economy? 
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As noted above, most organizations buy rather than build much of their software, but the 
phenomenon of packaged software has not received a proportionate amount of attention in IS 
research literature (Light and Sawyer 2007; Sawyer 2000, 2001). In particular, while Sawyer 
(2001) called for a market-based perspective on information systems development, a market 
perspective on packaged software and its implications for organizations is still underdeveloped. 
Pollock and Williams’s (2009a) biography of software approach provides a framework for 
studying a packaged software from a market perspective. Their study of a successful packaged 
software product – ERP – suggests that a successful packaged software market requires the 
mobilization of a knowledge network in support of an “organizing vision” (Swanson and 
Ramiller 1997) together with the successful execution of a strategy of “generification” – 
reconciling the diverse needs of users toward development of a standardized software product. 
The data indicates that in the case of CMS, an active knowledge network was enlisted in support 
of a coherent and compelling organizational vision – automating the contract lifecycle across 
the enterprise – but that generification failed. 
In this dissertation I go beyond that conclusion to investigate how and why generification failed, 
and more generally how and why market creation failed. To do this I extend my analytical and 
empirical frame to incorporate, on the one hand, the vendors and the analyst firms and, on the 
other, contracting in relation to CMS, within a broader market perspective drawing upon the 
theory of commoditization (Appadurai 1986a; Kopytoff 1986) and on studies of markets from 
economic sociology (e.g. Callon 1998a; Cochoy 2010; Lepinay 2007a, 2007b; MacKenzie and 
Millo 2003). The theory of commoditization identifies the role of classification in bringing 
products to market and hypothesizes a knowledge network at work in extended or remote 
production, where producers are separated from consumers. From the studies of markets two 
additional notions are particularly relevant here – product qualification and performativity in 
markets. Product qualification refers to the processes by which products are defined, described, 
given attributes and stabilized (Callon 2010; Callon et al. 2002; Lepinay 2007b; Muniesa et al. 
2007; cf. Caliskan and Callon 2010; Pollock and Williams 2009b), with classification (see 
generally Bowker and Star 1999) an important element (Sjögren and Helgesson 2007; cf. 
Pollock and Williams 2010, 2011).  
The theory of performativity in markets (Callon 1998b; MacKenzie and Millo 2003; MacKenzie 
et al. 2007a) originally identified economic models as performative (following linguistic 
philosopher J. L. Austin) because they do not “describe an existing external ‘economy’, but 
[bring] that economy into being: economics performs the economy, creating the phenomena it 
describes” (MacKenzie and Millo 2003, p. 108; see also MacKenzie et al. 2007b, p. 4), but has 
since been applied to other agencies of commerce, such as marketing (Cochoy 1998, 2010). 
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Austin’s theory of performativity entailed a notion of “misfire” (Austin 1962), when a 
performative statement failed to have its intended effect, which corresponds to Callon’s 
“overflowing” of a frame (Callon 1998c) or to a notion of “breakdown” (Butler 2010; Callon 
2010). In this dissertation I develop the notion of breakdown – the failure of expectations 
associated with a performative assumption or operation – as an analytical device for the study of 
market failure. 
Using these concepts and working with a variety of data sources – interviews, a site visit, survey 
data and archival material – dating from 2000 to 2011, I first develop a biography of CMS as an 
organizing technology for contract. Next I develop an alternative biography of CMS as a 
commodity. Extending the analytical and empirical frame in this second step to include the 
analysts and vendors within the process of commoditization both disrupts and informs the 
biography of CMS an organizing technology for contract, toward offering a fuller explanation.  
An analysis of the evidence of breakdown in the biography of CMS reveals performative 
assumptions and operations relating to both packaged software and the relationship of ICT, 
contract and knowledge – assumptions that were not valid and operations that did not work in 
the case of CMS. This analysis traces the logic of commoditization in packaged software 
markets, encompassing vendor firms and their investors as well as software and its users. My 
analysis challenges prevailing conceptualizations of packaged software and process 
commoditization (the conversion of organizational processes into products, following a program 
of decontextualization). Relating the findings of this study to trends in ICT-enabled contracting 
and other aspects of contracting in the networked economy, I identify issues that make 
organizational contracting knowledge a more difficult problem than research to date would 
suggest and set an agenda for further research regarding the relationship of ICT, contract and 
knowledge based on an open and underspecified theorization of contract as a technology of 
connectedness, in a relationship of potential convergence, complementarity and substitution 
with ICT. 
This study engages with the theory of performativity in several ways. First, it takes seriously the 
idea that breakdown – a failure of a performative operation to work as expected or intended – is 
revelatory (Butler 2010; MacKenzie 2004), and I use a table of breakdown to organize and 
present evidence of breakdown across multiple interacting levels of commoditization. This 
study also supports, in principle, an analytic decomposition of “performativity” as suggested by 
MacKenzie (2004, 2006a), but raises some questions about his proposed schemas. In particular I 
argue that Austin’s (1962) original insight into the strong performative effect of expressions that 
on execution have rule-based mechanistic or deterministic material outcomes is relevant to the 
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theorization of contract as a technology of connectedness and to other phenomena characteristic 
of the networked economy. 
1.4 Outline of the dissertation 
In Chapter 2, I review research literature that informs a market perspective on packaged 
software. In section 2.1, I describe how packaged software is generally defined and understood 
in relation to custom software, the business model for packaged software, and the problems of 
standardization and procurement. Existing research tends to analyse packaged software failure 
in terms of either loss of value due to commoditization (when a product becomes 
undifferentiated or generic, and widely available) or organizational misfit, the subject of many 
so-called implementation studies of ERP. In section 2.2, I explain how the biography of 
software approach developed by Pollock and Williams (2009a) provides a better framework for 
this study because it accommodates a market perspective on packaged software failure, and I 
develop a preliminary hypothesis that the failure of CMS might be traced to the lack of a 
knowledge network in support of an organizing vision or to a failure in generification. Toward 
developing the market perspective on this case of market failure, in section 2.3 I develop a 
theoretical complement to the biography of software approach by calling on the theory of 
commoditization and studies of markets from economic sociology, in particular developing the 
notion of breakdown as an analytical device for understanding market failure. Section 2.4 
summarizes this research literature toward forming a market perspective on packaged software. 
In Chapter 3, I survey research literature on ICT, contract and knowledge, which is often framed 
in relation to transaction cost economics and its governance dimension (markets and 
hierarchies). In section 3.1, I briefly describe transaction cost economics, its theory of contract, 
and the electronic markets hypothesis, and I relate EMH to the digital transformation of the 
organization as described by Kallinikos (2006) and to recent developments in contracting. I go 
on to note that TCE has been qualified and questioned over the years, and, in section 3.2, I 
briefly survey alternative (non-TCE) theories of contract. In section 3.3, I survey empirical 
studies of ICT, contract and knowledge. From this survey I conclude in section 3.4 that 
knowledge has been identified as a key element of contracting, but has been explored mostly in 
terms of its inter-organizational dimension, not from the perspective of the organization’s need 
for synthesizing contracting knowlege. Indeed, research indicates that organizational contracting 
knowledge is not well-supported by financial accounting or other any other organizing 
technology for contract. This frames the opportunity and the challenge for CMS. 
In the chapter on methodology (Chapter 4), I first explain why and how I am adopting Barad’s 
(2003, 2007) agential realism as my epistemological and ontological orientation (section 4.1), 
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relating her notion of posthumanist performativity to performativity in markets and to 
breakdown. In section 4.2, I go on to explain my use of the biography of software approach as 
methodology, positioning it in relation to other approaches and explaining how I apply it as a 
historical account informed by grounded theory and shaped by principles of corpus 
construction. Also in section 4.2, I discuss CMS as a biographical subject and how, taking up a 
second-level subject-object analytical framework, CMS as subject relates to “regions” of 
contract. In section 4.3, I describe my research design, provide a history of the study, and 
describe in detail the sources of data and methods of data collection. In section 4.4, I summarize 
my methodology and relate it to the presentation of data in Chapters 5 and 6 and the analysis in 
Chapter 7.  
In Chapters 5 and 6, I present my empirical material as I develop a biography of CMS in two 
stages or at two levels – first as an organizing technology for contract and second as a 
commodity – which I draw upon sequentially to build a table cataloguing evidence of 
breakdown for analysis. In Chapter 5, I present interview (including site visit) data, survey data, 
and archival material (vendor selling material and material from the IACCM archives) toward 
developing a biography CMS as an organizing technology for contract. In section 5.1, I explain 
why CMS seemed promising, by describing predecessor technologies, the founding of the 
IACCM and the idea of contract management and CMS as an organizing technology for 
contract management. In section 5.2, I describe the reference customer site visit I made in 2009, 
where I saw the benefits of CMS in use. In section 5.3, I describe the role of the IACCM in the 
biography of CMS. In section 5.4, I present evidence of breakdown from the data. I summarize 
this empirical material in section 5.5 with a brief biography of CMS as an organizing 
technology for contract and an initial table of breakdown. 
In Chapter 6, applying a market perspective that incorporates archival data relating to analysts 
and vendor firms, I construct a second superceding biography of CMS as commodity, and 
extend the table of breakdown. In section 6.1, I describe the analysts and their role in the 
biography of CMS. Section 6.2 sets out brief histories of five focus vendors, ending with a 
discussion of marketing by the vendors. In section 6.3, I discuss the further evidence of 
breakdown from the analyst and vendor material with a summary table presenting the evidence 
of breakdown from all of the data presented in Chapters 5 and 6. In section 6.4, I recast the 
biography of CMS, this time as a commodity. 
In Chapter 7, I present my analysis. I first discuss, in section 7.1, the preliminary hypothesis that 
the failure of CMS might be traced to the lack of a knowledge network in support of an 
organizing vision or to a failure in generification. I then present a detailed analysis of the table 
of breakdown brought forward from Chapters 5 and 6 against the research literature on 
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commoditization and markets (sections 7.2 and 7.3). In section 7.4, I draw these discussions 
together toward in an explanation of how CMS failed from a market perspective on packaged 
software, and the extent to which the failure related to contract, concluding that section and the 
chapter with a retrospective on CMS. 
In Chapter 8, I draw out the implications of this study. In section 8.1, I argue that this study 
challenges the business model for packaged software and spell out the implications of the logic 
of commoditization at work in packaged software production. In section 8.2, I generalize the 
findings of this study to question how we understand product qualification for process 
commodities. In section 8.3, I turn more generally to the implications of this study for ICT, 
contract and knowledge in the networked economy, beginning with some observations 
regarding the location of contracting knowledge and practice. I go on to respecify the problem 
of organizational contracting knowledge in light of this study and propose a research agenda 
around the theorization of contract as a technology of connectedness. In section 8.4, I draw 
together several of the implications of this study for practice, and, in section 8.5, I conclude 
with a discussion of the implications of this study regarding performativity, both as theory and 
as relevant to understanding the networked economy. 
In Chapter 9, I summarize my findings, my analysis and the implications (sections 9.1, 9.2 and 
9.3). I also outline my contribution, which is in three areas (section 9.4): to IS and organizations 
research on the topics of packaged software and the relationship of ICT, contract and 
organizational knowledge; to economic sociology on the topics of performativity in markets and 
product qualification; and to the theory of performativity on the topics of breakdown (or 
overflowing or misfire), the analytical decomposition of the notion of performativity, and the 
relevance of Austin’s original notion of performativity to the theorization of contract as a 
technology of connectedness. In section 9.5, I note limitations of this study, and, in section 9.6, I 
identify several areas for further research suggested by this study: toward the development of a 
taxonomy, analytical framework and vocabulary for software design, procurement and 
investment that reduces the dependence on “organizing visions” and product categories; 
regarding the problem of organizational contracting knowledge in light of the evolving 
relationship between ICT and contract; and tracing the interpenetration of ICT and contract and 
their conjoint performativity toward new understandings of ICT, contract and knowledge in the 
networked economy.  
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Chapter 2 Literature review: packaged software from a market perspective 
In this chapter, I review literature relating to to the first research question: “How can we account 
for the failure of CMS from a market perspective on packaged software? What are the 
implications for packaged software?” I begin, in section 2.1.1, with a definition of packaged 
software and by describing how packaged software is generally understood in relation to custom 
software – in particular how the logic of scale provides the rationale for the packaged software 
industry and the buy-versus-build procurement model. Next (section 2.1.2) I relate the logic of 
scale to the business model for packaged software as an information good and describe the 
threat of loss of value due to commoditization (when a product becomes undifferentiated or 
generic, and widely available, and thus competes on price alone). The logic of scale sets up the 
core design problem for packaged software, the problem of standardization, which can be 
resolved through a number of different strategies (section 2.1.3). The problem of standardization 
also sets up an ongoing tension between vendors and customers, manifest in implementation 
(section 2.1.3) and procurement (section 2.1.4). I conclude (in section 2.1.5) that packaged 
software is an important phenomenon but the market perspective is lacking; in particular, 
existing research tends to analyse packaged software failure in two ways: as a general 
phenomenon of commoditization (with the meaning above) or as organizational misfit, which 
has been the subject of many so-called implementation studies of ERP. Neither of these 
approaches promises a complete explanation for the failure of CMS. 
In section 2.2, I explain how the biography of software approach developed by Pollock and 
Williams (2009a) provides a better framework for this study. In section 2.2.1, I describe how the 
biography of software approach lifts the analysis out of the particular organizational setting, 
foregrounds the processes of packaged software production, and thus accommodates a market 
perspective on packaged software. Also in that section, I draw out three key concepts from 
Pollock and Williams’s biography of ERP: the knowledge network, the organizing vision (from 
Swanson and Ramiller 1997), and their concept of generification. In section 2.2.2, I relate their 
biography of ERP to technology histories associated with science and technology studies (STS) 
and the three key concepts to comparable concepts from other studies of technology production. 
I conclude in section 2.2.3 with a preliminary hypothesis, based on my reading of this research, 
that the failure of CMS might be traced to the lack of a knowledge network in support of an 
organizing vision or to a failure in generification. 
In section 2.3, I develop a theoretical complement to the biography of software approach by 
calling on the theory of commoditization, meaning here the process by which things become 
objects of exchange (Appadurai 1986a; Kopytoff 1986), and studies of markets from economic 
sociology (e.g. Callon 1998a). In section 2.3.1, I summarize key ideas from the theory of 
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commoditization as relevant to this study, classification in commoditization and the role of 
knowledge networks in extended or remote production being of particular relevance here. The 
theme of classification in commoditization has been further developed as an element of product 
qualification (the processes by which products are defined, described, given attributes and 
stabilized) in studies of markets from economic sociology, as I describe in section 2.3.2. In 
section 2.3.3, I discuss performativity in markets as explored in that literature, and, in section 
2.3.4, I develop the notion of “breakdown” in performativity as an analytical device for 
understanding market failure. In section 2.4 I draw this research together to derive four key 
themes regarding packaged software from a market perspective: the knowledge network, the 
organizing vision and generification as factors in successful market creation, and breakdown as 
an analytical tool for understanding market failure. 
2.1 How packaged software is understood 
According to Campbell-Kelly (2007), it was in the 1980s that software research turned away 
from a focus on software languages to consider the software industry, which was becoming an 
increasingly important phenomenon. In 1987, Fred Brooks, author of The Mythical Man-Month 
(Brooks 1995 [1975]), wrote about off-the-shelf software as providing “the most radical 
possible solution for constructing software … not to construct it at all” (Brooks 1987, p. 16). As 
Brooks saw it, buying packaged software would always be cheaper than building custom 
software, and today, most organizational software is bought, not custom-designed (Pollock and 
Williams 2009a, pp. 60-61; Vitari and Ravarini 2009; see also Howcroft and Light 2006, 2010; 
Strong and Volkoff 2010; Xu and Brinkkemper 2007). In light of the importance of packaged 
software to organizations, it is notable that in 2000 when a group of prominent scholars 
convened to draw up a list of software research topics, they did not include application software 
(Campbell-Kelly 2007), and packaged software, with the exception of ERP, has continued to 
receive proportionately little research attention (Light and Sawyer 2007). Furthermore, despite 
Sawyer’s (2001) calling for a market-based perspective on IS development, research on 
packaged software has for the most part remained centered around the organizational setting. 
2.1.1 A definition of packaged software; packaged software as compared to custom software 
Vitari and Ravarini (2009) define packaged software as: 
… commercially available software, where the user has no free access to the source 
code and no rights to redistribute. It is typically licensed onto the mass market as a 
tradable, ready-made, off-the-shelf pre-built product, whose eventual customization is 
controlled by the vendor. (p. 250) 
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In this formulation, the defining feature of packaged software is its ownership by vendors, who 
sell licenses to use it. Apart from its commercial terms of sale and use, packaged software is 
often understood in relation to custom software, compared in terms of scale, the skills required 
of IT user organizations, the method of development, and the measures of success (Table 2.1). 
The key benefit of packaged software is the expertise of the developers as scaled against the IT 
capabilities of individual organizations, resulting in better and more cost-effective IT 
deployments for the organizations (Brooks 1987; Light and Sawyer 2007); that is, the rationale 
for packaged software is the economy of scale and the assumed lower costs that will motivate 
firms to buy software rather than build it in-house. To adapt to the buy-instead-of-build model, 
IT user organizations shift away from bespoke software projects developed against requirements 
expressed in specifications (e.g. using the “waterfall” method or some variant; see Boehm 1988; 
Sawyer 2001) to procurement based on requirements expressed in a request for proposals (or the 
like, sometimes generically referred to as RFX) (Sawyer 2001). Whereas for custom software 
there is direct interaction between users and in-house developers, for packaged software the 
relationship between users and developers is abstracted and remote, mediated through a network 
of analysts, resellers, consultants and system integrators working across multiple channels (Keil 
and Carmel 1995; Sawyer 2001), with intermediaries “co-dependent” on vendors and user 
organizations for their business (Howcroft and Light 2010). Lastly, while the measures of 
success for custom software are user acceptance and user satisfaction, for packaged software, 
success is measured in terms of profitability and market share (Chiasson and Green 2007; 
Sawyer 2000). Thus Ó Raian (2010), in his study of software developers, writes about “the 
missing customer and the ever-present market”. 
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Comparing custom software to 
packaged software 
Custom software Packaged software 
Scale Localized, no scale benefits Benefits of scale and 
concentrated expertise 
Skills required of user 
organizations 
Requirements specification and 
software engineering 
Procurement skills, including 
RFX and contract management 
Method of development Close interaction between 
developer and user 
Mediated interactions involving 
analysts, resellers, consultants 
and system integrators across 
multiple channels 
Measures of success User acceptance and user 
satisfaction 
Profitability and market share 
Table 2.1 Comparing custom software to packaged software (cf. Keil and Carmel 1995; Sawyer 
2000, 2001) 
2.1.2 How the logic of scale shapes the business model for packaged software; the threat of 
commoditization 
Because the packaged software industry is based on the logic of scale – concentrating 
development time and expertise in a standardized product that serves the needs of multiple users 
– packaged software is sometimes considered an “information good”, as defined by Shapiro and 
Varian (1999, p. 3). For information goods (a piece of recorded music, as an example), the 
marginal cost of production approaches zero and profit margins are correspondingly high, and 
this model has been applied to software (see Gallaugher and Wang 2002; Pollock and Williams 
2009a, p. 20; Teece 1998; Xu and Brinkkemper 2007). Two further aspects of this model are the 
possibility of increasing returns due to “network effects” (positive feedback arising from 
positive network externalities) and the characterization of information goods as “experience 
goods” (Shapiro and Varian 1999). “Network effects” in this context refers to the dynamic of 
increasing returns if the particular packaged software product requires or benefits from 
interoperability across users (Arthur 1989, 1994; Katz and Shapiro 1985; Shapiro and Varian 
1999; cf. David 1985); the more users, the more valuable the tangible or virtual network defined 
by interoperability. Teece (1998) posits increasing returns as characteristic of knowledge-based 
industries, in contrast to the diminishing returns associated with the industrial production of 
manufactured goods. For “experience goods”, whose value cannot be understood unless they are 
“experienced”, Shapiro and Varian (1999, p. 5-6) argue that branding and reputation become 
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proxies for understanding the product based on prior experience. This dynamic has been 
discussed by Pollock and Williams (2009b) in relation to the role of analyst firms in the 
packaged software market as “the commodification of networked reputation” or “the 
commodification of community knowledge”. 
To achieve scale and capture possible network effects, packaged software firms seek rapid 
growth of market share, through “first mover advantage” (Shapiro and Varian 1999, pp. 29-32). 
Kirsch and Goldfarb (2008) link the idea of first mover advantage – that competitive advantage 
goes to the first to exploit a digital commerce opportunity – to the predominance in the dot.com 
era of what they call the “get big fast” strategy. The emphasis was on growth, even in the 
absence of revenues. But growth is not enough. Information goods are subject to the risk that 
competing products might be made available more cheaply or even for free. This is the threat of 
“commoditization” (Shapiro and Varian 1999, pp. 23-24), meaning here a product becoming 
undifferentiated or generic, and widely available, and thus competing on price alone. Haigh’s 
(2008) history of web and e-mail technologies demonstrates the sometimes elusive character of 
profits in software production. As Haigh concluded: “nobody got rich selling Internet e-mail 
programs” (p. 118).  
The challenge for packaged software firms is well illustrated by Vitari and Ravarini’s (2009) 
study of content management software (packaged software to manage web content) over the 
period 2002-2007. They counted software functionalities, including the offering of services, as 
against prices, and observed an increase in functionality, including the development of service 
offerings, and a reduction in price over time. The increase in functionality corresponded to an 
expansion to support other activities such as e-commerce, knowledge management and 
document management, “blurring even further the already fuzzy boundaries between these 
different types of applications”. Vitari and Ravarini found that, over time, the content 
management software applications faced increasing competition not only from internal software 
development but from open source software, which also added functionality over time. The 
authors conclude that packaged software vendors, confronted with the “general expected trend 
of declining cost-to-performance ratio over time of IT assets”, including software, had moved to 
a differentiation strategy based on service offerings (Cusumano et al. 2007; see also Campbell-
Kelly and Garcia-Swartz 2007). Overall, they found their study was consistent with “the shift 
towards commoditization (Carr 2003) and services in the IT industry (Rai and Sambamurthy 
2006)” and the development of open source software – although they pointed out that in 2002, 
when they started their study, these trends were not apparent to them.  
To summarize, the business model for packaged software levers the logic of scale. Properly 
executed, the business model generates high market share for a high margin information good, 
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with possible increasing returns from network effects. So understood, the principle risk for 
packaged software is the threat of commoditization. However, this view elides the central 
problem for packaged software production – the problem of standardization. 
2.1.3 The logic of scale and the problem of standardization 
The logic of scale for packaged software sets up the problem of standardization in packaged 
software production: how to reconcile particular user requirement with the need to standardize a 
product. This problem can be resolved in a number of ways. For example, users can adjust to 
the requirements imposed by standard software. Brooks (1987) observed that initially there was 
a lot of resistance to packaged software for payroll, inventory and accounts receivable, as 
businesses claimed that their needs were unique. Over time this resistance faded. Brooks 
attributed this to the ubiquity of cheap computing: Companies that bought low-cost computers 
could not justify expensive custom programming, and simply adapted their processes to match 
packaged software requirements.  
At the same time, developers can work with their software to eliminate particularized aspects 
and make it more generic, in other words to decontextualize it. In Chiasson and Green (2007), 
the authors were involved in a project which they characterize as an exemplar for packaged 
software development. The project was to take a specific piece of software developed for breast 
cancer healthcare planning and turn it into a more generic application. This project advanced 
through several stages, including reduction of linear pre-scripting of user interactions, 
rationalization of the database, and, finally, stripping out the data components tied to the 
specific healthcare domain. The project team ended up with software that could be used for any 
healthcare planning context and indeed for any planning context, by using configuration options 
to drop user-specific content into the framework provided by the software.  
In another approach to decontextualization, developers can design their software so that user-
specific requirements are localized through configuration (pre-enabled user options), modular 
construction (variable bundling of basic elements depending on user needs), and a layered, 
hierarchical architecture, which together create openness, optionality and flexibility (Pollock 
and Williams 2009a). Hanseth and Lyytinen (2009) define a hierarchy consisting of (1) IT 
capabilities, (2) applications, (3) platforms and (4) information infrastructures (such as the 
internet or industry-wide EDI networks). In this hierarchy:  
Applications consist of suites of IT capabilities. They are developed to meet a set of 
specified user needs within a select set of communities. … An application is a priori 
determined by choice of design context, user groups and functional goals. … Therefore, 
most proposed design theories address the design of applications by promoting ways of 
32 
 
generating effectively a closure in the included IT capabilities as to meet user’s needs 
… .  
Platforms differ from applications due to their heterogenous and growing user base, that 
is their design context is not fixed due to the constant generification of included IT 
capabilities ([Pollock and Williams 2009a]). (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2009, pp. 2, 4) 
Platforms, such as Microsoft Office, Windows, or ERP or CRM packages, provide a “(semi)-
closed, and highly complex suite of IT capabilities, which, thanks to the original architecting, 
can be extended” (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2009, p. 4). For comparison to Hanseth and Lyytinen’s 
hierarchy, Adomavicius et al. (2008), in an “ecosystem view” of the IT landscape, classify 
information technologies under three categories: products and applications, components, and 
infrastructure. An alternative cut is proposed by Matthiassen and Sorensen (2008). They 
envision organizational IT as consisting of a portfolio of information services supported by 
infrastructure (citing inter alia Broadbent and Weill 1997), and distinguish between systems 
(how IT artefacts are designed and intended to be used) and services (the everyday, possibly 
idiosyncratic actual use of IT artefacts). This carries an echo of Brooks’s suggestion that “the 
single most powerful software-productivity strategy for many organizations today is to equip 
the computer-naïve workers who are on the firing line with personal computers and good 
generalized writing, drawing, file and spreadsheet programs and then to turn them loose” 
(Brooks 1987, p. 17). In all of these strategies for IS design, the problem of standardization is 
managed by sterilizing core IT, i.e. isolating it from particularizing interferences. 
Still, there are limits to packaged software-imposed standardization. These generate problems in 
implementation and can require costly customizations. Lucas et al. (1988) drew early attention 
to the problems in implementing packaged software, and the many studies of ERP 
implementation or “misfit” continue this theme. Strong and Volkoff (2010), following and 
expanding on work by Soh (Soh et al. 2000; Soh et al. 2003; Soh and Sia 2004), analyse 
enterprise systems in terms of organization-enterprise system fit, noting that: 
Packaged software raises important theoretical issues associated with its definitional 
characteristic, namely that it is designed to fit generic rather than specific requirements, 
and hence is likely to be an imperfect fit in any particular instance. … According to one 
source, “The standard software customization rule of thumb states that 80 percent of the 
software application package should fit the organization as it, and only 20 percent of the 
software application should be customized” (Foster 2001, p. 4), and according to 
another, “it has been estimated that in the best case, integrated enterprise systems only 
address about 70% of the needs of the average organization” (Markus 2000, p. 20). 
(Strong and Volkoff 2010, pp. 731-732) 
To summarize, there are four basic strategies for resolving the problem of standardization for 
packaged software, set out in Table 2.2. The second and third are premised on 
decontextualization, that is the stripping out of features particularized to a specific setting. 
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Resolving the problem of standardization for packaged software 
User organizations adapt to the packaged software 
Packaged software developers make their product more generic 
Particularity is localized and isolated while the core is sterilized and protected from particularizing 
interferences: e.g. configuration, modularity, layered architecture, underspecified and fluid use of generic 
IT 
Customization 
Table 2.2 Resolving the problem of standardization for packaged software 
The problem of standardization in packaged software has been framed as an ongoing conflict 
between vendors and customers:  
[O]ne important implication of our study is that packaged software design and 
consumption is about competing and complementary objectives between vendors and 
consumers. Vendors attempt to develop software with as much generality as possible, to 
capture a wider market share … . They hope their software is ‘far’ enough away from 
specific organisational uses so that it can be shaped by many users, but not too far that it 
requires substantial resources to shape it to support specific practices. On the other 
hand, customers are (or should be) motivated to search for specific software systems 
that support their current or future practices. Where the two interests cross, customers 
are left with the choice of generic software that is hopefully less expensive to purchase 
and shape than starting-from-scratch. (Chiasson and Green 2007, pp. 551-552) 
2.1.4 The problem of procurement 
Unsurprisingly in this context, characterized by some level of vendor-customer conflict of 
interest, IT user organizations can find it hard to make good decisions about packaged software 
procurement, and the need for further research and guidance in this area has been recognized 
(see Chiasson and Green 2007; Howcroft and Light 2006; Pollock and Williams 2009a, pp. 60-
61, 2009b). Howcroft and Light (2010) adopt a social shaping of technology approach to 
critique the functionalist literature (e.g. Keil and Tiwana 2006) for suggesting that packaged 
software procurement is rational and follows a linear path from understanding user requirements 
to evaluation and then final selection. Appan and Browne (2012) have identified a general 
“misinformation effect” in the requirements elicitation process (not in the context of packaged 
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software procurement), where users tend to recall misinformation provided by analysts rather 
than their own beliefs and knowledge. These observations suggest that packaged software 
procurement is not as straightforward as repurposing the requirements-based “waterfall” of 
custom software development in requirements-based RFX practice. For example, Pollock and 
Williams (2009b, 2010), note that user organizations need to take into account not only the 
various attributes of the technologies but the viability of vendors, and whether they will invest 
in their products.  
Howcroft and Light (2010) also question whether packaged software is really standardized: 
Packaged software products are often conceptualized as standardized commodities, yet 
the more critical literature suggests they are in constant development, always 
provisional (Pozzebon and Pinsonneault 2005), and should be viewed in more fluid 
terms, as a “biography” that evolves across multiple cycles of development (Pollock 
and Cornford 2004). … It is difficult to query the claims being made by vendors and 
consultants, since they sell packages with the promise of transferring exemplary 
business practices – best practices – (Wagner et al. 2006) that are embedded within the 
technology. (p. 127) 
Adomavicius et al. (2008) observe the difficulty of “making sense of technology trends in the 
information technology landscape”:  
The sheer number of available technologies and the complex set of relationships among 
them make IT landscape analysis extremely challenging. Most IT-consuming firms rely 
on third parties and suppliers for strategic recommendation on IT investments, which 
can lead to biased and generic advice. (p. 779) 
The problem of procurement is further complicated by new product delivery formats, such as 
software as a service (SaaS) (Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz 2008), cloud computing 
(Armbrust et al. 2010; Willcocks et al. 2012) and IT outsourcing (e.g. Lacity et al. 2009; Lacity 
et al. 2010; Lacity and Willcocks 2012) that may present existential, or at least definitional, 
challenges to the packaged software concept. Campbell-Kelly and Garcia Swartz (2008, p. 220) 
argue that “the current incarnation of the SaaS concept and the computer utility represents a new 
attempt to shift the locus of software, and potentially computing power, outside the corporation” 
– to the servers of hosting companies, to the servers of on-demand software providers (such as 
salesforce.com) or “the network (in the case of Web services that involve the interfacing of 
many Web service providers)”. SaaS threatens to upset many accepted product and service 
categories: 
If a software-as-a-service company is an enterprise that writes, hosts and deploys 
software over the Internet, then what is an online bank? It too is software driven – users 
store financial data and make transactions in a way not dissimilar, for example, to Web-
based software. To take a less provocative example, consider eBay, which is very much 
a software creation. In a technical sense, eBay is a software platform – it publishes its 
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Application Program Interfaces, and hundreds of firms exist by offering software and 
Web-service complements. (Campbell-Kelly 2007, pp. 50-51) 
This theme of definitional fluidity is generalized in the dynamic of digital convergence and its 
correlates – device, network and market convergence – which entails the “interconnection, 
overlapping, contestation, and reconfiguration of physical and logical socio-technical 
infrastructures” and “non-linear interactions across layers” (Tilson et al. 2010). In the context of 
digital convergence, the notion of “packaged software” – what it is, where it is located, its 
interactions with and dependencies on other software and on hardware, rights to ownership and 
use – becomes somewhat fluid, inchoate and indeterminate.  
2.1.5 Summary: how packaged software is understood 
Packaged software has long been identified as an important phenomenon for organizational IS, 
but is still relatively under-researched. Looking at Table 2.1, we can observe uneven progress 
toward understanding packaged software from a market perspective. The rationale of scale for 
packaged software has been generally accepted, though the problem of standardization problem 
in the form of organizational misfit has been studied extensively (e.g Strong and Volkoff 2010). 
Procurement remains a subject marked for further research (e.g. Chiasson and Green 2007; 
Howcroft and Light 2006; Pollock and Williams 2009a). Pollock and Williams (2009a, 2009b, 
2010, 2011) and Howcroft and Light (2010) have illuminated the mediated interactions that 
shape packaged software production. Less understood is what it means when profitability and 
market share, not user satisfaction, are the measures of success (Chiasson and Green 2007; Ó 
Raian 2010; Sawyer 2000).  
The failure of packaged software has been framed as a loss of value due to “commoditization” 
(where the product becomes generic and widely available) or as organizational misfit. Neither of 
these promises a complete explanation for the failure of CMS. A general tendency to 
commoditization does not explain why some packaged software products (e.g. ERP) are more 
successful than others (e.g. CMS). Likewise, localized instances of misfit (as in the case of 
ERP) do not necessarily accumulate to failure at the product and market level. In a sense, the 
first explanation might be seen as pitched at too high a level of generality, and the second as 
pitched too low. In the next section I discuss an alternative approach that locates the analysis at 
the level of the product and market and thus accommodates a market perspective. 
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2.2 Pollock and Williams’s biography of software as a framework for this study 
2.2.1 Rationale; key concepts: the knowledge network, the organizing vision and generification 
In their study of ERP, The Biography of the Enterprise-Wide System, or How SAP Conquered 
the World, Pollock and Williams (2009a) develop a “biography of software” approach that 
subsumes the problems of standardization and procurement into an integrated view of packaged 
software production. By lifting the analysis out of the specific organizational context (e.g. 
implementation or procurement), the software itself and the processes of its production are 
foregrounded; the technological artefact is no longer taken for granted (cf. Orlikowski and 
Iacono 2001), nor its production treated as “design from nowhere” (Suchman 2002).  
 
The integrated end-to-end perspective on technology production is exemplified by Pollock and 
Williams’s concept of the supplier-user nexus, the “various interfaces between suppliers and 
users which constitute nexuses in which competing requirements are presented and worked out” 
(2009a, p. 88). The supplier-user nexus solves the problem of distance between users and 
developers. It includes intermediaries such as resellers, consultants and analysts, as well as 
customers as references and demonstrator sites – “webs of knowledge and influence from the 
vendors as they seek to manage and sustain their existing user base and expand their markets” 
(p. 92). Extending this line of research, Pollock and Williams (2009b, 2010, 2011) have 
followed their biography of ERP with studies of the role of industry analysts, such as Gartner, 
who create categories for software products and produce market research ranking software 
products and vendors, thus shaping the IT marketplace.  
 
In this dissertation I refer to the suppler-user nexus as the “knowledge network” (see Pollock 
and Williams 2009a, p. 91). This knowledge network works in part by promulgating “supply-
side rhetoric”, in the form of advertising, supplier literature and software demonstrations 
(Pollock and Williams 2009a, pp. 91-93). Supply-side rhetoric associates software with business 
programs, or “organizing visions” (Swanson and Ramiller 1997), that link a technology, its 
name and a managerial best practice (Pollock and Williams 2009a, pp. 119, 125-127), in ways 
that are sometimes “opportunistic and ephemeral” (p. 125). Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) 
“organizing vision” is “a focal community idea for the application of information technology in 
organizations” (p. 460).  
This vision serves key functions in interpretation, legitimation, and the organization and 
mobilization of economic roles and exchanges. The development and influence of an 
organizing vision is determined by a variety of institutional forces. Among these forces, 
the community’s discourse serves as the developmental engine. Other factors – business 
commerce, the IS practitioners’ world view, the motivating business problem, the core 
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technology, and material processes of adoption and diffusion – provide the discourse 
with its content, structure, motivation and direction. (Swanson and Ramiller 1997, p. 
458) (emphasis added) 
While marking the importance of supply-side rhetoric in shaping expectations according to 
organizing visions, Pollock and Williams also emphasize the characteristics of the software 
product as it evolves over time. As Pollock and Williams see it, in early development, packaged 
software is unstable and development may follow tactical lines, from one set of customer 
requirements to the next, as designers try to find sufficient commonality across multiple 
organizations to justify development and support of the software product. They have examined 
how this process occurs by considering the totality of design and development, the procurement 
decision and implementation, and found that customer interests and needs are reconciled with 
supplier interests through an ongoing process of “generification” – strategic extension of 
adoption first within and then across industry verticals by decontextualizing the product, making 
it more generic and localizing particularity (cf. Chiasson and Green 2007). In the case of ERP, 
qualities of ERP that enabled it to “travel” included configurability, modular construction, and 
open design (enabling integration and special-purpose add-on capabilities). Generification 
resolves the problem of standardization through a strategic process of selective or negotiated 
decontextualization, as user organizations try to get the most out of the software package and 
the supplier gathers requirements for a transportable product usable in new organizations and 
new domains. By theorizing generification and tracing its processes in detail, Pollock and 
Williams have made a major contribution to our understanding of how the problem of 
standardization is resolved in the packaged software industry. 
To summarize then, the biography of software approach foregrounds the packaged software 
product and its production. It thus accommodates a market perspective. From their study of 
ERP, Pollock and Williams identified as key to packaged software success a knowledge 
network activated around an organizing vision, but more substantively a process of 
generification that organizes product design toward reconciliation of user needs with the vendor 
interest in standardization. In the next section I relate the biography of software approach and 
these key concepts to other studies of technology production. 
2.2.2 Relating the biography of software approach and key concepts to other studies of 
technology production 
Despite their critique of some recent studies in STS, Pollock and Williams retain the “STS 
perspective as [their] core analytical commitment” (Pollock and Williams 2009a, p. 114), and 
their biography of ERP might be said to follow in the tradition of technology histories 
associated with STS (e.g. Bijker 1992, 1995; Hughes 1983; Noble 1984, 1999). An exemplary 
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technology history is Structuring the Information Age (2005)
 
by Joanne Yates,
3
 a history of 
automation in the life insurance industry. It began with the mechanical tabulating machine, 
originally invented for the 1890 US census by Herman Hollerith, a Columbia University-
educated engineer, who adapted the punched card technology used in the Jacquard loom to 
tabulate census responses. Because the census was a once-in-a-decade event, Hollerith looked 
for other potential customers for his technology. The life insurance industry was in its infancy 
but growing fast, and there was a constant shortage of (mostly female) clerks to manage the 
policy and payments records. The life insurance companies became big customers for the 
tabulating machine, and the two industries grew up together. 
Because the life insurance industry was a major user of tabulating equipment, its firms 
and associations interacted extensively with vendors to shape the technology, in 
particular seeking printing capability in addition to sorting, counting and adding 
capability. For example, a few firms hired an inventor to create customized equipment; 
several firms and associations stated their needs directly to the two primary vendors 
(Herman Hollerith, whose firm became IBM, and James Powers, whose firm became 
Remington Rand); and some firms exerted market power by switching from one vendor 
to the other as each added new capabilities. (Yates 2005, p. 6)    
Yates describes how competing vendors sought to increase their market share, and how 
insurance industry associations facilitated the sharing of knowledge among industry participants 
and interactions with the vendors. This resonates with Pollock and Williams’s biography of 
ERP in its focus on technology production as a joint, interactive and iterative process involving 
vendors, customers and intermediaries such as industry associations.  
The knowledge network described by Pollock and Williams as the supplier-user nexus bears 
some relationship to as the “relevant social group” of STS (Bijker 1992) – the persons and 
organizations that recognize or validate a new technology – and comparable knowledge 
networks have been identified in other research. Swan and Newell (1995) have described the 
role of professional associations in the diffusion of production and inventory control systems. 
Mark Suchman et al. (2000) have theorized the role of law firms within the “institutional 
ecology” of Silicon Valley, and Kenney and Florida (2000) and Ferrary and Granovetter (2009) 
have analysed the part played by venture capital firms.  
Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) theorization of the organizing vision, cited by Pollock and 
Williams (2009a), is consistent with findings of other researchers. According to Newell et al. 
(2000) the key in diffusion is not a particular technological artefact but instead the “spread of 
the knowledge and ideas underpinning the technology”. Mark Suchman et al. (2001), in a study 
                                                          
3
 Campbell-Kelly (2007) also singled out Yates’s Structuring the Information Age as a model of a holistic 
industry history, but speculated that it was too early to write such a history about software. In particular, 
he noted that we have only begun to study applications. 
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of Silicon Valley, argue that entrepreneurs need to establish a “cognitively viable enterprise” 
and build a cognitive framework, whereby “‘imaginary’ niches may become self-fulfilling 
prophecies” (p. 351). This involves “construct[ing] a mental map of underexploited 
opportunities, generat[ing] a coherent model for organizing around those opportunities, and 
communicat[ing] a legitimating account of the endeavor to potential stakeholders. Together, 
maps, models and accounts make up a cognitive framework” (p. 351). In the authors’ view, 
entrepreneurship is “a product of underinstitutionalized cognitive models, not of under-
exploited economic niches”. In a different domain, Preda (2007) traces the history of financial 
chartism, or technical analysis, and how it became a commodity sold to brokerage houses. He 
notes that “the success of technical analysis depends less on its capacity to calculate value, than 
on its capacity to shape cognitive agendas” (p. 41).  
Generification might be characterized as a particular set of strategies and processes related to 
what is called stabilization and closure in STS. In the initial stages, a new technology may be 
immature or unstable. But “[i]nterpretive flexibility does not continue forever. ‘Closure’ and 
stabilization occur, such that some artefacts appear to have fewer problems and become 
increasingly the dominant form of the technology” (Kline and Pinch 1999, pp. 113-114). 
Significantly, closure can occur through redefinition of the problem (Pinch and Bijker 1987, pp. 
44-46). Misa (1992) discusses the processes of closure, whereby “hardness” was brought to a 
contested field, in the development of “steel”, and Pozzebon et al. (2006) theorize the dynamic 
of “rhetorical closure” mutually constructed by suppliers, consultants and managers around IT 
“fashions”. But generification also incorporates a notion which de Laet and Mol (2000) describe 
as the “fluidity” of a technological artefact – that is, its ”technological appropriateness” across 
multiple diverse settings. They locate the “fluidity” of a bush pump in the technology itself and 
attribute this “fluidity” to its joint design by an individual engineer and the African villages for 
which it was designed. In these terms, generification refers to the processes by which packaged 
software is made “fluid”. 
2.2.3 A preliminary hypothesis 
What, then, does it take to make a packaged software market? As I read Pollock and Williams, 
and consistent with other research on technology production, we should look for a knowledge 
network that mediates between and includes developers and users. This knowledge network 
works in part by sharing and validating an “organizing vision” that through the mobilization of 
expectations animates and directs the work of the knowledge network toward successful product 
development and adoption. However, vendors also need to execute a generification strategy 
that, starting with a working instance of software, generalizes or decontextualizes it so that other 
user organizations can successfully adopt it. Generification resolves the problem of 
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standardization and creates a “fluid” product. Based on this research, we can hypothesize that 
when these factors are missing a packaged software product might fail. That is, it is a 
preliminary hypothesis for this study that the failure of CMS might be traced to the lack of a 
knowledge network in support of an organizing vision or to a failure in generification. 
2.3 Developing the market perspective: the theory of commoditization and studies of markets 
from economic sociology 
Pollock and Williams take the view that “the biographies approach is not ‘hard-wired’ to a 
specific theoretical perspective” (Pollock and Williams 2009a, p. 111). While acknowledging 
the attraction of “analytical purism” (p. 112), the authors argue that it carries a risk of over-
simplifying reductionism; at the same time they do not reject theory but view it as needed “to 
provide critical insight” (p. 113). That is, they view theory as a tool for understanding, with 
“methods and concepts deployed according to the issue and phenomena in hand” (p. 114). They 
survey various possible theoretical framings for the biography of software, such as Koch (2003; 
“mass production communities”), and Kaniadakis (2006; “an agora of technological change”). 
However, to develop a market-based perspective on packaged software for this case of market 
failure, I am adopting another theory to which Pollock and Williams link their work, the theory 
of commoditization (Appadurai 1986a; Kopytoff 1986).  
The theory of commoditization, as taken forward in studies of markets from economic 
sociology, provides a generalized conceptual frame for the knowledge network, the organizing 
vision, and generification. In addition, the studies of markets provide valuable insights into how 
products are brought to market, and useful points of comparison and corroboration for my 
findings, suggesting their generalizability is not necessarily limited to the software domain (an 
example being the implications of this study for process commoditization, discussed in section 
8.2). However, it is important to note that my selection of commoditization and the studies of 
markets as a theoretical frame for this study was not a priori but instead emerged in the course 
of investigation following the grounded theory approach as described in Chapter 4. While I 
started with a research orientation more toward a “design science” approach (“What was wrong 
with CMS?”), the first round of data collection as reported in Chapter 5 indicated that, as there 
were so many (relatively unsurprising) things “wrong” with CMS, the real puzzle lay elsewhere: 
“Why were market expectations for CMS so high?” In other words, the data called for reframing 
as a story about market making, not software engineering, though with implications for how we 
understand packaged software, as discussed in section 8.1. The theory of commoditization 
together with the studies of markets provide a more natural theoretical home for this story. This 
brings me to the last point in favour of the theory of commoditization as a complement to the 
biography of software approach for this study: The foundational writings of Kopytoff (1986) 
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and Appadurai (1986a), economic anthropologists whose work is now associated with the area 
of anthropology called material culture studies (e.g. Miller 1998, 2005; Tilley et al. 2006), are 
the source of the notion that commodities have a social life, and that a commodity has a 
biography. The commoditization perspective thus directly supports the biography of software 
approach, as further discussed in Chapter 4. 
2.3.1 Key concepts from the theory of commoditization: classification as an element of 
commoditization and knowledge networks in extended or remote production 
In this section I briefly summarize several key concepts from the theory of commoditization as 
relevant to this study. The first is classification in commoditization, and the second is the notion 
of a knowledge network at work in extended or remote production (i.e. where producers are 
separated from consumers, as in the case of packaged software production). 
“Commoditization” as used in this dissertation has two meanings. The first refers to the process 
by which things become commodities.
4
 In this dissertation, commoditization has this first 
meaning, unless otherwise indicated. The second meaning refers to a product becoming 
undifferentiated or generic, and widely available, thus competing on price alone, as discussed in 
section 2.1.2.
5
  
The key insight of the commoditization theorists is that commodities – things for exchange – 
“must be not only produced materially as things, but also culturally marked as being a certain 
kind of thing” (Kopytoff 1986, p. 64). That is, bringing things to market entails more than their 
physical production, and these associated cultural processes are important to our understanding 
of products and markets. Kopytoff then goes on to note, obliquely, the role of classification in 
commoditization: “Culture achieves order by carving out, through discrimination and 
classification, distinct areas of homogeneity within the overall heterogeneity” (Kopytoff 1986, 
p. 70). That is, commoditization depends in marking a thing as available for trade, usually by 
associating it with a class of things (an “area of homogeneity”) marked as available for trade. 
This work of classification is identified here as a foundation of commoditization, and other 
research, discussed in the next section, supports this observation. 
Kopytoff goes on to explain that heterogeneous commodities can be traded against each other 
either in barter or by reference to an “exchange technology” that translates value equivalence; 
                                                          
4
 The term “commodification” is also used in the literature. E.g. Carvalho and Rodrigues (2008, p. 268) 
define commodification to mean “the process by which an object (in the widest sense of the term, 
meaning a thing, an idea, a creature, etc.) comes to be provided through, and/or represented in terms of, a 
market transaction”. In other words, commoditization and commodification mean the same thing; I use 
the first term. 
5
 In a third meaning from neoclassical economics, commodities refers to a subclass of primary goods (see 
Appadurai 1986a, p. 7), e.g. traded on commodities exchanges or the subject of commodity options. 
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money being an exchange technology that has promoted extensive commoditization (Kopytoff 
1986, p. 72). Kopytoff hypothesizes that “the exchange function of every economy appears to 
have a built-in force that drives the exchange system toward the greatest degree of 
commoditization that the exchange technology permits” (p. 87). In Kopytoff’s argument, 
commoditization in turn affects values: “If worth is given a price, the going market price will 
become the measure of worth” (p. 88). And yet we can observe significant mismatches between 
the exchange value (price at market) of some things and the intrinsic, non-monetized value 
placed on them by society or by an individual. Particularly in extended or remote production, 
exchange or market value may substantially diverge from intrinsic worth.  
Appadurai (1986a) provides a second insight important to this study: Because of the distance 
between producers and consumers in extended or remote production, “[c]ommodities represent 
very complex social forms and distributions of knowledge” (Appadurai 1986a, p. 41), first in 
the production of the commodity, and second in its consumption. “If we regard some 
commodities as having ‘life histories’ or ‘careers’ in a meaningful sense, then it becomes useful 
to look at the distribution of knowledge at various points in their careers” (p. 41). If there are 
gaps in knowledge (for example between the grower of a commodity agricultural product and 
the ultimate market and consumer), this is usually taken to result in the relative deprivation of 
the commodity producer (pp. 42-43). But as Appadurai acknowledges (p. 54), the “detachment, 
indifference, or ignorance of participants as regards all but a single aspect of the economic 
trajectory of the commodity” is characteristic of extended production.  
Instead of tracing a line from acts of guilty consumption to the hidden truth of exploited 
producers, some geographers have taken up anthropological preoccupations with 
symbols and meanings in order to emphasize the strategic interests and partial 
knowledges with which particular actors encounter and construct a commodity at 
different moments in its circulation. (Foster 2006, p. 286) 
Citing Geertz’s (1979) study of a Moroccan bazaar, Appadurai (1986a, p. 43) writes that that 
“bazaar-style information searches are likely to characterize any exchange setting where the 
quality and the appropriate valuation of goods are not standardized”. There are discontinuities in 
knowledge – problems regarding authenticity and lack of expertise. Knowledge is fragmented. 
In such a setting, informational entrepots develop. “[A]s commodities travel greater distances 
(institutional, spatial, temporal), knowledge about them tends to become partial, contradictory 
and differentiated” (Appadurai 1986a, p. 56). Spooner (1986) describes the commoditization of 
Oriental rugs, where processes of authentication are critical, as featuring specialized 
“mythologies” (Appadurai 1986a, p. 48) for participants at each point in an extended chain of 
production. “The carpet business involves not just the supply of carpets as in the case of other 
commodities, but also the supply of information about them” (Spooner 1986, p. 198). 
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The “distributions of knowledge” associated with particular commodities generate markets in 
criteria and derivative meta-commodities. This process is traced by Appadurai (1986a) with 
respect to commodities futures trading, where he observes that “the moment of prices becomes 
an autonomous substitute for the flow of commodities themselves”, involving a “double degree 
of removal from the social relations of production and exchange” (p. 50). He describes “an 
agonistic, obsessive and romantic ethos” at work in these “tournaments of value” whose 
“concern with commodities is purely informational and semiotic and is divorced from 
consumption” – commodities as signs (citing Baudrillard 1981) which can yield profit if 
“manipulated properly” (pp. 50-51):  
In complex capitalistic societies, it is not only the case that knowledge is segmented 
(even fragmented) as between producers, distributors, speculators, and consumers … . 
The fact is that knowledge about commodities is also itself increasingly commoditized. 
… [A] traffic in criteria concerning things develops. (Appadurai 1986a, p. 54) 
(emphasis in original) 
From the perspective of commoditization, demand is thus contingent, and produced. Appadurai 
(1986a, p. 55) writes that the “best example of the relationship between knowledge and control 
of demand is provided by advertising in contemporary capitalist societies.” The end of 
advertising is the fetishism of the consumer – an example of double inversion as object is 
reflexively defined by and defines the subject (Appadurai 1986a, p. 56). We can compare the 
targeted audiences of these fetishized images of an ideal or transformed consumer with cargo 
cults – social movements in Pacific Island communities that developed mythologies associated 
with Western goods – where there was “an attempt to ritually replicate what were perceived as 
the social modalities of European life” (Appadurai 1986a, p. 52): “Cargo beliefs are an extreme 
example of the theories that are likely to proliferate when consumers are kept completely 
ignorant of the conditions of production and distribution of commodities and are unable to gain 
access to them freely” (p. 53). But as Tilley (2006, p. 68) remarks, “[a]lmost all the things 
surrounding us in consumer societies are bought ready-made and their conditions of production 
are concealed from the consumer”. Perhaps cargo cult-like attitudes and dependencies on 
marketized criteria are difficult to avoid in a “buy instead of make” economy.  
Table 2.3 summarizes these key concepts from the theory of commoditization. In relation to this 
study, the first point below locates the problem of standardization of packaged software within a 
broader context of classification in commoditization – that is, standardization as marking out an 
“area of homogeneity” – and ties it to “product qualification”, a concept I discuss in the next 
section. In addition, the idea here that knowledge is distributed and fragmented in extended or 
remote production, giving rise to a knowledge network and the potential for markets in criteria 
and derivative meta-commodities, gives context to the problem of procurement of packaged 
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software and the role of intermediaries such as analysts in packaged software markets. These are 
themes I develop in the biography of CMS, and I will argue that they help explain the failure of 
CMS. 
 
Theory of commoditization key concepts 
Commoditization begins by marking out a group of things as homogeneous (in some sense standardized) 
and available for trade – i.e. classification 
Economies tend to the maximum amount of commoditization that exchange technologies will permit 
Values are contingent; market values may diverge from intrinsic value 
Commodities represent complex distributions of knowledge; knowledge in extended or remote production 
is fragmented – “partial, contradictory and differentiated” 
Distributions of knowledge generate markets in criteria and derived meta-commodities 
Demand is contingent, and produced 
Table 2.3 Theory of commoditization key concepts 
2.3.2 Classification in product qualification  
More recent studies of markets from economic sociology
6
 can be said to apply the 
commoditization perspective (see Callon 1998b; Carvalho and Rodrigues 2008) across a range 
of empirical settings. These studies, by attending to the artefacts and practices that make up real 
markets, show how products, markets and demand are co-created:
 
 
                                                          
6
 Pollock and Williams (2009b, 2010) distinguish between economic sociology, associated with Callon, 
and the sociology of finance, associated with Mackenzie. For purposes of this dissertation I refer to both 
of these as economic sociology. In the more general turn to materiality, Pinch and Swedberg (2008) claim 
that materiality brings together themes from STS and economic sociology, while STS and economic 
sociology complement material cultural studies (starting with Appadurai 1986a and exemplified by Miller 
1998, 2005). Pinch and Swedberg argue that even if technology is an integral part of the economy, it is 
the profit motive that drives economic development (p. 12). They also observe that while information 
technologies may appear to be “non-material”, “in reality this type of technology permits new forms of 
entanglements between people and objects and can crucially change the material circumstances whereby 
exchange of goods and knowledge and where things and ideas circulate” (p. 12). 
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The organized market cannot be reduced to a mere system of trade and transaction. It is 
also, above all, a process in which agents who design and produce goods enter into a 
competition to capture a demand which they help to (re)define. (Callon 1998b, p. 42) 
In this account, bringing products to market entails “product qualification”. That is, the product 
must be defined, described, given attributes, and stabilized through processes that are variously 
located in the workings of a knowledge network. “[T]he qualities of goods and services are the 
output of complex operations of qualification, of framing and reframing, of attachment and 
detachment” (Muniesa et al. 2007, p. 5). Callon et al. (2002) theorize this in terms of an 
“economy of qualities”, locating the qualification of goods “at the heart of economic 
competition and the organization of markets” through the “co-construction of supply and 
demand”. “[E]conomic agents, that is, the firm, but also the spokespersons of intermediaries and 
consumers, are explicitly defined as being involved in the strategic management of product 
qualification” (pp. 200-201). In the authors’ argument, the model of a market as a function of 
supply and demand makes invisible a complex collective effort that unfolds over time: 
The design of new products, their iterative qualification and then their (successful) 
commodification imply cooperation between multifarious agents and institutions 
(research organizations, financial operators, venture capital, firms, administrations, 
consultants, professional associations, lead users, etc.). This collective investigation, 
which places learning processes in the foreground, implies complex, changing and 
evolving partnerships necessitating specific modalities of intellectual property and 
contractual arrangements. … This exploration applies both to goods (and their 
qualification, Callon et al. 2002) and to the agents; it can be analysed as a process of co-
production of supply and demand. (Callon 2010, p. 166) 
Lepinay (2007b), in a detailed account of what is required to bring a financial product to market, 
argues that for products to circulate they must have a stable, homogeneous ontological status, 
guaranteed by a standard. Similarly, Caliskan and Callon (2010) say that “pacifying” a product 
– standardizing it and fixing its qualities – is a necessary step in its “marketization”. In 
Kopytoff’s (1986) conception of the “biography” of a commodity, it travels, is initially alien but 
is adopted or adapted locally, and bears traces of its past history. But for Thomas (1991) 
commoditization involves detachment of an object from its history – “the alienation of a thing is 
its dissociation from producers, former users, or prior contexts” (Thomas 1991, p. 39); applying 
this insight, Pollock and Williams observe that vendors try to “manage” the biographies of their 
products in order to “detach” the software from its origins and history (Pollock and Williams 
2009a, pp. 117-118) – decontextualization again, in a slightly different sense to mean the 
erasure of prior context. 
Poon’s (2007) history of consumer credit scoring describes what could be called product 
qualification of an information good, adopting Callon’s definition as “non-rival (able to be used 
simultaneously by multiple actors), non-appropriable (costly to own), and universal (widely 
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generalizable)” (Callon 2002, p. 292, cited by Poon 2007, p. 302), qualities that Callon, writing 
about knowledge, calls “The Holy Grails of modern economics”. Consumer credit scoring was 
originally carried out on a contract basis for particular clients. The industrialization of consumer 
credit scoring occurred after a retired executive suggested that what had previously been a 
custom service for particular companies “could be packaged as a solution [and] sold over and 
over again” (Poon 2007, p. 292). This conversion of a particularized service into a standardized 
product exemplifies product qualification: standardization, stabilization and decontextualization.  
 Kopytoff (1986) implicitly invoked classification as related to some degree or element of 
standardization when he spoke of carving out “areas of homogeneity”, and this process of 
carving out groups of similar things, or sorting into categories – classification – has been noted 
in several studies of markets from economic sociology. Sjögren and Helgesson (2007) 
investigated how the qualities of an exchanged good (in their case, medicines) are settled. The 
authors describe this in terms of “classification tools, standardization bodies, consumer 
organizations, advertising agencies, and so on”. “The performance of markets is observable 
through the classification or qualification work implied by the establishment of similarities and 
differences among objects to be exchanged (cf. [Callon et al. 2002]). Classification work, that is 
the work that must be done to qualify goods and agents, generally relies on a diversity of logics” 
(Sjögren and Helgesson 2007, p. 215), including devices such as standards and labels in which 
the logics are materialized as well as the relevant actors such as regulators and analysts. Preda 
(2007, p. 40), in his analysis of financial chartism (technical analysis of stocks), noted that stock 
analysts have historically been relied upon to confer legitimacy on securities brought to market 
by classifying them according to accepted categories. Millo (2007, pp. 197-198), in a study of 
index-based derivatives, characterizes classification in product qualification as emergent and 
potentially competitive, as different constituencies promote their respective visions of the 
product and its qualities. These authors explicitly relate the process of product qualification to a 
definitive work on classification, Bowker and Star (1999).  
Pollock and Williams (2010), in writing on the work of technology analyst firms such as 
Gartner as “promissory organizations”, also focus on classification: 
We see classification as a powerful way for industry analysts to shape innovation: they 
name technologies in a way that anticipates their trajectory of development, the 
particular shape they will take, the new players who will enter the market, and the 
demand for the technology, and so on. An important reason for our view of 
classification as a form of promissory work is that attempts to classify the 
characteristics of new technology markets often “fail”, as markets do not always emerge 
in the way anticipated. Technological classifications are similar to the “organizing 
visions” identified by Swanson and Ramiller (1997), in the sense that they are subject to 
varying levels of support and momentum. However, when classifications are successful, 
they often become something of an “infrastructure” (resources that sink into the 
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background and only become visible when they break down (Bowker and Star, 1999). 
(Pollock and Williams 2010, p. 533) 
In Pollock and Williams’s interpretation, classifications or categories created by Gartner 
constitute infrastructural knowledge in the IT marketplace, “promissory work made durable”, 
directly involved in the creation of expectations and the shaping of material realizations in 
accordance with those expectations. Pollock and Williams (2011) argue that, through 
“categorization work”, Gartner strongly influences, though does not ultimately determine, the 
shape of IT markets, as evidenced in Gartner’s involvement in the trajectories of ERP and 
CRM. 
We show how they make regular (but not always successful) “naming interventions” 
within the IT domain and how they attempt to regulate the boundaries that they and 
others have created through episodes of “categorisation work”. (Pollock and Williams 
2011, p. 194) 
In these studies, Pollock and Williams bring together research on organizing visions and 
product categories (Pollock and Williams 2011), and in this dissertation I take the view, which I 
develop further in Chapter 7, that for packaged software the product category is the market 
correlate of the organizing vision, i.e. a reification and location for material enactment in 
support of the organizing vision. Product qualification and, in particular, classification as an 
element of product qualification become relevant in this study when I analyse the workings of 
the knowledge network around the organizing vision and the role of generification in the 
biography of CMS, where a market did not “emerge in the way anticipated”.  
2.3.3 Performativity in markets 
In addition to drawing attention to the processes of product qualification, economic sociologists 
have developed the notion of performativity in markets. Callon (1998a, 1998b) is credited with 
introducing the notion of performativity into the study of markets (Cochoy et al. 2010; 
Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2008; Preda 2007). Callon’s original idea was that “economics does 
not describe an existing external ‘economy’, but brings that economy into being: economics 
performs the economy, creating the phenomena it describes” (MacKenzie and Millo 2003, p. 
108; see also MacKenzie et al. 2007b, p. 4). MacKenzie and Millo (2003) applied the 
performativity thesis in analysing the Black-Scholes option pricing formula, a model of 
valuation that became embedded in market practices and products.
7
  
Performativity was first conceived by J. L. Austin (1962) as a characteristic of certain types of 
utterances or speech acts which (put simply) do not purport to describe reality (thus having a 
                                                          
7
 MacKenzie’s earlier study of ballistic missile accuracy, Inventing Accuracy (1990), is probably an 
extremely strong case for the general performativity thesis. 
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quality of being either true or false, in the logician’s sense) but perform an action or create a 
reality. In his examples – a marriage ceremony, writing a will, making a bet or making a 
contract – words do something, and in this regard are, in his coined word, “performative” as 
opposed to “constative” (or descriptive). In How to Do Things With Words, Austin (1962) 
proceeds to examine his notion of the performative and to self-critically break it down. In the 
end he develops a theory of speech acts in which most utterances (or locutions, in his 
terminology) have a mix of performative and constative content and affect, and indeed all, or 
nearly all utterances are “illocutionary”, in that the speaker has some sort of performative intent 
– to undertake a commitment, to adjudicate, to influence, to inform and so forth. An illocution 
might achieve its intended result or instead, in the absence of “conditions of felicity”, it might 
“misfire”. At the end of Austin’s analysis, having rather thoroughly dismantled his original 
distinction between performative and constative, he goes on to preserve performativity as a 
special theory within a more general theory of speech acts.  
As MacKenzie et al. (2007b) and Cochoy et al. (2010) point out, it is Judith Butler who took the 
notion of performativity to a broader audience with her work on gender categories. Over time, 
Butler’s concept of performativity has evolved. In Gender Trouble (1990), Butler constructs a 
critique of the assumption of a pre-discursive gender in part by developing a notion that the 
gendered body is performative, in that words, acts and gestures (as in a theatrical performance) 
produce the effect of pre-discursive identity. If the root of Butler’s “performativity” was in the 
nature of theatrical performance, Butler’s concept was arguably in a complex relationship of 
discontinuity with Austin’s more technical formulation. In subsequent writings, Butler clarified 
this issue. In Bodies That Matter (1993), performativity was said by Butler to refer to 
“reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects it names” (p. xii). 
Butler asked (p. 176) whether there was a difference between performing gender (as in the 
theatre) and the performative use of discourse (statements that create what they purport to 
describe) – i.e. whether these were two different senses of performativity – but she resolved this 
by reference to her concept of citationality. Dispensing somewhat with the history and the 
nuances, Du Gay (2010) summarizes Butler’s version of performativity as pointing toward the 
contingent nature of categories that are reiterated in social performances – what I refer to in this 
dissertation as classification performativity. 
Read in this way, Butler’s version of performativity is related to, but not precisely the same as, 
Austin’s original concept. Their common ground would be the idea that statements (may) bring 
about what they purport to describe and thus are material in effect or bound up with materiality. 
But the context and emphasis is different. Austin began by looking at words – such as a contract 
– that by their expression, in the right circumstances, do things according to a rule or other 
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conventional understanding – in the case of a contract, creating a binding obligation with certain 
consequences following if not performed. This sort of performativity is overt, in that it makes an 
express reference to law or other convention. Butler, exploring the nature of gender in terms of 
performance in the production of identity, is dealing with a different sort of effect, in which 
citationality is hidden in order to endow the speaker with more power (Butler 1993, p. xxi) or to 
produce an effect of a priori existence of the constructed effect.  
Juxtaposing the two versions of performativity, it is easy to see that they might be distinguished, 
and, working within the domain of economics, MacKenzie has put forward an analytic 
decomposition of “performativity”. In 2004, MacKenzie distinguished between “generic” 
performativity, “according to which markets and other economic relations are not to be taken as 
given, but as performed by economic practices; and ‘Austinian’ performativity, in which 
economics brings into being the relationships it describes” (MacKenzie 2004, p. 303). The 
former MacKenzie characterizes as a “weak claim” but “empirically important”, whereas the 
second is stronger but may be “relatively rare” (and, as noted by Butler (2010), often depends 
upon some sort of background legal or quasi-legal structure). MacKenzie subsequently refined 
his analysis (MacKenzie 2006a). In the new model, “generic” performativity occurs when 
economic tools and models are used in the economy, “effective” performativity is a subset of 
generic performativity where there is an effect of this practical use on economic processes. 
Within effective performativity, there are two sub-categories: “Barnesian” performativity (from 
Barnes 1988), where “an aspect of economics is used in economic practice, its use has effects, 
and among those effects is to alter economic processes so as to make them more like their 
depiction by economics” (MacKenzie 2006a, p. 41) and counterperformativity, where “the use 
of an aspect of economics alter[s] economic processes so that they conform less well to their 
depiction by economics” (MacKenzie 2006a, p. 50). MacKenzie adopted “Barnesian” over 
“Austinian” to emphasize that the performativity he was describing was not purely a matter of 
linguistics, and noted that the “conditions of felicity” for illocutionary (including performative) 
acts are material in nature. I note that both Barnesian performativity and counterperformativity, 
which together make up only a subset of “effective” performativity, describe positive and 
negative feedback loops, respectively. 
In an interesting reading of MacKenzie (2004), Butler (2010) generalized and recast somewhat 
his originally distinction, taking his generic performativity to mean that social categories are not 
natural or given but instead repetitively performed or enacted by human and non-human agents 
(i.e. classification performativity), and “Austinian” performativity to refer to those instances 
where the speaking of words create a fact, as in Austin’s original examples. In other words, 
Butler seems to be roughly equating MacKenzie’s (2004) generic performativity to her version, 
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or at least her version as understood by others as something like classification performativity, as 
distinct from Austin’s original notion. I note this analytic decomposition of “performativity” 
because it is a word often used – and I will use it here – yet its precise meaning is somewhat 
unclear. In this dissertation I hope, by working through various performative assumptions and 
operations at work in the biography of CMS, to shed some further light on this issue. For 
example, the positive feedback loops that MacKenzie identified with Barnesian performativity 
are directly and intentionally enlisted in marketing, as described in the next paragraph. 
Returning now to performativity in markets, while Callon’s original thesis related to economics 
and economic models, he also locates performativity in other agencies of commerce such as 
accounting and marketing (Callon 1998b, p. 27; 2007, pp. 332-333, 336; see MacKenzie 2006a; 
Skærbæck and Tryggestad 2010; cf. Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2008, pp. 98-99), and Cochoy 
(1998) has characterized marketing as “performative knowledge and know-how for capitalism”. 
In a demonstration of this performative dimension of the economy, Cochoy (2010) describes 
how a trade publication, The Progressive Grocer, transformed the business of small grocers in 
America between 1929 and 1946. This magazine, he argues, constituted: 
…a new kind of text, distinct from economic theories and managerial textbooks. Instead 
of just putting words into its pages in the hope that they would ultimately shape the 
external reality, Progressive Grocer relies on a language that mixes what is said and 
what it does, signs and artifacts, reports of actual practices and dreamed states of 
commerce. (Cochoy 2010, p. 299) 
The Progressive Grocer was intended to bring new marketing ideas to small grocers – and not 
incidentally to create a market for itself. A cartoon from the magazine – showing a grocer 
reading a book called “How to Build Displays that Sell” – illustrates a promise that 
merchandising know-how could delegate the act of selling to material things, namely the selling 
displays. Cochoy argues that a trade press journal like The Progressive Grocer is “precisely 
oriented at doing things with words, at building displays that sell” (p. 303), and describes 
various communications tools employed, including scale models, testimonies and photo novels 
(captioned photographs that tell a story). That is, in this case, performativity is an intentional 
strategy, or model, for turning imaginings and expectations into products and markets, and the 
belief in its efficacy as a model is itself performative. 
Pollock and Williams have noted a somewhat different type of performativity in the effect on 
the IT marketplace of Gartner’s Magic Quadrant, a two-by-two matrix that “compares and sorts 
vendors according to a number of more or less intangible properties (such as vendor 
‘competence’ and ‘vision’)” (Pollock and Williams 2009b). As they see it, while the Magic 
Quadrant purports to describe the relative positions of products and vendors, reflecting back to 
the market “networked reputation” or “community knowledge”, the Magic Quadrant and its 
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associated category, also created by Gartner as described in the preceding section, in fact have a 
role in shaping the IT marketplace. Pollock and Williams (2010) characterize Gartner and other 
analyst firms as “promissory organizations”, setting expectations that have a constitutive or 
performative role in technology markets. In other words, Pollock and Williams have located 
performativity in the analyst role in technology markets, incorporating classification 
performativity in relation to product categories. Here too, performativity links expectations and 
realizations, a theme highly relevant to the case of CMS. 
2.3.4 Breakdown of performative operations as a lens on market failure 
But while performativity is powerful, it is not all-powerful. From the beginning, the theory of 
performativity has addressed the situation where the intended effect of a performative statement 
failed to occur. In Austin’s parlance, this was called a misfire, and it occurred when the 
“conditions of felicity” for performative effectiveness were not present – for example, a contract 
might be signed but be invalid in the jurisdiction of performance. Callon has equated “misfire” 
to his notion of “overflowing” of a “frame” (Callon 2010, p. 164). Callon hypothesized his 
version of a performative statement or model as a “frame”, with an emphasis on classification 
and a link to product qualification:  
Framing is an operation used to define agents (an individual or a group of person) who 
are clearly distinct and dissociated from one another. It also allows for the definition of 
objects, goods and merchandise which are perfectly identifiable and can be separated 
not only from other goods, but also from the actors involved, for example in their 
conception, production, circulation or use. It is owing to this framing that the market 
can exist and that distinct agents and distinct goods can be brought into play. (Callon 
1998b, p. 17) 
“Overflowing” occurs when a modelled phenomenon escapes the boundaries of its framing 
model and is attributable to the residual and latent attachments from within the frame to what it 
excludes, “the omnipresence of connections with the outside world” (Callon 1998b, 1998c). 
This overflowing is “irrepressible and productive” (Callon 1998c, p. 250); for example, in e-
commerce, Licoppe (2008) observes, there is a regular “overflowing of the electronic 
transaction frame”. D’Adderio (2008) invokes performativity, framing and overflowing, in her 
analysis of artefacts and distributed agencies in an “engineering freeze” process at an 
automotive manufacturer. She considers at one extreme of performativity the “framing view”, 
“prescription” or act by fiat, and illustrates this by reference to the operation of computer code.  
At the other extreme, there is the full demise, rejection or disuse of a model or tool. 
This case corresponds to the ‘overflowing view’: the influence of the model is so weak 
that it is bypassed, worked around or outright rejected and therefore is not enacted in 
practice. One way to explain the demise of a tool of course is that individual agents 
have made the conscious choice to reject the model. Performativity theory, however, 
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while not denying this possibility, affords us a more interesting explanation: the model 
as statement has not been able to put into motion a world in which it can function. 
(D’Adderio 2008, p. 776) (emphasis added) 
In Bodies That Matter, Butler characterized performativity, based on citationality, as a kind of 
“construction”, but said that the limits of this constructivism were exposed at the boundary 
(Butler 1993, p. 5). In 2010, she suggested that “performative breakdown” – “when the effects 
of a performative operation fail to work” (Butler 2010, p. 150) – both reveals the performative 
operation and delineates the outer boundaries of its efficacy, marking an important limitation on 
an otherwise unlimited and “sovereign” performativity. Her example is the recent financial 
crisis as a breakdown of performativity in financial markets, a performativity that:  
… seek[s] to derive endless possibilities from limited resources. ... The ideal of a 
speculation that can only increase possibilities for profit but never break down in the 
face of an external limit is surely one that has produced some financial catastrophes in 
recent months. The present recession in some ways highlights this failure at the heart of 
financial performativity. (Butler 2010, p. 153) 
MacKenzie (2004) provides another example in the stock market crash of 1987, which “made 
the performed nature of economic relations evident by disrupting the performance”. 
MacKenzie’s (2006a) counterperformativity (characterized as a type of overflowing by Callon 
2007, p. 323) might be said to be a particularly eloquent case of breakdown, as it reveals an 
assumption of the performative program, that, by virtue of the performative enactment, is made 
false.  
In her consideration of the breakdown of performativity, Butler posits a real world that asserts 
itself by setting outer limits on human instrumental performativity, bringing things literally back 
down to earth. In this study I take up the suggestion that breakdown is revealing to develop it as 
an analytical device. For this purpose, I define breakdown as the the failure of expectations 
associated with a performative assumption or operation, and develop my biography of CMS 
around the evidence of breakdown toward identifying the performative assumptions and 
operations normally at work in the making of a packaged software market that did not work in 
this case. In Chapter 4, I develop this further, setting up a table of breakdown to organize my 
findings (in Chapters 5 and 6) and my analysis (in Chapter 7). 
2.4 Summary: developing a market perspective on packaged software  
Packaged software is an important phenomenon but has been under-researched. In particular, 
researchers have not explored packaged software, or the failure of packaged software, from a 
market perspective. Existing research tends to analyse packaged software failure as either a 
general phenomenon of “commoditization” (where a product becomes generic and widely 
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available) or an instance of organizational misfit, which has been the subject of many so-called 
implementation studies of ERP. Neither of these approaches brings a market perspective to the 
understanding of why one packaged software product might succeed while another one might 
fail, and thus neither promises a complete explanation for the failure of CMS. I have instead 
adopted Pollock and Williams’s (2009a) biography of software approach in order to 
accommodate a market perspective. According to Pollock and Williams, and consistent with 
other studies of technology production, making a packaged software market requires a 
knowledge network in support of an organizing vision, together with a successful program of 
generification. Pollock and Williams’s biography of ERP by negative implication suggests that 
CMS may have failed because of a failure in mobilizing a knowledge network around an 
organizing vision or because of a failure in generification. 
 
Pollock and Williams do not insist on the adoption of a particular theory for a biography of 
software, but they advocate the use of theory, appropriate for the inquiry at hand, to provide 
critical insight. For this study, I am looking to the theory of commoditization and studies of 
markets from economic sociology to complement the biography of software approach, in order 
to develop the market perspective on packaged software, to support the generalization of my 
findings and analysis, and for their contribution of key ideas relevant to this study: the workings 
of a knowledge network in extended or remote production; product qualification, in particular 
classification, in the creation of products and markets; and performativity in markets. The 
literature on performativity suggests breakdown of performativity as an analytical device for 
this study of market failure, a suggestion I take up again in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 3 Literature review: ICT, contract and knowledge in the networked economy 
In this chapter, I survey literature relating to the second research question: “To what extent did 
the market failure relate to contract? What are the implications for ICT, contract and knowledge 
in the networked economy?” There are several streams of empirical research regarding ICT, 
contract and knowledge, though not under that name, in IS and organizations studies and in the 
critical accounting literature, which I discuss in section 3.3. Because a significant amount of that 
research takes transaction cost economics (TCE) as a touchstone, I begin, in section 3.1, with a 
discussion of TCE, and, to further set the stage for the research review in section 3.3, in section 
3.2 I briefly survey alternative theories of contract.  
In section 3.1.1, I briefly describe transaction cost economics and its theory of contract, in 
particular its model of two principal contrasting modes of governance or coordination (markets 
and hierarchies). Following the logic of TCE, the electronic markets hypothesis (EMH) assumes 
that ICT promotes contracting, and a corresponding de-verticalization (section 3.1.2). I relate 
this concept to the ongoing digital transformation of the organization described by Kallinikos 
(2006) (section 3.1.3) and to recent developments in contracting (section 3.1.4). 
Notwithstanding TCE’s significant influence, and many developments that seem consistent with 
TCE, over time TCE has been qualified by its proponents in order to address potential 
anomalies, and questions have been raised about its completeness and explanatory power 
(section 3.1.5). In section 3.2, I briefly discuss alternative theories of contract (contract as legal 
construct (section 3.2.1); relational contract (section 3.2.2); contract as social and technological 
artefact (section 3.2.3); contracting as a knowledge competence (section 3.2.4); and networks as 
connected contracts (section 3.2.5)), summing up in section 3.2.6.  
In section 3.3, I describe empirical studies of ICT, contract and knowledge, first revisiting the 
electronic markets hypothesis (EMH) through empirical studies of ICT-supported contracting 
and IT contracting (section 3.3.1), then reviewing research regarding ICT as related to 
governance (markets and hierarchies) (section 3.3.2), and lastly specifying the problem of 
organizational contracting knowledge by reference to the literature (section 3.3.3). This 
literature review indicates that knowledge is an important aspect of contracting and documents 
the extensive use of ICT in relation to inter-organizational knowledge, but points to the lack of 
an organizing technology for contract inside the firm – framing the opportunity and the 
challenge for CMS. 
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3.1 Transaction cost economics and its theory of contract as related to this study  
The empirical research regarding ICT, contract and knowledge discussed in section 3.3 is often 
framed in reference to transaction cost economics (TCE), in some cases rationalizing the 
research findings under TCE constructs and in other cases arguing that TCE does not provide a 
sufficient explanatory framework for the findings (cf. Lacity et al. 2011). To set the stage for a 
review of this research, in this section I briefly summarize key aspects of transaction cost 
economics as related to this study, specifically noting its theory of contract and the electronic 
markets hypothesis (EMH) (Malone et al. 1987; Mithas et al. 2008). I will return to EMH in my 
analysis of CMS and its organizing vision in Chapter 7. 
3.1.1 Transaction cost economics and its theory of contract 
Transaction cost economics (Coase 1937, 1960, 1988; Williamson 1979, 1988, 1991, 2005a, 
2005b, 2010) is a theory of the firm according to which transaction costs, including the cost of 
contracting, determine or strongly influence whether a production activity is inside or outside 
the firm. That is, the boundary of a firm is determined by an efficiency-optimizing function that 
minimizes the sum of production costs and transaction costs (Anderson et al. 2000; Madhok 
2002; Williamson 1979), with the transaction the basic unit of analysis (Williamson 1991). Put 
another way, transaction costs are a constraint on contracting, which would otherwise always 
locate production with the lowest cost provider, and firms arise where contracting is not 
efficient. 
Hart (1995) has proposed as a complement to TCE the notion of “incomplete contract”, the idea 
that contracts are always to some degree incomplete because transaction costs make it 
impossible to provide in advance for all conceivable eventualities (see also Williamson 1988).  
The basic idea is that firms arise in situations where people cannot write good contracts 
and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. … In an ideal 
world, … [we] would write a binding contract that laid down each person’s obligations 
in every conceivable eventuality and imposed large penalties if anybody failed to live 
up to them.  [in a footnote: In an even more ideal world, we would not need a contract 
at all, since we could simply trust each other and rely on everyone behaving fairly]. 
(Hart 1995, p. 1) 
TCE is not only a theory of the firm, it is a theory of contract. In TCE, contract is considered 
“bilateral private ordering” (Williamson 2005b), and Callon cites Coase for the idea that 
bilateral contract can be used as a device for sorting out any issues, provided property rights are 
clear and transaction costs are nil. “Negotiation and the drawing up of contracts: these are the 
methods of co-ordination that [Coase] holds up as the ultimate foundation stones of 
civilization.” (Callon 1998c, p. 265) Contracts are classified according to a model of governance 
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in which “[t]ransaction costs are economized by assigning transactions (which differ in their 
attributes) to governance structures (the adaptive capacities and associated costs of which differ) 
in a discriminating way” (Williamson 1988, pp. 164-165). In TCE there are two principal 
contrasting modes of governance: markets (inter-firm transactions governed by contract and 
coordinated through the price mechanism mediating supply and demand) and hierarchies (intra-
firm governance coordinated through managerial control, incorporating norms, standards, goals, 
measurements and reports) (Caglio and Ditillo 2008; Williamson 1979, 1991). From this view 
on contract, we might expect contract-related ICT to vary according to contract governance 
type. Indeed this has been the subject of study, as further discussed in section 3.3, and, in 
Chapter 4, I develop a hypothesis that adoption of CMS was associated with market contracting.  
3.1.2 The electronic markets hypothesis  
Contract also figures in TCE as a cost variable in TCE’s efficiency-optimizing function. If 
contracting costs go down because of ICT, TCE predicts that contracting, relative to hierarchical 
governance within the firm, should go up. This leads to de-verticalization, i.e. activities once 
performed within an organization due to transaction costs are instead contracted out to lower 
cost providers. This was spelled out by Malone et al. (1987), who predicted that “by reducing 
the costs of coordination, information technology will lead to an overall shift toward 
proportionately more use of markets – rather than hierarchies – to coordinate economic activity” 
(p. 484), referring back by analogy to the growth of markets that followed on development of an 
earlier information technology, telegraphy.  
This is the “electronic markets hypothesis” (EMH) (Mithas et al. 2008), and it can be 
simplistically stated as an assumption that ICT promotes contracting.
8
 This assumption is 
evident in other speculations about the impact of ICT on the economy. For example, in his 2003 
book The New Financial Order, Robert Shiller envisioned a “smart computer network” that 
would keep track of [individuals’] contracts “so that the system ensures that contracts do not 
conflict with one another. … [such a network] will make possible more effective and more 
extensive contracts” (Shiller 2003, p. 81). Ciborra (2007), in part commenting on Shiller’s book, 
describes “contract-enabling” “grid technologies”, where “buy” crowds out “make”, and risk is 
optimally dispersed in a more perfect market. Van Heck and Vervest’s (2007) “smart network” 
is an ICT platform that supports the rapid formation of networks for trading of goods and 
services, including goods and services that are relatively complex and bundled.  
 
                                                          
8
 On this point, perhaps Kopytoff (1986) would be in accord: if ICT can be considered an exchange 
technology or as supporting the creation of exchange technologies, then ICT can be expected to promote 
commoditization. 
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3.1.3 Relating the electronic markets hypothesis to the digital transformation of the organization 
An ICT-enabled networked economy offering complex goods and services is directly reciprocal 
to ICT-propelled developments taking place inside organizations, as described by Kallinikos 
(2006). He observes the transformation of organizational operations into “computational 
objects” and the construction of a “computational rendition of reality” (pp. 2, 6), generating a 
kind of digitized version of the organization. This transformation occurs through a program of 
functional simplification and closure (Kallinikos 2005, 2006 p. 22, citing systems theorist 
Niklas Luhmann 1993). Functional simplification demarcates an “operational domain within 
which the complexity of the world is reconstructed as a simplified set of causal or instrumental 
relations”, becoming “inspectable and controllable” (Kallinikos 2005). Next, the principle of 
closure is applied to set boundaries that serve as a “protective cocoon…around the selected 
causal sequences or processes to safeguard undesired interference and ensure their recurrent 
unfolding” (Kallinikos 2005). As processes within organizations become more defined, 
bounded and enclosed (encapsulated, in the terminology of object-oriented design (Gamma et 
al. 1994, p. 11; cf. Langois 2006), lifted out of and stripped of relational context, they become 
transportable, remotely operable, and replicable. The resulting well-defined and circumscribed 
activities can be re-placed outside the organization.  
A related phenomenon is the general shift, described in Kallinikos (2006), in the form and 
function of the firm, away from the aggregation and control of physical resources toward the 
collection of and mastery over relationships and intangible rights. The disaggregated or 
disembodied organization described by Kallinikos can perhaps be thought of a “distributed 
organization”.9 Other researchers have considered this phenomenon in terms of an “algorithmic 
service transformation”: 
[This] is the digital or algorithmic transformation. Service activities themselves are 
changed when they can be converted into formalizable, codifiable, computable 
processes with clearly defined rules for their execution. This is an algorithmic service 
transformation facilitated by IT tools. Much of the service innovation then is around the 
adoption and effective implementation of IT tools. Certainly business processes from 
finance and accounting through to customer support and CRM are altered when they 
can be treated as matters of information and data management. Routine and manual 
functions are automated, and fundamental reorganization of activities is enabled. 
Likewise, sensors and sensor-based networks change many personal services. Then, as 
service activities are conducted by and with IT tools, the worker skills required change 
                                                          
9
 This is not necessarily a new phenomenon. Wendling (2009, p. 185) quotes Marx’s observations on 
Babbage regarding the ability of the machine to promote the division of labour, including over long 
distances: “the spinner can live in England while the weaver resides in the East Indies…. Thanks to the 
application of machinery and steam, the division of labour was able to assume such dimensions that large-
scale industry, detached from the national soil, depends entirely on the world market, on international 
exchange, and on an international division of labour.”  
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as well. And of course, as information moves, many activities that were previously 
tightly linked to particular places can be moved. (Zysman 2006, p. 48) 
The program of functional simplification and closure, or “algorithmic service transformation”, 
whereby processes are codified and become transportable, is premised on decontextualization in 
yet a third slightly different sense, meaning removal and re-location from a specific time and 
place. I will revert to this emerging theme of decontextualization in Chapter 8.  
3.1.4 Relating the electronic markets hypothesis to recent developments in contracting  
Recent developments in contracting seem consistent with the idea that that ICT promotes 
contracting and a corresponding de-verticalization. For example, supply chain management 
more tightly binds suppliers into the buyer’s production processes while reducing the buyer’s 
need to invest in buffer inventories. Associated with “lean” or “just-in-time” production (see 
Teubner and Collins 2011), it is the subject of numerous operations and information systems 
research studies (e.g. He et al. 2011; Hüner et al. 2011; Malhotra et al. 2005; Nissen and 
Sengupta 2006; Rai et al. 2006; Subramani 2004), and just one expression of a general focus on 
upstream costs and procurement strategies. For example, in a reverse auction, suppliers bid 
against a set of specifications provided by the buyer (Amelinckx et al. 2007; Bellosta et al. 
2011; Charki et al. 2011; Gatticker et al. 2006; Gumussoy and Calisir 2009; Hawkins et al. 
2009; Mithas et al. 2008; Ray et al. 2011). In outsourcing, an outside supplier contracts to 
perform business processes formerly carried on within the organization (Lacity and Willcocks 
2012; Willcocks et al. 2011; Willcocks and Lacity 2006). Customer relations, human resources, 
logistics, “business processes” generally, and even, in a step in regression toward total 
virtualization, procurement (cf. Lacity et al. 2006 on indirect procurement) can be outsourced. 
IT outsourcing has been particularly important as an industry and as a subject of IS research 
(e.g. Gefen et al. 2008; Goo et al. 2009; Lacity et al. 2009; Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity and 
Willcocks 2012; Levina and Ross 2003). (A related phenomenon, offshoring, means moving 
activities to a foreign (usually lower labour cost) location, but still within the organization 
(Leonardi and Bailey 2008; Levina and Vaast 2008; Olsson et al. 2008; Ramasubbu et al. 2008; 
Vlaar et al. 2008).) In cloud computing, an organization’s computer operations and data stores 
are relocated to an outside supplier, relying on the internet or other telecommunication network 
for access (Armbrust et al. 2010; Willcocks et al. 2012). Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) or 
software on-demand are other models that shift computing capabilities outside the organization 
(Campbell-Kelly and Garcia Swartz 2008). 
Service innovation (e.g. Chesbrough and Spohrer 2006; Grönroos and Ravald 2011; Maglio and 
Spoher 2008; Zysman 2006) is a more general formulation of the proposition that the networked 
economy enables the re-placement of organizational activities, in this case cast as services. 
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Barrett and Davidson (2008) describe the development of the global service economy, and 
Vargo and Lusch (2004, 2008) say that new paradigms are needed for understanding trade in 
services – revolving around relationships and value creation – as fundamentally different from 
trade in goods. As stated by Maglio and Spohrer: 
Service is the application of competences for the benefit of another (Vargo and Lusch 
2004). Service depends on division of labor and effective co-creation of value, leading 
to complementary specialization and comparative advantage among participants 
(Normann 2001). Before the development of globe-spanning trade and technology 
networks, service was usually performed in close contact with a client. Today, the more 
knowledge-intensive and customized the service, the more it depends on client 
participation and input, whether through clients providing labor, property, or 
information via organizational or technological value chains (Sampson and Froehle 
2006). Following this logic, we define service systems as value-co-creation 
configurations of people, technology, value propositions connecting internal and 
external service systems, and shared information (e.g., language, laws, measures, and 
methods; Spohrer et al. 2007). The smallest service system centers on an individual as 
he or she interacts with others, and the largest service system comprises the global 
economy. Cities, city departments, businesses, business departments, nations, and 
government agencies are all service systems. Every service system is both a provider 
and client of service that is connected by value propositions in value chains, value 
networks, or value-creating systems … . (Maglio and Spohrer 2008, p.18, emphasis 
added) 
Using different vocabulary and combining several of these models, Davenport has described 
“the coming commoditization of processes”:  
[A] new world is coming, and it will lead to dramatic changes in the shape and structure 
of corporations. A broad set of process standards will soon make it easy to determine 
whether a business capability can be improved by outsourcing it. Such standards will 
also help businesses compare service providers and evaluate the costs versus the 
benefits of outsourcing. Eventually these costs and benefits will be so visible to buyers 
that outsourced processes will become a commodity, and prices will drop significantly. 
The low costs and low risk of outsourcing will accelerate the flow of jobs offshore, 
force companies to reassess their strategies, and change the basis of competition. These 
changes are already happening in some process domains, and there are many indications 
that they will spread across virtually all performed processes. (Davenport 2005, p. 102) 
Adopting but slightly modifying Davenport’s terminology, I use “process commoditization” to 
refer to the conversion of organizational processes into products, following a program of 
functional simplification and closure, or decontextualization. An example, already discussed, 
from the pre-digital era is the evolution of consumer credit underwriting to an outsourced 
service and then an information good in the form of consumer credit scores (Poon 2007).  
Together these contracting models cover a broad range of organizational activities, and there are 
significant differences among them. What these concepts share is a logic of “buy” over “make” 
in the networked economy, consistent with TCE and EMH. 
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3.1.5 Transaction cost economics: qualifications and criticisms 
Transaction cost economics has been very influential (Coase 1988; Lacity et al. 2011; Lacity 
and Willcocks 1995; Williamson 2005a, 2010). It seems to be reflected in speculations about 
the impact of ICT on the economy (as discussed in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3) and borne out by 
recent developments in contracting (as discussed in section 3.1.4). As a model, its 
performativity is evidenced in the buy-versus-build analytical framework for procurement (a 
kind of “material mediator”; cf. MacKenzie 2006a).  
Nevertheless, both Coase and Williamson have acknowledged that there are many contractual 
relationships that cannot be accounted for by the basic efficiency-optimizing function of TCE, 
and TCE has been qualified in several important respects over time. Coase characterized long-
term contracts where the buyer is in control as effectively firms (Coase 1937), a theme he 
returned to in a discussion of long-term contracting in the US auto industry (Coase 1988). 
Williamson has identified various dimensions of transactions that might require hierarchical 
governance, including uncertainty, frequency, asset specificity, contract incompleteness, and 
“outlier disturbances” (Williamson 1979, 2010). Of these, the concept of asset specificity 
constitutes a major qualification to the efficiency-optimizing function central to TCE.
10
 Over 
time, asset specificity seems to have become a broad concept: it can take “physical, human, site 
specific, dedicated, brand name capital, and episodic (or temporal) forms”, and where there is 
high asset specificity and contract incompleteness, there will be a pressure toward “unified 
ownership and coordinated adaptations as implemented by hierarchies” (Williamson 2010, p. 
220).  
As another qualification, Williamson has acknowledged that there is an intermediate or “hybrid” 
mode of governance between markets and hierarchies, and this is now accepted as part of the 
TCE framework (Williamson 1979, 1991, 2010).
11
 To compare, Richardson (1972) proposed 
three modes of governance: market, direction (corresponding to hierarchy), and coordination, 
noting the multiple entanglements he had observed among firms, including joint ventures, 
technical agreements, subcontracts, trading in conjunction with production planning, “reliance” 
(such as Marks & Spencer’s relationship with suppliers), and technology pooling or transfer. In 
his view, the multiplicity of such arrangements suggested an alternative theory of the firm based 
                                                          
10
 Asset specificity is a characteristic of a transaction for goods or services that are valuable to the buyer 
but not to others. For example, the purchase of a specialized machine that can be used in one factory but 
not in any other factory features high asset specificity. 
11
 If hierarchical governance is by definition internal to the firm, then contracts might be either market or 
hybrid, in terms of the governance dimension; if hierarchy is a mode of governance, whether internal or 
external to the firm, contracts might be hierarchical, market or hybrid, in terms of the governance 
dimension. (Usage of the term hierarchy varies on this point.) In this dissertation I consider contract as 
potentially falling into any of the three types of governance. 
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on the notion of “complementariness”, taking into account scale economies, capabilities and 
knowledge as relevant factors. Richardson reconciled his analysis to Coase (1937) by saying 
that it could be characterized as an elaboration on “costs”, but he also cautioned that, in his 
view, a theory of the firm should not try to do too much. And there have been many questions 
raised about TCE’s completeness and explanatory power.12  
Even Williamson [1988] recognized the limitations inhering in TCE, concluding that 
‘‘few economists would insist on an unrelieved efficiency theory of economic 
organization,’’ and called for an enlarged perspective to fully grasp organizational 
design issues. (Covaleski et al. 2003, p. 421) 
Coase has acknowledged that TCE seems to focus on the buy-side only (a point I will come 
back to in Chapter 7):  
[T]he way in which I presented my ideas has, I believe, led to or encouraged an undue 
emphasis on the role of the firm as purchaser of the services of factors of production 
and on the choice of the contractual arrangements which it makes with them. As a 
consequence of this concentration on the firm as a purchaser of the inputs it uses, 
economists have tended to neglect the main activity of a firm, running a business. 
(Coase 1988, p. 38) 
 Granovetter (1985) challenged Williamson directly on a number of grounds. He questioned 
TCE’s simplifying model of an atomistic firm engaging in a-historic, anonymous transactions, 
which does not account for many observable business phenomena such as trade associations, 
interlocking directorates, relational contracting (see section 3.2.2), repeat purchasing, 
“Japanese” business practices, or sub-contracting, which he characterizes as a quasi-firm. He 
also asked who or what was the agent of the TCE efficiency optimization function – was it an 
inherent self-executing function of the economy, or instead executed by intelligent agents 
located in firms or proto-firms? Granovetter (1995) later noted that firms aggregate themselves 
into “business groups” and noted “the curious conjunction of empirical importance and 
analytical invisibility of business groups”. 
To summarize, from the beginning Coase noted that TCE did not account for long-term 
contracts, and asset specificity constitutes a major elaboration of the TCE explanatory 
framework. A “hybrid” mode of governance (between markets and hierarchies) has been 
identified, and some have raised more fundamental questions about the assumptions underlying 
                                                          
12
 In a footnote, Fischer (1977, p. 322) noted that TCE has been criticized as being tautological, by virtue 
of the potentially expandable notion of costs. “Transaction costs have a well-deserved bad name as a 
theoretical device, because solutions to problems involving transaction costs are often sensitive to the 
assumed form of the costs, and because there is a suspicion that almost anything can be rationalized by 
invoking suitably specified transaction costs.” Williamson (1988) considered this concern mitigated by 
assigning transactions, according to their attributes, to governance structures “in a discriminating way”. 
Perhaps the perceived limitations of TCE might be seen as a function of its origin, where Coase proposed 
transaction costs as an important corrective qualification to price as the (sole) organizing mechanism of 
the economy; i.e. transaction costs are the costs of using the price mechanism.  
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TCE and the TCE program, with possible negative implications for EMH and for TCE’s 
somewhat abstracted and unidimensional theory of contract. Before going on to consider 
research on the subject of ICT, contract and knowledge in section 3.3, I survey alternative 
theories of contract that are not so narrowly derived from or attached to an economic theory, 
starting with the foundational theory of contract as legal construct.  
3.2 Alternative theories of contract 
3.2.1 Contract as legal construct 
Contract as legal construct refers to an agreement, enforceable under law, involving mutual 
commitments among two or more parties (legal entities, including organizations and persons). 
“The factor which distinguishes contractual from other legal obligations is that they are based 
on the agreement of the contracting parties.” (Peel 2011, p. 1) The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts defines a contract as “a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law 
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.” 
(American Law Institute, 1981, section 1) 
The purpose of contract as legal construct is to put the weight of legal recognition and 
enforcement behind private agreements when the parties to those agreements intend to be 
bound. Subject to limitations related to the public interest, to prohibitions against fraud or other 
improprieties associated with the making of a purported contract, and to other exceptions and 
qualifications that have developed over time (Peel 2011, pp. 1-7), the law does not prescribe, 
proscribe or set limits on the terms of contract that persons, natural or legal, can enter into. That 
is, contract is deliberately emptied of content and abstracted in order to provide maximum 
freedom of contract.  
Enforceability of contract in the event of breach generally follows one of three routes (see 
generally Collins 2003, chapters 16 and 17): the award of damages, making the injured party 
whole for losses incurred as a result of the breach; compulsory or specific performance, in 
which the party in breach is ordered to perform according to the terms of the contract; and 
enforcement against security or collateral provided to support performance. The third type of 
enforcement action has been particularly implicated in the recent financial crisis; an example is 
discussed in section 3.3.3.  
3.2.2 Relational contract 
Of course enforcement of contract is only a single dimension of contract as enacted in 
commerce. It is relatively rare in the course of business to take a contractual dispute to court for 
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enforcement or interpretation. Trade is nearly always undertaken within a non-abstract, 
relational context, and a number of scholars have explored this aspect of contract. The notion of 
“relational contract” is based on the premise that every transaction is embedded in a 
relationship, and that effective analysis of any transaction requires consideration of the 
relational elements (Macneil 1985; 2003).
13
 As Campbell and Collins (2003, p. 25) say, 
“implicit dimensions of contract” concern “the presence of trust, implicit understandings and 
shared conventions established by trade practice”. Macauley (2003) notes that it can even be the 
case that the “the paper deal will not reflect the real deal: a writing can be inconsistent with the 
actual expectations of the parties” (p. 51). Bernstein (1992, 1996), in studies of diamond 
merchants and grain traders, has documented the significant gap between contracting as 
practiced on the one hand and both contract documents and contract as understood in law on the 
other.
14
 In focusing on the relationality of contract, these scholars distinguish between the 
abstraction of the legal concept of contract and the practice of contract within a contracting 
community. In so doing, they de-emphasize the centrality of the contract document. 
3.2.3 Contract as social and technological artefact  
Mark Suchman (2003), in his study of contracting in Silicon Valley, provides a third perspective 
where the contract document takes a leading role. Suchman takes the position that studies of 
contract have focused on “contract-as-doctrine” or “contract-as-relation”, but generally neglect 
“contract-as-artifact”. From his study of business lawyers working on transactions, he observes 
that contract documentation practices feature technology dynamics such as innovation, 
stabilization, diffusion, and path dependence, transcending any particular transaction. He argues 
that these contracts are social artefacts which work as “dynamic components of macro-technical 
                                                          
13
 Hugh Collins writes: “In … relational contracts, one will find some or all of the following features: 
governance mechanisms to manage adaptations, dispute resolution mechanisms, heightened duties of co-
operation such as duties to perform in good faith, ongoing duties of disclosure of information, including 
technical and confidential knowledge, ongoing monitoring of performance including frequent meetings to 
assess progress, complex allocations of risk between the parties, and incentive systems that redistribute 
the residual profit between the parties.” (Teubner and Collins 2001, p. 8) 
14
 Bernstein (1992, 1996) carried out several in-depth empirical studies that contrast contracting as 
understood and carried out by business people to the (intentionally) de-contextualized legal abstraction. In 
the case of diamond merchants, she found an industry that had opted out of the background legal system 
and in effect created a system of private law. In that system, contracts become binding with a handshake 
accompanied by the words “mazel u broche”, though Bernstein noted that younger traders had started to 
memorialize contracts in a writing. She further described a shift toward an IT-based contractual regime as 
the trading community extended beyond its traditionally Jewish base to include people of multiple 
ethnicities in many parts of the world. In her study of grain and feed merchants, Bernstein distinguished 
between relationship-preserving and end-game norms (citing Macauley 1963) and found that “even when 
[relationship-preserving norms] are clear and well-developed, they may be quite different from the terms 
of transactors’ written contracts, which contain the norms that transactors would want a third-party 
neutral to apply in a situation where they were unable to cooperatively resolve a dispute and viewed their 
relationship as being at an end-game stage” (Bernstein 1996, p. 1796). In this contracting community, the 
contract document served as a kind of precautionary risk technology (see Suchman 2003, p. 107), part of 
transacting business but only a part. 
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industrial regimes, rather than isolated products of microtechnical engineering decisions” 
(Suchman 2003, p. 125), and he resists the characterization of lawyers as “transaction cost 
engineers”. 
3.2.4 Contracting as a knowledge competence 
The resource-based or knowledge-based theory of the firm puts a premium on a firm’s routines 
and knowledge (Alavi and Leidner 2001; Nonaka 1994; Nonaka and von Krogh 2009). From 
this perspective, contracting is a knowledge practice for mobilizing extra-organizational 
resources toward organizational goals, particularly important in turbulent environments 
(Madhok 2002, pp. 542-543). Argyres and Mayer (2007), incorporating both transaction cost 
and knowledge perspectives, characterize contracting competence as a differentiating capability 
for organizations, and Vanneste and Puranam (2010) trace the process of learning in complex 
contracting. As noted in Chapter 1, Nonaka (1994) suggests that contracting should directly 
provide product and market knowledge in the form of customer reactions to products: 
“Customers and other market participants give meaning to the product by their bodily actions of 
purchasing, adapting, using, or not purchasing.” In sum, research indicates that contracting is 
both a key knowledge competence for organizations and a source of organizational knowledge. 
3.2.5 Networks as connected contracts  
In Networks as Connected Contracts, Teubner and Collins (2011) address the phenomenon of 
business groups that for many purposes operate as unit and yet preserve corporate separateness 
under law (cf. Granovetter 1995). The coordinating, indeed constitutive, mechanism for these 
groups is bilateral contract. Teubner proposes that such groups (just-in-time supply chains and 
franchising systems are his principal examples) be treated as “business networks” under the law, 
subject to a new set of rules and remedies in order to, among other things, establish liability of 
the group as a whole vis-à-vis third parties. Collins’s example is the selling of defective 
financial products through brokers and other intermediaries. Teubner and Collins suggest that 
our current legal framework for contract is inadequate to address issues of respect of risk, 
accountability and responsibility associated with business networks. 
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3.2.6 Summary of theories of contract 
 
There are many different theories of contract, and this section briefly notes several of them (see 
Table 3.1). Like “packaged software”, “contract” proves a rather fluid concept, or more 
precisely, inchoate or indeterminate in the absence of a particular lens of understanding. Not all 
of the theories noted here are consistent with TCE and EMH, and none of them address the 
evolving relationship of ICT and contract and the associated implications for organizational 
contracting knowledge. However, Suchman’s (2003) reframing of contract as social and 
technological artefact is suggestive, as is Teubner and Collins’s (2011) analysis, which locates 
contract in a network setting where it has effects beyond “bilateral private ordering”. With a 
broader perspective on contract informed by these different theories, I next turn to empirical 
studies of ICT, contract and knowledge. 
 
Theories of contract Description and comment 
Transaction cost economics Contract is “bilateral private ordering” and can be characterized along a 
dimension of governance, from markets to hierarchies.The cost of 
contracting is an element of transaction costs and is therefore a variable in 
TCE’s efficiency-optimizing function.  
Contract as legal construct Contract is a legally enforceable agreement. In general, the law does not 
prescribe or limit the terms of contract. 
Relational contract; 
implicit dimensions of 
contract; trading 
community norms 
Contract is embedded in a relationship and cannot be understood without 
taking the relationship into account. Much of contract is defined by the 
contracting community and may be implicit. The contract document may 
diverge from the reality of contract performance. 
Contract as social artefact 
and technology 
The contract document is a social artefact and technology defined by a 
contracting community and features technology dynamics that transcend 
the transaction. 
Contract as knowledge 
competence 
Contracting competence is a differentiating capability for organizations and 
contracting is a source of organizational knowledge.  
Networks as connected 
contracts 
Contracts are used to create “business networks” for which current legal 
frameworks are inadequate in respect of risk, accountability and 
responsibility. 
Table 3.1 Theories of contract 
3.3 Empirical studies of ICT, contract and knowledge 
3.3.1 Revisiting the electronic markets hypothesis: empirical studies of ICT-supported 
contracting and IT contracting 
The TCE-based electronic markets hypothesis predicts that the development of ICT will 
promote a shift toward market coordination because transaction costs will go down (Malone et 
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al. 1987). But Malone et al. also predicted closer coordination through “electronic hierarchies”. 
In their version of the distinction between markets and hierarchies, where there is a single 
supplier of a good to one or more buyers, the relationship between each buyer and the supplier 
is “primarily hierarchical”, because the buyers are not going to market to select from multiple 
suppliers (cf. Coase’s (1937) characterization of long-term contracts controlled by the buyer as 
effectively firms).  
Malone et al. identified two effects of ICT on coordination: an electronic brokerage effect and 
an electronic integration effect. The electronic brokerage effect arises in computer-based 
markets that enable buyers to compare the offerings of many suppliers very quickly. The 
electronic integration effect occurs when buyers and sellers use IT “to create joint, 
interpenetrating processes at the interface between value-added stages”. While the authors 
observed that IT would make both markets and hierarchies more efficient, they predicted a shift 
toward markets, as a result of decreased costs of coordination but also because ICT has a more 
subtle effect in reducing both effective asset specificity (through flexible manufacturing) and the 
complexity of handling detailed product specifications. 
They relate this argument to then recent growth in airline bookings made by travel agents using 
American Airlines’s electronic reservations system (which listed flights of other airlines, after 
American’s) and to increasing procurement of components from outside vendors by IBM, 
Xerox and General Electric (characterizing both of these somewhat dissimilar developments as 
evidence of the shift to electronic markets because they involve buyers selecting from multiple 
sellers). They say that electronic markets “may develop either from a nonelectronic market or 
from an electronic hierarchy spanning firm boundaries”, and model an evolution of electronic 
markets from markets biased toward a particular supplier, to unbiased markets, to personalized 
markets. Alongside, they model an evolution of electronic hierarchies from separate databases 
and processes, to linked databases and processes, to shared databases and processes. In one 
example they give, from the automotive industry, they suggest that once standard forms and 
processes have been established, electronic hierarchies evolve into electronic markets.  
The electronic markets hypothesis in Malone et al. (1987) was a forward-looking analysis 
formulated with reference to historical analogy and by using the logic of TCE and the TCE 
market-versus-hierarchy governance distinction to explain ongoing developments in certain 
industries as a function of ICT. However, with the benefit of twenty-five years’ hindsight, one 
can see that the authors emphasized the knowledge sharing in some contractual relationships 
when they identified the electronic integration effect and predicted an evolution toward shared 
databases and processes. 
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Mithas et al. (2008) challenged the electronic markets hypothesis, concluding that six 
dimensions of “non-contractibility” (quality, supplier technological investments, information 
exchange, responsiveness, trust, and flexibility) affect the willingness to participate in reverse 
auctions. “Non-contractibility” refers to “difficult-to-specify investments that a firm may need 
to make in the future in order to sustain a set of existing transactions or to initiate a new set of 
exchanges with the same partner (Bakos and Brynjolfsson [1993])” (Mithas et al. 2008, p. 707). 
Non-contractibility thus moves the unit of analysis away from the discrete transaction toward 
the longer term and the larger relationship. Mithas et al. argue that non-contractibility is thus a 
different phenomenon from asset specificity or even uncertainty.  
They ran a survey to correlate dimensions of contractibility to the expressed willingness to use a 
reverse auction and found that those who took a relational view of contracting said they were 
less willing to use a reverse auction. They also found that reverse auctions were more likely to 
be used by larger companies, probably because of cost (either hiring someone to run the auction 
or using reverse auction packaged software). Most significantly, they found that buyers avoid 
reverse auctions for specialized goods or for relationships involving substantial non-contractible 
commitments. From their analysis they argue that non-contractibility may be more important 
than asset specificity “particularly when buyers need unspecified exchange support from 
suppliers that will evolve over time”:  
Growth of the service sector further underscores non-contractibility, because 
information technologies and flexible manufacturing technologies are progressively 
causing a decline in asset specificity … [O]ur results are informative regarding 
assessment of the electronic markets hypothesis if we view Internet-enabled reverse 
auctions as an arm’s-length governance mechanism that allows firms to locate efficient 
suppliers and award contracts primarily based on price. The EMH suggested that 
information technology would lead to greater use of arm’s-length relationships. While 
this prediction was based on the role of asset specificity in exchange relationships, our 
results suggest the importance of recognizing non-contractible factors and lend support 
to Hess and Kemerer’s (1994) and Choudhury et al.’s (1998) observations that argue for 
complementing TCE logic. … we sympathize with the argument that non-contractibility 
reflects an extension of the transaction cost argument. However, even if one takes an 
expansive view of transaction cost theory, the non-contractible aspect is frequently 
under-emphasized despite the fact that it may often have the biggest impact on sourcing 
choices in cases such as our reverse auctions context. (Mithas et al. 2008, p. 718) 
(emphasis added) 
 
Pollock and Williams (2009a) observe that “[t]he most profound criticism of TCE concerns its 
exclusive attention to reducing transaction costs and its consequent failure to address processes 
of inter-organizational learning” (p. 68), and other researchers have identified knowledge, 
information exchange and other factors not readily accounted for in TCE’s efficiency-
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optimizing function at work in contractual arrangements and relationships. Writing about supply 
chains, Malhotra et al. (2005) note that “[t]he need for continual value innovation is driving 
supply chains to evolve from a pure transactional focus to leveraging inter-organizational 
partnerships for sharing information and, ultimately, market knowledge creation.” Frances and 
Garnsey (1996), in a study of the grocery industry in the UK, “showed that control mechanisms 
supported by information technology tightened inter-firm linkages, reduced costs throughout the 
system, and made UK supermarkets gain influence on suppliers through positive feedback 
effects” (Caglio and Ditillo 2008, p. 877-878). Caglio and Ditillo (2008) also reported that:  
Cuganesan and Lee (2006) analysed the impact of information technology on extant 
controls in both the inter-organizational and intra-organizational relationships that co-
existed in a procurement network. Contrary to the limited number of studies that have 
described information technology as unproblematically reinforcing dominant interests, 
Cuganesan and Lee showed that suppliers were not merely passive agents of 
information technology, but that they used it to their own ends and to increase the 
stability of procurement relationships, consequences that were unintended by the 
buyers, who introduced the technology in the first place. While information technology 
does not contain any inherent properties or effects, these latter are shaped by the actions 
of purposive organizational participants who build, promulgate and/or use this 
technology. The authors concluded that information technology gave both buyers and 
suppliers an increased ability to act upon each other through a dialectic of accounting 
control. (Caglio and Ditillo 2008, p. 878) (emphasis added) 
Subramani (2004) concluded from a review of how suppliers benefit from using a supply chain 
management system that transaction cost and resource based views of the firm are 
complementary. Fayard (2012, p. 169) et al. “conclude that the resources of internal electronic 
integration, external electronic integration, internal cost management, and absorptive capacity 
play significant direct and indirect roles in the development of an inter-organizational cost 
management (IOCM) resource”. 
Dibbern et al. (2008), in a study of software development and maintenance projects outsourced 
to India, concluded that:  
the client incurs post-contractual extra costs for four types of activities: (1) requirements 
specification and design, (2) knowledge transfer, (3) control, and (4) coordination. In 
projects that require a high level of client-specific knowledge about idiosyncratic 
business processes and software systems, these extra costs were found to be 
substantially higher than in projects where more general knowledge was needed. 
Notably, these costs most often arose independently from the threat of opportunistic 
behavior, challenging the predominant TCE logic of market failure. Rather, the client 
extra costs were particularly high in client-specific projects because the effort for 
managing the consequences of the knowledge asymmetries between client and vendor 
was particularly high in these projects. Prior experiences of the vendor with related 
client projects were found to reduce the level of extra costs but could not fully offset the 
increase in extra costs in highly client-specific projects. (p. 333) (emphasis added) 
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Similarly Gefen and Carmel (2008) found: 
In a world that is flat, where all clients and providers can easily transact with one 
another, offshoring represents the proposition that information technology providers 
from low-wage nations can now underbid providers from high-wage nations and win 
contracts. We examined a particularly flat "world" – an online programming 
marketplace – and found that this profound tilt to low-wage nations is overstated. … the 
strongest determinant of the winning bid is client loyalty: the client gives very strong 
preference to a provider with whom there has been a previous relationship, regardless 
of whether the provider is offshore or domestic. (p. 367) (emphasis added) 
Gefen et al. (2008) hypothesize that business familiarity mitigates risk in software development 
contracts, applying theories of trust and incomplete contract, and Cha et al. (2008) have 
emphasized the role of knowledge in offshore production.  
Lacity and Willcocks (1995) give critical consideration to TCE as an explanation for the 
outsourcing phenomenon, noting that TCE expressly addresses the sourcing decision, that 
outsourcing is often premised on cost savings (consistent with TCE), that practitioners use TCE-
influenced terminology to justify outsourcing (e.g. a “commoditized” good or service referring 
to low asset specificity), and that TCE had received a good deal of academic attention. In their 
reading, Williamson proposed TCE to explain why firms produce many goods and services 
internally, given the economies of scale for specialized production assumed by economic 
theory. That is, production costs are assumed to be lower for outsourcing, while transaction 
costs are higher. Lacity and Willcocks explain how Williamson reasons from this, taking into 
account transaction characteristics of frequency, asset specificity, uncertainty and “information 
impactedness” (uncertainty coupled with the threat of opportunism), and additional factors, such 
as the number of suppliers, to predict when outsourcing will not be efficient relative to internal 
production. Testing this prediction against outsourcing decisions and outcomes, the related 
contracts and cost savings, Lacity and Willcocks reported a very high percentage (87.5%) of 
anomalies. They then engaged in an exercise of first explaining the anomalies under TCE “by 
appealing to exceptions or by re-interpreting transaction cost theory language”, and speculated 
that the IT domain tends to generate exceptions to TCE due to rapid change and high 
uncertainty, penetration of IT to all business functions, high switching costs, and an 
“exceptional condition of information impactedness” due to customer inexperience.  
Lacity and Willcocks go on to take up a contrary interpretation of the data, which throws into 
question many of the assumptions that underlie TCE: that decision makers act according to 
economic efficiency, in accordance with organizational goals, and using information to make 
rationally bounded decisions; that the market always provides cheaper production costs due to 
economies of scale; and that the transaction is the appropriate unit of analysis. In terms of 
economies of scale, Lacity and Willcocks break down the costs of various IT capabilities and 
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show that the cost advantage may fall to outsourcing vendors or internally, depending on the 
type of cost and the scale of the internal capability. For example, only outside providers have to 
cover marketing costs or a return to shareholders (e.g. a minimum 15% gross margin), and they 
have a cost disadvantage as well in terms of business expertise. Lacity and Willcocks conclude 
their analysis by critiquing TCE in two respects: the language ambiguity that enables the 
qualifications and exceptions to TCE’s efficiency-optimizing function to cover essentially all 
anomalies (citing Fischer 1977); and the transaction as the unit of analysis – as too large (one 
might say indiscriminating) in the case of IT outsourcing to cover the multiple activities within 
the portfolio of an IT department.  
Lacity et al. (2011) return to TCE as a theory of decision-making and its applicability to IT 
outsourcing, noting that TCE provides a strong theoretical base for analysing build-versus-buy 
decisions. They agree with Karimi-Alaghehband et al. (2011) that applying TCE to IT 
outsourcing has yielded mixed results, but do not agree that “ITO researchers need to apply 
TCE more faithfully”. Instead, testing IT outsourcing decisions and outcomes against TCE 
logic, they reach the conclusions that “we may be asking too much of TCE” and argue that IT 
outsourcing needs its own endogenous theory.  
In sum, the research literature strongly indicates that TCE and the EMH provide only a partial 
explanation of ICT-supported contracting and IT contracting. Knowledge – whether knowledge 
about the counterparty based on prior experience, detailed product specifications, or the ongoing 
sharing of information between counterparties through linked or shared databases – is an 
essential part of contracting. 
3.3.2 ICT as related to governance (markets and hierarchies) 
Another stream of research comes to similar conclusions by exploring the relationship between 
ICT and the TCE governance dimension from markets to hierarchies. To introduce that research 
literature, I note again that “hybrid” contracting is part of the TCE governance dimension, 
falling between market and hierarchy. The EMH predicts a “move to the market”, but Koch and 
Schultze (2011) argue that instead there is a “move to the middle”, toward hybrid contracting:  
Over the years, research on the implications of information technology on network 
governance structures has explored the ‘move to the market’ and the ‘move to the 
middle’ hypotheses. The middle is a space in which the logic and modalities of markets 
and hierarchies are intermingled. There is increasing evidence that most network 
relations reflect mixed-mode or hybrid logic. (Koch and Schultze 2011, p. 123) 
(emphasis added) 
To ground this idea of a “move to the middle”, consider the notion of “IT-based cocreation of 
value” (Grover and Kohli 2012), the phenomenon of firms collectively levering IT investments. 
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Grover and Kohli take a relational view of the firm and then ask how IT can enable, expand or 
create value in each of four “layers”: relationship-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, 
complementary resources and capabilities, and effective governance. With respect to 
governance they note the electronic brokerage or integration capabilities of IT (an echo of 
Malone et al. 1987), and cite as an example the governance capabilities that Amazon offers to 
its small and specialty retailer partners. They also note that the four layers are not distinct but 
instead interdependent and may create path dependencies. Their examples include logistics (Rai 
et al. 2012), software platforms and their associated “ecosystems” (Ceccagnoli et al. 2012), and 
the relationship between an ERP vendor and its various implementation and training partners. 
All of these arrangements and relationships require ongoing coordination and deep ICT-based 
inter-locking between contract counterparties. 
This would be consistent with the conclusions of Caglio and Ditillo, who surveyed studies of 
inter-organizational control and found generally that hierarchical or hybrid governance requires 
“a continuous exchange of very detailed information concerning the technical and economic 
aspects of the activities performed and the use of resources” (Caglio and Ditillo 2008, p. 868).  
In summary, the need for information in the hierarchical and the relationship [hybrid] 
modes is crucial for the quality of the coordination of the activities. In both of these 
cases, the degree to which efficiency is created is highly dependent on the information 
available to the decision-makers. This is not the case for the market situation. 
(Håkansson and Lind 2004, p. 54) 
According to Håkansson and Lind (2004) and Boland et al. (2008), hybrid governance models 
pose a challenge to traditional management information systems approaches. Boland et al. 
conclude that: 
Taking an enterprise and decomposing it into operating units for the purpose of creating 
a management control system is fundamentally different from bringing separate 
enterprises together in a temporary assemblage and designing a management control 
system for them. The first sequence is a movement from a hierarchy to a market 
(creating market elements within a pre-existing organization) and the second sequence 
is a movement from market to hierarchy (creating an organization among pre-existing 
market elements). This difference in sequence is all-important, and we find that a 
system-theoretic approach to the problems of decomposition versus synthesis is helpful 
in framing our discussion of it. Simply put, the logic of breaking a system down into 
component parts (decomposition) is distinct from the logic of putting parts together to 
form a whole (synthesis), even though, at the end, a similar mix of market and hierarchy 
may appear to be in place. (Boland et al. 2008, p. 900) 
In summary, research indicates that non-market contracting (hybrid or hierarchical) requires 
integrative ICT between counterparties, or “lateral processing of information” (Hopwood 1996), 
and indeed as suggested by Malone et al. (1987) in their notion of the “electronic integration 
effect”. This locates contracting knowledge and practice as an inter-organizational enactment, 
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not localized inside the boundary of the organization but instead constituted in “temporary 
assemblages” with their own separate management control systems. However, the implications 
of these “temporary assemblages” for the production of the organization’s synthesizing 
organizational contracting knowledge, for example as reflected in its financial accounting 
system, are not spelled out. 
3.3.3 Specifying the problem of organizational contracting knowledge 
To summarize thus far, empirical research clearly shows that knowledge is an essential aspect of 
contracting and indicates that hybrid and hierarchical contracting requires integrative inter-
organizational ICT to support knowledge sharing between contract counterparties. What the 
research does not address is obliquely suggested by Boland et al. (2008) in the excerpt quoted 
above. That excerpt theorizes the shift away from a centralized organizational management 
control system based on the decomposition of the organization into business units toward the 
formation of multiple quasi-organizational management control systems arising from contracts. 
What the authors do not consider are the consequences of this phenomenon for synthesizing 
organizational knowledge. The formation of multiple, temporary quasi-organizations at the 
boundary of the contracting organization may exert a centrifugal, dis-integrating or fragmenting 
effect on organizational knowledge: If the organization is broken down not into internal 
business units but instead through multiple integrations with contracting counterparties, how is 
the organization put back together again to “form a whole”?  
For example, if a company is a supplier participating in several online trading platforms and 
selling directly to large companies, each of which dictates its own data standards and associated 
contracting practices, and if the same company uses a cloud vendor for customer relationship 
management and sales and outsources its logistics and after-service, it would appear to be rather 
difficult to extract from these disparate systems the minimum amount necessary to support cost 
accounting and financial reporting, quite challenging to develop information systems for senior 
management strategic decision-making, and a quixotic task to build an enterprise information 
system that captures the contract lifecycle. Yet it seems that just such a business model 
constructed around essential and mutual ICT-based dependencies is implied in the “IT-based 
cocreation of value”. 
Looked at from this perspective, the presumed generative effects of ICT on the economy 
encouraging the proliferation of such quasi-organizations might be expected to raise serious 
questions for organizational knowledge. In this section I first consider what we know about ICT 
and organizational knowledge generally, and then go on to consider the problem of 
organizational contracting knowledge. 
73 
 
The general problem of organizational knowledge and its relationship to ICT has been studied 
under a number of different names, including knowledge management (Alavi and Leidner 
2001), business intelligence (Elbashir 2011), management control systems for knowledge 
integration (Ditillo 2004), management support systems (including decision support systems, 
executive information systems, knowledge management systems and business intelligence) 
(Clark et al. 2007), and intellectual capital statements (Mouritsen et al. 2001). Enterprise risk 
management (Arena et al. 2010), enterprise resource planning (ERP) (Chapman 2005; Chapman 
and Kihn 2009; Dechow and Mouritsen 2005), accounting (Hall 2010) and packaged software 
generally (D’Adderio 2004) have all been linked to organizational knowledge production. Some 
authors (e.g. Teece 1998) have suggested that ICT rather unproblematically corresponds to 
increased knowledge.
15
 Alavi and Leidner (2001) suggest a direct, positive relationship between 
ICT and knowledge management, where knowledge management is conceived of principally 
(and narrowly) as sharing knowledge: 
Advanced information technologies (e.g., the Internet, intranets, extranets, browsers, 
data warehouses, data mining techniques, and software agents) can be used to 
systematize, enhance, and expedite large-scale intra- and inter-firm knowledge 
management. (Alavi and Leidner 2001, p. 101) 
Other research suggests however that it is unlikely to be so simple. Winograd and Flores (1986) 
quite some time ago described the relative ineffectiveness of computer technology in dealing 
with complex problems and unstructured data, and converting unstructured data into structured 
data is a perennial issue for information systems and organizational knowledge production, with 
“up to 80 percent of an organization’s process documents and data … in nonstandardized and 
semi-structured form (Negash 2004)” (Clark et al. 2007). Other authors (Chapman and Kihn 
2009; Dechow and Mouritsen 2005; Elbashir 2011) note that converting structured data (such as 
that contained in ERP systems) into knowledge is less than straightforward. D’Adderio (2004) 
has critiqued the assumption that organizational knowledge is a matter of codification, and 
argued for a shift to understanding organizational knowledge as process. 
                                                          
15
 “The new information technology is also dramatically assisting in the sharing of information. Learning 
and experience can be much more readily captured and shared. Knowledge learned in the organization 
can be catalogued and transferred to other applications within and across organizations and geographies. 
Rich exchange can take place inside the organization, obviating some of the need for formal structures. 
Network computing, supported by an advanced communications infrastructure, can thus facilitate 
collaborative entrepreneuralism by stripping out barriers to communication. It challenges existing 
organization boundaries, divisions, and hierarchies and permits formal organization to be more 
specialized and responsive. Interorganizationally, networked organizations have blurred and shifting 
boundaries, and they function in conjunction with other organizations. The networked organization may 
be highly ‘virtual,’ integrating a temporary network of suppliers and customers that emerge around 
specific opportunities in fast-changing markets. Recurrent reorganization becomes the norm, not the 
exception.” (Teece 1998, p. 60) 
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In addition, organizational knowledge is understood to be situated and thus multiple (Nonaka 
and van Krogh 2009). 
Frontline employees and lower managers are immersed in the day-to-day details of 
particular technologies, products, and markets. No one is more expert in the realities of 
a company's business than they are. But, while these employees and lower managers are 
deluged with highly specific information, they often find it extremely difficult to turn 
that information into useful knowledge. For one thing, signals from the marketplace can 
be vague and ambiguous. For another, employees and lower managers can become so 
caught up in their own narrow perspective, that they lose sight of the broader context. 
Moveover, even when they try to develop meaningful ideas and insights, it can still be 
difficult to communicate the importance of that information to others. People do not just 
passively receive new knowledge; they actively interpret it to fit their own situation and 
perspectives. Thus, what makes sense in one context can change or even lose its 
meaning when communicated to people in a different context. (Nonaka 1994, p. 30) 
Researchers (e.g. Carlile 2002; Karsten et al. 2001) have studied boundary objects (Star 1989; 
Star and Griesemer 1989) that reconcile knowledge across disparate work domains, but sharing 
and creating organizational knowledge across different “communities of knowing” (Boland and 
Tenkasi 1995), “epistemic communities” (D’Adderio 2004, p. 17, citing inter alia Knorr Cetina 
1999), or “communities of practice” (Lave and Wenger 1991) is a perennial problem. Howard-
Grenville and Carlile (2006) have pointed out that “knowledge regimes” may be fundamentally 
incompatible, and D’Adderio (2004) emphasizes the diversity of knowledge inside the 
organization – a diversity that is not easily or even productively resolved through ICT. These 
studies suggest that we should not assume that ICT unproblematically and straightforwardly 
produces organizational knowledge. 
I turn now to the question of ICT and organizational contracting knowledge. Contracting might 
in theory generate the most significant knowledge for organizations, as obliquely implied by 
Nonaka (1994). However, the relationship of ICT to organizational contracting knowledge per 
se does not appear to have been the subject of focused research, though business intelligence, 
management control systems, enterprise risk management and indeed customer relationship 
management, supply chain management, and supplier or vendor relationship management all 
bear upon different dimensions or types of contracting knowledge.  
Probably the most widespread and generalized technology for organizational contracting 
knowledge, even if not characterized as such, is financial accounting (cf. Hall 2010; Miller et al. 
2008; Skærbæck and Tryggestad 2010). It is hard to overstate the importance of financial 
accounting, which not only informs the market about an organization but informs the 
organization about itself. As internal operations are to an increasing degree replaced with 
contractual arrangements – in the “move to the middle” said to be characteristic of network 
relations – it is fair to ask how well financial accounts reflect the contractual commitments an 
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organization has made and the contractual commitments made to it. Håkansson and Lind (2004) 
argue that traditional accounting systems do not work for the network because they are based on 
a model which posits relations with the outside world as ipso facto “market” transactions, i.e. 
reducible to realized or realizable price or value, and, to the extent they are not, does not really 
account for them:
16
  
 
The boundary of the company divides the world in accordance with the two 
coordination modes, which are also matched by the need for information. On one side 
of the boundary is the hierarchy, with a need for very detailed information. On the other 
side is the market with a lesser need for in-depth information. When relationships [the 
hybrid mode] need to be taken into consideration, this clear image is shattered. In the 
relationship case, there is neither a clear boundary, nor do we have any matching 
internal coordination form. Thus, relationships must be a problem from an accounting 
point of view, given that accountancy has been developed in accordance with the 
hierarchy-market dichotomy. There must be a need to change accounting when used in 
a network situation. (Håkansson and Lind 2004, p. 54) 
Taking a somewhat different view that emphasizes the growing importance of intangible assets, 
Gröjer (2001) reached a similar conclusion: 
One of today’s challenges concerning financial accounting classifications is to cope 
with an organizational world that seems to become more immaterial than material, 
where resources in different immaterial forms act as the key production factors. In an 
accounting context, this development is reflected in concepts such as immaterial assets, 
intangibles, hybrid and intellectual capital. Allied concepts, including virtual 
organisations, relation marketing, value stars, human resource costing and accounting, 
enablers and performance drivers, are in themselves a starting point for accounting 
classifications. They express a need for altering the accounting boundaries or for acting 
as a demarcation for reclassification. One way to improve the accounting art is to use 
new organisational paradigms for accounting classifications. The accounting backbone 
is about classification and reclassification, i.e. to arrange something in a particular 
order. The accounting art of [portraying] organisations is currently under dramatic 
challenge. (pp. 695-696) 
The inadequacy of financial accounting as a source of organizational contracting knowledge 
was demonstrated in the case of Enron, where management entered into various contracts with 
affiliated parties that generated accounting revenues but no cash, that effectively converted 
loans to Enron into revenues, or that were so dependent on the price of Enron’s own stock and 
its credit rating that when these deteriorated the company collapsed in a cash crisis (Powers et 
al. 2002). In essence, these contracts shifted entirely speculative future revenues into the 
present, while creating undisclosed risks and liabilities. Because these contracts were so 
essential to Enron’s reported revenues, their key terms, the nature of the counterparties, and the 
associated risks and liabilities merited substantial disclosure within the organization and to the 
                                                          
16
 Kyte and Gilbert of Gartner wrote that information systems track transactions, not the underlying 
contract (Gartner Inc. 2003b; see footnote 2). This observation was made in support of contract 
management software. See also Figure 5.3. 
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outside world; instead, the contracts were used to hide Enron’s failing business model and 
deteriorating financial condition.  
Although the Enron case involved fraud, the obscurity surrounding key contracts is not limited 
to cases of fraud. Another example, from the recent credit crisis, is the now well-known case of 
AIG.
17
 In that case too, like Enron, AIG reported revenues on contracts but did not understand, 
or disclose, the associated risks and liabilities. 
In brief, AIG issued credit default swaps (CDSs) effectively guaranteeing various collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs).
18
 AIG’s credit default swaps were relied upon by major financial 
institutions in making investments that might otherwise have been considered imprudent or that 
they would not have been able to make under relevant capital requirements, and indeed the UK 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) had observed a sectoral transfer of credit risk from the 
banking sector to the insurance sector (Financial Services Authority 2004, pp. 55-56) in part 
through credit default swaps. However, notwithstanding significant concentration of the credit 
default swap market (the ten largest global banks and broker-dealers accounting for 70%), the 
rating agency Fitch had “concluded that the growth of the market is a positive development, as 
it assists the diversification of credit risk and results in improved liquidity in underlying credit 
markets” (Financial Services Authority 2004, p. 55). There seems to have been an idea on the 
part of proponents that credit default swaps would disperse risk, presumably in a kind of 
engineering sense, as a net or grid absorbs and disperses a physical impact – comparable to the 
optimized efficient risk-dispersion outlined by Shiller (2003) and Ciborra (2007).  
In 2007, AIG reported that the “likelihood of any payment obligation by [AIG] under each 
transaction is remote, even in severe recessionary market scenarios” (AIG 2007 Annual Report, 
pp. 121-122) (emphasis added). The premium AIG earned, even if it was very low, was more 
than its funding cost, which was 0. An AIG executive is reported to have said: “The models 
suggested that the risk was so remote that the fees were almost free money” (O’Harrow and 
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 The discussion that follows is, except as noted, based on reviews of SEC filings by AIG for 2007 and 
2008. 
18
 Under a credit default swap, one party agrees to pay the other party if a payment default occurs on 
reference debt, by paying the amount of the reference debt or by purchasing the reference debt. CDOs are 
a type of securitized financial instrument, consisting of a bundle of other debt obligations, including prior 
securitizations. Securitization is a financial technology which uses statistical models applied to an 
aggregation of debt instruments (contracts to pay money) to structure a tiered package of derived 
securities, representing horizontally layered, as opposed to vertically defined, rights to payments from the 
obligors. From the outset there was some confusion about the nature of credit default swaps. An interest 
rate or currency swap on a “notional amount” of $100 of underlying debt involves variations that are 
usually a small percentage of the notional amount. A credit default swap, on the other hand, stands behind 
the entire amount of the debt and acts more like a guarantee. Comparing a credit default swap to 
insurance, with that term’s prudential overtones, would be misleading to the extent it implies the sort of 
regulatory oversight common in the insurance industry. Efforts in the late 1990s to gain regulatory 
oversight over the credit default swap market were defeated (O’Harrow and Dennis 2008). 
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Dennis 2008). However, over the course of 2007 and 2008, AIG was forced to book losses on 
its credit default swaps because the market value of the underlying CDOs was deteriorating. By 
September 2008, AIG was facing a liquidity crisis (i.e. inadequate cash) due to collateral calls 
(demands to put up cash to back its obligations) triggered under the CDS terms by the continued 
degradation of the underlying CDOs and AIG ratings downgrades. The US federal government 
determined that a collapse of AIG threatened unacceptable systemic risk and rescued AIG with 
emergency financial assistance: AIG was a critical point of failure in a small and tightly 
interdependent contracting network.  
The FSA had noted potential problems in valuing credit default swaps of the type issued by 
AIG: “The market in portfolio trades is still new and relatively illiquid, so banks usually rely on 
models to re-value and risk manage the transactions on a day-to-day basis. Valuing and risk-
managing complex and illiquid structures like the portfolio trades described above presents 
challenges for even the largest and most sophisticated of banks.” (Financial Services Authority 
2004, p. 55). To assign a value to its CDS book, AIG used a modified version of the BET 
(binomial expansion technique) model originally developed by a rating agency in 1996 to 
generate expected loss estimates for CDO tranches. The BET model generated values, but not 
on the basis of knowledge of the “real” underlying assets that AIG had guaranteed. Instead, the 
model implied default probabilities and cash flows from price estimates on the individual 
securities comprising the portfolio of a CDO. AIG obtained prices from CDO collateral 
managers where these prices were available, but for 2008 CDO collateral managers provided 
these prices for only 61.2% of the underlying securities. For the rest, AIG derived the price 
based on a “matrix pricing” technique by comparison to similar securities.  
Though questions might be raised about AIG’s reliance on the BET model for valuation, there is 
no indication that AIG considered the collateral requirements of the credit default swaps; it was 
these collateral requirements that precipitated the liquidity crisis. These key contract terms were 
not disclosed in AIG’s financial statements until they presented acute threats to liquidity, and 
there is no other standard “internal coordination form” for contracting that would have 
necessarily brought them to the attention of senior management. In addition, with counterparty 
identities undisclosed, the exposures to AIG that other financial institutions were accumulating 
remained hidden until they were forced to be revealed in the course of the government bailout. 
To summarize, then, the literature indicates that knowledge is an essential aspect of contracting. 
However, research has focussed almost exclusively on understanding the inter-organizational 
dimension of contracting knowledge. Synthesizing organizational contracting knowledge is 
obliquely and partially addressed under numerous organizational knowledge initiatives 
(business intelligence, risk management, customer relationship management and so forth), but 
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the most widespread and generalized knowledge technology for contract is financial accounting. 
Research, and indeed recent events, point to the inadequacy of financial accounting systems, 
and the lack of any other “internal coordination form”, or organizing technology, for 
contracting, and thus to a significant gap in synthesizing organizational contracting knowledge. 
3.4 Summary: ICT, contract and knowledge in the networked economy 
Research on ICT, contract and knowledge is often framed in reference to transaction cost 
economics, which hypothesizes an overall efficiency-optimizing function that minimizes the 
sum of production costs and transaction costs, including the costs of contracting. It follows from 
TCE that as transaction costs go down as a result of the “electronic communication effect” 
(Malone et al. 1987), there will be a “move to the market”, and away from intra-firm, 
hierarchical governance. This “electronic markets hypothesis” is implicit in assumptions that the 
networked economy will be “contract-enabling”. However, empirical studies indicate not only 
that knowledge is an essential aspect of contracting but that hybrid or hierarchical contracting 
requires integrative inter-organizational ICT to support knowledge sharing between contract 
counterparties. This locates contracting knowledge and practice as an inter-organizational 
enactment, not inside the boundary of the organization, but the implications for the production 
of organizational contracting knowledge have not been addressed. According to the research 
and observable in recent events, organizational contracting knowledge is not well supported by 
financial accounting or by any other organizing technology for contract. This frames the 
opportunity and the challenge for contract management software. 
 
 
 
  
79 
 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
In this chapter, I outline the methodology for the study. Noting that research on technology 
tends to be shaped by and express an implicit if not explicit conceptual position (Orlikowski 
2010), I begin the chapter with a discussion of how Barad’s (2003, 2007) agential realism 
informs this study (section 4.1). In section 4.1.1, I briefly introduce agential realism as I 
understand it, and, in section 4.1.2, I relate Barad’s notion of apparatus to technology and apply 
this idea to an empirical example from the research literature. In section 4.1.3 I explain why 
agential realism is relevant to IS research generally and more particularly to this study. Lastly, 
in section 4.1.4, I relate agential realism to the earlier discussion of performativity in markets 
and breakdown. 
In section 4.2, I turn to the biography of software as methodology for this study, beginning with 
how it is positioned in relation to other approaches (section 4.2.1). I go on to discuss how my 
application of the biography of software approach is informed by grounded theory and shaped 
by principles of corpus construction (section 4.2.2). In section 4.2.3, I discuss CMS as 
biographical subject and a second-level subject-object analytical framework in which the 
adoption of CMS maps out “regions” of contract.  
In section 4.3, I describe my overall research design as it evolved over the history of the project 
(section 4.3.1) and then my various data sources and methods of data collection (interviews, 
including the site visit (section 4.3.2); the survey (section 4.3.3); and archival research (section 
4.3.4)). In section 4.4, I summarize how I have adapted and extended the biography of software 
approach for this study, explain my use of a table of breakdown to organize and analyse the 
data, and relate the presentation of data in Chapters 5 and 6 and the analysis in Chapter 7 to the 
overall research design and history of the project as discussed in section 4.3.1. 
4.1. Epistemological and ontological stance: Barad’s agential realism 
4.1.1 Barad’s agential realism 
For this study I am adopting Barad’s (2003, 2007) agential realism as my “onto-epistem-
ological” (Barad 2007, p. 185) framework. Barad’s project involves a particular way of seeing 
the world, with implications for inquiry (the project of knowledge) and for ethics. In developing 
agential realism, Barad works from her characterization of the essential nature of matter as 
understood by experimental physics. She particularly draws upon Niels Bohr’s notions of 
indeterminacy and complementarity (defined below) and of theories as embodied practices; 
upon Butler’s version of performativity in terms of the specific materialization of bodies as 
produced by repetition of regulatory practices (and as against representationalism); and upon 
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Foucault’s concept of discursive practices as material conditions that define meaningful 
statements and thus produce subjects and objects. 
For Barad the ontological primitive is the “phenomenon”, which is not only understood through 
but effectively (as I read Barad) probed and organized by its constituent “apparatus”, producing 
knowledge; “the boundary between an object of observation and the agencies of observation is 
indeterminate in the absence of a specific physical arrangement of the apparatus” (Barad 2007, 
p. 114). Barad anchors this notion by reference to the physics experiments that, depending on 
the setup of the laboratory apparatus as well as the larger material context of the experiment, 
variously determine light to be either a wave or a particle. From this she argues that matter is 
essentially indeterminate in the absence of a particular constituent apparatus that co-creates 
determinacy. Given a particular apparatus, “certain properties become determinate, while others 
are specifically excluded” (Barad 2007, p. 19), with the excluded properties not only unknown 
but indeterminate. There is a relationship of mutual exclusivity (or trade-off) between what is 
determined or determinable and what remains indeterminate (“complementarity”). As an 
example, she explores the apparently paradoxical nature of light (as both wave and particle), and 
she explains how the paradox is an outcome of our mutually exclusive classical concepts of 
wave and particle. In her account, these two concepts have been embodied in mutually exclusive 
experimental conditions, which, in testing a phenomenon that is apparently the same except for 
the experimental conditions, yield two mutually exclusive results. Thus measurement practices 
are an ineliminable part of the results obtained, but in a more profound sense than is implied by 
the notion of “uncertainty” – the idea that the experimental conditions inevitably disturb an 
otherwise determinate phenomenon.  
For Barad, then, following Bohr, the basic unit of what is real in any experiment is the 
phenomenon consisting of the entire experiment, and objectivity is established through the 
replicability of observed “marks on bodies” (or observed outcomes) in repeated experiments. 
Objectivity is not about premeasurement properties of independent objects (observation-
independence). Instead objects are within phenomena, where phenomena are the ontologically 
inseparability of objects and apparatuses. “[T]here’s an important sense in which Bohr’s 
framework offers a proto-performative account of the production of bodies” (Barad 2007, p. 
129). 
This is not the same as saying that the natural world is a social construct; for Barad, the real 
world is very much real, even if a matter of probabilistic materialization, and constraints rather 
than deterministic outcomes. But neither is the world “out there” vis-à-vis neutral (external) 
human observers who merely reflect or represent what they “see”; “seeing” is not the passive 
receipt of information from the outside world but at the physical level a material engagement 
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with the world (e.g. microscopes, STM (scanning tunnelling microscopes) technology, 
sonograms). Barad thus rejects representationalism – a notion that the world is comprised of 
observation-independent objects with attributes, which humans go about knowing and naming. 
For Barad the semantic and ontic questions are merged in materialized phenomena; to 
characterize the problems in knowing as “merely” epistemological, it may be inferred, enshrines 
representationalist assumptions of an atomistic, deterministic ontology.  
Generalizing her analysis of the quantum physics experiments, Barad proposes agential realism 
as her conception of the real. In this conception, the basic unit of reality is the phenomenon, 
consisting of “intra-acting” agencies, which are not a priori existing as ontological units but are 
defined relationally through agential intra-actions resulting in observed “marks on bodies” 
(outcomes). The reproducibility that defines objectivity entails some kind of causal structure 
and thus agency, from which objects may be (provisionally) inferred. What “marks on bodies” 
will be observed depends on the apparatus, with apparatus generalized from the laboratory setup 
to mean a type of phenomenon which is a specific material configuration of the world creating 
the conditions of possibility for determinate boundaries and properties of objects and meanings 
of embodied concepts within a phenomenon of which it is a constituent part. An apparatus, 
embodying a particular concept to the exclusion of others, is also a type of “material-discursive 
practice”, producing subjects and objects and creating the condition for the possibility of 
objectivity. 
Barad concludes that, within agential realism, meaning is made possible through specific 
material practices, knowing is a material engagement with the world involving differential 
responsiveness, and ethical responsibility is defined as accountability for marks on bodies 
(observed outcomes), and for the constitutive effect of exclusions. In her view, because it 
unsettles “nature’s presumed fixity”, agential realism opens up the “possibilities for change” 
(Barad 2007, p. 64). For Barad, neither knowing (differential responsiveness) nor ethical 
responsibility (accountability for marks on bodies) is limited to humans. And material agency 
has direct implications for human agency: Barad argues for ethical transitivity, meaning that 
humans are responsible for the material agency of their non-human creations. Following Barad 
would mean the end of “design from nowhere” (Suchman 2002). 
As a thought experiment for working with Barad’s notion of phenomenon, consider the airspace 
over Manhattan. This can be constitutive of multiple overlapping and non-mutually exclusive 
phenomena, theoretically without limit. Such phenomena might include or involve: the 
channelling of light from the sun; the channeling of artificial light into the night sky; air 
pollution; air rights under real estate law; an air traffic control sector with flight paths; large 
scale and localized air currents; multiple and (literally) layered living and working habitats; a 
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site of human activity over time; areas of reflective heat produced by different roofing materials; 
or the flight paths of migrating birds, which sometimes crash into reflective glass towers. These 
phenomena are materially co-existing and overlapping, but structured (not constructed), 
organized and understood through distinct material-discursive practices, each an “apparatus” 
(physical analysis of light; physical analysis of particles and chemicals; law and commerce; air 
traffic control systems; measurement of air movement at different heights and at different times; 
three-dimensional social mapping; historical, anthropological and archaeological artefacts, 
records and accounts; satellite heat maps;
 
and the flight of migrating birds).
19 
Depending on the 
particular apparatus, certain things will become meaningful; others will be excluded. 
4.1.2 The notion of apparatus as related to technology 
Barad does not equate apparatus with technology, and I believe that for her project such a 
reading would be an inappropriate limitation. Apparatus as a material-discursive practice that 
“helps to constitute phenomena through producing knowledge about them” is a formula that is 
useful, one might say powerful, partly because of its lineage (with reference to Butler and 
Foucault) but in large part due to its abstract quality and resistance to enlistment in particular 
agendas. However, the converse does not hold, and it can, I believe, be appropriate and 
productive to consider technology as apparatus.  
Furthermore I argue that it can be appropriate and productive to consider a particular technology 
as an apparatus and, as such, a subject of study. Barad emphasizes that each particular 
phenomenon and any constituent apparatus are uniquely occurring, and that, in particular, the 
boundaries of the apparatus are variable and may be broadly drawn – incorporating, in the case 
of a laboratory experiment, the laboratory conditions and laboratory personnel. However, I draw 
out an implication in Barad’s work to the effect that if observations produced through an 
apparatus are reproducible, and thus the foundation of objectivity, it is meaningful to discuss an 
apparatus (for example, a certain configuration of laboratory equipment, a bush pump, a 
packaged software product) as such and as related to multiple phenomena of which it may 
hypothetically form a constituent part. This can help us make sense of technologies that appear 
in many (potentially partial) instantiations, that may be dispersed, that are rapidly changing, and 
that may be intangible, such as the travel website TripAdvisor (Scott and Orlikowski 2012).  
To give another example, I apply the concept of apparatus in a reading of Mol and Law’s (1994) 
study of anemia. Observing that anemia’s physical existence either within the body or 
geographically may be difficult to locate, they use this example to construct a model of social 
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 Regarding New York City rooftops and heat, see Lynch (2012), Rosenberg (2012), and NASA Earth 
Observatory (2012). Regarding the effects for migrating birds of light from man-made structures and 
reflective glass on tall buildings, see Doty (2010) and Foderaro (2011). 
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topological spaces, including regions, networks and fluid spaces, by analogy to mathematics, 
where topology “articulates different rules for localizing in a variety of coordinate systems” (p. 
643, emphasis in original). Regions are clusters, having distinct boundaries and defined by 
certain similarities within the cluster, differences along other dimensions being suppressed (here 
there is an echo of “complementarity”). In networks, comprised of elements and the relations 
between them, distance is a function of the relation between the elements. Networks can cross 
boundaries between regions. Fluid spaces are characterized by unstable boundaries, and 
relations that retain continuity of existence even as they transform. Mol and Law identify two 
notional “regions” of anemia – “the Netherlands” and “Africa” – corresponding to markedly 
differential presentations of anemia. Because “it transforms itself from one arrangement into 
another without discontinuity” (p. 664), “anemia” is described as “fluid”.20 
Of interest in my analysis is that each of the two regions of anemia is marked out by the use of a 
particular diagnostic apparatus within the localized phenomena of the clinical setting: 
Laboratory analysis of blood samples using precision instruments corresponds to the region 
where anemia tends to be mild and relatively rare (“the Netherlands”); the “clinical gaze” as 
diagnostic apparatus corresponds to a region where anemia tends to be severe and widespread 
(“Africa”). Laboratory analysis and the clinical gaze differ in how they define what matters – in 
Barad’s sense, making certain things determinate and excluding certain other things. Where 
anemia is severe and widespread, the network of precision instruments, lab technicians and 
laboratories breaks down, and the clinical gaze takes over.  
As noted in section 2.2.1, “fluidity” is used in a somewhat different sense by de Laet and Mol 
(2000) in their analysis of a bush pump that has been widely adopted in Africa. They call the 
bush pump a “fluid” technology,“technologically appropriate” across many diverse settings. 
Turning back to my reading of Mol and Law (1994), we can say that the technological 
appropriateness of each diagnostic apparatus (laboratory analysis or clinical gaze) marks the 
boundary of a corresponding region of anemia; the boundary of each region of anemia in turn 
marks the limits of the “fluidity” of the corresponding apparatus. In this sense the apparatus 
(laboratory analysis or clinical gaze) not only diagnoses anemia but maps a region of anemia, 
and the boundary of each region is in turn marked by the breakdown of its corresponding 
apparatus.  
By working through this example I have drawn an explicit link between Barad’s notion of 
apparatus – as a material-discursive practice that probes and organizes the phenomenon of 
which it is a constituent part – and technology. The breakdown of technological 
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 Per Mol and Law a “mutable mobile”, in contrast to Latour’s (1986, 1987, pp. 226-227) “immutable 
mobile”. 
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appropriateness, or the limits or lack of “fluidity”, of a particular technology reveals 
characteristics of the phenomenon of which it is a constituent part, mapping out “regions” 
within the phenomenon.
21
  
Reading Mol and Law’s (1994) account of anemia or de Laet and Mol’s (2000) account of the 
“fluid” bush pump from the agential realist perspective, we have arguably achieved three 
advantages. First, Barad’s framework relates multiple instantiations of a particular technology 
(apparatuses in relation to localized phenomena) to a larger, but non-aggregated, more abstract 
phenomenon in which the technology is a constitutive, and performative, material-discursive 
practice. As noted above, this is a particularly useful in attempting to understand a technology – 
such as a packaged software product – as likely to be both dynamic and dispersed. Second, we 
have considered the breakdown of a particular apparatus as revealing, a point I take forward in 
sections 4.1.4 and 4.2.3. Third, following Barad’s model, localized and more tangible 
phenomena and larger or intangible abstract phenomena can be valid, and concurrently valid, 
but are never ontologically definitive or preclusive. This points to the multiplicity of ontological 
possibility – a theme that becomes relevant in the biography of CMS.  
4.1.3 Agential realism as relevant to IS research and to this study 
In the preceding section, I set out Barad’s agential realism as a frame for the study of 
technology generally, in particular working with her notion of apparatus. In this section I 
explain why I believe agential realism is a good fit for information systems research, and for 
this study. 
First I point out that an information system, such as a financial accounting system, or an IT 
artefact, such as an enterprise software package, is well characterized as a material-discursive 
practice, in that an information system or an IT artefact produces meaning through a specific 
material configuration and thus embodies the inseparability of matter and meaning. The nature 
of meaning, practices for making meaning, and the conditions for possibility of intelligibility 
(Barad 2007) – these are or should be the principal subjects for information systems. The 
blurring of epistemology and ontology as advocated by Barad is less arguable and more 
materialized in information systems than perhaps in other domains, as it is well understood that 
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 This analytical framework ties Barad’s project to the themes of technological appropriateness and 
breakdown as related to materiality. For example, Eglash (2006), writing on technology as material 
culture, cites Akrich’s (2002) account of the attempted implementation of a French-designed electrical 
generator in Costa Rica. Her account of the failed technology transfer takes specific account of the 
material attributes of the technological artefact. Eglash takes to task a purely semiotic analysis of 
technology and cites with favor Haraway’s (1997) characterization of technology as a “material-semiotic 
hybrid”. 
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information systems do not (only) reflect (represent) the world, do not (only) produce 
knowledge of the world, but actively produce the world (cf. Borgmann 1992).  
Second, an information system or IT artefact can be understood as an apparatus that probes and 
organizes the phenomenon of which it is a constituent part. The reduction of information 
through classification systems and for manipulation by computers involves a particular type of 
filtering (or “grating”; Barad 2007, p. 30), leaving some information behind (exclusion) but also 
creating both meaning and material consequences. For example, I would argue that the entity-
relational database, fundamental to today’s information systems, can be directly associated with 
the representationalist ontological assumptions that Barad critiques, where the world is 
comprised of discrete objects or entities with fixed attributes. These notions as embodied in a 
database constitute “regulatory practices produc[ing] a specific materialization of bodies” 
(Barad 2007, p. 63, citing Butler 1993), for example as evidenced in credit scoring or no-fly 
lists.  
Third, as drawn out in section 4.1.2 above, we can study an information system or IT artefact, as 
material-discursive practice or apparatus, across multiple instances (or phenomena). This is 
revealing of both the artefact and the larger phenomenon of which it is a constituent part, 
particularly at the points of breakdown. That is, we have on the one hand a particular 
information system or IT artefact as material-discursive practice or apparatus, sorting, 
partitioning and organizing the phenomena of which it is a part and producing knowledge. But 
Barad is not a constructionist, and believes in the materiality of a world ex-humans (and their 
non-human creations). Thus material agency within a phenomenon is not granted exclusively to 
the apparatus, but instead is located in observable intra-actions and then potentially attributable 
to various objects. For Barad, matter is active in the ongoing materialization of the world. In 
information systems, such material agency can be observed in technology dynamics such as 
path dependence and network effects, but also, as I discuss further in section 4.1.4, at points of 
breakdown. Thus Enron’s collapse revealed the breakdown of its defective financial accounting 
system as against the materiality of its inability to produce cash revenues from its ongoing 
business operations.  
Lastly, the multiplicity of ontological possibility entailed by agential realism enables an active 
engagement with the phenomenon of digital convergence (Tilson et al. 2010). Indeed it is an apt 
description of the most characteristic feature of digital convergence: the fluid, inchoate or 
indeterminate nature of “interconnection, overlapping, contestation, and reconfiguration of 
physical and logical socio-technical infrastructures” and “non-linear interactions across layers” 
(Tilson et al. 2010). In digital convergence, material artefacts and their associated attributes take 
on a kind of ontological indeterminacy, a fluid or inchoate quality. It becomes harder to say 
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exactly what something is: when is a computer a television; when is a mobile phone a camera; 
when does a search engine become a “data mart”; when is a social media platform a bank; when 
is a movie a video game and vice versa; and so forth. Agential realism (reflecting its origin in 
the example from experimental physics) does not break down in the face of inchoate or 
indeterminate phenomena whose constitutive objects are not tangible, self-evident, or pre-
determined. Instead it works backwards from “marks on bodies”; objects are defined by what 
they do, as measured by a particular apparatus or embodied practice of understanding. That this 
process of definition is always provisional and subject to the emergence of new, overtaking 
phenomena does not mean that it is a futile, moment-by-moment exercise. Instead we are 
engaged with (and within) a phenomenon as it unfolds “in a process of materialization that 
stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity and surface we call matter” (Butler 
1993, p. 9; cited at Barad 2007, p. 64). 
To summarize, I argue that Barad’s agential realism works well for IS research because 
information systems and IT artefacts can be meaningfully understood as material-discursive 
practices and apparatuses (with the implications noted above), across multiple instances, with 
the points of breakdown of particular interest. It is also a good fit to IS research, and in other 
areas, where the phenomena being investigated – in this case, packaged software and contract – 
are essentially indeterminate or inchoate, subject to various characterizations and revealing 
different aspects depending on the practical or theoretical lens applied. Such phenomena are 
likely to be “fluid”, here used to mean something that stays the same even as it changes (Mol 
and Law 1994), or (perhaps more concretely) to refer to a multiplicity of things that are the 
same at some level, yet not the same (like anemia). Following Barad, such phenomena can be 
made determinate only in relation to something else, i.e. when measured against a particular 
apparatus of understanding. In my study I am applying the lens (or apparatus) of 
commoditization to CMS, and (as described in section 4.2.3) the lens (or apparatus) of CMS to 
contract. I expect that my “readings” of CMS and of contract will reflect these choices. 
4.1.4 Agential realism, performativity in markets, and breakdown  
It remains to be said how Butler’s version of performativity relates to performativity in markets 
and my use of breakdown in this dissertation, as discussed in Chapter 2. First, I have noted that 
there has been a question raised from time to time (e.g. by Mol 1992, pp. 34-44, in respect of 
Butler 1990) as to whether the theory of performativity overstates the power of discourse 
(statements, models) in relation to matter, e.g. material bodies. Put in the alternative, what is the 
status of matter and material agency in relation to performativity? Barad offers a resolution with 
her concept of material-discursive practices, by locating performativity in the intra-actions 
within phenomena, and most fundamentally in her assertion that meaning and matter are not 
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separable. She argues for a “posthumanist” performativity, not limited to statements, or to 
humans and their creations, linguistic or otherwise. Barad’s invocation of performativity is 
principally a rejection of representationalism, but she goes on to say that humans are not the 
only ones engaged in performative enactments. In fact, in a move not dissimilar to Butler’s 
challenge to gender categories, she questions “the practices through which these differential 
boundaries [between human and non-human] are enacted” (Barad 2007, p. 66), and emphasizes 
that matter plays an active role in the materialization of the world. 
This is an all-encompassing notion of performativity that takes us quite some distance away 
from Austin, and may not be entirely easy to reconcile with MacKenzie’s schemas of 
performativity in the economy. Toward finding a common ground, I suggest that performativity 
is invoked when things that are normally considered ideational and intangible (statements, 
models, theories, assumptions (whether consciously held or not)) and having an apparently 
representationalist relationship to the world seem instead to have a material consequence, or to 
manifest in some sort of material embodiment, that is in some way surprising or otherwise 
noteworthy – evidencing, in Barad’s formulation, the inseparability of meaning and matter. 
Sometimes performativity involves a kind of feedback loop that may be hidden, as in the 
production of gender categories as described by Butler, or instead intentionally initiated toward 
creating a cycle of primed expectations and materialized realizations, as in the case of marketing 
(Cochoy 1998, 2010). Gartner’s Magic Quadrant (Pollock and Williams 2009b, 2010, 2011) and 
the Black-Scholes option pricing model (MacKenzie and Millo 2003) present more complex 
cases in terms of visibility and intentionality. On the other hand, Austin’s performativity, taking 
contract as an example, is completely visible, intentional, and (assuming “conditions of 
felicity”) effective, but does not involve any sort of feedback loop. These aspects of 
performativity are (as obliquely suggested by MacKenzie’s schemas) relative and variable, and 
Barad is making the more general point about the materiality of meaning, and vice versa.  
It is not my intention to attempt to reconcile the various versions of performativity. However, I 
would argue that Barad’s all-encompassing performativity does slightly reposition the notion of 
breakdown in a useful way and brings into the fold various observations that have been made 
about instances of breakdown, such as:  
[T]he model as statement has not been able to put into motion a world in which it can 
function. (D’Adderio 2008, p. 776)  
Barnesian performativity is not arbitrary self-fulfilling prophecy. (MacKenzie 2006a, p. 
51)  
[P]erformativity leaves open the possibility of events that might refute, or even happen 
independently of, what humans believe or think. (Callon 2007, p. 323)  
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As I read Barad, she would locate a performative operation that is intended or expected to bring 
about a certain materialization as a material-discursive practice or apparatus within a larger 
phenomenon where the intended or expected materialization may or may not occur. While 
Austin addressed this in terms of background law or some other technical requirement for 
performative effectiveness, Barad (2007, p. 64) notes that “the constitutive outside marks the 
limit to discourse”. When such a limit is encountered, it prompts an interrogation of the 
concepts embodied in the apparatus or other material-discursive practice and a consideration of 
what is excluded and what is included by those concepts as so embodied. An analysis based on 
breakdown begins with evidence of failed expectations and works backward to identify the 
agents. 
To illustrate, suppose a database characterizes all sea creatures as either fish or shellfish, using 
an image recognition technology.
22
 The operation of the database is to sort all sea creatures and 
its assumption is that all sea creatures are either fish or shellfish. In Barad’s terms, the database 
is an apparatus or material-discursive practice constitutive of a phenomenon that might be called 
sea creature sorting. To dramatize the example, take the case that all fish are eligible to be eaten, 
while shellfish are protected. Once the database is up and running, the consequences for sea 
creatures are undoubtedly material. When a dolphin appears, depending on the parameters built 
into the image recognition technology, it might be miscategorized (let us say, as a fish), it might 
be identified as an anomaly requiring adjustment of the database, or it might not be recognized 
at all. In any of those cases, there is a breakdown; the “constitutive outside” in the material form 
of the dolphin resisted the classification performativity of the database and its image recognition 
technology. The breakdown in one way or another is generative (cf. Callon 1998c) in that it 
produces a materialization and a meaning, among other things revealing assumptions embodied 
in the database (that all sea creatures are either fish or shellfish) and the image recognition 
technology. If the database and its image recognition technology are adjusted to take account of 
a third category of sea creatures, we might characterize the breakdown as corrective. 
To conclude, I mark “performativity” as having multiple meanings, and enlisted toward 
different aims. One might ask whether there is much integrity remaining in the concept or 
purpose in its use; I will return to this subject in Section 8.5. Holding this question open, I 
nonetheless take the view that tracing breakdown – the failure of expectation – is a productive 
way to organize and analyse the data in this study, as further discussed in this chapter and 
illustrated in chapters that follow.  
 
                                                          
22
 See Elias (2012) regarding the use of advanced imaging technology in airline passenger screening.  
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4.2 The biography of software approach as methodology for this study 
4.2.1. In relation to other approaches  
Pollock and Williams note that it can be a challenge to shape a methodology to track “the 
evolution of a technology … and how it is shaped by its specific historical context across 
multiple social locales” (Pollock and Williams 2009a, p. 80) or “complex technologies which 
are instantiated at multiple sites” (Pollock and Williams 2009a, p. 81). As I outlined in sections 
4.1.2 and 4.1.3, Barad’s perspective supports this sort of inquiry but does not, of course, address 
the methodological implications. As Pollock and Williams (2009a) point out, several common 
methodological approaches are clearly inadequate for developing an understanding the 
evolution of a packaged software product. Information systems development, software 
engineering and requirements engineering studies tend to take as their subject more or less self-
contained custom applications internal to an organization. “Before-and-after” snapshot studies 
which purport to demonstrate the technological success of new software products from a 
managerial perspective are too often aligned with the rhetoric of technology supply. 
Implementation studies that focus on breakdowns and failures, or that identify “success factors”, 
present a more sceptical view, but the time frames for observation may be truncated and 
research site selection may reflect some sort of bias (managerial or otherwise) or be a function 
of opportunistic access. A more fundamental concern is whether elements of the broader 
picture, in particular the nature and dynamics of technology supply, are missing altogether. 
Pollock and Williams observe that organizational and management studies tend to “blackbox 
the supplier and technology”, and tend to treat the vendor as “other”, whereas what is required is 
a more nuanced view of an “extensive network of technical, organizational and social 
arrangements whereby some (material, institutional) elements are difficult for local actors to 
change” (Pollock and Williams 2009a, p. 89).  
The biography of software approach is intended to address these shortcomings. Pollock and 
Williams characterize their approach as a “strategic ethnography” (Pollock and Williams 2009a, 
p. 112), a “‘variable research geometry’ that can be applied to diverse issues and in differing 
contexts, depending in particular upon what issue(s) are being addressed and which entities are 
being tracked” (Pollock and Williams 2009a, pp. 109-110). It is likely to involve multiple 
sources at multiple levels, and multiple methods, as appropriate to the research question. 
The biography of software approach diverges from the positivist and quantitative methodologies 
that have had a dominant position in IS research in the United States (Walsham 2012). 
However, Walsham (whose own research is interpretivist) argues that the other approaches, 
including not only interpretive but also design science and other action-oriented approaches, can 
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usefully complement positivist methodologies, and advocates methodological pluralism. Land 
(2010) has called for more historical studies in IS research, citing Pollock and Williams (2009a) 
as an exemplar, and Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) “organizing vision” as implying an 
“overtly historical approach”. The biography of software approach would clearly be responsive 
to these comments. 
4.2.2 A historical account informed by grounded theory and shaped by principles of corpus 
construction 
While Pollock and Williams describe their approach as a “strategic ethnography”, I suggest that 
the overarching methodology entails construction of a historical account. Precedents discussed 
in Chapter 2 (e.g. Cochoy 2010; Lepinay 2007a; Noble 1984, 1999; Poon 2007; Yates 2005) 
provide useful guidance. Both STS and studies of markets from economic sociology have an 
established tradition of technology histories – of telling the stories of technological artefacts, or 
of organizational or societal transformation associated with technology. MacKenzie and 
Wajcman (1985, pp. 10-14) cite Thomas Hughes’s technology histories, and Bijker and Law 
(1992) note that, while Bowker’s account of a particular Schlumberger technology is influenced 
by actor-network theory, his background is history.
23
 In Inventing Accuracy: An Historical 
Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (1990), Donald MacKenzie describes how 
improvements in missile accuracy were determined to be desirable, were designed and 
constructed, and then in various ways were evaluated. MacKenzie emphasized the need for a 
historical perspective because the relevant time frame exceeded the time constraints of a case 
study; “the weapons systems case study freezes time” (MacKenzie 1990, p. 8).  
It remains to say how a biography of software can be “strategic” in Pollock and Williams’s 
sense. In this respect, my biography of CMS is informed by grounded theory methodology 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967; Urquhart et al. 2010). Urquhart et al. have called for more use of 
grounded theory in IS research, in particular for theory development, and there are recent 
examples from relevant research literature (Beunza and Garud 2007; D’Adderio 2008; Levina 
and Vaast 2008; Pollock and Williams 2011; Pozzebon et al. 2011; Strong and Volkoff 2010). 
Pozzebon et al. (2011) note that grounded theory is linked to inductive theorizing and to 
“theoretical sensitivity. Sensitivity is the ‘ability to pick up on subtle nuances and cues in the 
                                                          
23
 “Bowker argues that the company successfully mobilized a series of resources to build a version of 
natural and social reality within which its methods secured success. As a part of this strategy, the 
company Whiggishly claimed that its geophysical techniques were, indeed, the product of an unfolding 
scientific and technical logic. … In short, the pretence of a natural trajectory and the concealment of 
contingency behind legal and organizational barriers were central ploys in the process of creating a 
successful technology. Bowker’s story suggests that the idea that technology may be seen as the 
appliance of science is a powerful form of rhetoric but, at least in the case of Schlumberger, rather far 
from the truth.” (Bijker and Law 1992, pp. 17-18, emphasis in original) 
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data that infer or point to meaning’ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008 p.19)”. The authors discuss 
inductive theorizing from cues (or clues?) to support creativity, but I suggest it is a productive 
approach generally for research questions that present in the form of a mystery, without a 
theoretical frame already established, or a pre-conceived hypothesis. These questions, like the 
research questions here, require a search for an explanation, rerum cognoscere causas, and thus 
an inductive approach.  
A longitudinal case study employing grounded theory procedures is appropriate for 
studying Org–ES fit [(the failure of CMS)] because it facilitates the emergence of 
theoretical concepts directly related to the phenomena being observed (i.e., misfits 
[breakdowns]), while simultaneously considering the context in which those phenomena 
are embedded (i.e., the organization and its new ES [the packaged software 
marketplace]). (Strong and Volkoff (2010, p. 734) 
However, except in one stage of the research (as discussed in section 4.3.1), I did not code text 
at a detailed level. Some consider detailed coding the foundation of or even equivalent to 
grounded theory, and so I say that this study is “informed” by grounded theory (perhaps “semi-
grounded”; Thompson and Walsham 2004). As informed by grounded theory, research design 
was based on the (iterative, provisional) sorting of data into themes or categories, the “constant 
comparison” of data and the theory under development, and the construction of a narrative or 
history that pulls the data and the theory together (Pozzebon et al. 2011; Urquhart et al 2010). 
The process was non-linear (Pozzebon et al. 2011). In my study the iterative loop of “constant 
comparison” encompassed not only data and “theory under development” but also the research 
literature (cf. Strong and Volkoff 2010), alongside a cycle of corpus construction around 
extension of the analytical frame and data collection to a point of saturation (Bauer and Aarts 
2000). That is, as the data was collected, I compared emerging themes with research literature, 
looked for novel or intriguing “leads” or “clues”, and identified missing pieces of the puzzle, 
before planning the next step (section 4.3.1). In managing this process against what was feasible 
in terms of access, I characterize the overall research design as “strategic” in Pollock and 
Williams’s sense. 
4.2.3 CMS as biographical subject; CMS and regions of contract 
It could be argued that “biography” with the associated anthropomorphism is a rhetorical and 
conceptual tool of convenience: Callon (1987) makes the case for the study of technology as a 
tool for sociological analysis without resort to anthropomorphism. But a biography is a 
particularly compelling form for a story about expectations and realizations. 
In doing a biography of a thing, one would ask questions similar to those one asks about 
people: What, sociologically, are the biographical possibilities inherent in its “status” 
and in the period and culture, and how are these possibilities realized? Where does the 
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thing come from and who made it? What has been its career so far, and what do people 
consider to be an ideal career for such things? What are the recognized “ages” or 
periods in the thing’s “life,” and what are the cultural markets for them? How does the 
thing change with age, and what happens to it when it reaches the end of its usefulness? 
(Kopytoff 1986, pp. 66-67) 
I offer two additional arguments in favor of “biography” as used in material culture studies. The 
first is the (provisional) reification-without-specification of the biographical subject to create a 
focus of inquiry. The second takes advantage of the two-level subject-object analytical 
structure: As the anthropomorphized biographical subject, software can “take a view on”, act 
on, and reveal its various associated objects.  
Vitari and Ravarini (2009) observe that “defining the subject can often be a challenge in the 
software arena”, and in Chapter 2 I suggested that “packaged software” is somewhat fluid, 
inchoate or indeterminate. It could be differentially “located” in a variety of “coordinate 
systems”, to use Mol and Law’s (1994) terminology. To deal with the definitional problem for 
their study, Vitari and Ravarini construct a definition of “content management sytems”, 
combining a definition of packaged software (section 2.1.1) with a description of a task or 
process (content management). Here the material culture studies perspective offers an 
alternative approach: We can locate and identify a thing (otherwise unspecified) by the life it 
leads. That is, the biographical subject is the thing that transcends local instantiations, travels 
through time and space, is named and recognized as as such, and has material agential qualities 
as traced across multiple instantiations (or phenomena). Like an avatar moving through a virtual 
game, it is clearly identifiable as (in some sense) a continuous entity from one setting to the next 
even if its qualities are to-be-specified, may change over time, and may even be irreducibly 
multiple in nature – “fluid” in the sense that it stays the same even as it changes (Mol and Law 
1994).  
Hoskins (2006), in considering the nature of agency of “relatively generic classes of objects”, 
cites Appadurai (1986b) and Myers (2001) for examples of multi-sited field projects “in order to 
trace things as they move through space and time” (pp. 74, 75).  
Critical fetishism – a heightened appreciation for the active materiality of things in 
motion – entails certain methodological questions and challenges, which recent writings 
in anthropology and geography address. For anthropologists, the exigencies of tracking 
commodities define a mode of fieldwork that Marcus has defined as doing ethnography 
“in/of the world systems”. This sort of fieldwork requires ethnographers to work in and 
across multiple field sites (e.g., scientists and traders), images (e.g., Rambo and 
Pokemon), and commodities of kinds (e.g., coffee and flowers) as they move from place 
to place and/or from node to node within a network of production and distribution. 
“Multi-sited research is designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or 
juxtapositions of locations in which the ethnographer establishes some form of literal 
presence, with an explicit posited logic of association or connection among sites that in 
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fact defines the argument of the ethnography” ([Marcus] 1995: 105, [Foster’s] 
emphasis). (Foster 2006, p. 286) 
The “logic of association or connection” as defining the otherwise unspecified biographical 
subject is well illustrated in John Law’s Aircraft Stories (2002). In this book, Law describes 
how his research into the fate of the failed TSR2 (nuclear fighter-bomber) military aircraft 
project challenged his notion of the object of study. In his account the TSR2 is not (solely) an 
aircraft or a project, it is ultimately, and irreducibly, the subject of multiple, unreconcilable 
narratives – a “decentered object”. 
The history of the TSR2 begins with a “gap” that opened up in the development of military 
aircraft (Law 2002, p. 67). The subsonic Canberra light bomber and reconnaissance aircraft had 
been immensely successful, but was aging and vulnerable to growing surface-to-air missile 
capabilities. In the meantime, the P1 Lightning supersonic fighter had been developed. The 
developer of both aircraft – English Electric – argued that its experience made it the best choice 
to develop a supersonic strike and reconnaissance aircraft as successor to the Canberra. This 
argument based on historical progress was, as Law observes, “perfectly plausible” (p. 69) – an 
example of an “origin story”. “[L]et’s say that this form of narrative is a coordinating strategy, a 
method for the cultural ordering of what would otherwise be disconnected objects.” (p. 70) But 
this was only one way to rationalize the design of the aircraft: A competitor, Vickers, touted its 
“weapons systems” expertise, and created what Law calls a “virtual space, virtual because it is 
conceptual and contains such entities as cost, size, lethality and ‘lethality per £ sterling’” (p. 77). 
Law describes the procurement process as a kind of story of interests, the many stories inherent 
in the design features and choices, and the “privileged place” of the designer. 
A marketing brochure tells a different type of story about the TSR2, first generating a range of 
“object positions” and then coordinating them into a single aircraft. Law identifies the 
mechanisms the brochure employs to connect and coordinate disparate elements: syntax that 
turns multiple objects into one (or unifies disparate identities); the physical structure of the 
brochure; a tabular hierarchy effected in the table of contents and ordering of material; the use 
of perspective and maps to project the aircraft and its capabilities into space; the presentation of 
the TSR2 as a complex of interrelated systems; and the association of the aircraft with speed 
and heroism. “This analysis implies that coherent and single objects are effects or products. It 
also implies a shift from epistemology to ontology. This is because inconsistency between 
different performances reflects failing coordination between different object positions rather 
than differences between external perspectives on the same object.” (Law 2002, pp. 8-9) He 
concludes: “[T]he work of object coordination and object disaggregation goes on – and on. It is 
to suggest that singularity of an object is precarious, uncertain and revisable.” (p. 36) To the 
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same effect he argues, “there is no such thing as a centered subject: like objects, subjects of 
knowledge are multiple or fractionally coherent. … the interferences between these different 
subject positions are a valuable source of data.” (p. 9) 
Law provides a kind of caution to the biography approach and the (provisionally) reified-but-
unspecified biographical subject when he notes that there is a “bias in favour of narrative 
continuity, and … discontinuities are effaced or deferred” (Law 2002, p. 9). This is a bias that 
the researcher cannot avoid, and “the difference between insider and outsider cannot be 
sustained: social scientists and participants alike tell their stories in terms of these narrative 
possibilities.” (p. 9) Law describes five narrative forms suggested during the course of his 
research project: plain history (though there is “no such thing”), a policy narrative (a “normative 
form of narrative, one that chains itself together by distributing praise, blame, and 
responsibility”), and ethical, esoteric and aesthetic narratives. He recounts how these patterns of 
narrative “coalesced in a particular way to interfere with one another and make a place of 
darkness” (p. 59). At this point the object became “decentered”. 
For purposes of the first research question, then, in light of these perspectives, I distinguish my 
approach from that taken by Vitari and Ravarini (2009) in their study of content management 
systems. First, I am not working from a constructed definition of the packaged software product, 
and, second, I do not conceive the biography of CMS as primarily about about price and 
functionality, though these things might be relevant. Instead it is about the life of CMS as 
commodity, the thing understood as such by and in the market, but otherwise unspecified, and 
potentially “decentered”. 
Turning to the second research question, the material culture studies perspective makes a further 
significant methodological contribution with its two-level subject-object analytical framework, 
in which the object of study, as subject, reveals the things and persons around it. “[I]t is the 
things-in-motion that illuminate their human and social context” (Appadurai 1986a, p. 5). 
“Biographies of things can make salient what might otherwise remain obscure” (Kopytoff 1986, 
p. 67).  
In this case, the biographical subject is CMS and its object is contract. But a comparable two-
level analytical structure (even if not expressed as such) is used in IS research whenever 
researchers analyse the relationship between an IT artefact and its project or object of 
organizational transformation, if they then go on to draw conclusions about the nature of that 
project or object (see Miettinen and Virkkunen 2005). Applying this two-level subject-object 
analytical framework to this case, we would say that CMS potentially reveals something about 
contract. The second research question (“To what extent did the market failure relate to 
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contract?”) can be stated in the alternative: “Is there something in the nature of contract that 
eludes and confounds automation as ‘envisioned’ or ‘understood’ by CMS?”  
I also specifically draw upon the example of Mol and Law’s “anemia” discussed in section 
4.1.2, analogizing contract to “anemia” – unlocatable and relatively unspecified – and 
suggesting that “regions” of contract can be mapped against adoption of CMS as an organizing 
technology. That is, I hypothesize that there is a “CMS region” of contract and a “non-CMS 
region” of contract (like “the Netherlands” and “Africa” of anemia), and take the view that 
mapping these regions to get an indication of those contracting contexts where CMS worked 
well and those where it worked less well will reveal something about contract.  
4.3 Overview of research design; multiple sources and multiple methods 
As noted in section 4.2.1, research design for the biography of software approach encompasses 
multiple sources at multiple levels, and multiple methods, as appropriate to the research 
question. For this study, I began with the motivating question: “What happened to contract 
management software?”, and thereafter the research progressed through iterative cycles of 
“constant comparison” (Urquhart et al. 2010). These cycles incorporated data analysis to 
identify emerging themes as against the research literature, refinement of the research question, 
and planning for the next step in data collection applying a logic of extension toward 
construction of a corpus (Bauer and Aarts 2000). In the following section I describe this process 
in detail, and then, in sections 4.3.2, 4.3.3 and 4.3.4, I describe the empirical material by type of 
data. 
4.3.1 From inside to outside: the iterative cycle of constant comparison and corpus construction 
I first heard of contract management software in 2002, when a colleague and I were approached 
to write a book on “contract management” (not contract management software). For my work, I 
was to be paid by a contract management software vendor. The purpose of this book, as 
described to us, was to explain the concept of contract management and to describe good 
contract management. My initial research indicated that there was little written on “contract 
management” as such; the term “contract management” had historically been used for the most 
part by US government contractors to refer to the administration of government contracts. In 
2002-2003, I conducted a set of interviews on contract management (including with Tim 
Cummins, the president and CEO of the IACCM), saw a demonstration (“demo”) of the 
vendor’s software, attended an IACCM European conference, and made a two-day site visit 
with my colleague to a customer of the vendor to discuss the implementation of contract 
management software for their procurement operation. But after our site visit we were unable to 
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make contact again with the customer. Our book was written but did not find a publisher, and 
my colleague and I went on to other things. 
Through the IACCM connection, I met other people who during the years 2003-2007 invited me 
to speak occasionally on the subject of contract management and contract automation. In 2007 
IACCM conducted a CMS “market sizing” survey, which showed a significant shortfall in 
industry revenues from what had been predicted five years earlier by Gartner. This raised the 
question: What happened to contract management software? I had not followed the market but 
based on my own favourable impression from 2003 had assumed that it would become a 
successful mainstream software product.  
I began my research in 2008 by carrying out a detailed analysis (including detailed coding) of 
vendor marketing material to understand how the vendors characterized their product and its 
benefits. I also conducted a second round of eighteen interviews in early 2008, this time 
focusing specifically on CMS and on other IT tools used in contracting (Appendix 4.1). Most of 
these interviews were arranged through IACCM contacts, and a number of them were with 
vendors or with CMS customers. One of my interviewees was the founder of a CMS vendor 
firm. But I also carried out several in-depth interviews, including one on-site, with the head of 
contracting for a UK public sector entity that was not a CMS customer. In this on-site interview 
the interviewee and I together filled out a detailed questionnaire regarding the portfolio of 
contracts he managed. In addition I conducted update interviews with several 2003 interviewees 
who were neither vendors nor CMS customers.  
My analysis of the vendor marketing material indicated that CMS was based on assumptions 
that (1) the contract document is the source of contract information, and that such information 
can be represented as discrete datapoints, (2) contract management is principally a matter of 
internal control and standardization, and (3) a closed, process-oriented application can 
overcome organizational fragmentation to centralize control over contracting and deliver an 
enterprise view of contract. These assumptions were not consistent with research on contract 
(see section 3.2), and interview data cast doubt on their validity. For the next stage of research, I 
sought an in-depth look at CMS in order to understand better its internal scope of 
implementation as against an organization’s portfolio of contracts and contracting activities. 
One vendor introduced me to three customers willing to be the subject of case study or site visit 
observations. My initial research design for this study contemplated three comparative case 
studies of the same software in different organizations. But over the course of 2008-2009, I was 
able to carry out only one in-depth site visit – at a division of a very large health insurance 
company in the United States (described in section 5.2). I conducted two interviews with a 
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second customer – a global consumer products company – at their headquarters in London, but 
was unable to arrange any follow-up. In the third case – a very large UK public sector entity – I 
was able to conduct an initial interview but despite willingness in principle on their side, 
scheduling difficulties (and no doubt the low priority given to my request) resulted in the 
follow-up visit being put off multiple times. I eventually stopped asking. Nevertheless, the 
interviews I was able to carry out indicated that the three implementations of the same CMS 
product were significantly different from one another (discussed in section 5.2.6). At the same 
time, through 2008 and 2009, I continued to conduct additional interviews, for a total of sixteen 
in this third round of interviews (see Appendix 4.1). Throughout the second and third round of 
interviews I was not committed to a particular hypothesis, nor had I adopted a particular 
theoretical lens. 
By the summer of 2009 I concluded I would not be able to progress the case studies or site 
visits. In addition I had reached a preliminary point of “saturation” (Bauer and Aarts 2000), as 
interview material became repetitive and predictable, depending on the positioning of the 
interviewee. Vendors continued to recite the benefits of CMS, but acknowledged that the market 
was immature, and that many customers remained at the lower levels of a “maturity model” (see 
Figure 5.5), implementing only a contracts repository but none of CMS’s more advanced 
features. Implementations were localized, and were difficult to achieve. I had assembled a 
catalogue of issues for CMS, and yet I did not feel the story was complete.  
Interview data had suggested that there was a correspondence between types of contract and 
CMS adoption. To get a broader and more structured data set, I designed a survey to locate 
CMS in relation to the TCE model of governance discussed in Chapter 3. To do this I designed 
a matrix (Table 4.1) bringing together a number of the perspectives surveyed in Chapter 3, and 
hypothesized that the dimensions of contract organized in this matrix would correspond to CMS 
versus non-CMS “regions” of contract. 
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Contract attributes Market governance Hierarchical or hybrid 
governance 
Scale (volume and 
standardization) 
High Low 
Relational contract Low High 
Performance easy to define High Low 
Data discreteness (how 
easily reduced to and 
represented by discrete data) 
High Low 
Implicit terms of contract Assumed relatively low 
and/or well-understood 
Variable, but unlikely to be 
well-defined 
Interdependency of 
performance 
Low High 
Risk and extended risk (risk 
or liability beyond the 
immediate counterparty, i.e. 
network risk) 
Assumed relatively low 
and/or well-understood 
May be significant and complex 
Counterparty information 
sharing 
Low High 
Table 4.1 Hypothesized contract attributes against market versus hierarchical or hybrid 
governance
24
 
In addition, to find a new perspective, in 2009 I carried out the first of two detailed website 
reviews of five CMS vendors (the “five focus vendors” and four (now three, following a 
merger) leading analyst firms substantially involved in defining and tracking the market. I 
selected the five focus vendors on the basis that (1) all five were mentioned as leading firms in 
the 2008 Forrester Wave for contract management software, (2) they have been active since the 
inception of the market, (3) as of 2009 they were still active in the market, and (4) historical 
                                                          
24
 Market transactions rank low in asset specifity and thus high in standardization. In the idealized market, 
key contract variables are few (e.g. price, quantity, date), and thus market transactions also rank low in 
relational context, performance (or breach) is easy to define, and the contract may easily be reduced to 
and represented by structured datapoints – a quality I call “data discreteness”. In the hierarchical or hybrid 
model, asset specificity and relational context may be high. Performance may be more “in the eye of the 
beholder” and there may be more recourse to unstructured data – that is, bespoke, natural language 
contract terms captured in a contract document. This means “data discreteness” may be low. In a well-
defined and sophisticated market, a large portion of contract content may be implicit, i.e. well-defined 
within the trading community though not reduced to writing in each contract. Implicit content may or may 
not be present but is unlikely to be well-defined in the hierarchical or hybrid model. In an idealized 
market transaction, interdependence of performance is low: The buyer pays a price against delivery. In 
the idealized market, risk is either low or assumed to be well-understood, whereas risk is potentially high 
but in any case likely to be less well-understood in the hierarchical or hybrid model. There is no ongoing 
need for information sharing with counterparties in market transactions, whereas in a hierarchical or 
hybrid governance situation there is likely to be an ongoing need for information sharing. 
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information is publicly available. Two (Selectica and Ariba) are public; i-Many, an early leader 
in the field, was public until the middle of 2009; and two (Emptoris and Upside) are privately 
owned. I also reviewed SEC filings for the three focus vendors that were public companies. 
SEC filings include a variety of data, including a full set of financial statements (balance sheet, 
income statement and statement of cash flows), a description of the company and its business, a 
description of the company’s products, customers, markets and competitors, and management’s 
discussion and analysis of financial results. Public companies in the United States are required 
to submit annual reports on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q. In addition they are 
required to provide prompt disclosure of material events (such as mergers and acquisitions) on 
Form 8-K. 
In the course of the SEC filings review, I revisited and reframed my initial encounter with CMS 
when I discovered that at the time of the customer site visit in 2003 the reference customer was 
in contractual partnership with the vendor to develop and market software. The contract that 
required the customer to engage in outreach and other marketing efforts was part of the public 
record, as was the ultimate failure of their joint software development initiative. Our book 
project had been a small (vanishingly small) part of the vendor’s marketing program and 
budget. The archival review of the five focus vendors showed that I, and my interviewees, had 
been taking the artefact too much for granted. Contract management software is entirely recast 
when set in the context of the producing firms’ highly distinct histories. It became clear that I 
needed to extend my analytical frame to consider the vendors, and that I needed the views of 
more people familiar with CMS but not associated with vendors. I looked to the survey to 
produce some additional “non-aligned” interview subjects. 
The archival review of the five focus vendors also produced a shift in my understanding of the 
motivating question. I had been thinking about it in terms of figuring out what was “wrong” 
with CMS. Now I wanted to know: Where did CMS come from? Why did the market expect it 
would be successful? In other words, I adopted a market perspective, and became more 
interested in the arc of disappointed market expectations. The key themes from Pollock and 
Williams (2009a) became the supplier-user nexus (later generalized as the knowledge network), 
supply-side rhetoric (generalized as the organizing vision) and generification. Following leads 
from Pollock and Williams’s book, I found that the theory of commoditization and the studies 
of markets from economic sociology provided a theoretical perspective that supported this 
extended analytical frame and restructured my data toward broader implications. In particular, 
from the theory of performativity in markets, my corpus construction incorporated a fourth 
theme, breakdown, which was not relevant in Pollock and Williams’s biography of a successful 
packaged software product. This stream of research thus provided a source of potential insights 
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as well as a target for “theoretical integration” (Urquhart et al. 2010); in other words, my data 
was now in dialogue with a richly theoretical body of research. 
My survey was sent to IACCM members in the spring of 2010. Based on the survey, I was able 
to conduct an additional seven highly informative interviews with survey respondents in early 
2011 – breaking out of the closed circle of vendor-related interviewees. I also successfully 
arranged an interview with a founder of one of the five focus vendors and with an authoritative 
analyst who has been following, and publishing on, the market since its inception. I updated my 
earlier interviews with the vendor firm that had been particularly helpful and with their 
customer who had hosted my 2009 site visit.  
As a subscriber to marketing material from the vendors and the analysts and a member of 
IACCM, I received a flow of emails from roughly 2007 through early 2011 on contract 
management software, and I listened in on various marketing “webinars” (presentations over the 
internet). In 2009 I spoke at a CMS user conference (the vendor is not one of the five focus 
vendors), and I wrote an article for IACCM’s newsletter. In 2010 I chaired a roundtable on 
contract automation at IACCM’s EMEA conference. These activities kept me generally abreast 
of market developments. In 2011, I carried out an updated review of archival material, 
consisting of SEC filings and website material, for both the five focus vendors and three key 
analysts and an archival review of IACCM materials, including a review of newsletters going 
back to 2002. To further explore the role of the analysts, I studied a legal proceeding against one 
of the analysts, Gartner, in the United States.  
The data defined the overall time frame covered by the study. The “biography” of CMS starts 
around 2000-2001; the relevant firms and the concept had their origin in the dot.com era. It was 
in 2002 that Gartner made a prediction of a $20 billion market by 2007; in the same year, my 
colleague and I were recruited to write our book on contract management. After 2008, Gartner 
terminated its “Marketscope” coverage of “contract management software” – indicating that it 
was no longer an emerging software market – but did not initiate the “Magic Quadrant” 
coverage Gartner provides to established software markets. By 2011, it had become relatively 
easy to trace the fragmentation of the CMS category and the evolution of product delivery 
platforms. So the overall time frame of this study runs from 2000 to early 2011, coincident with 
an arc of disappointed expectations and product and market realignment.  
In this section I have explained how the inductive approach suggested by grounded theory and 
principles of corpus construction successively refined and sharpened the research questions 
against the research literature and suggested the next step in data collection. There was a process 
of serial revelation, as the project followed a path from “inside” to “outside”, and in the end I 
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reached a second point of closure or “saturation”, where the early findings dropped into a more 
comprehensive explanatory framework. In the course of the journey I discovered a closed circle 
of self-referentiality, which was by no means apparent to me in either 2002, when I was 
recruited into the circle, or in 2007, when I took up the question of why CMS had “failed”. As 
we will see in Chapters 6 and 7, this closed circle of self-referentiality became part of the story.  
4.3.2 The interviews, including the site visit 
As discussed in section 4.3.1, I carried out interviews in roughly four stages, with the first in 
2002-2003, and the last in 2011. The interviews included two site visits, one in 2003 and one in 
2009. The list of interviews is included in Appendix 4.1, which also indicates by code other 
features of the interviews, such as whether interviews were conducted in person or by telephone, 
were part of a site visit, or incorporated a demonstration of software. Of the 53 interviews in 
total, the composition as between vendors, customers and others is shown in Table 4.2. 
 
The five focus vendors 7 interviews (covering 4 of the 5), including 2 
of the 5 founders of the companies 
Other software vendors, including vendors of 
CMS 
9 interviews 
Customers of five focus vendors 18 interviews 
Others (non-customer user organizations, 
IACCM staff, analysts, consultants) 
19 interviews 
TOTAL 53 interviews 
Table 4.2 Summary of interviews by market position 
All interviews were conducted with the intent of obtaining information about CMS from expert 
informants, not from a perspective of sampling or for close coding of the precise words used. 
Many of the interviews were with experienced and senior people, with ten, twenty or more years 
in the field. These interviews deeply informed the historical dimension, providing a kind of oral 
history (cf. MacKenzie 2004). Nearly all of the people I spoke with had been specifically 
following the development of the CMS product and market for years.  
Except as indicated, interviews were not recorded but instead I wrote them up shortly afterwards 
and (as noted) sent them to the interviewee for review. Except for the interviews in 2002-2003, I 
generally sent the interviewee a set of questions in advance, though these were used as talking 
points or a rough guide to encourage interviewees to tell me their own story and to share any 
insights they might wish to offer on the subject; i.e. they were semi-structured (cf. Fontana and 
102 
 
Frey 2000). The protocol for the second and third stage interviews (2008-2009) is included as 
Appendix 4.2.  
4.3.3 The survey 
In February and March 2010, the IACCM distributed the survey to the members of its Contract 
Management and Automation Communities of Interest (according to the IACCM, 4962 
members in all). The survey was in two parts, and was sent out by email with SurveyMonkey 
(www. Surveymonkey.com) links. Appendices 4.3 and 4.4 show the questions asked in the 
survey. I had a very low response rate relative to the size of the mailing, with N roughly 100 or 
so. This perhaps supports the comment made by one person from IACCM that contract 
managers are not all that interested in contract automation. Statistics that show the profile of 
respondents are set out in Appendix 4.5.  
As a method of data collection, online surveys provide a number of advantages but present 
some problems as well (Evans and Mathur 2005; Maronick 2009). They are fast, they 
accommodate question diversity and branching logic, they have global reach; on the other hand, 
they may be problematic in terms of representativeness and response rate. With respect to both 
representativeness and the low response rate, it is important to note that, as with the interviews, 
I did not treat the survey respondents as a representative sample of a larger population. Instead 
my principal goals for the survey were (1) to complement and corroborate (or not) other data 
with input from engaged informants in the CMS target market (see Chapter 6), (2) to trace 
associations between CMS adoption and other variables, and (3) to obtain additional interviews 
through a channel other than introductions. In other words, this is essentially a qualitative study 
that makes use of survey data within an overall logic of corpus construction to “saturation”. 
Still, I note that of those who responded roughly half (Part 2) or more (Part 1) provided email 
addresses, and of these a number of url addresses were of recognizable companies (e.g. IBM, 
Emerson, Chevron, Zurich, Rockwell, Hewlett Packard, CSC, British Petroleum, British 
Telecom, Thales, ConocoPhillips, Honeywell, Accenture). I also note that although the number 
of responses was low, it was on the same order of magnitude as what IACCM had achieved in 
their 2007 and 2009 market surveys.  
I downloaded the SurveyMonkey data into the statistical program SPSS for analysis. After 
download, I went through a process of scrubbing the data for uncompleted surveys, obvious 
errors and anomalies, and duplicate responses. I ended up with useful data for 106 respondents 
to Part 1 (N=106), and with useful data for 86 respondents to Part 2 (N=86). In Part 2, seven (7) 
responses were from vendors, consultants or resellers into the CMS market, and I had structured 
the survey so that these “sell-side” respondents answered only a subset of questions relating to 
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CMS priorities, to compare to non-vendor priorities. One non-vendor respondent incorrectly 
categorized his response as from a vendor, so did not complete most of the non-vendor 
questions. This means that for most of Part 2 questions, N = 78. Of these non-vendor 
respondents, 29 who were using, implementing or considering CMS answered a further subset 
of questions. In other words, respondents to Part 2 consisted of 86 total respondents; 7 sell-side 
versus 79 (or 78) non-sell-side; and, of non-sell-side, 29 CMS users (or prospective users).  
In both parts of the survey, the key dependent variable is adoption of CMS, whether from a 
pure-play
25
 CMS vendor, from another software vendor (such as an ERP vendor), or built in-
house. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of adoption of CMS, ranked into various 
categories (Appendix 4.6). Cross-tabulations against the level of CMS adoption were run 
against other questions in the survey and tested for statistical significance.
26
 In addition to 
questions regarding the association of CMS to type of contract, the survey asked a number of 
questions about the history of CMS, features of CMS, priorities with respect to CMS and the 
procurement and implementation of CMS. Answers to these questions where relevant are noted 
in Chapter 5. As discussed above, respondents were asked whether they would be willing to be 
contacted for interviews, and this yielded a relatively small number of especially informative 
“round four” interviews.  
4.3.4 Archival research 
Archival materials reviewed for the vendors included press releases, web materials (such as 
product descriptions, “white papers” and customer case studies), and analyst and news reports, 
as well as, for the three public focus vendors, SEC filings. As noted above I carried out these 
archival reviews twice, once in the summer of 2009 and a second time in early 2011. From this 
review and to the extent data was available, I prepared tables of financial data; strategic 
transactions; sales and marketing expenses and research and development expenses; stock return 
comparisons; capital infusions; segment reporting; revenue classification; customers; product 
evolution; the company description over time; and mentions of IACCM and analysts in press 
releases. 
The IACCM resource library was also a useful source for tracing the evolution of CMS. In 
particular, the IACCM ran CMS “market sizing surveys” in 2007 and 2009. In addition, I 
                                                          
25
 “Pure-play” refers to a vendor that offers or specializes in only a single type of software. In this case, 
pure-play vendors are those whose sole or principal product is CMS, as distinct from vendors who might 
offer CMS modules or capabilities within a more general ERP, ECM or other larger category offering. 
26
 I have noted P values < .10 as suggesting an association, but only within the limited scope and ambition 
of the survey as outlined above. For a number of cross-tabulations, given the low N, I reduced through 
combination the number of categories for CMS adoption and other variables, and have noted where cells 
(up to 20%) in the cross-tabulations might have counts less than 5. (Agresti and Finlay 2009; Kuha 2009) 
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researched contract management software and the five focus vendors on the websites of the 
(now) three analyst firms, Gartner (including AMR), Forrester and Aberdeen. Appendix 4.7 is 
an indicative list of Gartner materials relating to CMS and five focus vendors. I also researched 
a United States federal case against Gartner (ZL Technologies vs. Gartner) by reading the court 
filings, and read materials from CMS and other software vendors, in addition to the five focus 
vendors.  
There are two points to note regarding the archival research. The first is the instability of vendor 
website material.  
For some, the internet increasingly approximates the Foucauldian notion of the archive 
as the collection of all potential statements, constantly being transformed and recast 
[citation omitted]. While often seen as an extremely versatile depository of documents, 
facts and information, the internet constantly changes and transforms the information 
posted. (Geiger et al. 2010) 
Vendor websites change all the time, and substantially at the point of new ownership, so, for 
example, some materials found in my first website review in 2009 were no longer available 
online in 2011. On the other hand, the SEC website is a government document repository, as is 
the electronic document access portal for the US federal courts, so these sources represent stable 
content. The IACCM has continued to offer an archive of its newsletters and library materials. 
However, only some analyst materials are available without charge, and the analysts have no 
obligation to maintain an archive of historical material.
27
  
A second point relates to the dual role of much of the archival material in this study, which both 
records events in the life of CMS and constitutes primary data as communications of members 
of the knowledge network regarding the organizing vision and the category. For example, SEC 
filings provide investor disclosure as required by law but to some extent (particularly at the time 
of an IPO) are a selling document (or public relations document, see McKinstrey 1996; cf. 
Preston et al. 1996; Preston and Young 2000). They are filled with risk factors and other caveats 
to limit liability to investors, but they also enable management to set out their vision for the firm 
and to comment on results, strategy and plans for the future. In using SEC filings and vendor 
press releases as records of events in the life of CMS, I have for the most part taken these 
documents to represent management’s good faith effort to communicate to investors and the 
general public in compliance with any legal requirements. That is, I assume they represent a 
kind of self-reporting, are reasonably accurate as reflections of management’s understanding of 
                                                          
27
 When Campbell-Kelly tried to obtain industry reports from analysts such as IDC, Datapro and 
Forrester, he was told that they did not archive their reports for more than ten years, and that in any case 
the reports would not be made available (Campbell-Kelly 2007). 
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the business (or at least of how management wants to present the business), and sufficiently 
accurate for purposes of the arguments laid out in the dissertation.  
 
4.4 Summary of methodology; developing a table of breakdown 
 
To summarize, my methodology for this study is the biography of software approach (Pollock 
and Williams 2009a), which I have adapted and extended in several ways. I have adopted a 
particular epistemological and ontological position, Barad’s (2003, 2007) agential realism, 
arguing that it is particularly appropriate here where the objects of study – packaged software 
and contract – are, as I have shown in Chapters 2 and 3, to a degree fluid, inchoate or 
indeterminate, potentially “decentered objects” (Law 2002).  
 
To keep the biography of CMS in bounds and responsive to the motivating question, I followed 
a strategy informed by grounded theory (Urquhart et al. 2010) and shaped by principles of 
corpus construction (Bauer and Aarts 2000). Over the course of the research, this strategy turned 
the motivating question into two research questions, and structured corpus construction around 
four themes: the organizing vision, the knowledge network and generification from Pollock and 
Williams (2009a) and breakdown.  
 
Breakdown, as I have defined it to mean a failure of expectations associated with a performative 
assumption or operation, is used in this study as an analytical device, and, to record the evidence 
of breakdown as it appears in the empirical material, I work with a table of breakdown in three 
columns: (1) breakdown observed; (2) breakdown of what?; and (3) revealing what?. In the first 
column I collect the evidence of the various problems and issues that CMS seems to have 
encountered. The second column groups these into categories, not in terms of, say, software 
functionalities or the like, but instead in relation to expectations that have not been met – the 
business model for packaged software, the organizing vision for CMS, the category as the 
market correlate to the organizing vision, and lastly the market expectations for CMS. The third 
column is reserved for the performative assumptions and operations revealed by the breakdown. 
 
The table of breakdown that I use to organize and present my data and analysis is of course only 
that – a tool for organization and presentation. But I found a number of advantages in using this 
tool. Generally, the table first disciplines and then illustrates corpus construction and analysis. 
More particularly, it operationalizes the notion that breakdown is revelatory, setting forth the 
evidence of breakdown, specifying what broke down, and showing what performative 
operations and assumptions were (in my analysis) revealed. Though this material could be set 
out in text, or in terms of a coding scheme, and without reference to performativity or 
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“breakdown”, I am working within the performativity framework along a number of related but 
distinct lines: performativity in markets as developed by Callon, MacKenzie and others, 
classification performativity as suggested by Butler and (obliquely) by Bowker and Star, and, as 
I will discuss, Austin’s original performativity. The table of breakdown is a way of applying this 
theoretical orientation explicitly in data analysis. Further, the rows of the table – as they 
emerged from the data – generate a sense or story of interactions across different levels of 
commoditization. This informs my biography of CMS as a commodity, leading directly to an 
insight that I have theorized as a “substitution of performance” (section 7.3). Lastly, the 
sequential building of the table from Chapter 5 to Chapter 7 visually demonstrates the 
explanatory power achieved by expanding the scope of data collection to include the analysts 
and the vendors.  
 
In Chapter 5, I present the data up to the first point of saturation, develop a biography of CMS 
as an organizational technology, and create the initial version of the table of breakdown, using 
only the first two columns. In Chapter 6, to explore the market perspective, I expand the 
analytical frame to include the analysts and the vendor firms. Based on this additional data, I 
develop a second, subsuming biography of CMS as commodity, and fill out the two-column 
table with additional evidence of breakdown. In my analysis in Chapter 7, I bring the data into 
closer dialogue with the research literature in response to the research questions and fill out the 
third column of the table. This presentation thus closely follows the unfolding of the overall 
project as discussed in section 4.3.1 and illustrates the additional explanatory power brought to 
bear by applying the market perspective. 
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Chapter 5 Empirical material: a biography of CMS as an organizing technology for 
contract 
In this chapter, I draw on interview (including site visit) and survey data, vendor selling material 
and IACCM archival material to develop a biography of CMS as an organizing technology for 
contract, tracing the arc of disappointed expectations and building a catalog of breakdown 
against the organizing vision for CMS, the CMS category, and the business model for packaged 
software. In this version of the biography of CMS, CMS has precedents, an origin, and a name. 
It is a technological artefact with certain capabilities, brought to market with an organizing 
vision, sold by vendors, considered by prospective customers, implemented by user 
organizations, and remarked upon by industry observers. The business model for packaged 
software outlined an ideal career path for CMS, but CMS did not follow this path and 
accumulated a record of shortcomings. By the end of the story, “CMS” appears to be more than 
one technological artefact; as we will see, through the telling of the biography, the biographical 
subject fractures. 
In section 5.1 I explain why CMS seemed promising, by describing predecessor technologies 
(section 5.1.1), the founding of the IACCM and the idea of contract management (section 
5.1.2), and the organizing vision for CMS, as a natural progression in the application of ICT to 
contracting (section 5.1.3). In section 5.2, to compare CMS in a successful implementation 
against the organizing vision, I present data from a 2009 site visit, describing the reference 
customer (section 5.2.1), procurement and implementation (section 5.2.2), how CMS was used 
(section 5.2.3), and knowledge production capabilities of CMS (searches, reports and queries) 
(section 5.2.4). Two years later, I followed up the site visit to see what had happened with CMS 
in the interim (section 5.2.5). In section 5.2.6 I compare this implementation to the organizing 
vision for CMS and to two other implementations of the same software. In section 5.3, I briefly 
describe the role of the IACCM, a key participant in the knowledge network, in the biography 
of CMS.  
In section 5.4 I discuss evidence of how CMS broke down. In terms of the business model for 
packaged software, the evidence points to a breakdown in generification, that is, a failure to 
make CMS into a product that would easily work for different types of contracts and “travel” 
across industry verticals (section 5.4.1). With respect to the organizing vision, CMS did not 
“enclose” contracting (section 5.4.2), generally failed to produce contracting knowledge 
(section 5.4.3), and did not work equally well for all contracting environments but was 
associated with “algorithmic” contracting (section 5.4.4). Lastly, a lack of coherence in the 
CMS concept pointed toward a breakdown in the CMS category (section 5.4.5). I conclude the 
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chapter with a brief biography of CMS as an organizing technology for contract, and the initial 
table of breakdown (section 5.5). 
5.1 Why CMS seemed promising: the organizing vision for CMS 
5.1.1 Predecessor technologies 
From a technology standpoint, contracting has evolved alongside other document-centric office 
work. In the 1970s and 1980s, contract managers (or their secretaries) used typewriters or 
electric and electronic (early word-processing) equivalents, paper, carbon paper, “white-out”, 
photocopy machines, and physical cutting and pasting “like in kindergarten”. Some 
organizations used typed or printed standard forms or templates to enforce or encourage 
standardization of contract terms. Traditionally, a key issue in any contracting context has been 
whose “paper” would be used. That is, the contract would typically be based on one party’s 
standard form, and that party would be in charge of drafting revisions. Negotiations were carried 
out in meetings or over the phone, and revised documents sent around by the drafting party. 
Proofreaders manually read documents against one another to find and mark changes. Contracts 
were exchanged during negotiations through physical distributions by mail or courier and were 
signed in duplicate original paper copies. Storage and retrieval systems consisted of folders in 
file cabinets; for sensitive contracts, storage of contracts might be in “vaults” – secure cabinets 
or filing rooms with check-in and check-out procedures.  
With electronic word processing and email, the contract document environment speeded up but 
also to a degree became uncontrolled. It became easy to create a new contract using an old 
contract document that might be a poor model, or to use the wrong template, or to electronically 
cut and paste outdated or inappropriate language. Any party could make changes, and many 
drafts might be sent around for review. The “final” version of the contract was often left 
unprotected in the parties’ electronic records (not “locked down”), and might be inadvertently 
tampered with; or the electronic version might not reflect last minute handwritten changes. It 
was even the case that contracts were stored on personal computers and personal storage devices 
rather than on the firm network. 
At the same time, IT held out the promise of not only more efficient contracting but improved 
control and better contract information, taking advantage of the electronic documents 
environment (word processing capabilities together with email) in conjunction with a contracts 
database or spreadsheet. Lawyers and contract managers also experimented with document 
automation tools, which could build a document based on filling in a form or working through a 
“wizard”.  
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For example, one contracting group at a global telecommunications company used Lotus Notes 
in a desktop application linked to a database that included a contract summary, some data fields 
and the contract document. In the late 1990s, they took up a more ambitious bespoke project, 
also built on Lotus Notes and costing millions of dollars. It included bid functionality, automatic 
document generation, a negotiation platform, a contracts repository and a contract 
administration module, with alerts and a milestone checkoff. But this system was not mandatory 
across the firm, data entry was burdensome, some people resisted the heightened visibility, and 
there was no integration with the pre-existing “legacy” system. The system fell into disuse. 
Shortly afterwards, the company took up an ERP project, and in the course of that project a 
basic contracts database with about twenty items of metadata was constructed. But there were 
no controls imposed on filling in the questionnaire for the metadata, so the database was not 
particularly reliable and therefore not too useful. It too was abandoned.  
Such ad hoc efforts often did not take root. Initiatives would lapse when their proponents left 
the organization. In addition, the projects turned out to be more difficult than originally 
envisioned in terms of managing access, defining metadata fields, and coding contracts. To 
summarize, during the 1990s, as contracting professionals became familiar with the electronic 
documents environment and databases, they pursued ad hoc and often short-lived strategies 
based on the then-current versions of office IT. There was a sense that more could usefully be 
done with the right IT tools if they were available.  
5.1.2 The founding of the IACCM and the idea of contract management 
Around the same time, there was a growing focus on contract management as an organizational 
competence and as a profession. Contract management historically referred to making sure that 
complex contracts – mostly in the government contracts area – were carried out in accordance 
with their terms. Government agencies and government contractors had “contract managers” in 
charge of ticking the boxes of contract compliance and dealing with contract changes and 
problems. Over time, the skills and discipline associated with government contracting began to 
appear in commercial contracting contexts, which had historically been more informal. 
In 1999, the IACCM (International Association for Contract and Commercial Management, 
www.iaccm.com) was founded with the support of British Telecom, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, 
Lucent Technologies, Marconi Communications, and Siemens. Tim Cummins, a former senior 
contracting executive with IBM, has been the president and CEO of IACCM since it was 
founded. The IACCM seeks to professionalize the role of the contract manager and to develop 
contract management as a key organizational function and capability worthy of recognition and 
support. It runs annual conferences (one each for the Americas, Europe and EMEA) and has 
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developed individual training and certification courses as well as organizational benchmarking 
programs. As of 2011, IACCM claimed membership of over 20,000 individuals from 8724 
organization in 128 countries (44% Americas, 39% EMEA, 15% Asia-Pacific), including about 
half of the Global 500. IACCM has expanded beyond the IT and telecommunications industries 
to include the pharmaceutical, aerospace, professional services, outsourcing and other 
industries. This reflects a growing recognition that the stakes in global contracting are high, and 
that contracting professionals need training and support. From a contract management 
perspective, contracting in many organizations is less than optimal – inefficient, opaque, and 
fragmented across multiple administrative and business functions. The lack of an organizing 
technology for contract suggested an opportunity for software vendors. 
5.1.3 The organizing vision: automating the contract lifecycle across the enterprise 
Starting in about 2000-2001, software vendors began to market contract management software 
as an organizing technology for contract. While ERP systems managed the structured data for 
sales and purchases (e.g. delivery of goods), and CRM systems provided a place to store 
information about customers, they did not provide an organizing technology for the contracting 
process and contract documents. CMS was positioned to fill the gap between CRM and ERP, 
linking knowledge about counterparties with contract terms and transactional data. 
Contract management software provides workflow, automated document assembly, and a 
document repository, together with alerts, reporting and analytics capabilities, and was designed 
to support the entire contract lifecycle.  
Figure 5.1 The contract lifecycle as defined by Forrester Research (Forrester Research Inc. 
2008; with permission)  
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Bidding, negotiation and approvals would take place within the workflow application. Then a 
contract document would be generated, based on the key terms agreed. The finalized contract 
would be filed in an electronic document repository, with the key contract terms as document 
metadata (structured data about the contract, tagged to the document). These key terms could 
then be used to feed other IT systems internally and possibly external (counterparty) systems as 
well. 
Pre-contract (bidding,
preliminary
discussions, etc.)
Preliminary 
agreement
Contract creation,
negotiation,
revision,
approvals
Contract execution
and related
formalities
Contract 
performance;
possible 
amendments, etc.
Post-performance
survival of
some terms
Archival retention 
and eventual 
disposal
Process 
database, 
Incorporating
workflow, 
templates,
clauses,
document assembly,
guidance
Document 
database 
(repository) and 
associated 
metadata
Transactions 
or other
operational
database
The contract lifecycle 
as envisioned by 
CMS
Portal, queries,
reports,
analytics,
modelling
Amendments
Metadata
Operational
data 
Figure 5.2 The contract lifecycle as envisioned by CMS (adapted from vendor materials and 
Saxena 2008) 
This model of the automated contract lifecycle across the enterprise is continuous, closed and 
tightly coupled, with a single flow of key datapoints. Key dates (e.g. automatic renewal dates) 
can be automatically calendared for action; volume discounts and rebates can be monitored. 
Matching buy-side against sell-side (e.g. to manage warranties) or the “flowdowns” from main 
contracts to subcontracts becomes easier. The organization can map contract terms across its 
portfolio of contracts, spot trends or potential risks as they are developing. and manage the 
overall relationship with counterparties. With portal or query capabilities, contracting 
professionals can see what their colleagues are doing, find relevant precedents and in general be 
more informed about market conditions, trends, and customer requirements.  
Interviews indicated that vendors, analysts, customers and would-be customers were generally 
consistent in their views of the benefits that CMS might offer, and survey data did not point to 
any major misalignment in vendor and customer priorities (Appendix 5.1). The anticipated 
benefits most commonly mentioned by interviewees are summarized in Table 5.1.  
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Anticipated benefits of CMS  
Efficiency – including headcount reduction, ability of staff to handle more contracts, faster 
“cycle time” in parts of the contracting process, faster production of documents, and reduced 
need to call upon lawyers 
Centralized control – through standardization of contract documents and rules-based approval 
processes (workflow) 
Ability to find contract documents 
Improved reporting capability 
Improved compliance capability 
Amendments tracking 
Improved contracting knowledge, e.g. a “dashboard” of selling opportunities or contracting 
trends 
Document exchange and negotiation with counterparties 
Data integration (contract data flowing from and to other systems) 
Data-based contracting process improvements, including: alerts (notices and renewals), 
discounts and rebates, clause level management of contracts in bulk, and special contracting 
needs, such as monitoring “underdelivery” against annual contracts or supporting contract 
clause reviews by regulators 
Rapid integration in the M&A (merger and acquisition) context 
Revenue recognition benefits 
Table 5.1 Anticipated benefits of CMS based on interview data 
Principally, CMS promised efficiency and control, automating the contract lifecycle as a kind of 
production function: 
Contracting starts with an opportunity (sales function) to a quote, to a contract (in 
Word), to an order, to an invoice and shipping. It’s like an assembly line. (emphasis 
added) (user of CMS module in an ERP system, 2008) 
Besides software, an effective contract management system also has process and people 
in place, whether internal or provided as part of the solution, to perform the system 
implementation and management, perform contract negotiations, and maintain the 
overall system, including process modifications, clause library management and data 
entry. (Ariba, Protecting the Single Source of Truth: Effective Contract Management as 
a Core Business Strategy, 2007) 
In addition to efficiency and control, CMS promised “visibility” into contracting, including a 
“holistic” view of contract management that would supplement financial accounting.  
Risk-aware, performance-driven organizations understand the immediate value that 
comes from using CM technologies to improve product and service availability, reduce 
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costs, and lower risks through a more holistic view of CM that spans the balance sheet 
and income statement. (AMR analyst Mickey North Rizza 2008) 
 
Figure 5.3 Linking contract to the income statement and the balance sheet, from North Rizza 
(2008; with permission of Gartner Inc.; see footnote 2) 
 
Different groups within organizations had different priorities for CMS, but some contract 
managers looked to CMS to product contracting knowledge: 
The finance manager wanted the CM solution to be efficient, to be effective but mostly 
to reduce headcount. The director of global contracting (reporting to the finance 
manager) wanted to use the system to reengineer work processes, to segment work by 
expertise required, to use offshoring in India for some work and to work the time zones. 
He also believed it would make the contracting function more effective by providing a 
portfolio view. He wanted it in order to “understand what you are doing, and not on a 
deal-by-deal basis”, but instead by e.g. country, product group or counterparty. He also 
felt it would permit a kind of gap analysis between how the company thought it was 
positioning itself with its contract terms and the reality of what it was agreeing. It would 
in his view support learning and knowledge management, moving away from everyone 
using their own personal hard disks, and creating a “corporate capability”. (former 
director of global contracting, global telecommunications company, 2008) 
To summarize the story thus far, an opportunity developed to organize ICT in support of 
contracting, integrating electronic document and database capabilities in a natural evolution of 
contracting technology. Vendors responded with contract management software, which filled a 
process and data gap between ERP and CRM, neither of which served as an “internal 
coordination form” or organizing technology for contracting. The organizing vision for CMS, 
creating an expectation of how CMS would transform contracting and contract management, 
was to automate the contracting lifecycle across the enterprise as a closed, continuous 
production function. While efficiency and control were the most important benefits associated 
with CMS, CMS also promised better contracting knowledge. With its design based on the 
generic contract lifecycle, CMS would work for all types of contracts, for all businesses in any 
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industry; in other words it was intended to be “fluid”, technologically appropriate across diverse 
settings. In the next section I provide an example of how CMS worked in successful 
implementation, to compare an instance of CMS against the organizing vision. 
5.2 How CMS compared to the organizing vision in a successful implementation 
5.2.1 The reference customer  
In March 2009 I visited a customer reference site for one of the five focus vendors. This 
customer was a subsidiary (HealthSub) of one of the largest health insurance companies in the 
United States (HealthCo). HealthSub considered its business as innovative and offered 
customized packages of services to meet particular customer needs. The contract management 
group for HealthSub (CMGroup) was responsible for documenting and managing all of the 
contracts for the business unit. The group head had been in contracting for nearly two decades, 
starting in government subcontracting. His early experience with IT support for contracting was 
with litigation support case management tools, document databases developed for lawyers to 
help them manage documents in major litigations – a reminder that in terms of document 
storage and retrieval CMS did not offer anything particularly new or distinguishable from other 
products on the market. 
The CMGroup consisted of a team of four or five people responsible for signing up about 3,000 
contracts a year amounting to $1-2 billion in contract value. Part of CMGroup’s mission was to 
help the sales force turn sales opportunities into contracts, but the group’s portfolio of contracts 
also included buy-side agreements (agreements with providers), agreements with associated 
data handling providers under HIPAA (the Health Information Portability Accountability Act) 
and non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). The contract portfolio was a mix of short and relatively 
standard contracts and more detailed highly negotiated agreements, on both sell-side and buy-
side.  
5.2.2 Procurement and implementation 
The procurement process for CMGroup’s CMS system spanned two or three years, taking far 
longer than implementation. Vendor selection was politically charged, because there was 
another CMS product already implemented and running in another part of HealthCo. This other 
CMS product enjoyed a lot of internal support, including from the IT department. In the view of 
CMGroup, while the other solution might work for a high volume of standard contracts (e.g. 
individual doctor contracts), it was not a good fit for HealthSub’s varied and innovative 
business. Nevertheless, CMGroup tried at first to use the other CMS product. They identified 
four major problems. First, they found the system tended to crash when they re-imported 
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documents that had been exported for negotiation and revision. Second, the system had no 
ability to create ad hoc reports. Third, the system did not have a key word search capability. 
Lastly, and most critically, the vendor could not offer any support for getting the “legacy” 
contracts (contracts already in place) into the system in the first place. This initial step toward 
building a contracts repository (which would probably be set alongside an existing documents 
or records management system of some sort) was a major hurdle for CMS implementation 
generally.  
After the trial period with the incumbent vendor ended, CMGroup succeeded in getting their 
favoured vendor approved. The selected vendor arranged for a subcontractor to code the legacy 
contracts for the initial load into the system of over 16,000 documents in 4 weeks (two years 
later there were 20,000 contracts in the system). “All the other vendors said ‘I’ll give you the 
spreadsheet, you fill it in.’” CMGroup had calculated that it would take two full time employees 
three years to populate a spreadsheet for their 16,000 legacy contracts – something they decided 
that was not feasible. To hand over the contracts for loading, the team had to put the contracts, 
which they had already scanned in a long-term project, into folders. The folder structure created 
the top level categories (template, organizational unit and contract type). The process was 
greatly expedited through the benefit of a long-standing file-naming convention that made the 
sort much easier. All that the subcontractor employees had to read was the party name and the 
contract date for an initial load with about five data fields, the rest to be filled in “on the fly” 
(i.e. in the ordinary course) later. 
CMGroup chose a hosted solution (the CMS system was located on the vendor’s servers, 
accessed through the internet) in part to minimize the ongoing involvement of HealthCo’s IT 
department, which was not perceived as viewing contract management as an IT priority. As a 
hosted solution, the solution was available to users remotely from anywhere using a regular 
internet connection. In fact, the team found it faster running the application from home, and not 
via the enterprise network, due to bandwidth limitations.  
The initial implementation in 2007 took about 11 weeks. By 2009 the solution had been through 
phased roll-outs to cover all HealthSub contracting. One group within HealthSub was using 
CMS to store and manage template-based documents other than contracts. In other words, the 
functionality of CMS supported other document-based work and processes, pointing out the 
versatility, but also the lack of distinctiveness, of CMS. 
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5.2.3 How CMS was used 
Day to day, the CMGroup team leader was the principal liaison with the vendor support staff. 
The vendor was viewed as flexible and responsive, and relations with the vendor were very 
good, particularly in comparison to relations with the internal IT staff. The team leader attended 
the vendor’s annual user conference and found it very useful. CMGroup was willing to serve as 
a reference site for the vendor and to participate in webinars with the vendor, where the team 
leader was willing to quantify the efficiency benefits and cost savings their group had achieved 
with CMS.  
Indeed CMGroup users reported many benefits associated with CMS. Their CMS system gave 
them a place to store the definitive versions of their templates; before they could not be certain 
that they had the most recent version. They used the document automation feature to produce 
contracts much more rapidly; a task that might have taken 15-30 minutes before took only ten 
minutes using their CMS system. “Time spent drafting is reduced, and errors are reduced, from 
using the wrong language essentially.” The organized collection of contract documents with 
data like “last amended date” was helpful in managing changes in contract terms that might be 
required for hundreds of agreements affected by a change in regulations. When rates were 
changed on an annual basis, dozens of contracts – with different entities in different states – 
were affected, and this was relatively easy to manage in the CMS system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Image removed as copyright is owned by Upside.] 
Figure 5.4 An example of a “dashboard” from Upside’s entry level on-demand product 
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Each user had a “dashboard” including a task list (see Figure 5.4 for an example of a 
“dashboard” from another product). On the day I visited, the team leader had 129 active items in 
his task list. Another member of the team was managing about 200 active files. From the 
dashboard, users could create and edit templates, manage language across templates, search for 
contracts, launch a new contract, update contract data, upload contracts, and create and request 
reports. To build a template, the user did a cut-and-paste from Word and selected variables from 
a pick-list pre-defined by the vendor. Users agreed that the list was too long and not always on 
point, but with time the user could find or adapt what she or he needed. There was no way to 
delete old templates, so these were marked “DO NOT USE”.  
Contract creation and all of the interaction with the document database was through an interface 
called a header. There was a dropdown for selecting among existing counterparties with their 
addresses. But after initial contract creation, the database was not interactive with the document. 
That is, the database did not take in any changes from the document itself, as it might be revised 
over the course of negotiation. “It’s a one time deal.” This meant that coding of documents – 
tagging them with metadata for the repository – was a post-hoc, manual exercise. There was no 
flow-through of data. 
After the team produced a contract using the contract creation tool, the draft document left the 
CMS system, exported by email or saved to a hard drive. CMGroup used a shared drive, set up 
in folders by counterparty, as the working drive for the negotiation period, a “housing unit for 
drafts”. Changes were not always properly redlined in documents returned by counterparties 
during the negotiation period. Although there was a check-in and check-out capability in the 
CMS system to catch changes made by the other side in an exchange of documents, the staff did 
not rely on this tool but used a separate redlining tool (Deltaview from Workshare) to identify 
changes the other side may have made. In other words, the contracting process, even within a 
CMS environment, was not closed and continuous; there were numerous offline steps. 
Agreements were executed (signed) manually, because “wet signatures” were still required for 
revenue recognition. After an agreement was executed, the team scanned it into a static pdf 
format and then did a further conversion of the pdf into OCR (optical character recognition) 
format to permit full text search. Both documents were loaded into the CMS repository, the first 
as a “picture” of the executed contract, and the second to permit searching. The CMS vendor 
had tried to convince CMGroup that uploading the final Word document was sufficient but the 
team were of the view that “90% of our drafts, of our saved Word documents, aren’t final 
drafts”. Once again, there was a break in the CMS process, apparently not anticipated by the 
vendor. 
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In addition, executed contracts were loaded into Sharepoint (a Microsoft document management 
and collaboration platform that stores and manages access to documents). There were about 300 
subscribers to the contracts library in Sharepoint, including the finance department and the sales 
team. By allowing this access, CMGroup could reduce the calls and emails with requests for 
information about contracts. But the Sharepoint collection was not marked to indicate the 
current status of contracts; once posted the contracts were never removed. So CMS did not 
become the generally accessible contracts repository for the enterprise, and the duplicating 
Sharepoint collection was accessible but not authoritative.  
For handling amendments, CMGroup came up with their own use of the CMS functions. The 
CMS tool for amendments out-of-the-box (as provided by the vendor) did not work for them 
because, perhaps generalizing from another contracting environment, it made too many 
assumptions about how amendments were documented and handled. This was an example of a 
design feature carried over from another context that did not work for CMGroup.  
CMGroup acknowledged that matching customers to their affiliated corporate groups was an 
important but difficult contract information problem that was not addressed in either the CMS 
system or the separate CRM system. In fact, they said, data problems were pervasive in the 
CRM system, in part because the sales team did not like it, and relied on administrative staff to 
enter information. 
They [track] by [sales] opportunity so it’s not even tracked by customer. So they may 
have ten opportunities with [XCo] – you get ten records for [XCo], four of them might 
be with a division of [XCo] and one with the mother company of [XCo]. So you get ten 
records of opportunities in the CRM, where there may be only one contract tied to 
maybe one of those opportunities, so it’s very difficult, very difficult. … when the sales 
person says, ‘this is the opportunity,’ what is heard by the account manager might be a 
little bit different, but that’s what gets entered in the system, so you’ve already got a gap 
day one. 
Discussion about the sales team’s use of CRM revealed a more fundamental issue for CMGroup 
and their CMS system, arising from how the sales group worked to place HeathSub’s products 
with customers, and how HealthSub’s operations group made sure promised services were 
delivered.  
One thing about our business in and of itself it it’s highly customisable, so we don’t sell 
anything that’s standard. You won’t find an exact same solution for one customer to the 
next, so there’s already from day one that you sell something – a lot of times the 
salesperson doesn’t even know what the customer bought, and the customer a lot of 
times may not know either, so when you try to put that in a contract, oh boy, you end up 
with a lot of time spent just figuring out what was sold and what was bought. 
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HealthSub’s sales team did not interact with the CMS system. Instead they sent the proposed 
contract terms to CMGroup by email with document called a “product form”. This product form 
was generated and used by HealthSub’s operations group to manage the delivery of services to 
HealthSub customers. The product form was described as dead, inert, not linked to a database. 
CMGroup viewed the product form as causing some problems for them, but they did not feel it 
was within their power to challenge its use or the practices of the sales team and operations 
group that were organized around the product form. This was because HealthSub sourced their 
services in a modular fashion but the sales team needed to offer customers what looked like 
integrated packages. The operations group’s product form underpinned this very dynamic 
process by bridging the gap between sales and contract performance. CMGroup speculated that 
this might explain the complexity of the product form and the difficulty in stabilizing it 
sufficiently to reduce it to structured data and manage it within a database environment where it 
might, for example, support the production of contract documents. “And this is one of the 
reasons why the operations group took over the form because they were having trouble then 
operationalising this whole thing. Because literally the terms kept changing even as they were 
already implementing part of it.”  
Interviewee: The customer says, “Well I think the salesperson was selling me this and 
how come I don’t see this in your deliverable.” “Oh, ok, well I’ll give that to you,” not 
knowing, not fully understanding the financial and the margin implications, how they’re 
making agreements that are not in the contract but they’re operationalising the verbal 
agreements they made for the customer. Comes time to collect revenue and “Why aren’t 
we getting paid for these three things you turned on? They’re not in the contract…” 
“Well we gave them to the customer because they asked for it.” “Did you talk to 
anybody else about that?” “Well they said the salesman gave it to them.”  
Q: In that model you have sales and then you have the operations group both trying to 
make the customer happy but contracting has been left out of the picture. 
Interviewee: And finance. 
In other words, the “product form” and ongoing interactions between the sales teams and the 
operations team even after contract execution were essential elements of contract management 
for HealthSub but effectively bypassed CMGroup and their CMS system. 
5.2.4 Knowledge production: searches, reports and queries 
Although the vendor had been selected in large part because of its ability to help build the 
contracts repository, the result was not in all respects ideal. CMGroup felt that the industry 
generally, including their CMS vendor, did not provide a sufficiently robust text searching 
capability (“they’re not perfect, they’re not your Google”), but their team wanted to be ready 
with the OCR documents in the repository when the search tool was improved. Because the text 
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search capability was not especially strong, CMGroup was dependent on their system’s query 
and reporting capabilities based on the tagging of contracts with contract metadata. As described 
above, legacy contracts came into the system with only about five data fields tagged for each 
document. But on an ongoing basis the group manually tagged each contract with between ten 
and fifteen datapoints, including party name, dates (start, end, renewal), type of contract, 
contract manager name, business unit, business description, and a free text or comment field.  
CMGroup had paid the vendor to create three user-defined fields (UDFs) important to their 
business. “Clean request” and“initial draft sent” were used to indicate how quickly their group 
responded to sales opportunities. “Initial term” generated renewal alerts on a scaled basis 
depending on the duration of the contract. However, there were other important data fields that 
were put into the comment field of the CMS database. “Affiliate data wall” marked those 
contracts that require segregation of data to make sure HealthCo (likely a competitor of 
HealthSub’s contract counterparty) could not get access to it; this provision was worded in 
many different ways, and so could not be identified through key word search. CMGroup also 
needed to track contract provisions requiring data to be kept in the United States. CMGroup was 
able to run SQL queries on the comment field to produce ad hoc reports on these and other 
provisions. In this way CMS provided an important ability to track and report on a number of 
key contract terms important to HealthSub’s business, and brought a major efficiency 
improvement over manual searching and reporting. 
Still, the search and report capabilities reflected limitations in the system. Though these could 
be fixed through customization, there was a cost. For example, the team noted that the system 
did not have an “abandoned” status for contracts that did not go to completion, and this made it 
harder to work with the reports. The team leader said that at a recent user conference a 
participant brought this issue up, and half of the users put up their hands to indicate it was 
something they would like fixed. Of course an additional UDF for status could be added by the 
vendor, for a fee. CMGroup was looking forward to a new version of the software which would 
take user-defined fields directly into the underlying database without additional vendor time and 
charges. 
The metadata tagging was also constrained by practical considerations. The metadata fields 
were carefully selected and managed by the team leader, who effectively acted as the data 
manager for the system. One member of the team who used to manage an Access database for 
some of the contracts felt that the CMS system was not as flexible and did not capture as much 
as his old custom database in Access. That database had a hundred or so fields, but many were 
not filled in because they did not apply to all types of contracts, or (as remarked by the team 
leader) because the data entry had simply not been done for whatever reason. The team leader 
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felt that most of those fields were not that valuable, that the “return of value on those fields is so 
small. When we did implement [the CMS system] we cut all that fat out of it. We didn’t need it. 
Nobody wanted that information or needed it.” So the team leader had to balance the value of 
contract metadata against the work required to define and manage it and the ongoing work of 
manual tagging. 
This manual tagging was done by the contract managers in CMGroup themselves, so they did 
not experience data quality as a problem. There was no need to have data analysis (e.g. volume 
discounts) apply across multiple contracts, so data tags (contract metadata) related to single 
contracts only. The reporting capabilities of CMS ran off the contract metadata. This ad hoc 
reporting capability of the CMS system, based on SQL, had been one of the important features 
in vendor selection; the team did not have to engage (and pay) their own IT department to build 
reports for them. Management of contract renewal dates was particularly important; the renewal 
process started at different times prior to expiry, depending on contract term as logged in CMS. 
Reports run out of CMS were also used to manage the work of the group by monitoring contract 
status, turnaround time and workload. This information helped CMGroup justify requests for 
new hires. In sum, CMS reporting capabilities did directly address some key contract 
management issues, such as contract renewals and contract processing workload and 
throughput. 
However, as a standalone system, CMS produced standalone reports; there was no data 
integration horizontally with, for example, finance. CMGroup team members said that when 
finance called for periodic reports on sales activity, the finance executives ended up with three 
different reports, one on pricing, one on products, and one on contracts. CMGroup did not own 
the pricing information, which was in finance, or the product information: “So they’re 
essentially getting like 3 data dumps and trying to match the keys together to get it to all 
reconcile.” There was no data integration with other systems, and CMS did not generate an 
enterprise view of contract.  
The business sponsor thought that an enterprise view of contract would be very hard to generate 
because of the need to agree on common field definitions among all the different functions and 
business units. Identifying counterparties by affiliated corporate group was something he 
considered a business intelligence problem, not a contract management issue. In general, he 
acknowledged that it would be desirable to be able to do more with contract information, but he 
believed that they had to start with the basics. 
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5.2.5 Two years on 
At the time the CMGroup team leader joined HealthSub, there was no IT support for 
contracting, but by 2009 he felt that his group had become a leader in contract management 
within HealthCo, in large part due to their successful adoption of CMS. Over the following two 
years, CMGroup and the vendor continued to improve and expand the CMS system. The vendor 
built a contracts portal for HealthSub, enabling the broader user community to create some 
simple contracts, such as standard non-disclosure agreements, on their own. This “contracts on 
demand” feature was part of a move to a self-serve model. The query and ad hoc reporting tool 
was improved and made available to users outside CMGroup. Email integration had advanced 
for both outbound and inbound emails, and the team stored email approvals in CMS, not paper 
approvals. However, in terms of previously outstanding issues, redlining processes were still 
outside the CMS system, and the “product form” was still in use as before. 
CMGroup had created a UDF checkbox for each of the most common information requests 
from business users – data-sharing restrictions, diversity requirements, and offshoring 
restrictions – and used the comment field in the database to store the associated contract 
provisions. The new reporting tool was then able to report out all the contracts that had the 
requested items together with the actual text. This helped the legal department and operations 
group with their compliance and strategic decision-making about these issues.  
The team leader had also expanded his use of volume data to track staffing levels and, as 
appropriate, request additional staff. Despite all of the improvements in the CMS product, the 
software costs for CMS over the period had remained flat. The competing CMS product 
continued to be used in HealthCo, but other areas of HealthCo had started to use the same CMS 
product as CMGroup; by his team’s example the CMGroup team leader felt he had expanded 
the vendor presence within HealthCo.  
5.2.6 Summary: CMS in this implementation in comparison to the organizing vision and in 
comparison to two other implementations 
Notwithstanding the various minor problems CMGroup encountered in working with CMS, the 
team leader firmly believed that the team would never be able to manage their workload without 
CMS. Among other things, it provided the group with a shared workspace and enabled the team 
members to cover queries and fill in for others as necessary. Other stakeholders also appreciated 
the system. For the business sponsor, CMS was principally a management and control system. 
He saw their business as in the nature of a subscription business, and a major benefit of CMS 
was its generation of renewal date alerts to the sales force. Another purpose of the system in his 
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view was to identify and eliminate process bottlenecks. The lawyers appreciated CMS as a way 
to promote consistency in contract terms. 
This customer success story demonstrates many of the promised benefits of CMS: efficiency, 
control and standardization, the ability to find documents, improved reporting capabilities, 
better amendments tracking, an important improved ability to flag up contracts coming up for 
renewal. However, there were a number of offline processes even within CMGroup and there 
was no continuous data flow from production of the initial draft through to tagging in the 
repository. CMS did not join up contracting across the business unit. Crucially, the “product 
form” was a parallel organizing technology for contract that coordinated selling with contract 
performance, and because HealthSub’s offerings were so customer-specific and dynamic, 
evolving even over the life of a contract, it was not possible to capture the product form or 
product offerings in a structured data environment, such as a database. In addition, the 
penetration of the CMS system within HealthSub was only partial and localized; within the 
larger HealthCo it was one of two CMS systems in active operation. As an engine of production 
of contracting knowledge, CMS was limited. The contracts repository, once built, was not open 
to everyone in the business unit, and, at the time of implementation, was not full text searchable. 
CMGroup’s team leader kept a tight rein on data management, and the structured data 
capabilities were closely focused on a relatively small number of key business issues, but there 
was no data integration. The business sponsor of the group had limited expectations for CMS in 
terms of contracting knowledge; for example, he did not look to CMS to produce “business 
intelligence”. To summarize, while CMS was very valuable for CMGroup, it fell somewhat 
short of the organizing vision. 
Interviews with two other customers using the same software indicated that their 
implementations were different from one another and different from the implementation at 
CMGroup. For a global consumer products company, CMS was a principally a contracts 
repository that had been mandated for the various business units around the world; for legal 
reasons the repositories of the various business units were kept separate, and the lawyer who 
had sponsored CMS did not know what data fields were being used. A large UK public sector 
entity had substantially built out its CMS product with the help of IT consultants to run a multi-
billion pound annual procurement cycle in a data-intensive fashion. CMS at CMGroup was a 
very useful workspace for a small and highly productive contract management team. These were 
three very different adaptations of a single CMS software product. In particular, the divergence 
between CMS as a contracts repository (as used by the global consumer products company) and 
CMS as core software for a data-intensive procurement function (as in the case of the UK public 
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sector entity) is reflected in additional data, as I will discuss further in relation to the breakdown 
of the CMS category.  
Even in these CMS success stories, and looking across the three of them, there is evidence that 
the organizing vision for CMS was proving difficult to realize. A key supporter of CMS, the 
IACCM, has been the source of comments to the same effect.  
5.3 The IACCM and CMS 
 
The IACCM has long been a supporter of the use of IT to improve contracting processes and 
contracting knowledge. It has tracked the progress of CMS and provided a platform for 
communication for the CMS industry. For example, in 2003, IACCM released a report, with 
survey results, entitled “Contract Management – An Opportunity Still Being Missed?” 
According to this report, while significant numbers of contract managers characterized their 
contract management as falling short in cost control and risk management, fewer than a sixth of 
them contemplated implementing a contract management software solution in the coming year. 
IACCM identified a number of ways in which it could help – by collecting case studies, by 
engaging with vendors, through webcasts, and by developing standardized metrics for CMS 
solutions, and it has carried through with many of these initiatives. IACCM’s online library 
contains many resources on contract management software, and many of IACCM’s media 
center press releases are from and about the CMS vendor community. Over the years, software 
vendors have been sponsors of IACCM events, and Tim Cummins has appeared in vendor 
webinars. IACCM’s newsletter has an Automation and Technology Panel comprised of 
software vendors, and CMS vendors have been frequent advertisers in or sponsors of IACCM’s 
newsletter. In 2008, IACCM sponsored a book, Enterprise Contract Management: A Practical 
Guide to Successfully Implementing an ECM Solution, by Anuj Saxena (Saxena 2008); a 
chapter of this book (“co-sponsored by IACCM”) was available for download from the 
Emptoris website in 2009. IACCM has conducted two market surveys for CMS, in 2007 and 
2009. 
Notwithstanding IACCM’s support for contract automation and engagement with CMS, the 
organization has raised many questions about CMS over the years. For example, the 2007 
market survey noted that while CMS seemed to provide benefits to those taking it up, it had not 
enjoyed the success earlier predicted, and, in commenting on the survey, Tim Cummins asked 
whether CMS was already a thing of the past (Cummins 2007). In 2009, Cummins summarized 
the reasons why CMS had not enjoyed greater uptake. At first, he said, there were technical 
difficulties, but these had been largely overcome. But there were continuing difficulties in 
building a cross-functional solution: “This is why many implementations start small and hope to 
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expand; but often they seem to get stuck – or even worse, several competing solutions are 
adopted.” He observed that IT departments often resisted non-core applications like CMS, 
particularly when ERP vendors were promising contract management solutions in the near 
future. But mostly, he wrote, technology vendors were offering a solution to a problem that 
many firms did not realize they had (Cummins 2009). Cummins was well in tune with his 
constituencies on all points, as the next section shows. 
 
5.4 Evidence of breakdown from interview, site visit and survey data and IACCM archival 
material 
 
In this section I begin to fill out a table of breakdown, using it as a matrix to organize the 
evidence from interview, site visit, survey and IACCM archival data that points to a failure of 
expectations with respect to the the business model for packaged software (including 
generification), the organizing vision, and its market correlate the category. From the customer 
success stories described in section 5.2 and the IACCM’s expressions of disappointment, a story 
begins to emerge of a software product based on a flawed concept. In this section I summarize 
this and additional data to spell this out in more detail. 
5.4.1 Breakdown in generification 
The business model for packaged software described in Chapter 2 entails a strategy of 
generification to turn a customer-specific software product into a high margin information good, 
and CMS vendors I interviewed were well aware that they had to manage individual customer 
requirements against their goal of developing a standardized software product. They expressed 
this as the need to protect the core code, to avoid customization and to work instead with 
configuration options such as user-defined fields (e.g. as referred to in the case of HealthSub). 
Both vendors and customers appreciated that customization was not only costly at 
implementation but created an ongoing burden in the upgrade cycle, especially in an integrated 
environment. Still, customization could not always be avoided, and resellers and consultants 
played key roles in some CMS implementations, as in the case of the large UK public sector 
entity mentioned above. Implementations like that one involved significant investments of time 
and money on an ongoing basis.  
But the data suggests that CMS was more rigid and more specialized than vendors realized. In 
some cases, design choices embedded in hard coding seemed to reflect prior customer 
experience. In particular, CMS seemed to reflect a tilt to the buy-side and to “commoditized” 
procurement. That is, some CMS products seemed designed to help professionalized 
procurement operations compare generic goods, like laptops or office supplies, and select 
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suppliers on the basis of price. When products like these were considered for other contracting 
contexts, they did not fit. For example, the head of sell-side contracting for a global professional 
services firm said that they had built their own CMS system in-house because the commercial 
CMS products were designed for procurement, and for goods, not services. Survey data 
confirms the higher adoption on the buy-side (Table 5.3, p. 132). In addition, a number of 
interviewees questioned whether a generalized contracting process even existed, given how 
much contracting varies from industry to industry.  
This testimony points toward a fundamental breakdown in the business model for packaged 
software, in particular, generification. In Chapter 6, the genesis of this breakdown will become 
clearer. In the following sections I begin to trace in detail the breakdown of the organizing 
vision for CMS. 
5.4.2 Breakdown in the organizing vision: CMS did not “enclose” contracting 
Automating the contract lifecycle across the enterprise as a closed and continuous production 
function (Figure 5.2) was the core of the organizing vision for CMS, but the data indicates that 
CMS failed in this regard. Contracting spilled over the boundaries of CMS into offline 
processes. CMS users continued to work with email and Word, outside CMS, and to require 
physical documents with signatures for execution. The case described in section 5.2 shows how, 
even in a successful CMS implementation and within the localized group working with CMS, 
steps in the process (revision of documents after the first draft, exchange of documents, 
redlining, execution) went offline. In particular, the idea that structured data (key terms, or 
variables) used to create a first draft of a contract document could also be used as contract 
metadata proved overly optimistic. CMS databases were not designed to keep up with changes 
in contract documents as they were revised over the course of negotiations. Furthermore, some 
contract data applies across multiple contract documents, or is not within the contract document 
(ISO requirements, internal approvals, and status of the document). This meant that tagging or 
coding contracts with structured data was often a manual, post-hoc exercise.  
Second, interview data indicates that, even in successful implementations, CMS did not ensure 
functional or operational integration of contracting across the lifecycle of a particular contract. 
In the case of HealthSub, CMS provided significant benefits. However, it did not provide end-
to-end integration of the contract lifecycle, which remained fragmented between sales, contract 
management and the operations group in charge of contract compliance. The critical “product 
form” essentially skipped over CMS, and sales and operations stayed in direct contact to make 
sure customers were happy. The legal and finance departments worked with the contract 
management group but were not part of the CMS process. In this customer success story, CMS 
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was a valuable but highly localized digital work environment, but there was no attempt to 
reconcile the diversity of views and practices of other functions involved in contracting. 
Third, fragmentation of contracting by type of contract or business unit persisted. This resulted 
in localized and even multiple implementations of CMS inside the organization, with a 
pronounced split between buy-side and sell-side. The case of HealthCo illustrates multiple, 
disconnected instantiations of CMS products from different vendors. In another company, the 
sell-side had adopted one CMS system while the procurement function used a different CMS 
solution with a strong strategic sourcing orientation. This phenomenon of localized and multiple 
implementations was mentioned several times in interviews, and survey data confirmed it is not 
unusual (Appendices 4.6 and 5.2). This again points to the diversity of contracting knowledge 
and practice inside the organization. 
Briefly stated, CMS did not “enclose” contracting. Offline processes persisted, and CMS did not 
create a continuous data flow across the contract lifecycle. Functional or operational 
fragmentation across the lifecycle of a particular contract continued. Lastly, the fragmentation 
of contracting by type of contract or business unit resulted in localized and multiple 
implementations of CMS, with a pronounced split between buy-side and sell-side.  
5.4.3 Breakdown of the organizing vision: CMS did not produce contracting knowledge 
In Chapter 3, I identified knowledge as important in contracting, presenting an opportunity as 
well as a challenge for CMS. I also highlighted some known issues one might expect to 
encounter in any project to improve organizational knowledge, including the difficulty of 
converting unstructured data into structured data, the inadequacy of an approach based solely on 
structured data, and the localized, perhaps unreconcilably diverse nature of organizational 
knowledge. The data suggests that all of these were issues for CMS, reflected in the 
fragmentation of contracting across the contract lifecycle (described in the preceding section), 
but also in the challenges that CMS presented for adopting organizations in terms of data 
management, data extraction and data integration. 
According to the organizing vision for CMS, automating the contract lifecycle across the 
enterprise as a closed and continuous production function (Figure 5.2) would produce structured 
data that in turn would generate “visibility” into contracting. This expectation was not generally 
met, for a number of reasons. First among them, the fragmentation of contracting described in 
the preceding section could not be expected to generate “holistic” contracting knowledge. But 
the data points to a number of other factors as well. 
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Users discovered practical limitations on the contracts repository in terms of completeness, 
access and searchability. At the point of implementation, it was not always easy to locate all 
existing (“legacy”) contracts, and it was not always feasible to put them into the CMS system. 
Collecting and associating related documents, such as statements of work, certificates of 
milestone completion and the like could be difficult. Designing an access scheme was a new 
exercise for many organizations, access schemes require ongoing maintenance, and of course 
access to CMS could impact license costs.
 28
 In some CMS implementations full text search 
capability was not available.  
A more fundamental problem was that definition and extraction of structured data proved more 
difficult than anticipated. Defining and managing the metadata fields was a significant non-
technical exercise mentioned by a number of interviewees, including the head of CMGroup. 
Data fields beyond the most basic were not stable over time, and could not be comprehensive. 
For example, several interviewees mentioned that when they received requests to report on 
change of control provisions they found out that this was not captured in their contract 
metadata. Any change in the data fields might attract additional vendor charges (as in the case 
of HealthSub), and if documents were not recoded the database would become unreliable. As in 
the case of HealthSub, the initial coding of legacy contracts could be time-consuming and 
expensive, and possibly compromised on the completeness of the collection, the completeness 
of the coding, or both. After implementation, coding was an ongoing burden for contracting 
professionals, or required outsourced assistance. In light of these considerations, customers had 
to balance the benefits they expected to get from structured data as against its costs. Some 
customers put very ambitious programs in place, capturing dozens of datapoints for their 
contracts, but many settled for between ten and twenty basic items of data to tag contracts in the 
repository. 
Another issue was the lack of integration with other systems. As vendors saw it, to get the most 
out of CMS, structured data should be integrated with (taking from, feeding to, or compared 
with) a transaction database like ERP and with specialty tools or other applications such as 
CRM (customer relationship management), SRM (seller relationship management), strategic 
sourcing or supply chain tools, project milestone or KPI (key performance indicators) 
applications. The vendors generally advertised their ability to integrate with ERP, SAP in 
particular. But integration was a significant additional implementation exercise, and it required 
ongoing upkeep. In many cases, data integration – making contract data “live” and operational 
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 No survey respondent selected “Quite open access” in answer to the question “Which best describes 
who has (or will have) direct access to your contract management system?” (see Appendix 5.3). Indeed 
corporate structure may be intentionally designed to preserve separate legal and operational entities 
within the global organization, for example to encourage arm’s-length transactions in a shared services 
environment or for legal or tax reasons. 
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in the organization’s transactional systems such as ERP – was not undertaken. In addition, 
“integration” might take the form of manual validation or reconciliation rather than direct data 
feeds, because some organizations protect their basic transactions database as the “system of 
record” and do not permit other, satellite applications like CMS to feed it directly without data 
quality checks. Companies sometimes expected to be able to pull counterparty data from 
financial or CRM systems, but this was often more difficult than expected, particularly with 
respect to counterparty and counterparty affiliate identification. 
Lastly I note that adopters expressed rather modest ambitions for CMS in terms of its 
contributions to organizational contracting knowledge, ceding that ground to risk management, 
business intelligence or marketing initiatives, which are well-developed functions in the large 
organizations where contracting occurs at a scale that makes some form of contract automation 
necessary or desirable. This was the case for the CMS business sponsor at HealthSub, and for 
another business sponsor at an international consumer products company. In several instances, 
senior executives I interviewed did not know exactly what datapoints were being captured in 
their CMS system, but seemed to view that as a housekeeping detail – directly undercutting 
CMS as a generator of organizational contracting knowledge but consistent with viewing it as 
merely an “indexing system” (see section 5.4.5). In the survey (Appendix 5.1), customers did 
not rate moving to e-records in lieu of contracts or clause level management as priorities for 
CMS, and both vendors and customers rated outward-facing knowledge capabilities, such as 
counterparty and network risk management and network value creation, as less important than 
internal process improvements. Survey data regarding the features used by CMS adopters 
suggest that both internal advanced information features and outward-facing features are not so 
frequently used (Appendix 5.5): In 29 cases, only 3 used analytics, only 4 used data integration, 
only 5 used a shared workspace and only 6 exchanged data with counterparties, whereas 22 used 
amendment and change order tracking, 18 used contract creation and alerts, and 16 used full text 
search, the tying of related documents and a dashboard. Yet in interviews contract managers 
were able to identify knowledge problems they would like software to help them with, such as 
merger integration, or analysing contract terms against results. Survey data also indicates that 
customers were interested in matching contract terms to outcomes and in analytics and scenario 
planning (Appendix 5.1).  
To summarize, the data points to a number of factors which contributed to the breakdown of the 
organizing vision for CMS insofar as it promised “visibility” into contracting and better 
contracting knowledge. These are: the fragmentation of contracting described in section 5.4.2; 
limitations on the contracts repository (completeness, access and searchability); difficulties in 
defining and extracting structured data; limited data integration; and reduced expectations for 
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contracting knowledge as associated with CMS as opposed to risk management, business 
intelligence or other business initiatives. 
5.4.4 Breakdown of the organizing vision: CMS was associated with “algorithmic” contracting 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of CMS as measured against its organizing vision in terms of 
process automation and knowledge production, CMS clearly worked well in some contexts. For 
example, a consistent theme in interviews was the use of CMS to force standardization of 
contracting processes, usually starting with commodity goods procurement or standard licenses 
rather than services. One procurement manager using CMS constantly looked to extend the 
“commodification” of procurement, running an internal “catalog” for most goods acquisitions 
and a much smaller but growing proportion of services procurement. For another contracting 
professional who had been able to institute clause level management of licenses using CMS, 
service contracts were the next step. Another interviewee remarked: “As soon as you can 
commodify services, you can use the technology to manage them.” Contract volume was also a 
key parameter. Contracting professionals used CMS to manage “40,000 suppliers”, or “tens of 
thousands [of licenses] globally”. Document assembly was used in another company for NDA’s 
(non-disclosure agreements): “There are about 2000 a year on a no-touch basis.” In the case of 
the large UK public sector entity mentioned in section 5.2.6, the system managed about 3500 
providers under nine or ten thousand contracts. 
As I discussed in Chapter 4, interview data suggested that CMS might work best for “market” 
contracting, i.e. that the CMS “region” of contracting corresponded to “market” contracting 
along the dimension from “market”, to “hybrid”, to “hierarchical” governance in the TCE 
model. For my survey I translated the distinction between “market” and non-“market” 
contracting as set out in Table 4.1, hypothesizing an association between CMS adoption on the 
one hand and, on the other hand: high scale (volume and standardization), low relationality, 
contract performance being easy to define, relatively data discreteness (how easily the contract 
can be reduced to and represented by discrete or structured data), low in implicit terms of 
contract, low interdependency of contract performance, lower risk, and low counterparty 
information sharing.  
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Contract attributes Market 
governance 
Hierarchical or 
hybrid 
governance 
Association of CMS adoption to 
market governance indicated in 
survey results (p < .10)? 
Scale (volume and 
standardization) 
High Low YES – See Table 5.3 
Relational contract Low High NO 
Performance easy 
to define 
High Low NO 
Data discreteness 
(how easily reduced 
to and represented 
by discrete data) 
High Low YES – See Table 5.3 
Implicit terms of 
contract 
Assumed 
relatively low 
and/or well-
understood 
Variable, but 
unlikely to be 
well-defined) 
NO 
Interdependency of 
performance 
Low High NO 
Risk and extended 
risk (risk or liability 
beyond the 
immediate 
counterparty, i.e. 
network risk) 
Assumed 
relatively low 
and/or well-
understood 
May be 
significant and 
complex 
YES – See Table 5.3 and 
Appendix 5.8 
Counterparty 
information sharing 
Low High Possible – CMS not associated 
with counterparty information 
sharing; see Appendix 5.5 
Table 5.2 Survey results regarding hypothesized contract attributes of market versus hierarchical 
or hybrid governance 
For the most part, the survey data did not support an association between CMS adoption and 
those hypothesized dimensions of “market” contracting (Table 5.2). What the survey data did 
confirm was the association of CMS to what I characterize as “algorithmic” contracting (Table 
5.3), as I will explain. First, there was an association with contracting scale – i.e. contract 
volume and standardization. Related to standardization, there was an association with the firm’s 
ability to use its own contracting document. Consistent with interview data, the survey indicated 
that CMS was more likely to be adopted for buy-side contracting than for sell-side contracting. 
And, not surprisingly, contracting scale that supports CMS tends to be found in larger 
companies. 
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Response Category Response Does not have 
and is not 
considering 
CMS 
Using, 
implementing or 
considering CMS 
TOTAL Significance 
(Pearson Chi-
square) 
Important contract 
volume per year 
100 or fewer 17 (29%) 41 (71%) 58  P < .05 
More than 100 4 (10.5%) 35 (89.5%) 38  
Important contract 
volume in effect 
500 or fewer 19 (27%) 50 (73%) 69  P < .05 
More than 500 1 (4%) 25 (96%) 26  
Standardization  Below the mean  16 (36%) 28 (64%) 44  P < .01 
 Above the mean  5 (12%) 38 (88%) 43  
Your form used 
(respondent’s firm’s 
contract document is 
used) 
Below the mean  15 (33%) 31 (67%) 46  P < .05 
Above the mean  7 (15%) 41 (85%) 48  
Important contract 
buy-side, sell-side or 
other 
Buy-side 2 (6%) 33 (94%) 35  P < .01* 
Sell-side 18 (34%) 35 (66%) 53  
Other 2 (17%) 10 (83%) 12  
Firm size (revenues)29 Up to $10 million 7 (64%) 4 (36%) 11  P < .01*     
 $10 million to $10 
billion 
10 (19%) 42 (81%) 52 
Over $10 billion 5 (17%) 25 (83%) 30  
Data discreteness 
(contract can be 
represented by 
discrete datapoints) 
Below the mean 14 (30%) 32 (70%) 46  P < .05 
Above the mean 7 (14%) 44 (86%) 50  
Extended risk (risk or 
liabilities beyond the 
immediate 
counterparty) 
Below the mean 5 (13%) 34 (87%) 39  P < .10 
Above the mean 16 (27%) 43 (73%) 59  
Material risk-shifting 
to the respondent’s 
firm? 
No (risk shifting 
from the 
respondent’s firm, 
risk is shared, or risk 
not material 
8 (14%) 50 (86%) 58  P < .01 
 
 Yes 10 (43%) 13 (57%) 23  
Table 5.3 The CMS “region” of contract: responses to questions about the most important type 
of contract as related to CMS adoption (* indicates 1 cell (16.7%) has expected count less than 
5) 
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 In Part 2, similar analysis shows CMS non-adoption reducing for these 3 size categories from 75% 
(smallest firms) to 51.4% to 8.3% (largest firms), P = .001, 2 cells (33.3%) with expected count less than 
5. Reducing the number of size categories to two, with the cutoff at $10 billion, non-adoption is at 53.7% 
for the smaller organizations and 8.3% for the larger organizations, P < .001, with no cells with expected 
count less than 5. 
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There was also an association with structured data. Survey data (Table 5.3) showed an 
association between CMS adoption and data discreteness – measured by the respondents’ level 
of agreement with the statement that the contract could be represented by discrete datapoints.
30
 
Part 1 survey data also indicated a clear relationship between the number of datapoints 
regarding the most important type of contract captured in any information system or format and 
the adoption of CMS, and Part 2 survey data indicated a relationship between enterprise-wide 
data capture about contracts and adoption or consideration of CMS (Appendix 5.7). Datapoints 
captured most frequently were: expiry, renewal or other dates (85 of 99 respondents) and prices, 
discounts and rebates (65 of 99) (Appendix 5.8). These datapoints, often highlighted in CMS 
sales literature, are notably easy not only to define and and extract but to tie to increases in 
revenues (alerting sell-side customers to contract renewal opportunities) or reductions in cost 
(for buy-side customers with volume discount or rebate terms or wanting to avoid automatic 
contract renewals). It may have been far less easy to show the same sort of financial return for 
tracking other contract datapoints; again, the bigger benefit was probably on the buy-side.  
Thus far, if one were to describe a CMS “region” of contracting, that region would feature 
standard contracting (more likely to be under the CMS user organization’s contracting 
documents) in high volume, more likely in large companies and on the buy-side. The contracts – 
not surprising for standard contracts – would be relatively easy to represent using structured 
data.  
In the survey I asked respondents to say whether or not their organization had various other 
types of IT systems or initiatives, not related to contract management. I had hypothesized that 
organizations rich in other IT systems might not need CMS. However, there were a number of 
associations between other IT systems and initiatives and CMS; relationships with ERP 
(enterprise resource planning), CRM (customer relationship management), BI (business 
intelligence), workflow, and Microsoft Sharepoint were significant, while relationships with 
SRM (seller relationship management), ECM (enterprise content management) and an 
automated document creation capability were suggestive (Appendix 5.9). Relationships were 
weaker with MDM (master data management), a documents or records management system, and 
supply chain management, while there appeared to be no relationship with a general risk 
management function. Of factors I listed as potentially relevant to CMS procurement (analyst 
recommendation, consultant recommendation, experience in the industry, customer 
recommendation, part of a suite of IT applications, fit with the rest of organization IT, 
independence from the IT department, independence from the vendor), the one rated most 
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 There may be some correlation between the precise performance question and the discrete datapoints 
question, but respondents appear to distinguish between the two aspects of contract (Appendix 5.6).  
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important was fit with the rest of organization IT (Appendix 5.10). These data taken together 
suggests that a significant factor in CMS adoption was the firm’s conscious construction of, and 
investment in, an IT-based process and knowledge infrastructure built around structured data.  
In light of the “visibility” into contract that CMS promised, I had originally thought that 
adoption of CMS would be more prevalent where contracts represented extended risk or 
liabilities (to parties beyond the immediate counterparty) or where risk-shifting to the 
organization was a significant factor in the contract. The data did not support this hypothesis, 
and indeed those who identified extended risk above the mean were more likely to have reached 
the conclusion that they were not interested in CMS; there is also a relationship suggested by 
the data between risk shifting to the organization and a reluctance to adopt CMS (Table 5.3). 
The evidence is not conclusive, but suggests firms may be more hesitant to move to an 
automated environment when they are taking on risk and where risk is more complex.
31
 
Consistent with this finding, risk aspects of the contract appear not to be included in data 
capture with much frequency and are not associated with CMS adoption (Appendix 5.8). 
Perhaps the negative association between CMS and risk should not have surprised me, because, 
upon reflection, it is consistent with the hypothesis that CMS would be associated with 
“market” contracting, where risk is assumed to be minimal or at least well-understood.32 Still, 
this was a “surprise” in the data, hinting that contracting professionals are aware of contracting 
risk, and perhaps contracting knowledge more generally, as problems that resist reduction to 
structured data, and thus overflow the strictly computational approach implicit in, for example, 
Shiller’s (2003) “smart computer network”.  
According to the organizing vision for CMS, based on the generic contract lifecycle, CMS 
would work for all contracting contexts. But the data presented in this section suggests that 
contract exists in a “fluid” topological space (Mol and Law 1994), relative to CMS as an 
organizing technology. That is, the multiple and various instances of contracting (like Mol and 
Law’s anemia) are both the same, at some level, and yet not the same in important respects. One 
way that contracting is not the same is vis-à-vis CMS as an organizing technology, with 
adoption of CMS more likely for contracting at scale (featuring standardization and volume), 
reducible to structured data, on the buy-side of large companies, and presenting relatively low 
risk. The association with scale had been indicated in the interview data, leading me (influenced 
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 This may to some extent reflect the buy-side versus sell-side weighting of adoption, as buy-side appears 
to be transferring risk to others (reducing its risk) while the sell-side assumes it; however, I still observe a 
risk-shifting effect within the sell-side (Appendix 5.4). 
32
 Somewhat paradoxically, in Part 2 of the survey, when I asked CMS adopters who took the lead in 
acquiring CMS (selecting all that apply out of sales, procurement, legal/compliance/risk management, IT, 
CFO, enterprise contract management and business unit contract management), legal/compliance/risk 
management was most frequently named (in 14 out of 29 cases) as taking a leading role. Notably, in 
terms of making a business case for CMS, this is not a profit-generating function. 
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by the frequent invocations of TCE in the relevant literature, as discussed in section 3.3) to the 
hypothesis that CMS might be associated with “market” contracting. But the data points to a 
more straightforward relationship. The CMS region of contracting is where contract is most 
easily matched to computer capabilities, in other words, where contracting is “algorithmic” – 
reduced to mechanistic operations using structured data (cf. Licoppe 2008; Mirowski 2002). 
Consistent with the match of contracting to computer capabilities, though contrary to my 
expectations, CMS adoption was associated with the presence of other significant IT systems, 
and the relevant scale was more often located in large organizations. 
5.4.5 Category breakdown: lack of coherence in the CMS concept 
In the packaged software market, the product category refers to a group of products and 
associates them to an organizing vision (Pollock and Williams 2009b, 2010, 2011); as I have 
phrased it, the category is the reification and market correlate of the organizing vision. In the 
case of CMS, the data reviewed in this chapter hint at weaknesses in the CMS category. There 
were questions about what CMS was, and whether it was necessary. A particularly vivid 
comment on the lack of coherence in the CMS concept came from the director of sales and 
marketing for one of the five focus vendors, when he said that it was unclear whether CMS was 
about process or about information: contracting processes were variable and could not be 
reconciled, but contracting information needed somehow to be brought together. The comment 
perhaps suggests an awareness of problems that customers were experiencing in data 
management for CMS. The contract lifecycle expressed a process orientation that took data 
definitions and data extraction for granted, but these were major stumbling blocks for CMS 
customers. Others remarked on the conflicting views of contract held by different corporate 
functions – an issue that complicated CMS procurement and tended to limit and localize 
implementations.
33
 A long time industry observer speculated that it was “like the blind man and 
the elephant”, with various stakeholders defining “CMS” according to their own needs, and that 
the fragmentation of the market was inherent in these tensions present from the beginning – an 
observation that will become more meaningful in Chapter 6. Yet another long time industry 
observer and prospective customer who had been in the market periodically since its inception 
remarked on the instability of the product offerings, saying that they had “morphed” over the 
years. 
Another indication of trouble for the category was that, while “contract management software” 
seemed to be understood as referring to software in support of contract management, it was not 
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 Bartels (Forrester Research Inc. 2006) observed that CMS could be delivered in either a process-centric 
or enterprise approach, and noted the conflicts within the organization that affect the CMS procurement 
process.  
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necessarily identified with a standalone packaged software product. Interview and survey data 
are consistent in showing that “CMS” could be bought from a pure-play CMS vendor, bought 
from an ERP or other software vendor, or built in-house (Appendix 5.11).
34
 As a corollary, there 
was an overlap of functionalities with other software, especially CRM on the sell-side, and 
SRM, strategic sourcing, reverse auction and supply chain management applications on the buy-
side.  
Interviewees were confused not only about what CMS was, but whether it was necessary, 
expressing doubt about the business case for CMS and suggesting that costs outweighed the 
benefits (see Appendix 5.12). Several questioned whether IT support for contracting required 
anything more than Word, email and a spreadsheet. In several cases, a legacy ad hoc solution – 
a contracts repository or a document automation application, for example – (or its possible lack 
of use) was cited as a reason not to proceed with CMS. In other cases, firms that had records 
management or document management systems in place could not justify CMS, since contracts 
were already being stored and tagged with metadata; one consultant said that CMS was priced 
as an enterprise system but was often no more than an “indexing system”. Advanced features of 
CMS were costly to build out and support, and could not be justified in the absence of 
contracting scale. As a consequence, in many cases, “CMS” fell back to a reduced version 
consisting of a contracts repository, putting it in competition with applications for enterprise 
content management, records management, document management or collaboration (e.g. 
Microsoft Sharepoint).  
Putting the best light on this, some vendors and analysts developed a “maturity model” to 
benchmark an organization’s adoption and use of CMS – acknowledging that CMS adoption 
could be staged or partial (Figure 5.5). This is largely consistent with survey data (Appendix 
5.5), which shows early stage adoption centered on documents features of CMS rather than, say, 
data integration or modelling and analytics. 
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 One survey respondent from a global IT services company wrote in 2011: “Contract management, in 
my view, covers the entire ‘life’ of an opportunity, i.e. from opportunity identification through to payment 
of the last invoice by customer or end of the contract term, and closing all account IDs (if applicable). 
Contract management software for me, given my ‘definition’ of contract management above, is very 
broad and ranges from opportunity recording/tracking software and repositories for (mandatory) 
contractual evidences to process-based software and solid contract delivery applications and tools. Our 
CMS covers a range of interlinked programs, covering all CRM processes; the vast majority of this CMS 
is being developed globally and implemented locally, with some adjustments for mandatory local 
specifics. Globalization is ever increasing and any locally developed CMS will eventually be sunset 
(unless mandated by local legislation). The way I work today is perfectly supported by current CMS, i.e. 
my personal wish list is limited if not non-existent.” 
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Figure 5.5 Forrester’s version of the maturity model (Forrester Research Inc. 2011a; with 
permission) 
To summarize, there was a lack of coherence in the CMS concept. As it turned out, not only did 
contracting exist in a “fluid” topological space, so did “CMS”. Instances and invocations of 
“CMS” were, at some level, the same, and yet they were not the same. It was unclear whether 
CMS was about process or information, and different organizational functions held conflicting 
views of CMS. While “CMS” was understood to mean software in support of contract 
management, it did not point to a particular software package, and pure-play CMS was in 
competition with in-house and other software solutions, especially ERP. CMS functionality 
overlapped with that of other software, e.g. CRM, or strategic sourcing. Some asked whether 
CMS was necessary at all; while the business case for CMS appeared weak, the costs of CMS as 
an enterprise system with advanced features were substantial. In consequence, CMS often 
appeared in limited implementation as only a contracts repository (an “indexing system”), 
putting it in competition with records or document management systems. Even in the case of a 
single software product, as discussed in section 5.2.6, three implementations were quite 
fundamentally different, suggesting that perhaps the “maturity model” did not map out a 
technological trajectory but instead different “sub-regions” of CMS adoption, regions that 
would never coalesce. This lack of coherence points toward breakdown of CMS as a packaged 
software category. 
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5.5 Summary: a biography of CMS as organizing technology for contract; the initial table of 
breakdown 
A biography of CMS as organizing technology for contract begins with software vendors 
identifying an opportunity – contract management, as defined by the IACCM. With the benefit 
of learning from ad hoc applications of predecessor technologies for contracting, contract 
management software was essentially a bundling of already existing IT capabilities – document 
automation, databases and workflow. Understanding of CMS coalesced around an organizing 
vision – automating the contract lifecycle across the enterprise as a closed and continuous 
production function – and vendors and customers agreed on the likely benefits of a CMS 
system, centering on efficiency and control through standardization, with better contracting 
knowledge as a by-product of contracting process automation. Importantly, the contract 
lifecycle was not specific to any particular contracting context, and CMS was positioned to 
work for all types of contracts, and for all types of businesses, in any industry. There have been 
successful implementations of CMS, and I have described in detail one such case that 
demonstrates the benefits of CMS for a dedicated contract management group and their internal 
clients.  
Nevertheless the data provides evidence of numerous breakdowns, which I have detailed above 
and organized against the expectation that has failed: the business model for packaged software 
based on generification (section 5.4.1), the organizing vision for CMS (sections 5.4.2, 5.4.3 and 
5.4.4) and CMS as a packaged software category (section 5.4.5). That detailed discussion is 
summarized in Table 5.4, to be carried forward to Chapter 6.  
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Breakdown observed Breakdown of what? 
Hard coding from previous clients 
Buy-side or procurement bias 
Difficulty in generalizing cross-industry  
The business model for packaged software 
(generification) 
Process fragmentation (offline processes, no continuous data 
flow) 
Functional or operational fragmentation across the contract 
lifecycle 
Fragmentation of contracting by type of contract or business 
unit, especially buy-side versus sell-side; localized and multiple 
implementations  
 
The organizing vision – automating the contract 
lifecycle across the enterprise 
Fragmentation of contracting – see row above 
Limitations on the repository (completeness, access and 
searchability) 
Difficulties in defining and extracting structured data 
Limited data integration 
Reduced expectations for contracting knowledge as associated 
with CMS (as opposed to risk management, business 
intelligence or other business initiatives) 
The organizing vision – contracting knowledge as 
an outcome of automating the contract lifecycle 
across the enterprise  
CMS associated with scale (volume and standardization) and 
structured data 
CMS associated with large companies 
CMS associated with the buy-side 
CMS associated with IT infrastructure, especially ERP 
CMS associated with lower risk 
CMS associated with “algorithmic” contracting 
The organizing vision – CMS as an organizing 
technology for all types of contracts 
Unclear as to whether about process or information 
Conflicting function-specific views of CMS 
Competition with in-house and other software (e.g. ERP) 
Overlapping functionalities with other software (e.g. CRM, 
strategic sourcing) 
High cost of advanced features 
Weak business case  
Fallback to document repository (in competition with e.g. 
records or documents management systems) 
Category 
 
Table 5.4 Initial table of breakdown 
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To this point, the biography of CMS as an organizing technology gives an account of its 
precedents and its origin, in which CMS emerged, in a “harmonic convergence” (as one 
interviewee said, see Appendix 5.12), from antecedent technologies to meet a newly defined 
opportunity, contract management. But the biography shows that the business model for 
packaged software and the organizing vision for CMS as reified in its associated category failed 
to deliver on expectations in a number of ways. Most of all it shows that the CMS model of 
contracting – its organizing vision – did not sufficiently correspond to contracting as practiced 
in organizations to make CMS generally useful in the way anticipated. As in D’Adderio’s 
(2008, p. 76) characterization of overflowing, “the model as statement has not been able to put 
into motion a world in which it can function”. As one consequence, CMS did not seem 
particularly “fluid”, in the sense of being technologically appropriate in diverse settings. As 
another, by the end of the story there is a question not only about whether CMS is necessary, 
but about what it is – and the biographical subject, provisionally assumed, begins to fracture, 
prompting questions about its “production”. In the next chapter, adopting the commoditization 
perspective, I extend the empirical and analytical frame to include key market participants – the 
analyst firms and the vendors – and construct a biography of CMS as a commodity toward a 
fuller explanation.  
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Chapter 6 Empirical material: a biography of CMS as a commodity 
 
While in the preceding chapter I presented evidence of the various ways in which CMS as an 
organizing technology for contract did not live up to expectations, in this chapter I switch to a 
market or, more precisely, a commoditization perspective. Rather than take CMS for granted, 
this perspective focuses on how it was “produced”. In this second version of the biography of 
CMS, as a commodity, CMS still has precedents, an origin and a name. As before, CMS is sold 
by vendors, considered by prospective customers, implemented by user organizations, and 
remarked upon by industry observers; it had an ideal career path according to the business 
model for packaged software. But is no longer (just) a technological artefact. Instead, as a 
commodity, it represents a “very complex social form and distribution of knowledge” 
(Appadurai 1986a, p. 41) embodied, as I will show, not only in a technological artefact, but in 
other manifestations as well.  
 
The key empirical move toward switching to the commoditization perspective is to extend the 
analytical frame to include analyst coverage and vendor histories as essential elements of the 
software biography. In section 6.1, I discuss the analysts that covered CMS (section 6.1.1), the 
role of analysts in IT procurement as illuminated by a recent litigation (section 6.1.2), and 
analyst coverage of CMS (section 6.1.3). In section 6.2, I provide brief histories of the five 
focus vendors: I-Many (section 6.2.1), Selectica (section 6.2.2), Ariba (section 6.2.3), Emptoris 
(section 6.2.4) and Upside (section 6.2.5). Section 6.2.6 draws together some observations 
regarding the marketing efforts of the vendors. 
 
From this analyst and vendor data, I draw out additional evidence of how CMS failed to meet 
expectations (section 6.3). This comes under three headings: failure of the business model for 
packaged software (section 6.3.1), direct evidence of category breakdown (section 6.3.2) and 
the breakdown of correspondence between market perception and market performance (section 
6.3.3), and is summarized in Table 6.2, which I take forward to Chapter 7 for further discussion 
and analysis. In section 6.4 I conclude with an alternative and subsuming biography of CMS as 
a commodity.  
 
6.1 The analysts and their role in the biography of CMS  
 
Pollock and Williams (2009b, 2010, 2011) have highlighted the role of analysts in the IT 
marketplace and in particular, as I discussed in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, in what might be 
termed the reification of the organizing vision in the form of the category. In this section I 
discuss the analysts’ involvement in the biography of CMS, toward developing a fuller 
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understanding of not only how analysts figure in packaged software production but also the 
nature of the category. 
 
6.1.1 The analyst firms  
 
Three analyst firms – Gartner (including AMR, which Gartner acquired in 2009), Forrester and 
Aberdeen – have played a major part in the biography of CMS. Gartner, founded in 1979 by 
Gideon Gartner, a former Wall Street technology stock analyst, identifies itself as the world’s 
leading IT research and advisory company.
35
 Gartner’s most well-known research product is its 
“Magic Quadrant” (see Pollock and Williams 2009b). Magic Quadrant coverage is for products 
in the growth and consolidation phases of a five-stage product lifecycle (emergence, growth, 
consolidation, maturity and decline), while MarketScope coverage is for products and vendors 
that are “distinct and viable” but in the emergent or mature phases (Gartner Inc. 2008a; 
Appendix 6.1).
 36
 
 
Forrester Research is a smaller company,
37
 describing itself as an independent research 
company targeting companies with more than $1 billion in revenues. Corresponding to 
Gartner’s Magic Quadrant, Forrester produces the Forrester Wave (see Figure 6.2). Forrester 
develops the Forrester Wave based on its own weightings of various criteria; it also provides an 
accompanying Excel spreadsheet so that clients to give their own weightings to the criteria. 
 
The third analyst firm, Aberdeen, is owned by a marketing company, Harte-Hanks, and 
straightforwardly positions its research as serving “demand creation programs, online marketing 
campaigns and web-based sales and marketing tools” (Harte Hanks 2010 annual report). 
                                                          
35
 As of year end 2010 Gartner claimed to have over 60,000 clients in 11,601 organizations and 85 
countries. For 2010, revenues were $1.29 billion and net income was $96.3 million. According to its 2010 
annual report, Gartner had 1,249 research analysts and consultants, speaking 47 languages.  
36
 Magic Quadrant analysis is based on fifteen criteria in two categories: completeness of vision and 
ability to execute. MarketScopes use a limited set of criteria identified in the research to rate 
vendors/products in five categories ranking from strong negative up to strong positive. (Hawkins 2008) 
Gideon Gartner describes the origin of the “Magic Quadrant” as a “stalking horse” tool, never intended 
for publication. “Around 1987/88, I was working on further enhancing the Gartner Group Research 
Notebook, and happened to introduce the ‘stalking horse’ graphic as one technique which our analysts 
could occasionally use when presenting at research meetings to support a conclusion. This initiative was 
meant to be for internal discussion only, because the method seemed an oversimplification (yet an 
interesting starting point for certain confrontations which would be challenging and educational at our 
meetings). I do not recollect ever allowing the publication of an MQ, but during the mid-’90s and well 
after I left Gartner, the MQ feature grew to be a major deliverable for many of its clients! I acknowledge 
that we had left money on the table, as MQs grew in external popularity (and considerable dislike). In a 
future post, I expect to discuss the damage which this tool can create, sometimes leading to questionable 
corporate decision-making.” (Gartner 2011) 
37
 In 2010, revenues were $250.7 million, income from continuing operations was $20.5 million, and the 
company had 474 research and fulfillment employees. 
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Aberdeen writes research reports, case studies and “white papers” on a commissioned basis, and 
these reports are then made available by the sponsoring vendors. Aberdeen analysts are 
available to comment on vendor-sponsored webcasts, and Aberdeen also offers report 
sponsorship and event sponsorship opportunities to vendors.  
 
Gartner and Forrester follow much the same research and business model, deriving a large part 
of revenues from research subscriptions. Vendors supply information about their products by 
filling out questionnaires and in vendor briefings, and analysts also consult with customers (see 
Pollock and Williams 2009b, 2011). Aberdeen’s research model is based in part on email 
surveys; respondents are promised free access to the resulting reports (Appendix 6.2).  
 
6.1.2 The analyst role in the IT marketplace: evidence from a recent litigation  
 
To understand the role of the analysts in the biography of CMS, it is important to understand 
how they figure in the IT marketplace more generally (see Pollock and Williams 2009b, 2010, 
2011). The ratings that vendors receive from technology analyst firms, Gartner in particular, are 
important in IT procurement, to the extent that vendors hire analyst relations professionals to 
manage their relations with analysts. These ratings are produced within a framework of IT 
categories that the analysts construct and actively manage. The classification schemes that 
organize the work and the products of analysts can be seen in, for example, Gartner’s list of 
MarketScope and Magic Quadrant coverage (or see Appendix 6.2 for Aberdeen’s categories). 
Pollock and Williams (2009b) have noted that analyst assessments are viewed with some 
scepticism, and the analysts’ objectivity and independence have been questioned. In this section 
I discuss analyse a recent litigation in the United States that shines a light on the analyst role as 
gatekeepers in the technology marketplace and on the nature of the research they produce. 
Taking the commoditization perspective, this research constitutes not only “knowledge” in the 
chain of production from vendors to user organizations, but also a product in its own right – i.e. 
marketized criteria, or, in Pollock and Williams’s terms, commodified “community 
knowledge”. 
IT vendor ZL Technologies sued Gartner in the US federal courts, claiming that it was treated 
unfairly by Gartner when it was characterized as a “niche” player in the Magic Quadrant for 
email archiving software.
38
 Noting that Gartner’s Magic Quadrant was a “key revenue driver” 
                                                          
38
 The procedural history of the case is as follows: On May 29, 2009, ZL Technologies filed suit against 
Gartner Group and Gartner analyst Carol diCenzo in the Northern District of California, alleging 
defamation, trade libel, false advertising (under the Lanham Act), false or misleading advertising (under 
California state law), unfair competition, and negligent interference with prospective economic 
advantage. On July 6, 2009, the defendants filed motions to dismiss, to which the plaintiff replied in 
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because it “heavily influenced IT purchase decisions”, ZL claimed that its technology was 
superior but that it ranked lower because Gartner gave too much weight to vendors’ sales and 
marketing capabilities. They argued that the Magic Quadrant has the appearance of objectivity 
but is in fact subjective, and that there is a lack of transparency as the underlying criteria 
weightings are kept secret. They suggested that Gartner was influenced by its commercial 
relations with vendors, and argued more generally that Gartner’s “oppressive chokehold” stifles 
innovation (cf. Pollock and Williams 2011). ZL challenged Gartner’s business model, alleging 
that it levered the non-transparency of its research and the underlying “critical fact base not 
available elsewhere” into the sale of analyst time.39  
Gartner responded in several ways. First, they said that they never pretended to test or rate 
technology; instead their methodology was based on the collection and analysis of vendor 
briefings and customer opinions. Second they said that they did not assess technology separately 
from the vendor, and that considering sales and marketing support for a product was entirely 
legitimate; Gartner emphasized that customers make multi-year commitments to their vendors 
and need to be assured of their long-term prospects.
40
 But Gartner’s principal defense was their 
constitutional right to express a subjective opinion, and on this basis they ultimately won the 
case. “[T]he Magic Quadrant format itself rebuts any suggestion that it is a statement of fact.” 
Gartner also argued that its claims about its own expertise (“high quality, independent and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
opposition September 18, 2009, and Gartner filed a reply in support of motion to dismiss October 9. On 
November 4, the motion to dismiss was granted with leave to amend in part. On December 4, 2009, ZL 
Technologies filed an amended complaint, and a motion to dismiss was filed on January 8, 2010. On 
January 22, ZL Technologies filed a memo in opposition to the motion to dismiss, with a reply memo 
filed January 29. The motion to dismiss was granted on May 3, 2010. ZL Technologies appealed to the 9
th
 
Circuit, filing an opening brief August 16, 2010. The answering brief was filed September 28, and a reply 
brief on October 29. On May 13, 2011, the 9th circuit affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and writ 
of certiori (application to the US Supreme Court to hear the case) was denied October 19, 2011. As noted 
by Pollock and Williams (2009b), the analyst firms assign particular individuals to cover technology 
markets. This figured in the ZL litigation when ZL sued the individual analyst alongside Gartner and 
when the Gartner ombudsman attributed ZL’s unhappiness with its MQ ranking to a “relationship issue” 
with the individual analyst: “at this point it’s come down to level of trust and respect” (ZL complaint filed 
May 29, 2009). 
39
 “Gartner sells time with its analysts at a high price. As far back as 2004, Gartner charged $6,500 for a 
single engagement with an analyst over the phone, $10,000 for a face-to-face engagement with an analyst, 
$12,000 for an engagement with an analyst involving an external client audience and $16,000 for 
engagements with non-Gartner clients. The list price for an all-day session with an analyst was $15,000. 
Gartner also sells packages to clients for annual bundles of services totaling in the tens of thousands of 
dollars or more. On information and belief, those prices have increased since 2004.” (ZL amended 
complaint filed December 4, 2009) 
40
 “Accordingly, in evaluating vendors, Gartner considers not only their products, but also sales and 
marketing, financial strength, and other factors shedding light on the vendors’ long-term prospects and 
ability to adapt to changing requirements. … Plaintiff asserts that the Magic Quadrant Reports assert facts 
because they are presented as ‘fact-based mathematical reviews of product performance.’ … That is 
plainly wrong. The Reports do not review product performance. Indeed, they do not even review 
products: instead, they evaluate vendors on an overall basis. A vendor’s product is considered in 
evaluating vendors, but it is only one of many criteria and it is assessed based upon customer opinions 
rather than product testing or other quantitative evidence.” (Gartner answering brief filed September 28, 
2010)  
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objective”) were likewise merely opinions, and thus protected speech. (Gartner motion to 
dismiss filed July 6, 2009)  
 
The reader of a Gartner Magic Quadrant report could not mistake it for a compendium 
of objective fact or quantifiable test results. From the title page – which identifies the 
report as a “Magic Quadrant” and notes the contents to be opinion [footnote to MQ] – 
through to the end, it is evident from both tenor and substance that the Magic Quadrant 
is not the test-driven “Consumer Reports”-style product review the plaintiff suggests. 
As the plaintiff highlighted in its Complaint, the Magic Quadrant reports “do not 
involve a single minute of independent testing of . . . products.” … Instead, as made 
clear by three statements made at the outset of the report, the Magic Quadrant is 
subjective in nature. (Gartner reply in support of motion to dismiss filed October 9, 
2009) (emphasis on Magic in the original) 
 
This case first of all demonstrates that both vendors and Gartner understand that Gartner has a 
key gatekeeping role in the IT marketplace. Second, Gartner, though calling itself an IT research 
and advisory company, does not test or analyse technology; it collects opinions, i.e. it does 
market research, which it reports back to the marketplace. Third, Gartner does not consider that 
it rates software products; instead it rates vendors, with the software only one factor 
contributing to the overall rating, the vendor’s marketing budget and its commitment to 
marketing being another.  
 
6.1.3 Analyst coverage of CMS 
 
With this background, I now turn to the role of the analysts in the biography of CMS. Gartner 
has been a key observer of the CMS marketplace, producing many research articles on CMS and 
CMS vendors (see Appendix 4.7); in addition, both Gartner and Forrester followed CMS 
vendors Ariba and Emptoris under other categories, such as e-procurement.  
 
Tracing analyst coverage of CMS, we see how, through words (and pictures; see Figure 5.1), the 
organizing vision is first turned into a financial opportunity for prospective customers, then a 
financial opportunity for vendors, and then an IT product category to which an expectation is 
attached. Illustrating this transformative enactment is the widely cited Contract Life-Cycle 
Management: A $20 Billion Market, by Gartner’s Andy Kyte, published in April 2002, which 
described the anticipated benefits of contract life cycle management and early industry 
expectations for the market.  
Enterprise management teams should stand back and look at the greater problem before 
rushing into piecemeal investments in changes to procurement processes. In many 
industry sectors (especially capital-intensive industry sectors), contract life cycle 
management is a core process, but is not recognized as such and suffers from diverse 
ownership and little or no coordination. Enterprises should audit the risks to which they 
are exposed through poor contract management, and assess the opportunities for 
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immediate bottom-line cost savings that could be achieved through better visibility and 
management of contracts. … [the financial opportunity for customers] 
 
The increased awareness of the importance of contracts has not gone unnoticed by the 
IT industry. Solutions and services vendors are congregating around this opportunity for 
new business. … [the financial opportunity for vendors] 
 
Confusion in the marketplace is normal at the inception of a major new application 
domain. Contract life cycle management is almost an unexamined territory in many 
major global corporations, but it will soon be on the executive management agenda and 
will attract substantial investment. This investment will be driven by three strong 
themes. First, the desire to cut costs by using every opportunity to reset contract prices, 
by re-examining established contracts and improving the structure of new contracts. 
Second, to make all the risks embedded in the contract infrastructure visible, and to 
establish mechanisms to reduce and manage the risk. Third, to seize the opportunity to 
define new, flexible working relationships with suppliers as part of the underlying 
imperative to restructure the enterprise cost base. These forces will combine to make 
contract life cycle management a highly visible program of work in at least 60 percent 
of Global 2000 enterprises by the first half of 2003. As a result of the potential demand 
for radical improvements in this space, enterprises will be spending more [than] $20 
billion a year on software and services for contract life cycle management by the end of 
2007 (0.7 probability). (Gartner Inc. 2002; see footnote 2) (emphasis added) [the 
expectation for the category] 
 
Cost reduction was at the heart of this version of contract management, with risk management a 
second place consideration. But Kyte also addressed contracting knowledge, recommending a 
“contract health check” and emphasizing that senior managers should have the information at 
hand to respond to events impacting contract obligations, such as political unrest, major 
currency fluctuations, changes in law, mergers and acquisitions, counterparty bankruptcy, 
changes in ISO standards, supplier price increases and allegations of IP violations by 
suppliers.Of the $20 billion in predicted revenues, 80% would be in services, a detail that was 
not so widely reported. Kyte also observed, in what might in light of subsequent developments 
be taken as a warning sign, that contract management had been taken up by ERP vendors, e-
procurement and SRM vendors, and vendors specializing in CMS (pure-play vendors), as well 
as in “specialist offerings aimed at particular markets”. 
 
Andy Kyte and his successor as Gartner’s analyst for contract management software, Deborah 
Wilson, co-authored "MarketScope for Contract Management, 2007” (Gartner Inc. 2007a; see 
footnote 2), saying that “[t]he early enterprise contract management solutions are maturing into 
cohesive tools, while many new entrants in the market are driving innovation”. The 2008 
MarketScope reported that the market had grown 23% in 2007, and was expected to grow 16% 
in 2008 (Gartner Inc. 2008c; see footnote 2). However, after writing the 2008 MarketScope, 
Wilson posted a blog entry questioning the rationale for CMS, saying she had been “too easily 
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swayed by the ‘contract lifecycle management’ rhetoric” defining the CMS industry (Wilson 
2008; Appendix 6.3; see footnote 2). 
 
As of February 2011, Gartner’s list of Magic Quadrant and Marketscope coverage said that 
“Contract Management” as a category had been “retired”, with the 2008 MarketScope listed as 
the last. As of January 2012, “Contract Management” was no longer listed at all. One 
explanation would be that contract management did not “graduate” to the Magic Quadrant. 
Another somewhat more nuanced interpretation of the “retirement” of MarketScope coverage is 
that the category did not cohere. In May 2010, Wilson (Gartner Inc. 2010; see footnote 2) 
produced an “Enterprise Contract Management Solutions Vendor Guide”, describing an 
“already fragmented market” that had become “even more fragmented”. This guide divided the 
“ECM solution market landscape into 8 segments: strategic sourcing application suite add-ons, 
content management application add-ons, e-signature-based, sell-side solutions, industry-
specific solutions, ITAM (IT asset management) tools, ERP suite applications, general purpose 
ECM solutions and other ECM solutions”. In February 2011, Wilson and colleagues considered 
whether enterprise contract management could be implemented across the entire enterprise. 
Their advice was that CMS as “über-filing cabinet” (i.e. a contracts repository) could indeed be 
implemented enterprise-wide and that this sort of implementation “should not be overlooked 
just because it is relatively simple and unconnected to other applications”. But “[w]hen 
extensive integration and contract-type-specific functionality is required for multiple contract 
types (i.e., for sales and purchase contracts), separate, type-specific CLM solutions are the most 
cost-effective, practical alternatives” (Gartner Inc. 2011; see footnote 2).  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Gartner’s analysis of CMS implementation style (from Gartner Inc. 2011; with 
permission; see footnote 2) 
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In December 2009, Gartner bought a competitor, AMR Research. AMR had covered contract 
management software from the beginning, publishing reports and offering commentary on 
industry developments. AMR had its own CMS analyst, Mickey North Rizza, who joined 
Gartner where she continued to work as a research analyst until June 2012. One blogger noted a 
divergence in historical coverage of CMS as between AMR and Gartner – with focus vendor 
Upside winning high marks from AMR but left out of Gartner’s coverage (Busch 2010). 
 
Like Gartner, Forrester has been observing the CMS market from the beginning; its long-time 
lead analyst on the market is Andrew Bartels. Forrester issued Forrester Wave reports on CMS 
(which they call contract life-cycle management software, or CLM) software in 2006, in 2008 
and in 2011. In 2006 (Forrester Research Inc. 2006), Bartels identified I-Many, Upside and 
diCarta as some of the vendors that had helped create the category, noting that Ariba was also in 
the Leaders category. Bartels described two approaches to CMS (process-centric or enterprise), 
noted the conflicts within the organization that affect the CMS procurement process, and 
advocated the cross-process implementation that would cover multiple types of contracts. The 
report also noted that CMS (CLM) faced competition from ERP, SRM and ECM solutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Image removed as copyright is owned by Forrester Research Inc.] 
Figure 6.2 Forrester Wave for Contract Life-Cycle Management 2006 (Forrester Research Inc. 
2006) 
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In the 2008 Forrester Wave (Forrester Research Inc. 2008), Emptoris (having acquired diCarta, 
see section 6.2.4), Upside, Ariba and Selectica are in the Leader category, and I-Many is a 
Strong Performer. The market for CLM purchases was reported as growing in excess of 25%, 
but also consolidating. ERP vendor SAP is also in the Leader category.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Image removed as copyright is owned by Forrester Research Inc.] 
Figure 6.3 Forrester Wave for Contract Life-Cycle Management 2008 (Forrester Research Inc. 
2008) 
 
By 2011, Upside, Ariba, Selectica, Emptoris, ERP vendor Oracle’s E-Business Suite and SAP 
were in the Leader category (Forrester Research Inc. 2011a). The 2011 Forrester Wave reported 
revenues figures showing buy-side CMS as a component of e-purchasing, growing at 17% a 
year, with revenues of $368 million. Giving an insight into their methodology, the 2011 
Forrester Wave indicated that Forrester had evaluated ten vendors (selected based on product fit, 
customer success, and Forrester client demand). The data collected for each vendor included 
one day of scenario-based product testing, a vendor survey, a product demo and three customer 
reference calls.  
 
In research later that year, Forrester (Forrester Research Inc. 2011b) issued a report authored by 
Bartels noting that: 
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Four forces are keeping the $5 billion ePurchasing and contract life-cycle management 
(CLM) software markets highly competitive and dynamic. First, cloud delivery via 
software-as-a-service (SaaS) is a growing part of the market, reaching 41% of total 
vendor revenues by 2012. Second, Smart Computing is permeating the market, with 
embedded analytics and rich collaborative environments becoming key functions in 
products like CLM, services procurement, supplier risk and performance management, 
and of course automated spend analysis. Third, vendors with a strong vertical focus in 
several cases have outperformed the overall market, while many other vendors are 
concentrating on several vertical industries. Fourth, the activity of exchanging critical 
work objects like purchase orders (POs), invoices and contracts, and necessary business 
information is raising the importance and value to vendors of networks for connecting 
buyers and suppliers together.  
 
None of these were features of the organizing vision for CMS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Image removed as copyright is owned by Forrester Research Inc.] 
Figure 6.4 Forrester Wave for Contract Life-Cycle Management 2011 (Forrester Research Inc. 
2011a) 
 
Aberdeen has put out many reports on the CMS market and vendors over the years, including 
several “benchmark” reports. These reports focus on the benefits of contract management and 
contract management software, e.g.: 
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Figure 6.5 Aberdeen’s “The Impact of Poor Contract Management within the Enterprise” 
(Aberdeen Group 2006; with permission) 
 
As an example of Aberdeen Group research, in April 2007 Aberdeen Group issued a report 
called: “Contract Lifecycle Management and the CFO: Optimizing Revenues and Capturing 
Savings”. The report was underwritten in part by I-Many, Selectica, CMS vendor CMA Contiki, 
and document automation vendor Business Integrity. Another Aberdeen report, “Select[ica] 
EMC – Contract Lifecycle Management from Selectica and EMC”, dated May 2009, presented 
survey results from Aberdeen Group’s August 2008 “Contract Lifecycle Management Report”, 
which was for a time made available on a complimentary basis in part due to sponsorship by 
Selectica and SAP (as of July 2012 it cost $399). Tim Minahan followed the CMS market at 
Aberdeen for a number of years, before moving to Procuri, later acquired by Ariba, where he 
became chief marketing officer.  
 
To summarize, Gartner, Forrester, Aberdeen and, prior to its acquisition by Gartner, AMR all 
covered CMS. Gartner provided “MarketScope” coverage to CMS in 2007 and 2008, but has 
since retired the category. Lead analyst Deborah Wilson questioned the “contract lifecycle” in 
2008, and has tracked the fragmentation of the CMS category, particularly between a contracts 
repository (the über-filing cabinet) and specialized process applications. Forrester issued 
Forrester Waves on CMS in 2006, 2008 and 2011, charting the shifts in relative positioning of 
the key pure-play vendors and the encroachment of ERP and ECM vendors into the CMS space. 
Tracing coverage of CMS, individual analysts do offer insightful and sometimes critical 
commentary based on following their assigned markets day to day. As examples of this sort of 
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synthesizing guidance I would point out Wilson’s distinction between enterprise-wide and more 
specialized, purpose-built applications (Gartner Inc. 2011; see footnote 2), her blog questioning 
the contract lifecycle (Wilson 2008; Appendix 6.3; see footnote 2), and Bartels’s (Forrester 
Research Inc. 2011b) commentary on the evolution of the CMS market. In reports like these, 
analysts not only explain software products and vendors to customers but interpret the market 
for all participants, including vendors and their investors. In this respect, analysts are like other 
specialty trade media, and the case of CMS supports Pollock and Williams’s characterization of 
analyst research as commodified “community knowledge”. In Chapter 7 I will take this point 
forward in a somewhat different way to explain the failure of CMS within a commoditization 
framework. 
 
6.2 Five focus vendors 
 
Having traced the analyst coverage of CMS, I now turn to the five focus vendors: I-Many, 
Selectica, Ariba, Emptoris and Upside. In the following brief histories distilled from hundreds 
of pages of archival materials, I am looking first of all to understand them in relation to the 
business model for packaged software, including generification, and more generally to draw out 
the implications of Sawyer’s (2001) observation that profitability and market share, not user 
adoption and user satisfaction, are the measures of success for packaged software. .  
 
6.2.1 I-Many 
 
I-Many is considered a pioneer in the contract management software market (Forrester Research 
Inc. 2006). Incorporated in Massachusetts in 1995, I-Many went public in 2000, and, in the 
circumstances described below, was acquired by a private equity company in 2009. Appendix 
6.4 presents an overview of key measures of the company’s size and financial results for the 
years when it was a public company. 
 
Before going public, I-Many’s focus was on sell-side software for contracting in the healthcare 
industry, and in its initial S-1 registration statement for the IPO (initial public offering), filed in 
March 2000, the company linked its prospects to the growth of the healthcare industry. The S-1 
characterized healthcare purchasing as complex, with pricing determined off a number of 
variables: volume and composition of items purchased, number of parties to the contract, 
seller’s market share and purchaser’s demographics, as well as how many products are used in a 
particular surgical procedure. Pricing incentives were generated through chargebacks and 
rebates, and US government healthcare regulations added another layer of complexity. 
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I-Many executed several strategic moves intended to improve its positioning in advance of the 
IPO. It launched an internet portal, “I-Many.com”, intended to serve as a “marketplace for 
trading partners in the healthcare industry”. But management also believed “that the purchase 
contracting practices in many other industries are similar to those in the healthcare market” 
(emphasis added) and intended to explore opportunities to serve other industry verticals. In May 
2000 they entered into a strategic partnership arrangement with Procter & Gamble in order to 
move into the consumer packaged goods market (see Appendix 6.5). The company suggested 
that this strategic partnership would help them extend their reach into broader B2B (business to 
business) e-commerce, which they believed was “increasingly characterized by the use of 
complex purchasing contracts” (I-Many S-1 filed May 17, 2000) – like the healthcare contracts 
described in the initial S-1. The industry section of the S-1 was recast from healthcare to B2B e-
commerce. Immediately after the IPO the company turned to making strategic acquisitions and 
alliances (see Appendix 6.6) intended to grow or consolidate market share, enter new markets 
and gain new software capabilities. In August 2001 and March 2002, I-Many bought contract 
management software vendors Provato and Menerva, and in 2002 I-Many released its 
ContractSphere product for “full contract lifecycle management capability, buy-side and sell-
side”.  
 
Over the following years, I-Many won analyst praise but despite significant expenditures on 
sales and marketing (see Appendix 6.26) failed to achieve profitability. I-Many was unable to 
expand into new verticals: No royalties were earned, and no milestones reached under the 
agreement with P&G, and the agreement was amended so that P&G was paid in warrants for I-
Many stock. During 2004, I-Many’s auditors resigned, NASDAQ threatened a delisting because 
of I-Many’s low stock price, and management looked for a buyer for the company. In December 
2004, I-Many announced a merger with Selectica, which Selectica’s chief described as a 
combination of Selectica’s pricing engine (see section 6.2.2) with I-Many’s contract 
management expertise. In January 2005, another software company, Trilogy, made a tender 
offer for Selectica, based on an assumption that the I-Many merger would not go through. The 
Trilogy offer was rejected by Selectica, which remained committed to the merger with I-Many. 
But in March 2005, I-Many shareholders rejected the merger on the basis that the price ($1.55 a 
share) was too low.  
 
By June 2005, investors called for new management, long-time CEO Leigh Powell left in 
August 2005,
41
 and from the summer of 2005 through 2008 there was a significant changeover 
of executives. Strategy under new management was to capitalize on I-Many’s dominant position 
                                                          
41
 In 2011 he was CEO of iContracts, a vendor of contract management and compliance solutions for the 
pharmaceutical and healthcare industry. 
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in healthcare, through still proclaiming its status as “the only publicly-traded, independent 
company devoted to Enterprise Contract Management”. They also shifted their business model 
away from the sale of licenses toward subscription and other “recurring” revenues. At the end of 
2007, I-Many placed $17 million of senior convertible notes to shore up its cash position. In 
2008, the company made two acquisitions in the healthcare software business, and expanded 
into the medical devices market. But in the third quarter of 2008 the financial crisis caused a 
collapse in I-Many’s stock price, and the company was again threatened with a delisting by 
NASDAQ. The senior convertible notes were accelerable on delisting, so I-Many faced a 
liquidity crisis. In December 2008, the company announced that it had agreed to be bought by a 
private equity company for a price of $.43 a share, eventually increased to $.61 a share, far 
lower than the price offered by Selectica in 2004-2005 (see Appendix 6.7). The new owners 
announced a far narrower brief for the company, focusing on regulated industries requiring 
“enhanced data management, data processing and business intelligence” (Appendix 6.8). 
 
In summary, I-Many began and ended the period 2000 to 2010 as a provider of specialty 
contracting applications for the healthcare business, with a particular expertise in US 
government healthcare regulations. In preparation for its IPO, I-Many constructed a broader 
business model under the banner of contract management, which was “agnostic” in terms of 
industry specialization, and entered into a strategic partnership with Procter & Gamble to 
develop a consumer packaged goods business. The P&G partnership would have been the first 
step in a horizontal move across industries. However, the company failed to substantially extend 
its reach into industries beyond healthcare, which remained the mainstay of its business. 
Segment reporting (Appendix 6.9) shows the anticipated development of a consumer packaged 
goods segment (2000-2002), which was dropped by 2003. The high water mark of non-
healthcare revenues was 2003, and by 2008, it accounted for only 15% of revenues; for many 
years I-Many said that it needed to move beyond the healthcare industry, and then 
acknowledged that it was highly dependent on the healthcare industry. Throughout the period 
2000 to 2008, I-Many generated losses and ran down its cash position until a liquidity crisis 
forced its sale for a price per share far lower than the price Selectica had offered four years 
earlier.  
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[Image removed as copyright is owned by I-Many.] 
 
Figure 6.6 I-Many’s “Enterprise Software for Contract Management – A Buyer’s Guide” (I-
Many 2006)  
 
The history of I-Many suggests that a data-centric model of contracting developed to suit a 
specialized contracting context was not easily generalizable. Strategic transactions, including 
partnerships with customers to extend market reach, high sales and marketing expenditures and 
a shift of the business model toward recurring revenues (Appendix 6.10) were not sufficient to 
make CMS profitable. As a footnote to the I-Many experience with CMS, I point out here a 
white paper called “The Myths, Pitfalls and Realities Around Enterprise Software for Contract 
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Management: A Buyer’s Guide” that I-Many produced in 2006; it was no longer available on 
the I-Many website as of 2011. This white paper identifies many of the uncertainties around the 
business case for CMS, consistent with findings outlined in Chapter 5. It is not clear why I-
Many produced this document, though I surmise that it was intended, in a perhaps self-serving 
way, to help prospective customers develop realistic expectations for CMS, and to distinguish I-
Many, as an established and experienced CMS vendor, from the many smaller competitors 
beginning to offer CMS products.  
6.2.2 Selectica 
Selectica, which became a public company in 2000, was a late-comer to CMS. Appendix 6.11 
presents an overview of key measures of the company’s size and financial results. Selectica was 
incorporated in 1996, acquiring the technology and assets of Catalogics Software Corporation, a 
company founded by Dr. Sanjay Mittal. Both Dr. Mittal and Selectica co-founder Rajen Jaswa 
were graduates of the Indian Institute of Technology, and for some years a significant portion of 
Selectica’s staff and operations were located in India. Selectica’s software enabled companies 
such as BMW to configure and price complex products (i.e. products with lots of “options”) for 
sale in web-based environments. Selectica described its “configuration, pricing and quoting” or 
“CPQ” application as a rules-driven “pricing engine” incorporated in an “internet selling 
system”. Selectica’s product was intended to replace sales personnel in e-commerce, and, 
though the company had only a few customers, management believed that its model was 
extendible to new vertical markets.  
 
After its IPO, Selectica had over $200 million in cash and it made some strategic acquisitions 
into new industry verticals. Like I-Many (and many other dot.com companies), Selectica used 
its equity as currency, giving warrants to partners and customers but also relying on stock-based 
compensation to pay its employees. Its stock price collapsed from a high of $86.50 in the 
quarter ended June 30, 2000 to $3.53 a year later, and Gartner commented in May 2001: “Sales 
configuration vendors have lost nearly 96 percent of market value in the past year and laid off 
more than 800 employees.” (Gartner Inc. 2001; see footnote 2) 
 
From the beginning, Selectica had listed as risk factor the trouble it experienced extracting the 
“knowledge base” from its customers during implementations. A pattern developed where 
customers seemed to rotate in and then out of the top revenue spots, for example: 
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  Customer revenues, year ended March 31, 
   
  2003  2002  2001 
       
CCustomer A    25 %     *       *   
CCustomer B    14 %     11 %     *   
CCustomer C    *       *       17 % 
CCustomer D    *       *       16 % 
CCustomer E    *       *       14 % 
 
Table 6.1 Selectica top customers by revenue shares, fiscal years 2001-2003 
 
By March 2003, Selectica’s stock was trading for less than its cash and investments, making it a 
potential takeover target. Yet Selectica featured in Gartner’s 1H 2003 Magic Quadrant for sales 
configuration as a leader, together with Oracle and Siebel (Gartner Inc. 2003a; see footnote 2). 
In December 2003, the company started to work on “lower-priced versions of its configuration, 
pricing and quoting solutions designed to target companies with projects of mid-tier complexity 
that do not require customized solutions”; they identified telecommunications and 
manufacturing as their core markets (Selectica press release January 22, 2004). The company 
also reported “making progress in developing vertical industry-specific applications that deliver 
out-of-the-box solutions” (Selectica press release April 29, 2004, emphasis added). 
 
In May 2004, Selectica had its first tangle with a competitor, Trilogy, when Trilogy sued 
Selectica for patent infringement; Selectica countersued in November. In January 2005 Trilogy 
made a tender offer for Selectica (see section 6.2.1), which did not go through. Conflict with 
Trilogy (later acquired by Versata) would plague the company for years to come, and a 
comprehensive settlement was not agreed until 2011.
42
  
                                                          
42
 In January 2006, Selectica settled its original lawsuit with Trilogy for $7.5 million, but in October 
2006, Trilogy (now Versata) sued them again, again alleging patent infringement. In October 2007, 
Selectica announced a settlement with Versata over the CPQ business. Under the terms of the settlement, 
Selectica was required to pay a $10 million lump sum plus additional amounts in excess of $7.5 million 
over time. There was a full license of Versata patents for CPQ, and the two parties allied to sell CPQ to 
existing Versata customers. In July 2008, Versata made an offer for Selectica, which the board rejected, 
and Versata proceeded to accumulate Selectica stock, acquiring over 5% by November. Selectica’s 
management then amended Selectica’s existing shareholder rights plan (“poison pill”) to reduce the 
triggering event threshold from 15% to 4.99%, justifying the action on the basis that changes in control 
over 4.99% might jeopardize one of Selectica’s principal assets – its accumulated NOL (net operating 
loss) position for tax purposes. As a result, Versata’s equity position was effectively diluted in January 
2009 when the pill was triggered. Selectica sought a declaratory action in Delaware Chancery Court to 
have its shareholder rights plan upheld. In February 2010, in a significant corporate law decision, the 
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While the company had not spent down its cash from the IPO, its product and its business 
model were not succeeding. In a strategic break away from reliance on its CPQ software, 
Selectica made the failed attempt to acquire I-Many (section 6.2.1), and, when the acquisition 
was turned down by I-Many shareholders, Selectica bought Determine contract management 
software, in May 2005. The company’s market strategy now encompassed buy-side as well as 
sell-side. In addition, they began to offer a web-based hosted or on-demand product, targeting 
the middle market customer and looking to generate a subscription-type stream of revenues. The 
company acknowledged a growing reluctance on the part of their traditional customer base to 
take on large scale custom implementation projects, as well as growing competition from ERP 
vendors. Domain expertise was now recognized as a critical success factor, and Selectica 
claimed manufacturing, banking and insurance as their three principal verticals.  
 
By February 2006, the contract management business was starting to take hold, and Selectica’s 
CEO said he was “very optimistic about that little business”. During 2006 Dr. Mittal left the 
board, and by the end of the year Selectica’s crossover to the contract management software 
business was well underway. Selectica’s original business was described as the “legacy” 
CPQ business, and put into maintenance or run-off mode to support existing customers. Jason 
Stern, formerly of I-Many, was hired in 2006, and by 2010 was credited with leading the 
turnaround of the company, when Selectica finally started reporting positive cash flow, albeit on 
a low revenue base. As of 2011, Selectica described itself as “provider of deal management 
solutions, including sales configuration and contract lifecycle management solutions”, and its 
motto was “Get Deals Done Right”. The company provided its own take on its history – as a 
smoothly transitioning concept-driven business: 
Our company was founded in 1996 based on the then revolutionary idea that Internet 
technologies could provide users with “selection and configuration expertise” to guide 
users in making better decisions in the sales process. Over the years, we’ve expanded on 
our vision to encompass the entire deal management process, with a comprehensive 
suite of solutions that includes sales configuration, pricing, quoting, and contract 
lifecycle management, with modules for mobile devices, employee self-service, and 
Salesforce.com. Today, our solutions help companies get deals done right in over 20 
industries, by over 100,000 users, to process over one million new contracts annually. 
(www.selectica.com, accessed November 18, 2011). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Delaware Chancery Court held in favor of Selectica and against Versata on the rights plan amendment. 
This decision was appealed by Versata but upheld in October 2010. On September 20, 2011, Selectica 
and Versata entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement. Under the settlement agreement 
Selectica agreed to pay Versata about $6 million, and Versata sold its Selectica shares back to Selectica 
and agreed not to buy any more for 25 years. 
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Selectica began life as a configuration, pricing and quoting (CPQ) software company, and the 
founders and investors believed that the future of e-commerce for sellers was in algorithmic 
configuration capabilities. They believed that Selectica’s early experience developing software 
of this type for several large companies would translate into broader success, but they met 
competition from ERP vendors. When this business collapsed, the original management left. 
The proposed merger with I-Many in 2004-2005 was an attempt at strategic consolidation, 
matching Selectica’s still large cash reserves and sell-side CPQ platform with I-Many’s contract 
management business. When the merger fell through, Selectica bought a contract management 
capability (Determine). Over the following years they were able to build this into a small, 
marginally cash-flow-positive business, under the leadership of a former I-Many executive, 
while the original CPQ business declined (Appendix 6.12). During this time, Selectica spent 
more than seven years locked in a running battle with another software company over 
intellectual property rights, customers and revenues, and corporate control; their court case in 
Delaware made new corporate law.  
 
Selectica was like I-Many in that it started with a data-centric model of contracting which it 
believed would have wide applicability in e-commerce, and in that its experience points to the 
domain-specificity and even customer-specificity of contract data – its customer concentration 
being noteworthy (Appendix 6.13). Like I-Many, Selectica relied on strategic transactions and 
high sales and marketing expenditures to grow revenues, but was locked into a high proportion 
of low margin service revenues (Appendix 6.14). Unlike I-Many, Selectica did not run out of 
cash, but its history demonstrates the use of intellectual property litigation and unfriendly stock 
acquisitions as competitive strategies. Also unlike I-Many, Selectica came late to CMS – in 
2005, when its original CPQ capability was being overtaken by ERP or internally developed 
systems. As of July 2012, the company was repackaging CPQ as a cloud application available 
through salesforce.com’s AppExchange. 
6.2.3 Ariba 
Ariba, which went public in 1999, came into the CMS market from yet a different angle – B2B 
e-commerce for “indirect spend”, i.e. expenses not directly tied to the production of the products 
or services the company sells.
 43
 Appendix 6.15 presents an overview of key measures of the 
company’s size and financial results. Ariba originally positioned itself within B2B e-commerce 
for what they called “operating resources”, a category which corresponds to indirect spend. 
                                                          
43
 For a bakery the cost of flour is direct spend, while the cost of a telephone is indirect spend. Cf. Lacity 
et al. (2006). 
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Ariba intended to link its customers’ purchasing with Ariba’s supplier network, an e-commerce 
portal or platform. Ariba’s target customers were:  
 
large, multinational corporations and public sector institutions … We believe these 
organizations will be the most likely early beneficiaries of an automated, reliable, robust 
and scalable procurement solution and can provide strong customer references. 
Furthermore, we believe the large spending power these organizations can channel 
through our Ariba.com network will attract suppliers to the network. Finally, these 
organizations have demanding requirements and rigorously test our products, assisting 
us in designing a robust, reliable and scalable solution. (Ariba S-1 filed April 23, 1999)  
 
Ariba believed it had “first mover advantage” with this customer group and expressly invoked 
the “network effect” which it expected to exploit.  
 
After the IPO, Ariba made a series of acquisitions in the B2B e-commerce (or “net market”) 
business, using its inflated equity as currency (Appendix 6.16) and taking on a large amount of 
goodwill. In 2001, when the dot.com bubble burst, and e-commerce did not achieve its expected 
level of success, Ariba went through a period of crisis. By 2003 the company had largely 
written off its “net market” acquisitions and repositioned as a provider of “spend management” 
solutions. Co-founder of Ariba Keith Krach left the company in 2003.
44
 Over the following 
years, Ariba consolidated its position in spend management, making several strategic 
acquisitions (e.g. of Freemarkets), shifted to a subscription model, and in the background 
continued to expand and develop its supplier network. “We believe that technology alone is not 
enough to transform procurement from a tactical to a strategic function. Accordingly, Ariba 
Spend Management solutions combine domain expertise, operational services, software 
applications and network access.” (Ariba 2004 10-K) Still, Ariba was not profitable, with 
relatively high levels of low margin service revenues (Appendix 6.17).  
 
In 2004, Ariba began charging suppliers fees for access to its Ariba Supplier Network. In 2005, 
the Ariba Supplier Network had been opened up to customers using competing e-procurement 
software. In 2006, the supplier network had 140,000 registered suppliers and handled more than 
$90 billion of transactions. In June 2007, Aberdeen Group issued a report called “Could Ariba 
Be B2B’s Comeback Kid?”  
 
Though Ariba was named a leader in the 2006 Forrester Wave
 
for contract life-cycle 
management, in Ariba’s annual report for 2006 contract management was listed as just a 
component of Ariba’s spend management solutions. In 2007, Ariba bought Procuri, “a 
                                                          
44
 In 2011 he was the head of DocuSign, a major e-signature provider (docusign.com, accessed November 
18, 2011). 
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privately-held provider of on-demand supply management solutions”; Procuri had bought 
CMSI, a contract management software vendor, in 2005. Gartner commented that for Ariba the 
Procuri transaction removed a competitor, as Procuri’s products were largely duplicative, but 
complemented Ariba’s large company (more than $2 billion in revenue) customer base with 
mid-market customers from Procuri (Gartner Inc. 2007b; see footnote 2). Procuri customers 
were migrated to Ariba over the next several years. Ariba held its position in the CMS category 
when it was named as a leader in the Forrester Wave for Contract Lifecycle Management in 
August 2008 (Forrester Research Inc. 2008). But for Ariba contract management was part of 
procurement. The company strengthened its procurement offerings with solutions for the 
“contingent labour” (temporary contract work) market. 
 
Ariba moved to profitability in 2009, and in 2010 effected a further repositioning, as “the 
leading provider of collaborative business commerce solutions”, no longer limited to spend 
management, and a player in “cloud computing”. In Ariba’s description of its offerings as of the 
end of 2010, contract management products were split between buy-side and sell-side, and 
allotted only one paragraph each (Appendix 6.18). Meanwhile, the “Ariba Network” was 
featured much more prominently than in the past. The supplier network was by this time quite 
substantially built out; access from the supplier side was quality controlled, and attracted a fee 
based on deal flow (e.g. 1% for $100 thousand to $10 million), with supplier fees an increasing 
proportion of revenues for Ariba. In January 2011, Ariba bought Quadrem, a European-based 
online network for buying and selling goods and services. As of 2011, Ariba seemed poised to 
realize, to some extent at least, on the original vision of networked e-commerce. In May 2012, 
the company announced that it had entered into an agreement to be acquired by SAP for $4.3 
billion. In the joint press release (May 22, 2012), the companies said that “[t]he acquisition will 
combine Ariba’s successful buyer-seller collaboration network with SAP’s broad customer base 
and deep business process expertise to create new models for business-to-business collaboration 
in the cloud”.  
 
Ariba started with a vision of B2B e-commerce for indirect spend (or “operating resources”). 
Using their stock as currency they made a number of expensive acquisitions during the dot.com 
boom, which they had to write down when the bubble burst, generating large non-cash losses. 
B2B e-commerce did not materialize as quickly as early proponents had expected, and after the 
first few years Ariba re-positioned as expert in spend management. Ariba came late to CMS, 
and contract management has always been a secondary or complementary offering. In 2007, 
Ariba bought Procuri in a market consolidation move and in this way acquired the contract 
management capabilities originally developed at CMSI. But in the meantime Ariba continued to 
expand its supply network, moved to an on-demand model, and, in 2010, associated itself with 
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cloud computing. In a fashion, it continued to work its original vision, and after a decade of loss 
moved to a profit position in 2009. As of 2011, Ariba, as an “eProcurement” vendor, was a 
leader in CMS, as judged by Forrester (Forrester Research Inc. 2011a), and by 2012 became an 
attractive acquisition for SAP. But Ariba is not a success story for CMS.  
 
Ariba’s history is notable for a number of reasons. Like I-Many and Selectica, Ariba initially 
used its stock in strategic transactions, but to a far greater degree – resulting in enormous 
amounts of goodwill and then enormous losses as goodwill was written down. But in many 
other ways Ariba is different from I-Many and Selectica. Foremost is its approach to the issue of 
scale. Instead of starting with a particular customer or industry with the expectation that the 
experience would generalize, the company all along targeted the professionalized procurement 
function of very large companies, a kind of industry-agnostic specialty. It was committed to the 
buy-side, and to a supplier network, which it opened to competing enterprise software solutions. 
They evolved on-demand and cloud computing capabilities and eventually supported the sell-
side for their suppliers. In this overall story, CMS plays a relatively small role, and is split 
between buy-side and sell-side. 
 
6.2.4 Emptoris 
 
Like Ariba, Emptoris (founded in 1999) began life by claiming a place in B2B e-commerce, 
with strategic sourcing and request for quote applications. As in the case of Selectica, the 
company’s rules-based and algorithmic foundation was associated with an individual 
technology entrepreneur, Avner Schneur, a graduate of Technion University in Israel. Unlike 
Selectica, Emptoris focused on the buy-side.  
Emptoris’s ePass capability centered around “sourcing events”. In July 2001, Emptoris 
announced that there had been 21 sourcing events using ePass, covering 500 types of items and 
over 20 million individual items of industrial parts, ingredients and business services. The 
company claimed major savings for its customers directly attributable to Emptoris’s 
“optimization-based decision support” software capabilities, as an overlay to ERP. Appendix 
6.19 gives a sense of both the scale and granularity of Emptoris’s data-centric approach. 
Poor analytics and toxic data locked inside ERP systems make it impossible to gain a 
comprehensive view of spend. … Even if companies have pursued an ERP solution, a 
data warehouse solution, or a business intelligence solution, they can now augment 
these initiative with new key technology offerings from Emptoris, to gain true spend 
visibility using these existing investments, in as little as three months. (Emptoris press 
release November 14, 2006) 
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Emptoris made many strategic e-commerce alliances during the dot.com era, including, in 
February 2001, a strategic partnership with diCarta, “the award-winning leader of Internet-based 
business-to-business contract and revenue management solutions” with a “web-based contract 
lifecycle management application”. DiCarta was named a leader in the 2006 Forrester Wave for 
CMS, and that year merged with Emptoris. Andy Kyte of Gartner (the author of the $20 billion 
prediction for CMS) commented, suggesting that CMS vendors like diCarta were being 
acquired by vendors in the more “mature” e-sourcing category.  
Most large organizations have accepted that there is value in using IT systems for 
handling requests for information, proposals or quotations: They have accepted the e-
sourcing model. However, the market for e-sourcing systems is far from saturated and 
there is still a lot of growth potential. Meanwhile, the paradigm for contract life cycle 
management has not yet achieved visibility or acceptance. System vendors have not 
been able to achieve the growth that their value proposition deserves. When a mature 
market and an emerging market overlap in their buying centers and value propositions, 
the vendors in the mature market tend to acquire those in the emerging market to grow 
and to extend their own value propositions. There has been a quiet, but strong trend for 
providers of e-sourcing systems to acquire companies offering contract management 
systems. (Gartner Inc. 2006; see footnote 2) (emphasis added) 
Following the diCarta acquisition, Emptoris’s CMS profile and its marketing efforts in support 
of CMS increased. For example, in March 2008, Emptoris partnered with IACCM to present a 
series of seminars in Europe on the role of technology in contract management, and an Emptoris 
customer was profiled in IACCM’s newsletter. In July there was an Emptoris webcast featuring 
Syngenta Crop Protection and Tim Cummins of IACCM. Citing the 2008 Forrester Wave for 
CMS, Emptoris noted:  
The Forrester Report calls contract management software one of the most important 
business applications of the decade, stating, “At the risk of engaging in a bit of 
hyperbole, we believe that CLM could turn out to be one of the most important new 
business applications of the first decade of the 21st century.” Further, “Forrester's 
analysis of CLM market data shows that purchases of CLM are growing at rates in 
excess of 25%, and we continue to get more client inquiries about CLM than any other 
ePurchasing product.” (Emptoris press release August 13, 2008)  
In November 2008, Emptoris was rated “positive” in Gartner’s MarketScope for contract 
management software (Gartner Inc. 2008c; see footnote 2), while earlier in the year it was rated 
a leader in Gartner’s Magic Quadrant for sourcing applications (Emptoris press release 
December 3, 2008).  
Emptoris worked to take customers from competitors, Ariba in particular, by making 
promotional offers. For example, in 2006, Emptoris announced a “ValueNow” program of 
incentives for customers switching to Emptoris from another vendor; in November of that year 
it announced it had taken “large marquee accounts” from Ariba. When Ariba bought Procuri in 
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2007, Emptoris invited Procuri customers to migrate to Emptoris under its “conversion” 
program. Emptoris renewed this invitation in 2008 when Ariba announced that it would end 
support for Procuri solutions in 2009. In April 2007, Ariba sued Emptoris for patent 
infringement, seeking “damages for losses related, in part, to Fortune 500 customers who had 
converted from Ariba to Emptoris”. In December 2008, a $7 million judgment was entered 
against Emptoris. Based on analyst commentary,
45
 notwithstanding Emptoris’s continuous 
announcements of increasing revenues, the judgment appears to have put the company in a cash 
bind, and in January 2009 Emptoris announced that it had been acquired by Marlin Equity 
Partners, a private equity company. Avner Scheur left the company later that year. 
After the change in ownership, Emptoris continued to develop expertise in particular areas of 
procurement. In 2010, Emptoris developed the “contingent workforce” or “contingent labour” 
management area, offering to “demystify” services procurement in a webinar co-hosted by 
HCMWorks, “leaders and pioneers in the field of human capital optimization and services 
procurement” (Emptoris press release April 29, 2010). In September 2010, Emptoris was ranked 
a leader in Forrester Wave: Services Procurement Q3 2010 (Emptoris press release September 
30, 2010). In January 2011, Emptoris announced the acquisition of Rivermine, a leader in 
Gartner’s first Magic Quadrant for telecom expense management (Rivermine press release 
January 6, 2011). In December 2011, IBM announced a definitive agreement to acquire 
Emptoris for its “Smart Commerce” initiative, with contract management just one part of its 
procurement offering. 
Emptoris, like Ariba, was originally positioned in the B2B e-commerce space, offering an 
algorithmic capability for its “sourcing events”. During the dot.com era it made strategic 
alliances, including with diCarta, an early entrant in the CMS market with a highly developed 
contract creation capability. In 2006 Emptoris bought diCarta as part of the wave of 
consolidation. As with Ariba, contract management was a secondary or complementary 
capability relative to Emptoris’s principal business, sourcing and spend analysis. Ariba and 
Emptoris were competitors: Emptoris worked to take customers from Ariba, particularly after 
Ariba’s Freemarkets and Procuri acquisitions. Ariba sued Emptoris for patent infringement. 
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 In March 2008, Gartner’s Deborah Wilson had issued a Vendor Rating on Emptoris, saying that 
“Emptoris has established itself as a general-purpose, premium sourcing and contract management 
applications vendor” (Gartner Inc. 2008b; see footnote 2). But in the summer of 2009, Emptoris 
announced that it was starting a search for a new executive. Wilson, while commenting on the loss of 
Avner Schneur, noted that “Last year’s disclosure (that came as a result of the Ariba patent infringement 
lawsuit) that Emptoris’ revenues were much lower than the analyst community had been left to believe 
were quite unsettling. Even more surprising was the fact that Emptoris was no where near profitable (at 
least not in 2007), which given its size and age, it should have been. It is not a good sign that Emptoris 
was not able to get another round of funding from its existing investors last December when it had to 
pony up $7 million in damages to pay Ariba.” (Wilson 2009; see footnote 2) 
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When the judgment in this case was handed down, Emptoris was apparently short of cash and 
had to turn to Marlin Partners. The founder of Emptoris subsequently left. Within two years, 
Marlin had sold Emptoris to IBM. 
6.2.5 Upside 
Upside also started as the vision of an individual technology entrepreneur. Ashif Mawji moved 
to Alberta, Canada from Kenya in 1987, when he was 15, and it was in Alberta that he started 
an e-billing company in 1999. This is the company that became Upside Software. Although 
early on Upside received “first round funding”, Upside has never gone public. Neither did it 
become a private equity portfolio company. Instead, as of 2011, about 90% of the company was 
owned by management. Ashif Mawji was still the head of Upside in 2011. In 2000 Upside hired 
Doug Hay, a business intelligence software engineer (previously from Cognos and IBM), and 
Mr. Hay was still Upside’s chief architect in 2011. Upside’s business description has been 
consistent over the years (Appendix 6.20). 
Upside continuously improved their product, tracking the changes in press releases and on their 
website, and offering affordable options. They introduced low-cost, easy deployment version of 
the products starting in 2000: “License fees for UpsideContract-LITE start at $1,500 and 
deployment costs are as low as $5,000, providing a price point that enables companies to 
manage their investment and receive a very fast return on investment (ROI), often in as little as 
30 days.” (Upside press release December 2, 2002) In 2004, Upside made a number of product 
innovations – integrating with Word, offering a fully hosted solution, and creating a very low-
priced option with fees as low as about $50 per month, with a 2-week free trial offer. Mr. Mawji 
emphasized the product’s affordability, noting as well that Upside had a “100% zero 
customization track record (meaning that its flagship product, UpsideContract, has been 
installed at customer sites with no changes to the core product code” (Upside press release June 
15, 2006). In 2011 the company began to offer UpsideLiveLite – SaaS contract management 
software for “as little as $19.99 a month” or $220 for 30 users (with a 45-day free trial).  
Upside steadily built its business starting with early customer partnerships. In 2000, it entered 
into a marketing alliance with the Government of Alberta in exchange for use of its software 
and a percentage of gross sales. In 2001, Upside signed a major deal with Burlington Northern, 
and in 2002 signed another major client – Hewlett Packard. By the time of Upside’s 2007 user 
conference, Procter & Gamble (formerly a marketing alliance partner of I-Many, as noted in 
section 6.2.1) delivered a “success story” presentation. Upside press releases frequently 
mentioned industry analysts Aberdeen, AMR and Forrester and the IACCM (see Appendix 
6.24). For example, in November 2003, an Upside press release contained favourable comments 
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from Tim Minahan of Aberdeen and from IACCM, as well as a quotation from Gartner on the 
contract management market. In July 2005, when Aberdeen released a report on the contract 
management software market, Upside issued a detailed press release, and a complimentary copy 
of the report was made available through the press release. IACCM’s 2007 market sizing survey 
was also made available through an Upside press release, which contained favourable 
commentary from Tim Cummins and from AMR Research. Upside’s continuing close 
relationship with IACCM (“Upside helps educate the industry about IACCM”) was signaled in 
2008 when Upside offered a complimentary IACCM membership to its customers. In 
November 2009, AMR ranked Upside number one of seventeen CMS vendors in an analysis of 
17 criteria (Upside press release October 29, 2009), and Upside was a leader in the 2011 
Forrester Wave for CMS. 
Upside press releases have provided periodic reports of revenue growth (as Emptoris’s press 
releases did), but also say that Upside has been continuously profitable starting in 2001. For 
example, in 2005, the company announced that they had increased sales “in just four short years 
by a whopping 1,984% and profits have grown by over 455%” (Upside press release January 
17, 2005). Even so, Upside does not seem to have been a very large company in terms of 
revenues and profitability. On July 24, 2012, Upside announced that it would be acquired by 
NASDAQ-listed Sci-Quest, “a leading provider of cloud-based source-to-settle solutions”, for 
approximately $22 million. This acquisition would represent the absorption of Upside into a e-
procurement. 
Upside stands out against the other four focus vendors for the continuity of its management and 
business, and linear or organic product development. While the company has large customers 
with complex deployments including data integration, Upside moved early to offer lower cost 
versions of its product that might compete with the many low-cost document-centric CMS 
vendors that emerged. Upside worked early to build substantial alliances with key clients such 
as the Government of Alberta, and has always emphasized its links with analysts Aberdeen, 
AMR and Forrester as well as the IACCM. According to its press releases, Upside moved to 
profitability from its second fiscal year of operations. However, with the 2012 announcement of 
its acquisition by Sci-Quest, there is an acknowledgment that contract management software is a 
complementary offering. 
6.2.6 “Supply-side rhetoric”: marketing CMS  
All five vendors were very active in generating “supply-side rhetoric”, marketing across many 
channels and to many audiences simultaneously, in particular targeting large companies (the 
Global 2000 or the Global 1000) as potential customers (see e.g. Appendix 6.19). An Ariba 
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annual report provides an indicative account of vendor marketing efforts (Appendix 6.21). 
Concepts such as the “contract lifecycle” were mobilized, and illustrated (see Figure 5.1 and 
Appendix 6.22). For the public companies, SEC filings were directed principally toward 
investors but also referenced by analysts and customers in the course of due diligence and 
analysis. 
Vendor websites posted press releases, guides and educational materials such as so-called 
“white papers”, sponsored analyst reports, marketing brochures and webcasts or webinars (see, 
e.g., Appendix 6.23). Press releases announced product developments, client wins and favorable 
analyst ratings or commentary (see Appendix 6.24 for a list of analyst and IACCM mentions in 
Upside and Emptoris press releases). The typical webinar involved a customer and vendor 
representative, with commentary provided by an analyst, a media representative or a 
representative of the IACCM. Vendors also provided materials intended to assist in the 
procurement process, such as I-Many’s buyer’s guide referred to in section 6.2.1, or an RFP 
template for CMS procurement with an analysis of deployment options Selectica made available 
on its website in 2009. Vendor websites also featured customer lists, customer testimonials, 
“success stories” and case studies. Customers presented their “success stories” at conferences, 
another key marketing platform, and acted as references. User group meetings were platforms 
for discussion of technical issues but also marketing and community-building, where successful 
customers might be given awards. Selling interaction would incorporate software demos, and 
vendors increasingly used web interactivity for demos, links to promotional videos posted on 
youtube.com, and targeted web ads (see Appendix 6.25).  
What stands out in a review of marketing materials is the self-referentiality among market 
participants. Customers were cited in marketing materials for investors (SEC filings and press 
releases) and to other customers, the analysts and the IACCM. The analysts and the IACCM 
were cited to investors and customers. Investor support was important to analysts; for example, 
analysts commented favorably when private equity investors acquired I-Many and Emptoris, 
promising financial support. This body of discourse built up, echoing and amplifying in a kind 
of collective marketing, or co-marketing, within the knowledge network.  
Marketing costs for CMS were high.
46
 For the years 2000-2003, aggregate sales and marketing 
expenditures were $80 million against revenues of $186.7 million, or 43% of revenues, for I-
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 Marketing expenses can be significant for IT companies. In the original filing for its IPO, Groupon 
presented a non-GAAP figure for “Adjusted Consolidated Segment Operating Income” or Adjusted 
CSOI, which excluded online marketing expense on the basis that “Online marketing expense primarily 
represents the cost to acquire new subscribers and is dictated by the amount of growth we wish to 
pursue.” For 2010, online marketing expense was over $421 million on revenues of $713 million. “[W]e 
think of it [Adjusted CSOI] as our operating profitability before marketing costs incurred for long-term 
168 
 
Many; $112.3 million against revenues of $152.8 million, or 73% of revenues, for Selectica; 
and $638.3 million against revenues of $1.1 billion, or 55% of revenues, for Ariba. For these 
three vendors, aggregate sales and marketing expenses for 2000-2007 were approximately $1.2 
billion, revenues were approximately $2.9 billion, and there was an aggregate loss of more than 
$5 billion (Appendix 6.26).
47
 As the principal of one CMS vendor (not one of the focus 
vendors) said in 2009: 
At the tail end of the internet boom, CMS became the “next hot topic”. The North 
American companies followed the normal pattern for that time which was to buy market 
share, using the proceeds of multiple rounds of VC funding, with the VC looking to 
capital gain on exit. A typical marketing program involved spending of about $40 
million, which assumes a market cap of about $500 million. This was okay in the good 
old days but didn’t work any more. So in 2002-3, the providers were burning up venture 
capital, building up huge sales forces, but the market was not moving. So there has been 
attrition and consolidation.  
In this quote we see the perceived direct relationship between market capitalization, marketing 
and market share, organized around the “next hot topic”, CMS as a category – a direct line 
running from equity investments in vendors, through marketing the category, to market share. 
The software itself is nowhere to be seen. I suggest that this may be part of what it means to say 
that market share and profitability substitute for user satisfaction as measures of success for 
packaged software. In Chapter 7, I will expand on this observation in relation to the theory of 
commoditization.  
 
6.3 Evidence of breakdown from analyst and vendor archival material 
 
In this section I draw on the data from the analyst and vendor archival material to present 
further evidence of how CMS failed to meet expectations with respect to the business model for 
packaged software, including generification, and the category. With the analyst and vendor data 
in hand, it also becomes possible to address more directly the motivating question for this study 
(“What happened to contract management software?”) as a failure of correspondence between 
market expectations and market performance. This is an important reorientation away from 
“What was wrong with CMS?” to “Why were market expectations for CMS so high?” This 
material is under three headings – evidence of the breakdown of the business model for 
                                                                                                                                                                          
growth.” (Groupon S-1, June 2, 2011) The SEC responded: “We note your use of the non-GAAP measure 
Adjusted Consolidated Segment Operating Income, which excludes, among other items, online marketing 
expense. It appears that online marketing expense is a normal, recurring operating cash expenditure of the 
company. Your removal of this item from your results of operations creates a non-GAAP measure that is 
potentially misleading to readers. Please revise your non-GAAP measure accordingly.” (SEC comment 
letter made available June 30, 2011) 
47
 Noting here that a large portion of this loss was non-cash – the write-down of goodwill after stock 
acquisitions. Probably some of the market expenditures were also non-cash. 
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packaged software; direct evidence of category breakdown; and the breakdown of 
correspondence between market expectations and market performance – and is summarized in 
the italicized items in Table 6.2, where they are added to the table of breakdown brought 
forward from Chapter 5. 
 
Breakdown observed Breakdown of what? 
Hard coding from previous clients 
Buy-side or procurement bias 
Difficulty in generalizing cross-industry  
Contract data was domain-specific and even customer-specific 
Instability of products and vendors 
Strategic transactions to acquire customers and extend into new verticals 
Conflict over customers and IP 
High proportion of service revenues 
Development of multiple delivery options from enterprise to low-cost 
subscription model; emergence of “commoditized” competition at the 
low end 
The business model for packaged 
software (generification) 
Process fragmentation (offline processes, no continuous data flow) 
Functional or operational fragmentation across the contract lifecycle 
Fragmentation of contracting by type of contract or business unit, 
especially buy-side versus sell-side; localized and multiple 
implementations  
 
The organizing vision – automating the 
contract lifecycle across the enterprise 
Fragmentation of contracting – see row above 
Limitations on the repository (completeness, access and searchability) 
Difficulties in defining and extracting structured data 
Limited data integration 
Reduced expectations for contracting knowledge as associated with CMS 
(as opposed to risk management, business intelligence or other business 
initiatives) 
Contract data and knowledge are domain-specific and even customer-
specific 
The organizing vision – contracting 
knowledge as an outcome of automating 
the contract lifecycle across the 
enterprise  
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Breakdown observed Breakdown of what? 
CMS associated with scale (volume and standardization) and structured 
data 
CMS associated with large companies  
CMS assocated with the buy-side 
CMS associated with IT infrastructure, especially ERP 
CMS associated with lower risk 
CMS associated with “algorithmic” contracting 
CMS vendors targeted large firm customers 
4 of 5 focus vendors started with an algorithmic contracting capability 
Algorithmic contracting is domain-specific and even customer-specific 
The organizing vision – CMS as an 
organizing technology for all types of 
contract 
Unclear as to whether about process or information 
Conflicting function-specific views of CMS 
Competition with in-house and other software (e.g. ERP) 
Overlapping functionalities with other software (e.g. CRM, strategic 
sourcing) 
High cost of advanced features 
Weak business case  
Fallback to document repository (in competition with e.g. records or 
documents management systems) 
Clear encroachment into CMS space by ERP and other software vendors 
Rating of CMS vendors under other categories 
CMS subsumed under other categories such as e-purchasing 
Gartner retirement of the category 
Emergence of subcategories along various dimensions (repository versus 
process; documents (Upside) versus data; verticalization (I-Many); 
procurement focus with a network (Ariba) or purchase category 
expertise and granularity (Emptoris)) 
Category 
(Early) vendor equity valuations relative to revenues and profitability 
Projected market size as compared to lack of revenues 
Category success as compared to product unprofitability 
Market expectations in relation to 
market performance 
 
Table 6.2 The extended table of breakdown (italics indicates evidence from analyst and vendor 
data) 
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6.3.1 Further evidence of the breakdown of the business model for packaged software  
 
The business model for packaged software described in Chapter 2 entails a strategy of 
generification to turn a customer-specific software product into a high margin information good. 
With respect to generification, the histories of the vendors tell an interesting story. 
Generification to new verticals was the cornerstone of I-Many’s strategy from before its IPO 
until roughly 2007. The P&G alliance and other strategic transactions were motivated by the 
desire of management to move beyond the healthcare industry, but their efforts to extend 
beyond this industry ultimately failed. Generification to new verticals was also Selectica’s 
strategy for its CPQ engine. Early acquisitions were attempts to buy into new verticals, and 
management appears to have been very sensitive to the importance of domain expertise, 
certainly for CPQ and its hard-to-extract “knowledge base”. But the most striking thing about 
Selectica is persistent, “revolving door” customer concentration, which did not go away when 
Selectica moved out of CPQ into CMS (Appendix 6.13). The experience of these two 
companies indicates that moving to new verticals was a challenge for the data-centric models of 
CMS, and the early assumptions that these companies made (expressed in their SEC filing 
documents) about the generalizability of data-intensive buying or selling in specialized domains 
were not borne out. The contract data and algorithmic contracting developed by I-Many for the 
healthcare domain did not transfer to the consumer packaged goods industry (Procter & 
Gamble) or beyond, and Selectica’s CPQ engine, though generic in concept, required a great 
deal of customization to specify pricing parameters and business rules. These approaches were 
domain-specific and even (as indicated in the case of Selectica) customer-specific. This had 
negative implications not only for generification as an element of the business model for 
packaged software, but for the organizing vision for CMS: For CMS to produce contracting 
knowledge from contract data, there would need to be a significant investment in domain-
specific or customer-specific data management, and, contrary to the idea that CMS would work 
for all types of contracts, in all types of businesses in any industry, that investment would be of 
limited use in other contexts. 
 
The other three vendors effectively sidestepped generification, if generification is understand as 
a strategic extension of product adoption within and then across industries. From the beginning, 
Ariba management evidenced a sensitivity to scale issues by targeting the indirect spend 
programs of very large companies, a kind of cross-vertical domain, which they actively 
supported through their supplier network. In order to build out this e-commerce platform, Ariba 
reached out to suppliers as well as their own competitors through open standards and 
community-building efforts. Emptoris also focused explicitly on serving the procurement 
function of the largest global companies with data-rich contract analytics. Upside, working from 
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a document-centric orientation, does not seem to have struggled with industry specialization or 
customer concentration; on the other hand it does not appear to have grown very large, with an 
acquisition price of $22 million in 2012 after being in business for over ten years. 
In other words, none of the five focus vendors in this ultimately unsuccessful category 
successfully executed a strategy of generification. But the breakdown of the business model for 
packaged software is evidenced in a number of other ways. First, with the exception of Upside, 
the companies struggled to stabilize their software offerings and their industry positioning, as 
can be traced through product and company descriptions and segment reporting over the years 
(see e.g. Appendices 6.9 and 6.12). Vendors pursued strategic acquisitions to buy software and 
customers (see Appendices 6.6 and 6.16), tried to take customers from other vendors through 
direct appeals, or attempted to weaken rivals with IP litigation. Notwithstanding these efforts, 
based on the data from the three public companies, vendors were locked into low margin 
services, while high sales and marketing costs and research and development costs made it hard 
to achieve profitability (see Appendices 6.10, 6.14, 6.17 and 6.26). Over time the vendors 
moved to different selling models, first taking up subscription pricing to smooth revenues, and 
then offering SaaS, on-demand or cloud solutions. They developed low-cost or “on-ramp” 
alternatives to extend product reach, as the novelty of the product wore off, competing low-cost, 
generic, “commoditized” versions of CMS became available, and customers became more 
reluctant to take up costly, high risk enterprise implementations. Except at Upside (for which no 
hard data is available), CMS per se does not seem to have been a profitable concept or product, 
and, as noted, Upside does not seem have become a very large company. As evidenced by all 
these particulars, CMS did not become a high margin information good. 
6.3.2 Direct evidence of category breakdown 
The breakdown of the CMS category, suggested in section 5.4.5, comes into clear view with the 
benefit of analyst and vendor data. It is signaled by the competition from ERP and other 
software vendors, by the fact that the five focus vendors (with the exception of Upside) have all 
been associated by analysts with other categories (the healthcare sector for I-Many, CPQ for 
Selectica, e-purchasing for Emptoris and Ariba), and by the fact that CMS is sometimes 
subsumed within other categories, usually e-purchasing. Gartner retired the category for 
MarketScope or Magic Quadrant coverage, and both Gartner and Forrester have remarked on 
the fragmentation of the category and emergence of subcategories along various dimensions 
(repository versus process; documents (Upside) versus data; verticalization (I-Many); 
procurement focus with a network (Ariba) or purchase category expertise and granularity 
(Emptoris)). In Chapter 7, I explore the meaning of this de-composition of the CMS category in 
more detail. 
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6.3.3 Breakdown of correspondence between market expectations and market performance 
The early years of CMS, at the end of the dot.com era, evidence overoptimistic projections for 
the future of CMS, as reflected in inflated stock valuations and the use of company stock and 
rights to revenues in deal-making. This was not unusual for the time, and stock prices of the 
three public focus vendors did collapse early on. However, the analysts continued to support the 
category, with the first questioning of the rationale for CMS coming from Deborah Wilson of 
Gartner at the end of 2008. Juxtaposing analyst coverage with the vendor histories, they do not 
match up. First of all, analysts continued to focus on growth prospects as the vendors continued 
to post losses. More fundamentally, the core vendors in the CMS categories were in fact very 
disparate, coming at contract management from very different perspectives, with different 
histories, different products and different capabilities. For all of the vendors except Upside, 
CMS was not the initial core product offering, but instead a strategic extension, complementary, 
or even marginal. Analysts reported on the CMS category and gave high marks within that 
category to the focus vendors. Meanwhile, except at Upside, CMS was neither stable nor 
profitable.  
I suggested in section 5.4.5 that perhaps instances and invocations of “CMS” were, at some 
level, the same, and yet they were not the same – that, is that CMS existed in a “fluid” 
topological space (Mol and Law 1994), and that there were different “sub-regions” of CMS (e.g. 
enterprise systems versus “indexing systems”). In the breakdown of correspondence between 
market expectations and market performance, there are hints of another sort of multiplicity – of 
two related but distinguishable phenomena, a product and a category, that share the same name. 
In Chapter 7, I analyse these as two different levels of commoditization.  
6.4 Summary: a biography of CMS as a commodity 
In Chapter 5, I described the emergence of CMS as a natural progression from antecedent 
technologies, as vendors organized software capabilities to meet a newly defined opportunity – 
contract management. It was, as one interviewee said, a “harmonious convergence”. This is one 
version of the origin narrative. It is similar in structure to the origin narrative for the TSR2 
aircraft described by Law (2002) – a “gap” opened up, and, in a kind of inevitable trajectory, 
predecessor technologies evolved to fill the gap. But – for some reason – CMS as an organizing 
technology did not work, or did not work as intended. This narrative is reasonably satisfying but 
incomplete. It takes the production of CMS for granted, and does not really explain where CMS 
came from and who made it. 
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The history of the five focus vendors reveals a more surprising yet more believable story. While 
Upside moved swiftly to claim, develop and consistently maintain a document-centric contract 
management software space, all of the other five focus vendors started out in other businesses 
and were data-centric in their approach to contracting. That is, all of the vendors other than 
Upside began with a view of contracting as a data-rich, specification-driven, and somewhat 
mechanistic transactional environment offering opportunities for optimization through 
computational capabilities, and there was a link to e-commerce. Two of the companies (I-Many 
and Ariba) built e-commerce platforms. I-Many’s was quickly abandoned, but Ariba continued 
to develop and expand their supplier network, and ten years later it was the focus of their 
business and strategy. 
 
Very briefly, the years 1999-2003 might be characterized as the years of promise, marked by 
optimistic predictions by Gartner and others. The background was e-commerce. The vendors 
pursued strategic transactions using stock and other equity interests as currency and (in the case 
of I-Many and Selectica) believed in extension to new verticals. After the dot.com crash and 
collapse of early e-commerce initiatives, there followed a period (roughly 2004-2007) of 
consolidation and repositioning. Vendors were not able to generalize their earlier industry- or 
customer-specific successes, and were locked into low margin services. There was a fight for 
revenues through consolidation, direct competition for customers, IP litigation and hostile stock 
acquisitions. Except for Upside, products and vendors were unstable. Evolving their offering to 
try to achieve a better balance between high margin software sales and low margin services, to 
“smoothe” revenues, and to reach new markets, vendors designed low-cost simplified 
alternatives to their original “enterprise” offerings, as well as SaaS, on-demand cloud products, 
shifting product delivery to a subscription basis. However, low end offerings also suggest a 
stratification of the product to include a low-cost, generic “commodity” tier, corresponding to 
the fragmentation of the market and increasing competition from new CMS entrants as well as 
from ERP, ECM, other software products and in-house solutions. By around 2008, vendors had 
established clearly distinct positioning (toward documents, spend, or a vertical specialization). 
There was a de-composition of the CMS category alongside the second coming of e-commerce 
and the emergence of the cloud.  
Alternatively, we could trace “CMS” as software code. To take just what we understand from 
the vendor histories: “CMS” as software code originated at Upside (on its way to SciQuest); at 
Provato and Menerva (ending up at I-Many); at diCarta (ending up at Emptoris, now IBM); 
Determine (ending up at Selectica); and at CMSI (ending up at Procuri, then Ariba, on its way 
to SAP).  
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Separately, a group of facilitators (vendors, investors, analysts, the IACCM and customers) 
developed and promoted the organizing vision for CMS and the CMS category. Upon 
inspection, and as set out in section 6.2, the group is revealed as closed and self-referential. 
Analyst rankings and IACCM pronouncements were posted on vendor websites and included in 
SEC filings; vendor and analyst communications were made available by IACCM; a key analyst 
(Tim Minahan) moved from Aberdeen to Procuri, which was then acquired by Ariba; Selectica 
and I-Many tried and failed to merge; Nextance (an early CMS vendor) was bought by Trilogy 
(Versata) in 2006, which was engaged in nearly continual conflict with Selectica from 2004 
through 2011; Emptoris tried to take customers from Ariba, Ariba sued Emptoris; Upside 
offered IACCM memberships to customers; an executive from I-Many took over at Selectica, 
while I-Many’s long time and founding CEO became CEO at an I-Many competitor.  
The biography of CMS as organizing technology for contract, following the origin narrative of 
organic emergence, or “harmonious convergence”, does not reflect the turbulent life of CMS as 
a commodity, when we take into account the circumstances of its production including the 
vendor histories, analyst coverage in relation to the category, the role of marketing, and the 
workings of the knowledge network generally. In Chapter 7, using the table of breakdown as a 
guide, I tie these aspects of the biography of CMS together to put forward an account of the 
failure of CMS from a market perspective and in relation to contract. In this story the product 
category plays a major role, and so does marketing. By the end of this story, CMS as a 
technological artefact has receded into the background, and “CMS” as the biographical subject 
is recharacterized as a related set of material enactments following the logic of 
commoditization, but failing to produce the intended packaged software market. Tracing this 
story sheds light on the failure of CMS from a market perspective and on the nature of packaged 
software production. It also ties the failure of CMS to the nature of contract and contracting, 
with implications for ICT, contract and knowledge. 
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Chapter 7 Analysis: accounting for the failure of CMS from a market perspective on 
packaged software and in relation to contract  
 
In this chapter I bring the data into closer dialogue with the research literature to offer an 
explanation of how CMS failed from a market perspective on packaged software and to what 
extent this failure related to contract. First, in section 7.1, I relate the data to the preliminary 
hypothesis (section 2.2.3) that the failure of CMS can be traced to a failure of the knowledge 
network around an organizing vision or a failure in generification, concluding that, for CMS, 
generification did not work. In section 7.2, I go beyond this conclusion by using the table of 
breakdown carried forward from Chapter 6 to identify performative assumptions and operations 
in the biography of CMS: that packaged software is an information good and that generification 
is a generalizable strategy toward creating a packaged software product and market (section 
7.2.1); the organizing vision for CMS (contract management as process automation, structured 
data as knowledge, and contract as algorithmic) (sections 7.2.2, 7.2.3 and 7.2.4); and 
classification as performative (section 7.2.5). In section 7.3 I trace the logic of commoditization 
in the biography of CMS to identify a “substitution of performance” across three levels of 
commoditization (financialized meta-commodities in the form of equity interests in vendor 
firms, marketized criteria in the form of analyst ratings, and CMS as product) as a further 
performative assumption and operation in the biography of CMS. In section 7.4, I present the 
completed table of breakdown, summarize my analysis with respect to the research questions, 
and conclude with a brief retrospective on contract management software. 
 
7.1 Revisiting the preliminary hypothesis: a failure of generification  
 
From a reading of Pollock and Williams (2009a) and consistent with other research on 
technology production, making a market in packaged software requires a knowledge network 
mobilized around an organizing vision and the process of generification. The knowledge 
network solves the problem of distance between developers and users of packaged software, 
while generification resolves their competing interests. In section 2.2.3, I set out a preliminary 
hypothesis that the failure of CMS was due to a lack of a knowledge network mobilized around 
an organizing vision, or due to a failure of generification. In this section I discuss this 
hypothesis in light of the data. 
 
In section 5.1, I described the organizing vision for CMS – automating the contract lifecycle 
across the enterprise as a closed, continuous production function, producing contracting 
knowledge. With its design based on the generic contract lifecycle, CMS would work for all 
types of contracts, in all types of businesses in any industry. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, 
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marketing materials, analyst coverage and IACCM commentary reiterated the organizing vision, 
which “provide[d] the discourse with its content, structure, motivation and direction” (Swanson 
and Ramiller 1997, p. 458). The organizing vision was shared across a knowledge network 
including vendors, customers, the IACCM and analysts. Pollock and Williams (2009b, 2010, 
2011) have identified the role of analysts as central in the packaged software industry, and the 
biography of CMS bears this out. As outlined in section 6.1.3, the analyst firms Gartner 
(including AMR), Forrester and Aberdeen covered the CMS product and vendors from the 
beginning. Gartner’s $20 billion prediction was an early milestone in defining a market and 
building expectations for market growth, though it later pulled back from the category. Forrester 
has continued through 2011 to generate Forrester Wave reports for CMS. Aberdeen, a “demand 
generation” firm, has produced sponsored reports explaining the CMS concept and value 
proposition. Section 5.1.3 outlines the consistent support that the CMS concept has received 
from the IACCM. Customers have also been an important part of the knowledge network for 
CMS, providing references, participating in user groups and in marketing efforts, and even 
involved as business partners in product development (e.g. P&G in the case of I-Many; the 
Government of Alberta in the case of Upside) (see section 6.2). There is no indication of a lack 
of a knowledge network in support of an organizing vision.  
 
However, generification, if understood as starting with a working instance of software and then 
generalizing it first within and then across industries, was not a successful strategy for CMS 
vendors (sections 5.4.1 and 6.3.1). Customers noticed hard coding from previous clients and 
identified a buy-side or procurement bias in some products. It was difficult to generalize 
enterprise CMS from one industry to another; contracting data was domain-specific and even 
customer-specific. In other words, at CMS was not very “fluid”, in the sense of technological 
appropriateness in diverse settings (de Laet and Mol 2000). Turning then to the vendor histories, 
I first note that I-Many followed an express strategy of generification to new industry verticals, 
which it failed to execute and eventually abandoned when it retreated to its healthcare specialty. 
Selectica was not able to generalize its CPQ product, and experienced high customer 
concentrations and low revenues even after switching to contract management. Thus for I-Many 
and Selectica the strategy of generification did not work. On the other hand, Ariba and Emptoris 
sidestepped the problem of generification by identifying the professionalized procurement 
operation in large companies as their target customers. In this way they developed a cross-
industry domain specialization. Upside, too, seems for the most part to have bypassed 
generification with a document-centric approach. I-Many, Ariba, Emptoris and Upside thus 
illustrate three different paths to scale and profits: industry specialization (I-Many); 
development of an industry-agnostic specialization in procurement (Ariba and Emptoris); and 
an industry-agnostic documents focus (Upside).  
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By negative implication, the case of CMS, where vendors did not successfully follow a strategy 
of generification, is consistent with Pollock and Williams’s explanation of the success of ERP 
and can be read to support an argument that a successful packaged software product is built 
through generification. However, this does not explain in detail how or why generification 
failed, and it does not explain why market expectations for CMS were – in retrospect – so 
inflated. I take these questions forward in sections 7.2 and 7.3. 
 
7.2 Performative assumptions and operations in the biography of CMS: analysing the evidence 
of breakdown 
 
In this section I analyse the evidence of breakdown to identify three key sets of performative 
assumptions and operations in the biography of CMS. The first – packaged software as an 
information good and the generalizability of generification – relates to the breakdown in the 
expectation that the CMS market would develop according to the business model for packaged 
software. The second – contract management as process automation, structured data as 
knowledge, and contract as algorithmic – relates to the breakdown in the organizing vision for 
CMS as an expectation of how CMS would transform contracting and contract management. 
The third – classification performativity of the software category – relates to the breakdown of 
the CMS category as reification and the market correlate of the organizing vision. 
 
7.2.1 Packaged software as an information good and the generalizability of generification 
 
As discussed in section 2.1.2, the business model for packaged software is based on the logic of 
scale and the production of a high margin, “make one, sell many” information good. That is, 
packaged software production depends on some strategy of standardization. In this respect, 
packaged software is not markedly different from other commodities: Kopytoff (1986) wrote 
that turning an object into a commodity meant carving homogeneity, i.e. a class of goods, out of 
heterogeneity. In the studies of markets from economic sociology, this has been theorized as 
product qualification, the processes by which a product is defined, described, given attributes, 
and stabilized (Callon et al. 2002; Lepinay 2007b; cf. Caliskan and Callon 2010). 
Standardization and stabilization make the product replicable so it can achieve scale. Further, 
while Kopytoff (1986) observed that a commodity bears traces of its past history, Thomas 
(1991) argued that commoditization involves detachment of an object from its history – “the 
alienation of a thing is its dissociation from producers, former users, or prior contexts” (Thomas 
1991, p. 39), and Pollock and Williams (2009a, pp. 117-118, referring to Thomas) observed that 
packaged software vendors try to present their products as detached from the context of their 
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origins and histories. That is, the business model for packaged software incorporates 
decontextualization, as an element of or complement to standardization and stabilization, as 
demonstrated in Chiasson and Green’s (2007) staged decontextualization of the healthcare 
planning application.  
 
For packaged software, then, successful product qualification – standardization, stabilization, 
decontextualization – results in a replicable high margin information good that is portable and 
can “travel”; generification is a strategy toward successful product qualification. Generification 
– starting with one working instance of software then shaping it to extend into other 
organizations within and across industries – selectively decontextualizes the product and makes 
it more “fluid”, i.e. “technologically appropriate” across many diverse settings (de Laet and Mol 
2000). As such, generification seems a generalizable approach to packaged software production 
(e.g. as argued by Chiasson and Green 2007), and I-Many and Selectica expressly adopted a 
strategy of generification in an apparent belief in its efficacy.  
 
I have already noted in section 7.1 the evidence that generification did not work for CMS. 
However, there is additional evidence from the vendor histories of their struggle to make CMS a 
high margin information good (Table 7.1, excerpted from Table 6.2). Except in the case of 
Upside, vendors and their products were unstable. In attempts to generate sales, vendors 
engaged in strategic transactions to acquire customers and extend into new verticals, and there 
was conflict over customers and intellectual property. Low margin service revenues remained 
high as a proportion of total revenues, indicating that the software was not really severable from 
the vendor. At the same time, to attract customers with affordable options, to try to achieve a 
better balance between high margin software sales and low margin services, and to meet 
increasing competition, vendors developed multiple delivery models ranging from a low-cost 
subscription product to compete with low-cost, generic, “commodity” alternatives coming to 
market, to enterprise implementations with a high service component, to software incorporating 
significant domain expertise.  
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Evidence of breakdown observed Breakdown of what? 
Hard coding from previous clients 
Buy-side or procurement bias 
Difficulty in generalizing cross-industry  
Contract data was domain-specific and even customer-specific 
Instability of products and vendors 
Strategic transactions to acquire customers and extend into new 
verticals 
Conflict over customers and IP 
High proportion of service revenues 
Development of multiple delivery options from enterprise to low-
cost subscription models; emergence of “commoditized 
competition at the low end 
The business model for packaged 
software (including generification) 
 
Table 7.1 Breakdown of the business model for packaged software, including generification 
 
The lack of stability in the CMS product and vendors corresponds to what Vitari and Ravarini 
(2009) observed in their longitudinal study of content management systems, where the software 
changed, and vendors came and went (“In the end, only four packaged CMS [content 
management software] applications remained in all three of our examined sets from 2002 to 
2007” (Vitari and Ravarini 2009, p. 259). In addition, the evolution of the CMS business model 
is consistent with their conclusion that “commoditization” (a product becoming generic and 
widely available) and a trend toward service offerings as differentiator are characteristic of the 
packaged software market. Coming from a different direction, Zysman (2006), writing about 
service transformation, has reached a similar conclusion about the conversion of information 
goods into subscription services and the offering of services as differentiator for information 
goods. 
 
Just as important, this algorithmic transformation blurs the line even further between 
product and service. …. IBM has transformed from a company selling a product in 
which service support provided competitive advantage into a service company 
embedding products in its offerings. The services that ride on the product platform 
become the differentiated asset that creates value for the firm. (Zysman 2006, p. 4) 
 
Seen in this light, the fact that CMS was not really severable from the vendors is not surprising. 
Indeed, Gartner’s Magic Quadrant, with its two dimensions of “completeness of vison” and 
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“ability to execute”, positions vendors, not software, and the ZL litigation discussed in section 
6.1.2 further underscores the point that Gartner does not consider software severable from the 
vendor. As noted by a Gartner analyst in an excerpt quoted by Pollock and Williams (2009b, p. 
138), “buying software [is] a partnership with a vendor, and that’s a long-term relationship”.  
 
On the one hand, it could be said that the case of CMS confirms the business model for 
packaged software in that it demonstrates a failure in product qualification as we understand it 
for packaged software. Vendors were not able to create a standard and homogeneous class of 
products that corresponded to the organizing vision for CMS: in other words, CMS did not 
achieve “ontological stability” (Lepinay 2007b). CMS products did not become severed from 
their histories of prior implementations, or from the vendors. Decontextualization through 
generification did not work for those vendors that adopted it as a strategy, and CMS did not 
become an information good. On the other hand, the case of CMS, read together with Pollock 
and Williams (2009b), Vitari and Ravarini (2009) and Zysman (2006), complicates our 
understanding of product qualification in the packaged software market as standardization, 
stabilization and decontextualization, and indicates that packaged software can be more than, or 
different from, a high margin information good like a piece of recorded music.  
 
Pollock and Williams (2009a) and Howcroft and Light (2010) have already suggested that 
packaged software cannot be properly understood as standardized or stabilized, but instead is 
essentially malleable, or provisional. The biography of CMS supports this conclusion. But just 
as notable in the biography of CMS was the inability to sever the software from its context, 
illustrating the limits of decontextualization. The high service component of vendor revenues 
shows that CMS could not be severed from the vendors, but the failure of I-Many and Selectica 
to extend their markets through a strategy of generification further shows that CMS could not be 
severed from its past customers. Nor could it be severed from its existing customer base, given 
the importance of customer references and customer success stories in marketing and of user 
group involvement in software development as well as marketing. Lastly, the ownership of the 
vendor, and the vendor’s profitability and stability, mattered. When vendors needed cash, they 
turned to new owners. New owners might or might not (as in the acquisition of Procuri by 
Ariba) continue to support the product and its users. I argue that the software links all of these 
market participants, as a location of a type of co-investment perhaps not so far, conceptually, 
from Grover and Kohli’s (2012) cocreation of IT value as a collective leveraging of IT 
investments. One could say that this is what vendors promise when they say that their software 
incorporates “best practice”, and it is directly implicated in those markets that feature increasing 
returns. Rather than decontextualization, there is recontextualization within an emergent 
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network of dependencies, most clearly illustrated by Ariba’s business model designed around its 
supplier network and its pending acquisition by SAP. 
 
In the biography of CMS, the failure of the market to evolve according to the business model 
for packaged software reveals the assumptions that packaged software is a high margin 
information good – standardized and stable – and that generification, or selective 
decontextualization, is a generalizable strategy in packaged software production toward creating 
a “fluid” information good that “travels”. As a “failure case”, the case of CMS could be read to 
support (by negative implication) the business model for packaged software and its underlying 
assumptions. However, reading the case together with with Pollock and Williams (2009b), 
Vitari and Ravarini (2009) and Zysman (2006) suggests that it may not be useful in all instances 
to think of packaged software as an information good shaped by decontextualization. In the next 
section, where I discuss the breakdown of the organizing vision for CMS, I argue that packaged 
software like CMS is better understood as an instance of process commoditization.  
 
7.2.2 The organizing vision for CMS: contract management as process automation 
 
As discussed in section 5.1.3, the organizing vision for CMS was to automate the contract 
lifecycle across the enterprise, generating “visibility” into contracting, in other words, better 
contracting knowledge. Since the contract lifecycle was a generic model of contracting, CMS 
was proposed and positioned as an organizing technology for all types of contracts, for all 
businesses in any industry. In this section and the following two sections, I discuss the 
breakdown of the organizing vision and identify three underlying performative assumptions – 
contract management as process automation, structured data as knowledge, and contract as 
algorithmic.  
 
The core of the organizing vision for CMS was the contract lifecycle, modelled as a closed, 
continuous production function, joining up fragmented processes and generating structured data 
that would flow through to transactional databases and analytics applications. In section 5.4.2, I 
have documented the ways in which contracting overflowed the process model of CMS (see 
Table 7.2, excerpted from Table 6.2). Contracting remained fragmented by offline processes, by 
function across the contract lifecycle and by type of contract or business unit, resulting in 
localized or even multiple CMS implementations, and with a pronounced split between buy-side 
and sell-side. Even in an implementation that was considered successful by the vendor, which I 
describe in section 5.2, there were offline processes, with no continuous flow of data as 
promised by CMS’s enclosing and integrating model. In addition, functional fragmentation 
across the contract lifecycle persisted: The sales force used a “product form” that bypassed 
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contract management altogether, and went directly to the operations group responsible for 
contract compliance. While CMS provided a valuable working space and work management 
tool for the contract management group, the implementation was localized, and a competing 
solution was used in another part of the organization.  
 
Evidence of breakdown observed Breakdown of what? 
Process fragmentation (offline processes, no continuous data 
flow) 
Functional or operational fragmentation across the contract 
lifecycle 
Fragmentation of contracting by type of contract or business unit, 
especially buy-side versus sell-side; localized and multiple 
implementations  
 
The organizing vision – automating 
the contract lifecycle across the 
enterprise 
 
Table 7.2 Breakdown of the organizing vision – contract management as process automation 
 
According to Hanseth and Lyytinen’s taxonomy, CMS was an application, a bundling of IT 
capabilities predicated on the enclosure of a process: “Therefore, most proposed design theories 
address the design of applications by promoting ways of generating effectively a closure in the 
included IT capabilities as to meet user’s needs” (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2009, p.2). Put another 
way, an application should correspond to a valid instance of “functional simplification and 
closure” (Kallinikos 2006 from Luhmann 1993). Simply put, contracting resisted enclosure by 
CMS, which imagined contract management as an instance of process automation. 
 
I argue that to better understand this breakdown, CMS should not be conceptualized as a (failed) 
information good, or in terms of how it was sold (see Vitari and Ravarini’s (2009) definition of 
packaged software, section 2.1.1), but instead as a form of process commoditization, that is, 
conversion of organizational processes into products, following a program of functional 
simplification and closure, or decontextualization. To ground this assertion and relate it to the 
origins of CMS, I compare CMS to the CRM project at IBM described by Ciborra and Failla 
(2000). That project followed the path prescribed by management literature in the 1990s, which 
advised companies to set up infrastructures (Broadbent and Weill 1997) and link them to 
business process re-engineering (BPR) projects (Davenport and Short 1990; Hammer 1990), on 
the assumption that switching from a hierarchy view to a process matrix using IT would result 
in dramatic efficiency gains. In the project described by Ciborra and Failla, CRM was 
envisioned as a major new infrastructure consisting of processes, people and technology, and 
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the goal was “to outline the sequence of activities needed to complete a negotiation cycle that 
starts from identifying a business opportunity and continues through making an offer, writing 
the contract, and delivering the solutions procured internally and/or through business partners, 
up to the monitoring of client satisfaction” (p. 107). Notably, the task assigned to CMS (on the 
sell-side) is virtually indistinguishable from the task assigned to CRM at IBM. In each case, the 
idea was to use IT to knit together fragmented processes across organizational functions and 
business units through process standardization.  
 
At the time that CMS was brought to market, BPR was a widely accepted model for business 
improvements (see Newell et al. 2000), suggesting that the process orientation may have 
informed the organizing vision for CMS. The difference between the CRM project at IBM and 
CMS was that the CRM project was clearly localized and customized to a particular 
organization whereas CMS was sold as a packaged software product – one that not only 
reflected a process orientation but assumed the generalizability or standardizability of an 
organizational process following a program of functional simplification and and closure or 
decontextualization – as outlined by Davenport (2005). In the final step, “formalizable, 
codifiable, computable processes with clearly defined rules for their execution” can be located 
anywhere: “[A]s information moves, many activities that were previously tightly linked to 
particular places can be moved” (Zysman 2006, p. 48). Codified processes can become 
commodities in a kind of radical decontextualization – not only stripped of particularity but 
physically relocated – to an enclosing enterprise application, to a vendor’s remote server, or to 
an outsourcing provider. CMS offered a codified process as a commodity, but could not 
“enclose” contracting.  
 
The overflowing of codified processes is a phenomenon long remarked and well understood in 
IS research. Winograd and Flores (1986) and Dreyfus (1992) cautioned that success in solving 
problems that feature discrete data and explicit rule sets cannot be simply extrapolated to predict 
success with more complex, context-dependent problems. “The professional discipline of 
‘systems analysis’ has focused on routine structured processes, frequently attacking problems of 
volume and routine rather than problems of communication” (Winograd and Flores 1986, p. 
151). Other scholars have written extensively on the subject (e.g. Ciborra 1996; Suchman 2007), 
and, to cite a recent study from economic sociology, Licoppe (2008) observes that there is a 
regular “overflowing of the electronic transaction frame” in e-commerce. So the finding that 
CMS could not enclose contracting is not surprising, but it has implications for the program of 
process commoditization that I discuss in section 8.2. 
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7.2.3 The organizing vision: structured data as knowledge 
 
CMS promised “visibility” into contracting, but was not particularly successful in producing 
organizational contracting knowledge, as I discuss in section 5.4.3 (see Table 7.3, excerpted 
from Table 6.2). There was the persistent fragmentation of contracting, already noted, which 
CMS did not resolve. Customers also experienced a number of practical problems with the 
contracts repository in terms of completeness, access and searchability, and had difficulty in 
defining and extracting structured data. Data integration was limited. CMS was not associated 
with risk management, and users generally did not look to it to produce organizational 
contracting knowledge. In the implementation I describe in section 5.2, relatively few datapoints 
were captured in discrete data fields, and there was no data integration. In that implementation, 
the system produced alerts for contract renewals, but the business sponsor did not expect CMS 
to produce much more in terms of contracting knowledge, ceding that ground to business 
intelligence initiatives.  
 
Evidence of breakdown observed Breakdown of what? 
Fragmentation of contracting as described in Table 7.2 
Limitations on the repository (completeness, access and 
searchability) 
Difficulties in defining and extracting structured data 
Limited data integration 
Reduced expectations for contracting knowledge as 
associated with CMS (as opposed to risk management, 
business intelligence or other business initiatives)  
Contract data and knowledge are domain-specific and 
even customer-specific 
The organizing vision – contracting 
knowledge as an outcome of automating the 
contract lifecycle across the enterprise 
Table 7.3 Breakdown of the organizing vision – structured data as knowledge 
 
From a perspective informed by the research discussed in section 3.3.3, CMS can be said to 
have incorporated a quite limited and perhaps naïve perspective on organizational knowledge, 
or, put in the alternative, its knowledge program was more ambitious than proponents 
understood. The CMS model conceptualized contracting knowledge largely as a matter of the 
structured data corresponding to variables in contract templates. The assumption was then that 
organizational contracting knowledge would be a direct outcome of automating the contracting 
process and the continuous flow of structured data through to transactional databases and 
analytics applications. By working to this assumption, CMS took on all of the difficulties of 
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turning unstructured data into structured data (Clark et al. 2007; Negash 2004) and building a 
cross-functional database that would reconcile the conflicting perspectives of organizational 
functions having an interest in contract processes and information (cf. D’Adderio 2004; 
Howard-Grenville and Carlile 2006; Nonaka and van Krogh 2009). While reconciling the views 
held by different organizational functions is a perennial problem in organizational knowledge, 
as noted by these authors, CMS encountered a special version of this problem in that other 
organizational contracting knowledge initiatives overlapping contract management, such as risk 
management, business intelligence and supply chain management, were already separately 
established and resourced. At the same time, it was unclear whether investment in CMS’s 
structured data approach was really the path to contracting knowledge (cf. Chapman and Kihn 
2009; Dechow and Mouritsen 2005; Elbashir 2011; Nonaka 1994; Winograd and Flores 1986). 
Many reduced the scope of the data extraction and integration elements of a CMS program, 
implementing it as a contracts repository or “indexing system”, and adopted limited 
expectations for CMS as associated with contracting knowledge.  
 
Some CMS customers, like the large UK public sector entity discussed in section 6.2.6, did 
make substantial investments in managing contract data, but these were highly particularized. 
Emptoris claimed that customers using its reverse auction capability to run multi-million dollar 
procurement programs at a high level of data granularity would achieve direct cost savings. 
Some CMS vendors, like I-Many, created valuable market niches by developing domain-
specific expertise and content. In cases like these, CMS did produce and manage structured data 
and support computational aspects of contract management. That is, some contracting and 
contracting knowledge did benefit from a data-intensive approach but only when the data was 
particularized to a domain (healthcare; large scale procurement) or a customer (the UK public 
sector entity). The fact that contracting data was domain-specific and even customer-specific 
meant that high value data-rich implementations did not necessarily generalize to other 
contracting contexts. In this respect, the nature of contracting knowledge directly impacted 
generification. 
 
The nature of contracting knowledge also set CMS went down two different paths – toward 
specialized, data-rich, high value implementations or toward a more general document 
repository with limited metadata, corresponding to the eventual category breakdown described 
by Gartner (specialized process applications as against the “über-filing cabinet”). The “über-
filing cabinet” was relatively “fluid”, technologically appropriate for many organizations and so 
corresponding to a potentially large “region” of contracting, but hard to distinguish from other, 
widely available general purpose software that an organization might already have. Specialized 
process applications were not as “fluid” but had high value in their respective “regions” of 
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contracting. This was reflected in the eventual fragmentation of the CMS category, discussed in 
section 7.2.5.  
 
One might ask, given what is known about organizational knowledge and about contract, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, why CMS was based on such a reductionist view of the relationship 
between ICT and organizational contracting knowledge. Here the vendor histories provide some 
measure of explanation. All of the vendors other than Upside began with a calculation capability 
that had applicability in a contracting context. In their early experience, tracking a few discrete 
contracting variables – expiry and renewal dates and volume discounts and rebates (as of 2009 
still the most frequently tracked structured datapoints; see Appendix 5.8) – could generate 
quantifiable increased revenues or cost savings, and Ariba’s and Emptoris’s systems encouraged 
competitive pricing from suppliers. Through the lens of their particular expertise and early 
experience, and with a particular view of how e-commerce would develop – largely consistent 
with Malone et al.’s (1987) electronic markets hypothesis – it made sense that contract would 
resolve to the manipulation of discrete market-defined variables corresponding to terms in 
contract documents and data in organizations’ internal information systems.  
 
7.2.4 The organizing vision: contract as algorithmic 
 
In fact, as discussed in section 5.4.4, there was an association between CMS and such 
“algorithmic” contracting. The contract lifecycle was a generic model, abstracted away from 
any particular organization or domain, and CMS was supposed to work for all types of 
contracts, and for all types of businesses, in any industry. But CMS did not work equally well 
for all contracting environments (see Table 7.4, excerpted from Table 6.2). Based on survey 
data, the CMS “region” of contracting (see Table 5.3, p. 132) tends to feature scale (volume and 
standardization) and data discreteness (the relative ease with which contracts can be reduced to 
structured data). For example, in my survey, while only 4% of respondents with more than 500 
of their most important type of contract in effect did not have and were not considering CMS, 
that percentage was 27% for respondents with 500 or fewer of their most important type of 
contract in effect. CMS was associated with large companies, with 83% of survey respondents 
with firm revenues in excess of $10 billion using, implementing or considering CMS. It was 
also associated with the buy-side, with lower risk, and with investment in other organizational 
IT infrastructure, especially ERP. Since algorithmic contracting depends on the specifics of 
structured data, it tends to be domain-specific and perhaps even customer-specific (e.g. as 
reflected in Selectica’s customer concentration or in the case of the large UK public sector 
entity discussed in section 6.2.6).  
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Evidence of breakdown observed Breakdown of what? 
CMS associated with scale (volume and 
standardization) and structured data 
CMS associated with large companies 
CMS associated with the buy-side 
CMS associated with IT infrastructure, especially 
ERP 
CMS associated with lower risk 
CMS associated with “algorithmic” contracting 
CMS vendors targeted large firm customers 
4 of 5 focus vendors started with an algorithmic 
contracting capability 
Algorithmic contracting is domain-specific and 
even customer-specific 
The organizing vision – CMS as an organizing 
technology for all types of contracting 
 
Table 7.4 Breakdown of the organizing vision – contract as algorithmic 
To summarize, CMS seemed to work best for algorithmic contracting at scale, with an 
implication that this is the region of contracting where the cost of advanced, data-rich features 
could be justified. In other cases – where contracting was not algorithmic or where scale could 
not justify the cost – organizations were not interested in CMS, or, as noted above, CMS might 
be implemented on a reduced basis, as a contracts repository (the über-filing cabinet). The CMS 
“region” of contract was limited, indicating that contracting resists characterization as 
universally or essentially algorithmic in nature.  
This is consistent with Mithas et al. (2008). In operationalizing their test of the electronic 
markets hypothesis, the authors take a reverse auction as a proxy for an ICT-enabled market 
mode of coordination. In particular they are adopting Malone et al.’s (1987) definition of a 
market as a mechanism that enables a buyer to choose among the competing offerings of 
multiple sellers. The reverse auction represents, in my terms, algorithmic contracting, and I read 
their finding to say that contracting professionals resisted an algorithmic contracting technology 
for situations featuring elements of “non-contractibility” (quality, supplier technological 
investments, information exchange, responsiveness, trust, and flexibility). That is, some 
contracting is algorithmic in nature, but some (“non-contractible” contracting) is not, and 
contracting that is not algorithmic in nature resists ICT-enabled algorithmic reduction. Licoppe 
(2008, p. 318), in considering e-commerce, cites Mirowski’s (2002) description of markets as 
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“automats” and market transactions as “algorithms”: “Information and communication 
technologies (ICT) have contributed toward translating economic interactions into algorithms, 
especially in the context of financial markets and e-commerce. … However, commercial 
interactions themselves cannot be entirely equated to a finalized algorithmic process and 
reduced to a sequence of discrete steps leading toward a predefined goal.” 
 
The experience of CMS in confronting limits to algorithmic contracting is also consistent with 
the many other empirical studies of ICT, contract and knowledge discussed in section 3.3. These 
studies emphasize the importance of knowledge in contracting in supply chains (Frances and 
Garnsey 1996; Malhotra et al. 2005; Subramani 2004), in outsourcing (Dibbern et al. 2008; 
Gefen et al. 2008; Gefen and Carmel 2008) or in non-market transactions more generally 
(Caglio and Ditillo 2008). This sort of knowledge-intensive contracting is unlikely to be 
“algorithmic”. Theories of contract discussed in section 3.2 are similarly incompatible with an 
idea that contracting is essentially algorithmic. The premise of relational contracting (Bernstein 
1992, 1996; Macauley 1963, 2003; Macneil 1985, 2003) is that in many cases the essential 
elements of the contractual relationship are not reduced to writing, so it could hardly be the case 
that they are captured in structured data parameters, no matter how granular these might be.  
 
Likewise, that data-rich algorithmic contracting is domain-specific – that for ICT and contract, 
industry has to be “taken seriously” (see Chiasson and Davidson 2005) – is not a surprising 
outcome in light of research that shows that contracting takes place in a contracting community 
(Bernstein 1992, 1996; Suchman 2003). In fact, in the course of formulating EMH, what 
Malone et al. (1987) observed but did not remark upon is that ICT was enabling contracting in 
data-rich environments where large organizations had made substantial investments in domain-
specific platforms (American Airlines) or the sharing of detailed specifications with suppliers, 
two rather different phenomena that the authors characterized as electronic markets because, in 
accordance with TCE’s efficiency-optimizing function and buy-side focus (Coase 1988), they 
facilitate a buyer’s review of multiple purchasing options. However, if the organizing vision for 
CMS was not consistent with what is known about knowledge in contracting, relational 
contracting or contracting communities, it was consistent with the expertise and early 
experience of key vendors, and it reflected their targeting of large companies as customers, the 
buy-side orientation of several key vendors (Ariba and Emptoris), and dot.com era visions of e-
commerce. Above all, it imagined contracting in terms of computer capabilities. 
 
To summarize, the organizing vision of CMS broke down in three respects, revealing the 
corresponding performative assumptions. First, CMS envisioned contract management as a 
process automation project, largely in accord with BPR and the more recent model of process 
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commoditization, following a program of functional simplification and closure, or 
decontextualization. Second, CMS imagined that process automation would produce structured 
data and that structured data is the same as knowledge. Thus stated, this represents a common 
misapprehension of IT capabilities and, in light of research on ICT, contract and organizational 
knowledge, the outcome for CMS is unsurprising. But here the particular failure of these 
assumptions against the domain-specificity of contracting data and knowledge was directly 
implicated both in the failure of generification, discussed above, and the eventual fragmentation 
of the category, discussed in the next section. Lastly, CMS conceived of contracting as 
essentially or potentially algorithmic – contracting through the lens of computer capabilities. 
The organizing vision for CMS incorporated a process orientation like BPR and a model of 
algorithmic reduction not unlike that embodied in a reverse auction (Mithas et al. 2008), in e-
commerce (Licoppe 2008) or in Malone et al.’s (1987) concept of electronic markets. It had a 
tilt to the buy-side, like TCE (Coase 1988). Richly reflecting all of these influences, and the 
expertise and early experience of key vendors, the organizing vision for CMS performatively 
excluded much of contracting, which overflowed CMS, materializing in breakdown of the 
organizing vision but also a generative, productive, or corrective breakdown, or fragmentation, 
of the category, discussed in the next section. 
 
7.2.5 Classification performativity in product qualification: the category as reification and 
market correlate of the organizing vision 
 
Pollock and Williams (2010, 2011) have described the classification work of analysts in 
creating categories for IT products and noted the effects of these categories in shaping the IT 
marketplace – that is, the performative role of classification in product qualification in the IT 
marketplace. They have also drawn a link between the category and the organizing vision 
(Pollock and Williams 2011), and, in section 2.3.2, I have characterized the product category as 
the market correlate of the organizing vision, a reification of the organization that is specifically 
enlisted in the creation of expectations in the IT marketplace. 
 
Stepping back from the IT domain, Sjögren and Helgesson (2007) have noted that classification 
is an essential element of product qualification (in their case, of medicines), and both they and 
Pollock and Williams cite a definitive work on classification, Bowker and Star (1999). Because 
what Bowker and Star have to say about classification directly bears on this case, it is worth 
noting here some of their key precepts. According to Bowker and Star, a sound classification 
system is one that is internally consistent, with no gaps and no overlaps between categories. A 
sound category should correspond to its referents, and not to other things, and its referents 
should fall into that category and no others. Having too few categories (too high a level of 
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abstraction of generality) results in having information that is not meaningful or valuable, but 
having too many generates errors or randomness; the level of abstraction or granularity should 
be pitched to scale. When things being categorized do not fit the established categories, 
resulting in ad hoc responses, these anomalies indicate problems in the classification system, 
and may reveal residual categories – the dolphin in the sea creature sorting system. 
Reconstituting the classification system to accommodate the anomalies can be corrective. On 
the other hand, things that do not fit the established categories might be put in the wrong 
category, or they might just not be recognized and disappear; in Pollock and Williams’s (2010) 
account, software products that do not fall within a category become to some extent invisible. A 
classification system organizes, but it also excludes, an idea resonant with Barad’s perspective 
in her focus on the excluding properties of an apparatus or other material-discursive practice. 
 
Pollock and Williams (2010) note that not all attempts at classification succeed, and in the case 
of CMS, the evidence (discussed in sections 5.4.5 and 6.3.2, and summarized in Table 7.5, 
excerpted from Table 6.2) points to technical classification problems for the CMS category 
when assessed against the rules laid out by Bowker and Star. CMS overlapped with too many 
other products in the market and general purpose IT capabilities already available to 
organizations. It was unclear what CMS actually referred to. There was a question about 
whether it was about process or information; there were conflicting function-specific views of 
CMS that were hard to reconcile. The vendors and products classified as CMS were not the 
same, and some of those vendors and products appeared under other categories. CMS itself was 
sometimes treated as a part of e-purchasing. Pitched at too high a level of abstraction and 
generality, the category was to some extent abandoned by Gartner, and reconstituted into 
subcategories. In particular, the high cost of advanced features and the corresponding weakness 
of the business case for many organizations were reflected in a de-composition of the category, 
split between a low value, general purpose document repository and high value, data-rich and 
domain-specific applications. 
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Evidence of breakdown observed Breakdown of 
what? 
Unclear as to whether about process or information 
Conflicting function-specific views of CMS 
Competition with in-house and other software (e.g. ERP) 
Overlapping functionalities with other software (e.g. CRM, strategic sourcing) 
High cost of advanced features 
Weak business case  
Fallback to document repository (in competition with e.g. records or documents 
management systems) 
Clear encroachment into CMS space by ERP and other software vendors 
Rating of CMS vendors under other categories 
CMS subsumed under other categories such as e-purchasing 
Gartner retirement of the category 
Emergence of subcategories along various dimensions (repository versus process; 
documents (Upside) versus data; verticalization (I-Many); procurement focus with a 
network (Ariba) or purchase category expertise and granularity (Emptoris)) 
Category 
 
Table 7.5 Category breakdown 
The classification problem for CMS was similar to that described by Vitari and Ravarini in their 
study of content management systems:  
While the name Content Management Systems is commonly used for commercial 
purposes, it has no generally recognized definition, so the market offers products under 
that label that differ significantly, while at the same time software systems with many 
similar functionalities are commercialized under labels such as Document Management 
Systems (DMS) and Knowledge Management Systems (KMS). (Vitari and Ravarini 
2009, p. 250) 
 
As discussed in section 4.2.3, Vitari and Ravarini build their own definition by separately 
sourcing meanings for “content management” and “packaged software” and define content 
management systems as “commercially produced software packages supporting the 
management of web site content”. Working with their definition, they nonetheless found that, 
over time, content management systems evolved to support other activities such as e-commerce, 
knowledge management and document management, “blurring even further the already fuzzy 
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boundaries between these different types of applications”. By finessing the definitional 
difficulty they originally observed, they elide the classification problem in qualifying content 
management systems as a product. That is, content management systems as a software category 
was not distinguishable from other software categories and was too abstracted to correspond to 
a real, singular, enclosable process. Vendors faced competition from low-cost, generic, 
“commodity” products offering the same functionalities and developed service capabilities as a 
differentiator.  
 
In light of Vitari and Ravarini’s example and the emergence of the relatively “commoditized” 
über-filing cabinet version of CMS, Chiasson and Green’s (2007) description of their project to 
generify, or decontextualize, a healthcare planning application takes on a different meaning. The 
software developers started with an application for breast cancer healthcare planning, and ended 
up with an application that could be used in any planning context. The case of CMS and that 
described by Vitari and Ravarini suggest that this generic planning application, empty of 
domain-specific content, might become a low value “commodity”. This theme is echoed by 
Pollock and Williams (2009b), who note that Gartner began to focus on differentiating vendor 
qualities (“ability to execute” and “completeness of vision”) in part because IT systems are no 
longer all that distinguishable in terms of functionalities. Taken to its logical conclusion, this 
observation suggests that a strategy of generification which is based solely on 
decontextualization (as modelled in Chiasson and Green 2007) may be counterproductive. Just 
as suggested by Bowker and Star, there is a tradeoff between the level of abstraction and value. 
 
As described in the previous three sections describing the breakdown of the organizing vision, 
contracting overflowed CMS, and correspondingly resisted classification under the CMS 
category, resulting in breakdown marked by the generative, productive or corrective emergence 
of subcategories. The case demonstrates that while classification performativity is powerful in 
product qualification, including in the IT marketplace, it is not all-powerful. Expectations are 
not always realized, and it is necessary to account for both the content of the vision and the 
work involved in its production (Pollock and Williams 2010, p. 529). In the preceding section, I 
discussed the content of the (organizing) vision for CMS; in the next section I look more closely 
at the work involved in the production of its market correlate, the CMS category, as well as the 
place and nature of the category within the overall logic of commoditization in the biography of 
CMS. 
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7.3 The logic of commoditization in the biography of CMS: a “substitution of performance” 
I return now to the motivating question for this study – the difference between the projected 
market for CMS and actual market size realized (see the discussion in section 6.3.3 and Table 
7.6, extracted from Table 6.2). This was initially reflected in the high early vendor equity 
valuations in relation to low revenues and lack of profitability, common in the dot.com era. 
However, even after the dot.com crash, category success in the form of favorable analyst 
reviews continued in the face of product unprofitability. Though the evidence of breakdown 
reviewed so far describes a number of reasons why CMS failed, what it does not explain is what 
sustained the CMS program for so long.  
 
Evidence of breakdown observed Breakdown of what? 
(Early) vendor equity valuations relative to revenues and 
profitability 
Projected market size as compared to lack of revenues 
Category success as compared to product unprofitability 
Market expectations in relation to market 
performance 
 
Table 7.6 Breakdown of correspondence of market expectations and market performance 
 
My argument is that this breakdown can be traced to the logic of commoditization as theorized 
by Appadurai (1986) – to the workings of the knowledge network in extended or remote 
production, and in particular to the emergence of financialized meta-commodities and 
marketized criteria in relation to an underlying commodity. In this tiered structure, the category 
is the space where marketized criteria trade. In this section, I use these concepts to develop a 
theory of “substitution of performance” across three levels of commoditization in the biography 
of CMS. These three levels of commoditization were related, as I will show, but distinct and 
separate: “This is because inconsistency between different performances reflects failing 
coordination between different object positions rather than differences between external 
perspectives on the same object”; “the interferences between these different … positions are a 
valuable source of data” (Law 2002, pp. 8-9). 
 
To begin, the packaged software market is an example of remote production; developers are 
separated from users (Sawyer 2000). In the case of ERP, as described by Pollock and Williams 
(2009a), the distance between developers and users was successfully bridged by the knowledge 
network. The knowledge network for CMS included vendors, customers, the IACCM and 
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analysts. Pollock and Williams (2009b, 2010, 2011) have identified the role of analysts as 
central in the packaged software industry, and, as discussed in section 7.1 above, analysts 
played a leading role in the biography of CMS. Section 5.1.3 outlines the consistent support that 
the CMS concept has received from the IACCM. Customers have also been an important part of 
the knowledge network for CMS, providing references, participating in user groups and in 
marketing efforts, and even involved as business partners in product development. However, the 
case of CMS demonstrates a dynamic of the knowledge network different from that observed by 
Pollock and Williams, and more along the lines suggested by Appadurai (1986a). 
 
Appadurai (1986a) theorized that in the production of demand in a chain of production where 
knowledge is fragmented – “partial, contradictory, and differentiated” – the knowledge network 
may not so much bridge the gap between producers and consumers as arbitrage discontinuities 
in knowledge. The consumer who does not have direct experience of the product and its 
production is in something of the position of a cargo cult: A new product appears, but the 
consumer, not knowing how it is produced, how it works or how to use it, becomes receptive to 
mythologies, or framing discourse, about its origin, its nature and its import. In these 
circumstances, knowledge about the product (or claims that purport to represent knowledge 
about the product) becomes valuable. Appadurai hypothesizes that in such a case, knowledge 
(or purported knowledge) about a commodity may even become a commodity in its own right, 
that is, markets in criteria will develop: “The carpet business involves not just the supply of 
carpets as in the case of other commodities, but also the supply of information about them” 
(Spooner 1986, p. 198).  
 
The role of analysts in IT marketplace and in the biography of CMS can be seen as constituting 
a market in commoditized criteria of type hypothesized by Appadurai. The analysts generate 
knowledge (or knowledge claims) about products and vendors, and the principal intended 
consumers or users of knowledge are organizations buying IT products. The nature of the 
knowledge produced by analysts is controversial, as noted by Pollock and Williams (2009b) and 
illustrated in the ZL litigation I discuss in section 6.1.2. This is in part because it is well known 
(if not in detail) that, notwithstanding that user organizations are the primary target customers 
for analyst research, vendors are a principal source of revenues for analyst firms. In other words, 
there is a suggestion (e.g. in the ZL litigation) that analysts’ research is biased in favour of 
vendors who pay them. However, in the case of CMS, apart from Aberdeen, which is openly in 
the business of “demand generation”, it cannot be said that the analysts were passively 
unquestioning industry spokesmen. As noted in section 6.1.3, Gartner and Forrester have 
offered critical commentary. The analysts have their own reputations to manage and protect in 
order to preserve the value of their research. This still leaves open the question of the nature of 
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that research. To defend their legal position under the First Amendment (guaranteeing freedom 
of speech) in the ZL litigation, Gartner argued that their research is essentially opinion, 
protected under the First Amendment – a subjective opinion, based on sifting and collating the 
opinions of others. Pollock and Williams (2009b) advance a not dissimilar position when they 
theorize Gartner’s research process as the objectification and commodification of “community 
knowledge” gathered from vendors and customers and thus reflexively shaping the IT 
marketplace (Pollock and Williams 2010, 2011). 
 
I make a somewhat different point here, suggesting that analysts establish categories in part to 
organize the knowledge (or knowledge claims) that they sell – marketized criteria in the form of 
research-as-product. I argue that the categories constitute part of the infrastructure of the market 
in which their research-as-product can be sold, or, alternatively, that the categories themselves 
constitute knowledge (or knowledge claims) or research-as-product. In either case, the analysts 
become, in an oblique but very real sense, invested in these categories and the organizing 
visions to which they correspond because they are part of and necessary to their own research-
as-product. Following Law’s (2002) conception, the category might be said to create a virtual 
space in which disparate objects – the vendors and their software – can be connected and 
coordinated, accommodating the commensurability required for the analysts’ ratings and 
rankings (Pollock and Williams 2009b, 2011; cf. Scott and Orlikowski 2012). The space then 
becomes a focus of an “obsession with positioning products” (Callon et al. 2002). Graphical 
presentations such as the Magic Quadrant and the Forrester Wave translate these virtual spaces 
into actual two-dimensional images, where a vendor and its software are materialized as a single 
x-y coordinate of value. 
 
According to this view, both vendors and analysts were invested in the CMS category as a key 
coordinating device for their products. But other participants in the knowledge network were 
also invested in the CMS category, obliquely through their ownership of equity interests in the 
vendor firms. From a commoditization perspective, equity stakes in the vendor firms represent a 
kind of financialized meta-commodity in contract management software as the underlying 
commodity. That is, an equity interest in a CMS vendor firm represents an interest in future 
cash flows from CMS, and the market in shares is a market in expectations for the category. 
Looking at the biography of CMS, we can identify a number of participants taking equity stakes 
in vendor firms, all across the knowledge network. Not only shareholders, but employees, 
resellers, consultants and other business partners received shares, options or other equity 
interests in vendor firms. So did customers, such as Procter & Gamble in the case of I-Many or 
the Government of Alberta in the case of Upside.  
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There are other more attenuated forms of investment in the category across the knowledge 
network. In the dynamic so clearly identified by Gartner in the ZL litigation, even when 
packaged software customers do not take equity interests in a vendor firm they are of course 
invested in vendor support of the product and, so long as the product is not proprietary to them, 
they benefit from an increased customer base. The IACCM’s investment in CMS is complex 
and may involve an unstated reciprocity. Though the IACCM has no doubt received revenues 
from CMS vendor firms, it may have been just as important to have vendors participate in 
IACCM and support the still relatively new concept of contract management, for example as 
Upside did when it offered its customers memberships in IACCM.  
 
A large part of the cash invested in CMS vendor firms went to build the expectations for the 
category through marketing expenditures in support of the category and the organizing vision, 
as discussed in section 6.2.6. Some of those funds undoubtedly made their way to other 
knowledge network participants, in particular the analysts. Gartner, in both the ZL case and 
their explanation of the Magic Quadrant, emphasizes sales and marketing as key in the software 
industry, and there is no indication that CMS vendors failed either to devote significant 
resources to marketing CMS or to deploy a range of marketing tools, all as described in section 
6.2.6. In fact, as I will go on to argue, they may have succeeded too well.  
 
To summarize thus far, the knowledge network for CMS was invested, albeit differentially and 
in some cases obliquely, in the CMS category and organizing vision, which had the benefit, 
over seven years, of more than $1.2 billion in sales and marketing spend, most of that coming 
from vendor firm investors. The participants in the knowledge network were thus in a 
relationship of material co-dependency (see Howcroft and Light 2010), one that could probably 
be traced in detail and quantified (i.e. assigned monetary values) given sufficient access, time 
and resources.  
 
While concepts such as mass-production communities (Koch 2003) and agora (Kaniadakis 
2006) hint at a kind of free-flowing openness and symmetry in participation between developers 
and users, Pollock and Williams suggest that the supply side is “privileged” (2009a, p. 55), and 
they (Pollock and Williams 2011) challenge the notion of a “communitarian” framing of 
technology categories in favour of an emphasis on the role of analyst firms as “knowledge 
institutions of information technology” that “draw up and police the boundaries that surround 
new technological fields of activity”. The biography of CMS suggests that the supply side 
achieves and maintains its “privileged” position in large part by dominating and setting the 
terms of the discourse through marketing expenditures. It is somewhat less easy to explain how 
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the category and organizing vision can continue to thrive in the knowledge network in the face 
of evidence that the underlying product is struggling to find customers. 
 
In this regard, Cochoy (2010) provides a provocative hint. In Chapter 2, I discussed the case of 
The Progressive Grocer, a trade publication targeted at modernizing the merchandising 
practices of small grocers. The Progressive Grocer was not the organ of a professional 
association of grocers but instead was produced and published by a trade press founded by a 
group of journalists. The journalists had identified the modernization of small grocers as 
creating a business opportunity for them, which they financed by selling magazine 
advertisements to companies that sold store furniture, cash registers and other magazines to 
small grocers. These advertisers were The Progressive Grocer’s real clients, and the magazine 
was sent to grocers for free. Just as in today’s internet advertising, the grocers were effectively 
“sold” to the advertisers. Notably, in 1931, the magazine published an ad describing its success 
in attracting advertisers even during the Depression. 
  
This strategy, which is highly similar to the rhetoric used by the founders of the Journal 
of Marketing in 1936 (Cochoy 1998), consists of substituting one performance for 
another: the money manufacturers invested in Progressive Grocer to advertise ‘displays 
that sell’ was presented as the proof of the practical efficiency of the same displays. 
(Cochoy 2010, p. 305) 
 
 
Cochoy argues that “investments” made by advertisers were touted as evidence of the success of 
the products promoted in the magazine. In this way, the magazine as advertising vehicle and the 
products it advertised were cross-sold. That is, there was a “substitution of performance” across 
multiple levels of commoditization.  
 
Taking up Cochoy’s (2010) insight, one explanation for the lack of correspondence between 
market perception and market performance in the case of CMS might be that investor support, 
analyst reviews, IACCM support, and customer references substituted for proven success of the 
software product. This substituted performance was to a significant degree produced by the 
marketing budgets provided by investor funds following a belief that packaged software 
production can be led by category construction around an organizing vision, i.e. a substitution of 
performance created through marketing, first to investors and then, with funds provided by 
investors, to customers, just as suggested in the interviewee quote in section 6.2.6. In this way, 
three markets were materially linked – the market in CMS, the market in equity interests in 
CMS vendors (financialized meta-commodities), and the market in analyst ratings, 
recommendations and coverage (a market in criteria).  
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Pollock and Williams (2009b) describe such a substitution of performance in relation to analyst 
rankings when a user organization IT executive links progress on a CRM project to a good 
showing for the vendor on Gartner’s “ability to execute” axis – using this linking to get more 
resources from the vendor. The customer and the vendor engage in a form of exchange and 
partnership structured around the Gartner ranking, the Gartner category, and the vendor’s 
commitment to the product, with the Gartner ranking put in play as a kind of currency between 
the vendor and the customer. Specifically, the vendor’s improved performance vis-a-vis the 
customer is directly traded for an improved Gartner rating. This transitive substitution of user 
satisfaction to analyst rankings occurred after the procurement decision, in the course of the 
vendor’s performance.  
 
But I argue that substitution of performance across the levels of commoditization is 
characteristic of the packaged software market, with user satisfaction in the underlying often 
substituted out. With respect to financialized meta-commodities in the form of equity interests 
in vendor firms, it was Sawyer (2000) who observed that, for packaged software, profits and 
market share substitute for user satisfaction. That is, a software product is of interest to vendor 
firms only insofar as it generates customer revenues as the path to profits and market share. The 
biography of CMS shows vendors actively pursuing customer revenues by buying software with 
its installed base of customers, by aggressively competing to attract customers from other 
vendors, or by buying firms with a competing or complementary offering to force market 
consolidation and migration of customers to the acquiring firm. The vendors demonstrate a keen 
awareness of the market, and make alliances and acquisitions, or file patent lawsuits and buy 
stock of competitors, to buy or create the opportunity for incremental revenues. Strategic 
transactions figure prominently in the biography of CMS, demonstrating that in a calculus that 
privileges financialized meta-commodities, software is only one factor in the production of 
revenues, profits and market share. Gartner’s analytical approach, which weights technology as 
only one factor in its rankings of products and vendors, is fully consistent with this perspective.  
 
In the pursuit of revenues, market share and profitability, marketing is key. Particularly at the 
stage of procurement, marketized criteria such as analyst rankings stand in for user satisfaction 
based on prior experience. Shapiro and Varian (1999, pp. 5-6) effectively justify such a 
substitution of performance when they claim that, for “experience goods” like software, 
branding and reputation (howsoever produced) become proxies for understanding based on prior 
experience, and, consistent with this model, the role of analysts as gatekeepers in the IT 
marketplace is well understood and to a degree accepted. In this way marketized criteria can 
lead the underlying market both in impact and in time. The performativity of marketing centered 
around category construction and marketized criteria is thus central to making a market in 
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packaged software. So long as the category is strong and the organizing vision convincing and 
widely held, any problems a customer might experience with the product might be considered 
anomalous, a localized issue of organizational misfit or the like.  
 
The CMS industry appears to have succeeded in establishing a software category, through 
“reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects it names”, or 
performativity (Butler 1993, p. xiii). In other words, the category was successful, for a time, in 
that it was “able to bring about the world that it points to (i.e., actors come to think of others and 
themselves according to these terms)” (Pollock and Williams 2009b). The “rhetoric” of CMS – 
a commoditized expectation or imagining – proceeded on a relatively smooth trajectory, but it 
separated from the life of the product and the vendors, and took on a life of its own. Similar 
observations have been made by Newell et al. (2000) regarding BPR, and by Mitchell (2007, pp. 
251-252) regarding Soto’s prescription for unlocking the value of land by creating alienable title 
– concepts that enjoyed wide acceptance but were not so successful in operation. To take 
another example, Callon describes how marginalist analysis enjoys success in universities and 
compares that to what it would take to make marginalist analysis work in practice: 
 
In the paper world to which it belongs, marginalist analysis thrives. All it needs are 
some propositions on increasing returns, the convexity of utility curves, and so forth. 
Transported into an electricity utility (for example, Electricite de France), it needs the 
addition of time-of-day meters set up wherever people consume electricity and without 
which calculations are impossible; introduced into a private firm, it requires analytical 
accounting and a system of recording and cost assessment that prove to be hardly 
feasible. (Callon 2007, pp. 331-331) 
 
 
By analogy to Callon’s example, and returning to Pollock and Williams’s suggestion to look at 
the work involved in the production of the category, Table 7.7 compares what it took to create 
the CMS category to what was required of vendors, customers and intermediaries in order to 
make CMS work. Creating a category required a significant marketing budget deployed in the 
knowledge network. To get CMS to work was an entirely different undertaking. In particular, 
the third column of Table 7.7 shows how much of the cost and work fell upon the user firm.  
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What it took to create the CMS 
category 
What it took to design, sell and 
support CMS 
What it took to buy, 
implement and use CMS 
Marketing resources 
Organizing vision (the contract 
lifecycle) 
Analyst validation of the category 
Professional organization support 
Customer references 
Multiple communications formats 
for the narratives and signs (e.g., 
websites, white papers, webinars, 
conferences) 
Designing or acquiring software 
capabilities 
Managing intellectual property 
issues 
Selling efforts 
Negotiating a contract 
Implementation generally 
Meeting maintenance and user 
support needs 
Managing upgrades 
 
 
Building a business case 
Selecting a procurement 
strategy and provider 
Negotiating a contract 
Coordination with internal 
IT 
Implementation generally 
Legacy contract import 
Data definitions agreement 
Data integration (if 
attempted) 
Ongoing compliance, 
including coding and data 
entry 
Ongoing vendor 
management 
Managing upgrades 
 
Table 7.7 Creating the CMS category versus making CMS work 
 
The organizing vision on which the category and the product were based abstracted out all the 
specifics of contracting, marginalizing users and excluding practice. It decontextualized 
contracting, in theory producing a standard and generic information good that was “fluid” and 
could “travel”, but in practice making CMS costly and burdensome to adopt. This suggests a 
certain risk, often overlooked, in neglecting the materiality of practice in favour of radical 
decontextualization; it may not always be cheaper to buy instead of build. 
In brief, early equity investments funded the marketing of CMS. The substitution of marketing 
success, as proxy for anticipated profits and market share, as proxy in turn for user satisfaction, 
succeeded for a time (roughly, until the cash ran out) within the invested knowledge network 
but eventually collapsed when CMS failed to manifest in practice, and produce cash profits. It 
was easy to make the category, it was harder to make CMS work. It is a pale copy of the Enron 
story, where accounting constructed a profitable enterprise, up to the point when profits failed to 
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manifest in practice. In Barad’s terms, discourse encountered the limits imposed by the 
“constitutive outside”. 
I come back to Appadurai’s (1986a, pp. 50-51) observations regarding commodities futures 
trading, where “the moment of prices becomes an autonomous substitute for the flow of 
commodities themselves”, involving a “double degree of removal from the social relations of 
production and exchange”. That is, he is describing a “substitution of performance” – as I have 
described here, but not linked to markets in criteria and not as attenuated as stock prices in 
relation to the products sold by the issuing firms (which I have called financialized meta-
commodities). In these “tournaments of value” whose “concern with commodities is purely 
informational and semiotic and is divorced from consumption” – commodities as signs (citing 
Baudrillard 1981) can yield profit if “manipulated properly”. He also speculates that these 
“tournaments of value” affect more mundane commodity flows and calls for a fuller 
examination of the “the modes of articulation of the ‘tournament’ economies with their more 
routine commodity contexts”. Appadurai is saying that trade in commodities as signs in relation 
to – representing – other, underlying commodities – can both be autonomous and affect the 
underlying commodities, and that it is material: It can yield profits. “Substitution of 
performance” as illustrated in the case of CMS links these insights to the theory of 
performativity in markets, evidencing the performativity of discourse in markets in the form of 
trade in commodities as signs: What the case of CMS illustrates is that the trade in commodities 
as signs (marketized criteria and financialized meta-commodities), apparently 
representationalist in relation to and substituting for an underlying commodity, can indeed be 
autonomous, separating from the underlying commodity, and can yield profit, constituting a 
self-sustaining performative realm, but subject to collapse when it encounters the “constitutive 
outside”. That is, there are limits to an otherwise “sovereign” performativity (Butler 2010). 
 
7.4 Accounting for the failure of CMS from a market perspective on packaged software and in 
relation to contract; retrospective on CMS 
 
Pollock and Williams’s (2009a) biography of ERP suggests that a successful packaged software 
market requires the mobilization of a knowledge network in support of an organizing vision 
(Swanson and Ramiller 1997), but more substantively the successful execution of a strategy of 
generification, to turn a particularized software product into a standardized, high margin 
information good. The first version of the biography of CMS, as organizing technology for 
contract, shows an active knowledge network in support of a coherent and compelling 
organizing vision, but indicates that generification did not work, and CMS accumulated a record 
of shortcomings. This biography begins with a technological determinist or essentialist 
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assumption that the technological artefact is ontologically coherent and that it was designed 
(“from nowhere” in Lucy Suchman’s sense) as a neutral, technical solution to meet a specified 
need. But by the end of the story, the CMS category is breaking down, and “CMS” appears to 
be more than one technological artefact; through the telling of the biography, the biographical 
subject fractures, calling into question our understanding of how it came to be. 
 
The second version of the biography of CMS, as a commodity, is an account of the 
“production” of CMS, and of how it broke down (see Table 7.8 for a summary). This second 
version of the biography subsumes and to a degree explains the first. CMS was associated with 
an organizing vision and its market correlate the category. The category was a site of material 
enactment, a coordinating mechanism (Law 2002) for disparate objects (the various CMS 
products and vendors) but also for investment, both financial and cognitive, across the 
knowledge network. Separately, CMS as a technological artefact was variable and unsettled, the 
subject of conflicting views, bought and sold, moving through and to different organizations, 
positioned and repositioned. Law (2002), in his study of the TSR2 aircraft, found a “place of 
darkness”, where competing narratives could not be reconciled. The table of breakdown 
decenters CMS, locates it along multiple dimensions, and illustrates the lack of convergence 
between the category and the technological artefact and product, Law’s “place of darkness”. 
While Pollock and Williams note the relative “boundedness” of tangible commodities as 
contrasted to the malleability of software, in the case of CMS this is more than a question of the 
lack of stability in software code and capabilities, the temporal provisionality of a technological 
artefact. “CMS” was not ontologically coherent.  
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Breakdown observed Breakdown of what? Revealing what? 
Hard coding from previous clients 
Buy-side or procurement bias 
Difficulty in generalizing cross-
industry  
Contract data was domain-specific 
and even customer-specific 
Instability of products and vendors 
Strategic transactions to acquire 
customers and extend into new 
verticals 
Conflict over customers and IP 
High proportion of service revenues 
Development of multiple delivery 
options from enterprise to low-cost 
subscription models; emergence of 
“commoditized” competition at the 
low end 
The business model for packaged 
software (generification) 
Packaged software is an information 
good 
Generification is generalizable 
Process fragmentation (offline 
processes, no continuous data flow) 
Functional or operational 
fragmentation across the contract 
lifecycle 
Fragmentation of contracting by type 
of contract or business unit, 
especially buy-side versus sell-side; 
localized and multiple 
implementations  
 
The organizing vision – automating 
the contract lifecycle across the 
enterprise 
Contract management means process 
automation 
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Breakdown observed Breakdown of what? Revealing what? 
Fragmentation of contracting – see 
row above 
Limitations on the repository 
(completeness, access and 
searchability) 
Difficulties in defining and 
extracting structured data 
Limited data integration 
Reduced expectations for contracting 
knowledge as associated with CMS 
(as opposed to risk management, 
business intelligence or other 
business initiatives) 
Contract data was domain-specific 
and even customer-specific 
The organizing vision – contracting 
knowledge as an outcome of 
automating the contract lifecycle 
across the enterprise  
Structured data is knowledge 
 
CMS associated with scale (volume 
and standardization) and structured 
data 
CMS associated with large 
companies 
CMS associated with the buy-side 
CMS associated with IT 
infrastructure, especially ERP 
CMS associated with lower risk 
CMS associated with “algorithmic” 
contracting 
CMS vendors targeted large firm 
customers 
4 of 5 focus vendors started with an 
algorithmic contracting capability 
Algorithmic contracting is domain-
specific and even customer-specific 
The organizing vision – CMS as an 
organizing technology for all types 
of contracting 
Contract is algorithmic 
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Breakdown observed Breakdown of what? Revealing what? 
Unclear as to whether about process 
or information 
Conflicting function-specific views 
of CMS 
Competition with in-house and other 
software (e.g. ERP) 
Overlapping functionalities with 
other software (e.g. CRM, strategic 
sourcing) 
High cost of advanced features 
Weak business case  
Fallback to document repository (in 
competition with e.g. records or 
documents management systems) 
Clear encroachment into CMS space 
by ERP and other software vendors 
Rating of CMS vendors under other 
categories 
CMS subsumed under other 
categories such as e-purchasing 
Gartner retirement of the category 
Emergence of subcategories along 
various dimensions (repository 
versus process; documents (Upside) 
versus data; verticalization (I-
Many); procurement focus with a 
network (Ariba) or purchase 
category expertise and granularity 
(Emptoris)) 
Category Classification is performative 
(Early) vendor equity valuations 
relative to revenues and profitability 
Projected market size as compared 
to lack of revenues 
Category success as compared to 
product unprofitability 
Market expectations in relation to 
market performance 
Substitution of performance through 
marketing 
 
Table 7.8 Completed table of breakdown (italics indicates evidence from analyst and vendor 
data) 
 
The table of breakdown points to three levels of commoditization in the biography of CMS: the 
underlying product (computer code packaged as organizing technology), its financialized meta-
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commodity (equity interests in producing firms), and commoditized criteria (analyst ratings and 
rankings). The case demonstrates that financialized meta-commodities and marketized criteria 
can have a privileged role in product qualification for packaged software, effectively standing in 
for user satisfaction. I theorize this as a “substitution of performance” across multiple levels of 
commoditization, as suggested by Cochoy (2010) in another context. In the case of CMS, 
substitution of performance was effective, to a point, masking the lack of ontological coherency. 
 
The table of breakdown also draws out the assumptions performatively at work in the biography 
of CMS – beliefs in packaged software as an information good and in the generalizability of 
generification as a strategy (a kind of meta-organizing vision for the packaged software 
industry) toward creating an information good; in the organizing vision of CMS (contract 
management as process automation, structured data as knowledge, and contract as algorithmic); 
in classification as performative; and indeed in the substitution of performance through 
marketing. These assumptions, materially enacted as intentional performative operations, were 
the site of significant investment (financial and cognitive), and succeeded in creating a software 
category and generating expectations for that software category. However, they not only 
produced but simultaneously constrained understanding and, within the larger phenomenon, 
they broke down when they encountered the “constitutive outside”. 
 
How can we account for the failure of CMS from a market perspective on packaged software? I 
argue that the fundamental breakdown was in classification performativity in product 
qualification when an attempt to classify a new technology failed (see Pollock and Williams 
2010). The category for CMS was overly abstracted and insufficiently differentiated. The 
organizing vision and its generic model of the contract lifecycle eliminated critical distinctions 
and smoothed over significant tensions inherent in the category’s disparate origins. It was a 
model based on idealization (MacKenzie 2006a), corresponding to “dreamed of states of 
commerce” (Cochoy 2010), “drawing on a world … that had not yet been realized” (Lepinay 
2007a, p. 270). Accordingly, the organizing vision broke down. Contracting resisted 
classification as algorithmic, and would not stay within the bounds of the CMS process model. 
CMS did not generally deliver the sort of “visibility” into contracting – the contracting 
knowledge – that it promised would arise from the automation of the contract lifecycle. 
Contracting and contract data were variable – across industries and as between buy-side and 
sell-side. So vendors could not execute on their strategies of generification, and CMS failed to 
become an information good. These compounding breakdowns eventually materialized in a 
divergence between market expectations – as evidenced first in the financialized meta-
commodities of equity interests in vendor firms and thereafter in the marketized criteria of 
analyst coverage – and market performance as measured by revenues and profits. This produced 
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the motivating question for this study. The multi-level breakdown analysis turns the motivating 
question upside down, from “What happened to contract management software?” to “Where did 
the expectation of market success come from?” – that is, from a question about an IT product 
failure to a story about performativity and breakdown in market making. Vendors eventually 
took different paths to look for scale and profitability. However, it took some years for this to 
unfold. During those years, first financialized meta-commodities (equity interests in vendor 
firms) and then marketized criteria (in the form of favourable analyst coverage) kept the CMS 
program alive. The invested knowledge network and the organizing vision with its market 
correlate the category detached into a closed performative realm that eventually – when 
customer revenues failed to materialize – collapsed. 
 
With respect to the second research question, the breakdown of the organizing vision indicates 
that market failure for CMS was directly related to the nature of contract and contracting. 
Contracting is not universally susceptible to algorithmic reduction; but where it is, it is scale 
that warrants the substantial cost of specialized ICT, including data management and data 
extraction. CMS was designed around an unstated assumption that contracting was algorithmic, 
and its proponents underestimated or underplayed the data management and data extraction 
requirements. Contracting is domain-specific so that, to be valuable, ICT for contracting should 
grapple with specialized knowledge and practice requirements and their cost. Contracting is 
fragmented inside organizations, both across the contract lifecycle and for different kinds of 
contracting, with a notable split between buy-side and sell-side, but internal fragmentation by 
type of contract may to some extent be explained and indeed justified by the domain-specificity 
of contracting, or by other mandates of the various “knowledge regimes” (Howard-Grenville 
and Carlile 2006) having an interest in contract (e.g. risk management, business intelligence or 
supply chain management). Organizational contracting knowledge is a problem not susceptible 
to simple ICT approaches based on process automation and structured data. 
 
However defensible this analysis might appear from today’s perspective, it is important to keep 
the story of CMS in perspective. First, it is in part a dot.com story. Kirsch and Goldfarb (2008) 
estimate that as many as several thousand internet firms got venture capital funding to pursue 
“get big fast” strategies, on the basis, crudely put, that market share could be bought (see section 
6.2.6). But “most Internet business concepts were not capable of productively employing tens of 
millions of dollars of venture capital” (Kirsch and Goldfarb 2008, p. 262). They conclude that 
the dot.com bust was more about the collapse of oversold valuations than the failure of 
inherently bad ideas (cf. Ashkenas et al. 2012), and many smaller firms did survive the dot.com 
shakeout. Though “get big fast” was not the right model for many internet firms, Kirsch and 
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Goldfarb’s analysis indicates that the exit rate in the internet business was not unusually high 
compared to that in other emerging industries. 
 
Second, the breakdown of the CMS category is not the end of the story. Vendors have found 
different ways to move forward. Thus the resistance of contracting to an overly simplistic 
classification was not only revelatory but generative, productive, or corrective (cf. Barad 2007; 
Bowker and Star 1999; Callon 1998c). Notwithstanding the relative weakness of the CMS 
category, observers believe it will likely persist in some form, in the reconstituted sub-
categories or possibly subsumed within stronger categories/products, such as e-procurement or 
ERP. Indeed the recently announced acquisitions of Emptoris by IBM, of Ariba by SAP and of 
Upside by Sci-Quest indicate that this is happening. Pollock and Williams (2010) describe how 
a Gartner analyst was able to defend several patently failed predictions by pointing out how 
some aspect of the prediction, or some insight it contained, or its general thrust or underlying 
theme, was in some way borne out. In the same way, Gartner’s prediction for CMS may have 
come true. That is, there may be a $20 billion market for software and services supporting 
“contract management”, but not under that name.  
 
In Pollock and Williams’s (2010) typology of promissory behaviour, Gartner’s prediction was 
perhaps a “vision let loose”: speculative and low in accountability. On the other hand, I would 
argue that vendors, the IACCM, customers and even the analysts did not see that way: In 2009 
the prediction was still cited to me by a vendor and noted by Tim Cummins (Cummins 2009) as 
an indication of the level of disappointment in the product and category. At this point it is 
interesting to revisit this high point of the CMS trajectory. Gartner identified three goals for 
improved contract management: to reduce costs including through an accelerated contract cycle; 
to identify and reduce contract risks; and to enable improved, more flexible arrangements with 
suppliers “to restructure the enterprise cost base”: in other words – risk management and buy-
side cost reduction. But CMS does not seem to be associated with risk management except at a 
very rudimentary level (e.g. making sure there are executed contracts in place and that they can 
be located) (section 5.4.4). Buy-side cost reduction is operationalized principally as a data-
driven process which need not be associated with contract management per se but might instead 
be called strategic sourcing, spend management or supplier relationship management. “New, 
flexible working relationships with suppliers” would entail supplier collaboration capabilities, 
but these are not features of CMS, and instead would be more associated with supply chain 
management (e.g. as in Malhotra et al. 2005; Rai et al. 2006). Cost reduction and supply chain 
management are brought together in “inter-organizational cost management” (Cooper and 
Slagmulder 2004; Fayard 2012). In other words, the programs identified by Kyte remain 
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important but have been taken up by other, more successful “organizing visions”, under other 
names (cf. Pollock and Williams 2010, 2011). 
 
I would argue, however, that the CMS project and the efforts of the vendors, the analysts, and 
the IACCM have resulted in higher awareness among contracting professionals of the 
possibilities for ICT in relation to contracting. In particular, the biography of CMS provokes 
important and still unanswered questions about how organizations in the networked economy 
can understand and manage their contracts, i.e. the problem of synthesizing organizational 
contracting knowledge. In the next chapter I discuss this and other implications of this study.  
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Chapter 8 Implications of this study 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the implications of this study for packaged software (section 8.1), for 
process commoditization (section 8.2), for ICT, contract and knowledge in the networked 
economy (section 8.3), for practice (section 8.4) and for the theory of performativity (section 
8.5). Beginning with the implications for packaged software, I question the business model for 
packaged software, suggesting that packaged software is not best understood as an information 
good (section 8.1.1), and that the logic of commoditization in packaged software production 
gives rise to more fundamental conflicts of interest between vendors and customers and between 
analysts and customers than may be taken account of in the buy-versus-build procurement 
model (section 8.1.2). 
 
With respect to process commoditization (section 8.2), this study illustrates on the one hand the 
critical importance of classification in product qualification, but suggests on the other that 
classification of process commodities is always and essentially, not contingently, provisional 
and contested. This study also suggests that process commoditization involves a different type 
of product qualification, where overflowing, dependencies and provisionality must be 
accommodated, and thus may revolve around contract and information exchange rather than 
product definition.  
 
In section 8.3, I draw out several implications of this study for ICT, contract and knowledge. In 
section 8.3.1, I hypothesize that trends in ICT-enabled contracting involve further fragmentation 
of contracting and dis-location of the contract vis-à-vis the organization. In section 8.3.2, I 
discuss how not only these trends but the logic of commoditization, the phenomenon of process 
commoditization and the interdependency, consequentiality and a strong Austinian 
performativity of contract in the networked economy suggest that the problem of organizational 
contracting knowledge is more acute than has been suggested by the IS or accounting literature 
to date. From the arguments laid out in these sections, I conclude that contract is located 
between organizations, involves information exchange, is not inert and can have network effects 
beyond the contract parties. Based on this conclusion, in section 8.3.3, I offer an alternative or 
complementary theory of contract – as a technology of connectedness, with possible strong 
Austinian performativity, in a relationship of potential convergence, complementarity and 
substitution with ICT.  
 
In section 8.4, I draw together the implications of this study as they relate to practice – 
specifically, for packaged software design, procurement and investment. This study joins others 
in challenging the dominance of organizing visions and categories in shaping the IT 
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marketplace but goes on to ground a more fundamental critique of the buy-versus-build 
analytical framework for procurement. 
In section 8.5, I discuss the implications of this study for the theory of performativity, as an 
empirical study that applies and explores the notion of breakdown and that identifies multiple 
instances of performativity, supporting in principle an analytic decomposition of 
“performativity” as suggested by MacKenzie (2004, 2006a), but raising some questions about 
his proposed schemas. In particular I argue that Austin’s (1962) original insight into the strong 
performative effect of expressions that on execution have rule-based mechanistic or 
deterministic material outcomes is relevant to the theorization of contract as a technology of 
connectedness and to other phenomena characteristic of the networked economy. 
8.1 Implications of this study for packaged software 
A starting point for the understanding of packaged software is through the lens of software 
engineering, as packaged software is compared to custom software (Sawyer 2000). From that 
perspective, the business model for packaged software production is based on the logic of scale 
(Brooks 1987; Light and Sawyer 2007), with software theorized as a “make one, sell many” 
high margin information good (see Gallaugher and Wang 2002; Pollock and Williams 2009a, p. 
20; Teece 1998; Xu and Brinkkemper 2007). For user organizations, because of the assumed 
scale economies, buying software should be cheaper than building it in-house. However, the 
logic of scale sets up the problem of standardization for packaged software, and thus a tension 
between vendors and customers (Chiasson and Green 2007), often complicating procurement 
(Chiasson and Green 2007; Howcroft and Light 2010) and implementation (e.g. Lucas et al. 
1988; Strong and Volkoff 2010). Pollock and Williams’s (2009a) important study of ERP, 
applying a biography of software approach, identified generification as an important process in 
the successful making of a software product and market, solving the problem of standardization, 
reconciling the interests of vendors and customers, and, as related to the business model for 
packaged software, resulting in the production of a high margin information good. This study 
impacts this understanding of packaged software in several respects. First, it questions the 
business model for packaged software. Second, by tracing the logic of commoditization in 
packaged software production, it informs a market perspective on packaged software that, 
among other things, challenges the buy-versus-build analytical framework for procurement. 
 
8.1.1 Questioning the business model for packaged software  
 
As discussed in section 7.2.1, this study shows that packaged software is not an information 
good in the sense that a piece of recorded music is an information good – standardized, stable 
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and decontextualized. Howcroft and Light (2010) have argued that packaged software is 
unlikely to be standardized and stable. Pollock and Williams (2009b) have observed that 
packaged softare is not severable from its vendor, and this study shows that packaged software 
is not always easily disentangled from its history, its past users, its current users and the 
vendor’s owners. That is, decontextualization may not be possible.  
 
Decontextualization can also be taken too far. The biography of CMS, read together with Vitari 
and Ravarini (2008) and Chiasson and Green (2007), shows how decontextualization that 
marginalizes users and excludes practice can have two counterproductive effects. First, it can 
invite competition, including from low-value, generic, “commodity” products. Second, it can 
put burdens on the user organization, which has to devote substantial resources toward making 
the software work. Simply put, in some cases, software that is generic and context-free may be 
less valuable for any particular user and face more competition. On the other hand, packaged 
software that is generic and context-free but sets the standard for interoperability or other 
dependencies (networks and platforms) may indeed benefit from network effects and increasing 
returns – if it has not been given away free, as in the case of email programs (Haigh 2008). 
 
If packaged software is not an information good, it may be useful instead to understand what it 
actually does – that is, to take a performative perspective. As one example, I-Many, offering 
software to aid compliance with Medicare and Medicaid regulations, is a kind of bolt-on to the 
US regulated healthcare industry comprising highly specialized knowledge directly supported 
by software, and it might be more meaningful to consider I-Many as a specialized IT systems 
sub-contractor to big pharmaceutical companies rather than as a vendor of packaged software. 
From its early strategy of generification, I-Many made a pivot toward data-rich, domain-specific 
recontextualization to find scale and profitability. As another example, Ariba recontextualizes 
large company procurement, relocating this organizational activity to its supplier network. In 
the case of CMS generally, I have proposed that it is best understood as a process commodity, 
with implications I discuss in section 8.2. 
 
To summarize, this study questions the business model for packaged software understood as an 
information good – standardized, stable and decontextualized. In particular, it suggests that 
decontextualization may not be possible, and further that it may not be desirable. Generification 
is one path to scale and profitability; recontextualization may be another. 
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8.1.2 A market perspective on packaged software: the logic of commoditization in packaged 
software production 
In section 2.4, I suggested that research to date had not pursued the meaning of Sawyer’s (2000) 
observation that profitability and market share are measures of success for packaged software 
(see also Chiasson and Green 2007; Ó Raian 2010). In section 7.3, I have theorized this as a 
“substitution of performance”, where not only financialized meta-commodities in the form of 
equity interests in vendor firms (as Sawyer observed), but also marketized criteria in the form of 
analyst ratings and rankings, take precedence over the packaged software itself. Because of the 
substitution of performance, packaged software production reflects the logic of 
commoditization, not software engineering.  
By implication, the production of packaged software cannot be understood (solely) through the 
lens of, or by analogy to, software engineering. Product extension, market consolidation and 
firm growth oriented toward the production of revenues, profits and market share, as illustrated 
in the case of CMS, bear little correspondence to the “waterfall” model of software development 
against user requirements, even an attenuated “waterfall” model translated to RFX-based 
procurement practices and negotiated through knowledge intermediaries. Packaged software 
that is a product of this logic may not be “designed” against a set of user requirements in the 
sense generally understood in the systems development literature (such as Boehm 1988). 
Perhaps it was “designed from nowhere”: 
Within prevailing discourses anonymous and unlocatable designers with a license 
afforded by their professional training problematise the world in such a way as to make 
themselves indispensable to it and discuss their obligation to intervene, in order to 
deliver technological solutions to equally decontextualized and consequently 
unlocatable users. This stance of design from nowhere is closely tied to the goal of 
construing technical systems as commodities that can be stabilized and cut loose from 
the sites of their production long enough to be exploited en masse to the sites of their 
use. … this ethos of commodity production and marketing stands as an ideal for many 
manufacturers of computer systems … . (Suchman 2002, p. 95) (emphasis added) 
 
But one could make the case that CMS and perhaps other packaged software may be “designed 
from nowhere” in a different sense – in the sense that it is not “designed” at all. Instead, 
following the logic of commoditization, software companies strive through various means, 
including software acquisition and development, corporate deal-making, IP litigation and the 
deployment of large marketing budgets, to generate revenues, profits and market share. The 
expectations of revenues, profits and market share trade as financialized meta-commodities in 
the form of equity interests in vendor firms. Those expectations are built through a kind of trade  
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in marketized criteria in the form of analyst ratings and ranking around the organizing vision 
and its market correlate the category. 
 
In the case of CMS, the category was a site of material enactment, a coordinating mechanism 
(Law 2002) for disparate objects (the various CMS products and vendors) but also for 
investment, both financial and cognitive, across the knowledge network. The category provided 
the cognitive framework, whereby “‘imaginary’ niches may become self-fulfilling prophecies” 
(Suchman et al. 2001, p. 351). This involved “construct[ing] a mental map of underexploited 
opportunities, generat[ing] a coherent model for organizing around those opportunities, and 
communicat[ing] a legitimating account of the endeavor to potential stakeholders. Together, 
maps, models and accounts make up a cognitive framework …” (Suchman et al. 2001, p. 351), 
with entrepreneurship “a product of underinstitutionalized cognitive models, not of under-
exploited economic niches”. But in the case of CMS, the engagement with “contract 
management” appears to some extent “opportunistic and ephemeral” (Pollock and Williams 
2009a, p. 125). Appan and Browne (2012) have identified a general “misinformation effect” in 
the requirements elicitation process (not in the context of packaged software procurement), 
where users tend to recall misinformation provided by analysts rather than their own beliefs and 
knowledge. This study suggests that an organizing vision can have a similar powerful 
“misinformation effect” not just on customers but on analysts (as suggested in Wilson’s 2008 
blog questioning the contract lifecycle), vendors and investors, distorting packaged software 
procurement but perhaps also software design, strategy and investment.  
 
To summarize, I suggest that, from a market perspective, packaged software is more radically 
different from custom software than is generally appreciated. While the problem of 
standardization for packaged software has been cast as a conflict between vendors and 
customers (Chiasson and Green 2007), the financialized “substitution of performance”, where 
market share and profitability, as well as commoditized criteria, serve as proxies for user 
satisfaction, puts a more fundamental conflict of interest at the heart of the vendor-customer 
relationship. In addition, the interest of analysts is in maintaining the value of their proprietary 
models, such as categories, and revenue streams from vendors. Neither the vendors nor the 
analysts have a deep knowledge of user organization needs. I note here that in the course of 
interrogating the economy of scale assumption in IT outsourcing, Lacity and Willcocks (1995) 
identified costs that fall uniquely on outside vendors: the costs of acquiring business expertise, 
marketing expenses, and shareholder returns. That these considerations need to be accounted for 
alongside the presumed economies of scale in production seems an obvious point and yet is 
often overlooked in the buy-versus-build analytical framework that underpins software 
procurement.  
216 
 
8.2 Implications for process commoditization 
In sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4, I discussed the arguments suggesting that process commoditization – 
the conversion of organizational processes into products, following a program of functional 
simplification and closure, or decontextualization (see Davenport 2005; Zysman 2006) – would 
be an increasingly important aspect of the networked economy, corresponding to the de-
composition or de-verticalization of the organization described by Kallinikos (2006). In section 
7.2.2, I suggested that packaged application software like CMS is a form of process 
commoditization. In this section I draw out the implications of the case of CMS for process 
commoditization generally. 
The case of CMS illustrates the critical importance of classification in product qualification for 
process commodities. Drawing lessons from the failure of classification in the case of CMS, we 
would conclude that the boundaries of the product category must be clear; that the boundaries of 
the process being commoditized should also be clear; that the process commodity should 
correspond to an actual process – one that already exists, or one that can be adopted in vivo; and 
that the process commodity should be pitched to a level of abstraction (or generality) to produce 
tangible economic benefit to customers at a scale that produces profit for the seller. Put another 
way, process commoditization, ideally, is based on a “valid” instance of functional 
simplification and closure (Kallinikos 2006, from Luhmann 1993; cf. Hanseth and Lyytinen 
2009), the codification and relocation of process described by Zysman (2006) and 
standardization (Davenport 2005). In this model, process commoditization is based on radical 
decontextualization, but the case of CMS gives warning of possible weakness in the program. 
 
First, the overflowing of CMS’s process model described in section 7.2.2 suggests that the 
radical decontextualization underlying process commoditization is liable to overflowing. To 
take an example from another context, one interviewee, a contracts lawyer at a global 
outsourcing company, observed: 
 
In the service area compliance is much more subjective. If you contract for No. 2 
yellow pencils, and they send No. 3 red pencils and half are broken, it is easy to say 
there’s non-compliance. But if you say: Are you responding to a call within fourteen 
seconds 90% of the time within business hours? This raises questions: how to track it, 
how to calculate it. How do you treat a call that comes in four seconds before close of 
business? What if there is an ice storm? What if Microsoft puts out a patch and you are 
loaded with call volumes while people are scrambling to figure out what happened and 
how to calm everybody down? What about the fact that the internal help desk took 
thirty seconds to answer a call? … So as operations move outside the organization, 
contracts come much more into play. Contracts are creating standards of operational 
performance at a very granular level. … And company culture. The contract is your way 
to express that culture to strangers. This is how we do business, this is what our 
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customers expect, this is what you have to do to make it invisible to our customers that 
they are not dealing with us. 
 
 
As noted in section 7.2.2, the overflowing of codified processes is a phenomenon long remarked 
and well understood in IS research. Of more interest is the fact that what is conceptualized as 
decontextualization is materialized as recontextualization. That is, codifying and relocating 
process in the course of process commoditization may reveal previously unnoticed or latent 
dependencies and create new dependencies. In the case of CMS, by codifying “contract 
management” and relocating it to a packaged software environment, user organizations became 
entangled in a network of co-dependent relations incorporating technological artefacts, markets 
and market participants, including previous and current customers. Most significant was the 
interdependency between the vendors, who owned the software code and who retained both the 
right and the obligation to maintain it, and the users, who had to invest significant resources to 
make CMS work.  
 
At this point, for further illustration of the overflowing and dependencies that may characterize 
process commoditization, I return to Lepinay’s (2007a) detailed look at what it takes to turn a 
process or a service into a product from the seller’s point of view. In the case analysed by 
Lepinay, a bank designed a new class of products called correlation products, which, in 
Lepinay’s account, transformed a service – hedging for a client through portfolio balancing on 
an ongoing basis – into a contract issued by the bank. We might characterize this as contract-as-
product. Lepinay describes the operational assumptions that underpinned the bank’s presumed 
ability to perform its obligations and profit under the contract, and shows how these 
assumptions proved to be false, as regards both trade execution in the relevant financial markets 
spread across the world’s time zones and the bank’s back office capabilities.  
 
Interestingly for this study of CMS, a principal issue in managing the product was what could 
be characterized as poor contract management: “Preserving the product essentially meant 
preserving the latest and most accurate version of the contract, the one that was shared by the 
bank and its client” (Lepinay 2007a, p. 272). Contract changes were agreed in confirmations 
exchanged between the bank and the customer, sometimes through several rounds of 
negotiation. “But this waltz involving the bank and the client, actually displayed a 
fragmentation within the bank”, namely between the traders and the back office staff. These 
positions turned over frequently, so there was little personal continuity, and processing times 
were significantly different as between the two operations. These issues were presumptively 
resolved through the maintenance of matching folders, one in each of the two departments and a 
218 
 
third archival version, which were supposed to reflect all communications concerning the 
contract.  
 
At one point a contract folder was lost by traders, and as it transpired the lost traders’ version of 
the folder was the only correct version; the others had not been kept up to date. Further, the 
mismatch between the trading desk and the back office was reflected in inconsistent data entries 
in their respective databases. Only by taking the embarrassing step of asking the client for 
copies of the relevant communications could the bank figure out its obligations under the 
contract. To prevent recurrence of this situation, the bank created software that monitored the 
two databases for discrepancies and, more importantly, created a digital archive of all contract 
communications. This solved the problem as between the traders and the back office but did not 
work well for the traders because the software revealed their strategies among themselves, an 
extremely problematic feature for the competitive trading desk community. “[F]inance was 
proving that it had a body, fragile and made of a very tenuous fabric” (Lepinay 2007a, p. 275). 
 
In the next stage of Lepinay’s story, the product evolves from a custom, hand-crafted, product 
to one that is fully supported by “industrial processing”, using a computerized system to manage 
pricing and product information. No such system was available off the shelf, and the bank was 
reluctant to work with an outside vendor to build one, since this would give the vendor access to 
valuable proprietary intellectual property, and, by way of the vendor selling to another bank, 
help competitors and drive the product toward “commoditization” (meaning it would become 
generic and widely available). “This solution would have been available to another bank and the 
investment would be worthless.” (Lepinay 2007a, p. 275) The bank therefore opted to build an 
in-house proprietary system, which was positioned as a strategic competitive advantage for 
selling the product to clients. Lepinay says that the system, which was fully integrated and 
highly specific, was also strategic within the bank, helping to insure that this trading activity 
could not be easily sold off or otherwise jettisoned as a standalone business.  
 
[T]he products and the system had been designed in such a way as to not be easily 
detachable from one another. It came as a bundle but, with the incorporation of back 
office facilities, it ended up being much more than a package. Actually, management 
struggled against moves toward a packaged commodification of its activities, doing its 
utmost to attach it through as many channels to make its substitutability unlikely. 
(Lepinay 2007a, p. 277) 
 
 
Lepinay notes that the bank was offering this particular product when other banks could not, 
and that the product was difficult to value as it was not comparable to other assets and liabilities 
of the bank. This meant the product was rather opaque to bank shareholders, and vis-à-vis 
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regulators required a customized and specially approved risk valuation strategy. But this was 
counter to the general structure of accountability for the bank, which was based on the assembly 
of modular but standardizable, commensurable business units. Lepinay suggests that the product 
and its associated program confounded the liquidity and calculability assumptions underpinning 
the bank’s overall coherence and accountability vis-à-vis investors. 
 
Lepinay (2007a) illustrates the problems encountered in converting a service or process 
(ongoing management of a diversified portfolio) into a product (in this case, a contract-as-
product). As it emerged, the process being commoditized depended on markets and institutional 
functions and processes that resisted enclosure within the process model, and the process 
commodity created new dependencies on market capabilities and on record-keeping, 
computerized systems and other “internal coordination forms” (cf. Håkansson and Lind 2004) 
that did not exist before. “This product was drawing on a world of finance that had not yet been 
realized” (Lepinay 2007a, p. 270). 
 
The overflowing and dependencies in process commoditization were remarked by Lacity and 
Willcocks (1995) when they noted that the “ubiquitous nature of information technology 
penetration” presented a challenge to IT outsourcing. 
 
When participants tried to isolate information technology activities for outsourcing, 
they often discovered that changes to the outsourced function affect other areas of the 
business. The vendors typically lacked the specialized knowledge to cope with 
organizational interfaces outside the boundaries of the information technology 
outsourcing contract. (Lacity and Willcocks 1995, p. 227) 
 
 
I suggest that because process commodities are characterized by overflowing and dependencies, 
their definitions and their boundaries are inherently and always provisional and subject, or 
vulnerable, to overtaking classification schemes, new categories, and the encroaching extension 
of other product categories. Therefore, notwithstanding classification’s central position in 
qualifying process commodities, it is always and essentially, not contingently, provisional and 
contested. “[T]he work of object coordination and object disaggregation goes on – and on. … 
the singularity of an object is precarious, uncertain and revisable.” (Law 2002, p. 36) 
 
A view of process commodities that is not based on functional simplification and closure but 
acknowledges overflowing, dependencies and provisionality causes us to rethink product 
qualification – the processes whereby the product is defined, described, given attributes, and 
stabilized (Lepinay 2007a), and alienated or severed from the site of production (Thomas 1991). 
One way to interpret the implications of this study for process commoditization is that product 
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qualification, if it means the standardization and stabilization of the product and its detachment 
from the site of production, or decontextualization, is more difficult to achieve and maintain for 
process commodities than Zysman (2006) and Davenport (2005) seem to suggest. As an 
alternative, Callon et al. (2002) proposed that “what is important in the service business is the 
relationship or, rather, system of relationships which, on a material and collective basis, 
organize the qualification of products”. In their theorized “economy of qualities”, “the economy 
of goods gives way to an economy of relations” (Callon et al. 2002, pp. 210-211, 213). More in 
accord with Callon et al. (2002) than Davenport (2005), this study suggests that process 
commoditization involves a different type of product qualification altogether, where 
overflowing, dependencies and provisionality are tolerated, and must be accommodated.  
 
This means, among other things, that the pre-commoditization object quality (“thing-ness”) of 
the subject of the buy-versus-build analytical framework for procurement is not so clear, and the 
bright line between buy and build is not so bright (see Cooper and Slagmulder 2004). It also 
means that that process commoditization may revolve around contract and information 
exchange rather than product definition. That is, process commoditization is part of the “move 
to the middle” (Koch and Schultz 2011) discussed in section 3.3.2. According to Håkansson and 
Lind (2004), we would expect process commoditization to require inter-organizational ICT; or, 
according to Boland et al. (2008) process commoditization would generate “temporary 
assemblages” of contract counterparties, each “temporary assemblage” requiring its own 
“management control system”. In section 3.3.3 I raised the question of what this means for 
organizational contracting knowledge, and I return to the subject of organizational contracting 
knowledge in the next section.  
 
8.3 Implications for ICT, contract and knowledge in the networked economy 
 
In Chapter 1, I characterized the relationship of ICT, contract and knowledge in the networked 
economy as evolving, perhaps undertheorized, and, in some circumstances, problematic. In this 
section I discuss some aspects of how ICT and contract are evolving, suggest some problems 
that these and other emergent phenomena create for organizational contracting knowledge, and 
propose a new theorization of ICT and contract as the basis for further research. 
 
8.3.1 The dis-location of contracting knowledge and practice vis-à-vis the organization 
 
In section 3.3.2, I noted a hypothesized “move to the middle”, or increase in “hybrid” 
contracting in networked relations. I suggested that this would seem to entail a proliferation of 
inter-organizational ICT and speculated, in section 3.3.3, that it might exert a centrifugal, dis-
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integrating or fragmenting effect on organizational knowledge, as contracting knowledge and 
practice is located outside or just at the boundary of the organization in a “temporary 
assemblage” or quasi-organization. In other words, there would be a kind of dis-location of 
contracting knowledge and practice vis-à-vis the organization. But the case of CMS, by 
illustrating the domain-specificity of contracting data and knowledge, provides a useful 
reminder that the location of contracting knowledge and practice relative to the organization is a 
more fundamental issue, not limited to “hybrid” contracting. Indeed, as Millo et al. (2005) 
show, even in market transactions, the knowledge aspect of contracting does not disappear; for 
market transactions, contracting knowledge and practice is relocated to market infrastructure, 
such as a clearinghouse. Approaching contract from the perspectives of relational contracting 
and as a social artefact and technology, respectively, Bernstein (1992, 1996) and Suchman 
(2003) both locate contracting in contracting communities. But CMS did not address the ICT 
needs of a contracting community, nor did it work in the inter-organizational space. CMS 
placed the contract lifecycle inside the organization; but the common ground of contracting 
knowledge and practice is located in the relationship between organizations and within the 
contracting community.  
 
There was a separate but related problem for CMS that bears on the location of contracting 
knowledge and practice, and that is the issue of cost. High value data-rich versions of CMS 
tended to be limited to larger firms with thousands or tens of thousands of relatively standard 
contracts to manage. Accordingly, CMS vendors targeted the large firm market. Malone et al. 
(1987) observed that large organizations were developing ICT-based contracting capabilities, 
and Mithas et al. (2008) noted that larger organizations seemed more likely to engage in reverse 
auctions, probably because of the cost. In other words, ICT-enabled contracting is expensive, 
but can be cost-effective over volume. I suggest that cost has significant implications for where 
ICT-enabled contracting will be located. 
 
Taking these two points into consideration, it seems reasonable to expect ICT-enabled 
contracting to gravitate to those locations where an investment in domain-specific contracting 
knowledge and practices can be justified by scale. This might include a procurement portal for a 
very large organization. An example would be the Tennessee Valley Authority’s Supplier 
Connections Portal, “which manages contracts that provide services and materials to TVA and 
oversees warehousing, investment recovery, and logistics operations” 
(www.tva.gov/doing_business.htm, accessed December 5, 2011). Data-intensive verticalization 
strategies, such as that of I-Many, show that ICT-enabled contracting can also be located in 
software effectively shared across organizations in specialized contracting domains, while 
Ariba’s supplier network suggests that ICT-enabled contracting can be cost-effective at domain-
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specific contracting nodes of the networked economy. This follows the same logic as the 
organization of markets generally, toward a concentration of specialized knowledge and the 
sharing of costs of standards, risk management and transaction execution (e.g Langlois 2006; 
Millo et al. 2005). 
 
This trend would weaken the case for enterprise CMS, as firm portals and industry trading 
platforms continually reconfigure the corresponding contract data and process requirements 
inside counterparty organizations. The resulting contracting data and processes would be 
unlikely to converge to or produce a unified, holistic view of contracts inside the organization. 
Further, while a firm of diamond merchants might share diamond trading practices with other 
diamond merchants (Bernstein 1992), there is no particular reason to think the firm would 
benefit from analysing diamond trading activities and purchases of office equipment together by 
reference to a unified CMS database. Likewise it is hard to imagine that an airline has any 
reason to integrate its online booking system (which it might not own but instead license or 
participate in) with its employee payroll and benefits system (which it might outsource). 
 
The example of an airline and its online booking system points to a second important 
development affecting the location of contracting knowledge and practice relative to the 
organization, the proliferation of “distributed contracting”. By distributed contracting I refer to 
instances where the terms of contract are constituted and made of record across multiple ICT 
and other tangible or intangible modalities, as in e-commerce. For example, in the online travel 
sector, “the contract” between a traveller and the travel services providers is effectively 
distributed between background laws and regulations, database records, electronic 
communications and personal interactions. Distributed contracting challenges the traditional 
notion of contract as embodied in a single contract document. Google’s attempt to construct an 
effective agreement with authors for its Google Books program (Helft 2011; Rushe 2011) is 
another example of distributed contracting. As a further example, there is increasing visibility 
across logistics, as hand-offs to delivery services are communicated through to purchasers of 
goods (through package tracking websites) to a degree that would have been considered 
astonishing not too many years ago. The collaborative working relationship between seller and 
logistics provider is opened up by information technology, not only as between them but for the 
benefit of the purchaser. From an information systems perspective, this is based on giving 
outsiders access to organizational databases, as anticipated by Malone et al. (1987).  
 
To summarize, we can identify several trends in the co-evolution of ICT and contract that point 
to further fragmentation and dis-location of contracting knowledge and practice vis-à-vis the 
organization. First, perhaps somewhat consistent with TCE and EMH, I suggest that ICT-
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enabled contracting will be located where scale supports the cost of system build-out and 
maintenance (minimizing per-transaction contracting costs). Second, I have pointed out the 
proliferation of distributed contracting, which may make locating “the contract” potentially 
more challenging. The first development promotes further internal fragmentation of contracting, 
and both of these developments involve a dis-location of the contract vis-à-vis the organization. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that, at least in some cases, this dis-location of contract may 
make it harder to know when contracts have been entered into, where they might be located, and 
what their terms are.
48
 Briefly stated, contract is located between organizations, not inside them, 
and involves information exchange between counterparties. This may not automatically 
generate but instead confound the creation of synthesizing organizational contracting 
knowledge, a point I consider when I return to the problem of organizational contracting 
knowledge more generally in the next section. 
 
8.3.2 Respecifying the problem of organizational contracting knowledge 
 
To review, as discussed in section 3.3, research indicates that knowledge is an essential aspect 
of contracting (e.g. Frances and Garnsey 1996; Malhotra et al. 2005; Dibbern et al. 2008; Gefen 
et al. 2008) and that hierarchical or hybrid contracting (in TCE terms) requires integrative inter-
organizational ICT to support knowledge sharing between contract counterparties (e.g. Boland 
et al. 2008; Caglio and Ditillo 2008; Håkansson and Lind 2004). However, while organizational 
contracting knowledge is obliquely and partially addressed under numerous organizational 
knowledge initiatives (business intelligence, risk management, customer relationship 
management and so forth), research points to the inadequacy of financial accounting systems, 
and to the lack of any other “internal coordination form” (cf. Håkansson and Lind 2004) for 
contracting, and thus to a significant gap in organizational contracting knowledge. CMS was 
positioned to address this gap, but largely failed to do so, for all the reasons discussed in section 
7.2.3. In brief, the case of CMS shows that organizational contracting knowledge is a problem 
not susceptible to simple ICT approaches based on process automation and structured data. It 
further suggests, by implication as I have elaborated in the preceding section, that the creation 
of synthesizing organizational contracting knowledge is more challenging than generally 
appreciated because of the dis-location of contracting practices and knowledge vis-à-vis the 
organization.  
 
                                                          
48
 Note that in this comment I am remarking on the knowledge of organizations as counterparties; the 
owners of portals and e-commerce or industry platforms will become catchments for specialized market 
and contracting knowledge – informational entrepots, which is one of the reasons that a market 
participant may find it advantageous to build a trading platform. 
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Moreover, this study also points out the importance of markets in financialized meta-
commodities and commoditized criteria as hypothesized by Appadurai (1986a), and illustrates 
their potentially distorting effects on knowledge across the knowledge network. At a minimum, 
the knowledge network as an aspect of extended remote production should be taken into account 
in problematizing contracting knowledge. The commoditization perspective characterizes 
knowledge in extended or remote production as likely to be “partial, contradictory, and 
differentiated” (Appadurai 1986a), and I have theorized a “substitution of performance” that 
may privilege financialized meta-commodities and marketized criteria, or “signs” as 
commodities, relative to what they purport to represent. To the extent that ICT enables the 
proliferation of these “signs” as commodities, its effect may be quite contrary to an expectation 
that ICT will directly promote information sharing and thus knowledge (see Teece 1998). 
 
In addition, I note the implications of process commoditization for organizational contracting 
knowledge. In the networked economy, as understood through the lens of TCE and EMH, 
contracting will increase, as products, work and risk are re-located around the network to 
achieve maximum overall efficiency (as discussed in section 3.1.1), including through process 
commoditization and resulting in the “distributed organization” discussed in section 3.1.3. In 
section 8.2, I described process commoditization as characterized by overflowing, dependencies 
and provisionality, but here I shift to a focus on the consequences for organizational contracting 
knowledge. I return again to Lepinay’s (2007a) financial contract-as-product. Contract-as-
product is a perspective on contract not discussed in Chapter 3, but process commodities are 
generally memorialized in contracts. The problem of organizational contracting knowledge for 
process commodities is illustrated several times in Lepinay’s account – and his account covers 
only the bank’s side. The bank could not keep track of the contract; it could not reconcile its 
databases to the contract; it could not reconcile its databases to each other; it was difficult to 
value the contracts; and it was difficult to reconcile reporting of the contracting unit’s business 
to the style of reporting the bank normally required of its business units.  
 
Returning now to AIG’s credit default swaps discussed in section 3.3.3, we see the same type of 
internal opacity, but in addition the effect of reference to market information as a substitute for 
understanding of the underlying assets – another substitution of performance. The CDS book at 
AIG was managed by reference to market valuations, with reliance on market price discovery 
substituting for actual credit underwriting. Critically, contractual arrangements created extended 
interdependencies, producing and transmitting adverse events through latent contract 
mechanisms: In particular, AIG does not seem to have modeled the contractual effects of its 
own credit downgrades or of collateralization requirements, i.e. liquidity dynamics. That is, 
though AIG struggled to value the contracts by market standards, the more important thing was 
225 
 
how the contracts would work in certain circumstances, i.e. what they would do. In Austin’s 
original sense, they were performative speech acts. Furthermore, their performativity was 
transmissive – it had “hydraulic” ripple effects that extended beyond the immediate 
counterparties. Contractually created interdependence in the network can generate a cascade of 
amplification effects, which in the case of AIG posed a threat to many other financial 
institutions.  
 
Ciborra (2007) cautioned of risks that would be “new and surprising”: A folding or collapse of 
the network can create sudden, unanticipated proximity in terms of risk and consequences, as 
the distributed organization discovers extended vulnerability, such as supply chain risk. 
Significantly, these effects are not described per se in contract documents but are effects of how 
the contracts work (do things) and are thus performative, not only in Austin’s (1962) original 
sense but in their in their potential effectiveness beyond the immediate counterparty: what I will 
call a “strong Austinian” performativity. This strong Austinian performativity might include the 
ability to transmit, transform, absorb, or amplify effects across the network, or a role in 
constituting network phenomena such as risk concentration (as in the case of AIG), or business 
networks (as described by Teubner and Collins 2011).  
 
The interdependency and consequentiality of contract is not a phenomenon limited to the 
financial industry. As argued by Teubner and Collins (2011), there are a number of common 
contracting situations where contractual interdependency and consequentiality in the network 
often overflow a legal framework designed to enforce and interpret a standalone agreement 
between two parties. Their examples are just-in-time supply chains and franchising, but 
subcontracting and outsourcing are others. This non-obvious or opaque web of interdependency 
and consequentiality may result in loss of traceability and accountability. Collins characterizes 
contractually constituted business networks as potentially having it both ways: 
 
Unless the law responds appropriately to these particular qualities of networks, this type 
of business co-ordination creates the risk of “organized irresponsibility”. In other 
words, the network achieves the level of organization that it requires for efficient co-
ordination of productive relations, but simultaneously minimises the risk of external 
liability for the network as a whole. (Teubner and Collins 2011, p. 68) 
 
As an example, Collins considers the proliferation of multi-layered temporary employment 
arrangements as a use of the network to subvert employment and social regulation. He thus 
suggests that one possible consequence of using contractually produced business structures in 
the networked economy is loss of accountability. “This discussion of the external liability of 
networks examines their darker side” (Teubner and Collins 2011, p. 71). 
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That is, a localized and bilateral analysis of contract, even one that acknowledges its “hybrid”, 
implicit, or relational characteristics, does not really do justice to what contract is “doing” in the 
network. In this regard I refer to Callon’s (1998b) citation of Granovetter (1985). 
 
For Granovetter the only possible solution is that provided by the network; not a 
network connecting entities which are already there, but a network which configures 
ontologies. The agents, their dimensions, and what they are and do, all depend on the 
morphology of the relations in which they are involved. (Callon 1998b, p. 8) 
 
That is, there are network phenomena that are not apparent when seen through the lens of the 
“firm” and “bilateral private ordering”. This constricted understanding of the networked 
economy collapses when it encounters the “constitutive outside” created by contract – a supply 
chain, a franchise arrangement, multiple layers of subcontracting, “cocreation of IT value”, or 
an invisible vortex of risk like AIG. Just as Enron could not be fully understood in isolation 
from its affiliated off-balance-sheet counterparties, nor AIG’s counterparties fully understood in 
isolation from AIG, a network of connected contracts cannot be fully grasped through the lens 
of the “firm” and “bilateral private ordering”. Contract is not inert, and it has network effects 
beyond the counterparties. 
A view of contract that takes account of the location of contracting knowledge and practice, the 
proliferation of financialized meta-commodities and marketized criteria, the phenomenon of 
process commoditization, and the strong Austinian performativity of contract giving rise to 
network phenomena significantly complicates the problem of organizational contracting 
knowledge (see Table 8.1), beyond what research to date would suggest. The problem of 
organizational contracting knowledge, raised but not resolved by CMS, remains substantially 
unsolved, with implications that are not well understood. In the next section I propose a new 
theorization of ICT and contract as a basis for taking this forward as a subject for further 
research. 
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Respecifying the problem of organizational contracting knowledge 
Need for inter-firm IS to coordinate hybrid and hierarchical contracts (see Caglio and Ditillo 2008) (from 
Chapter 3) 
Fragmentation of organizational contracting knowledge initiatives (business intelligence, risk 
management, customer relationship management, etc.) (from Chapter 3) 
Inability to account for hybrid and hierarchical contracts (see Håkansson and Lind 2004) (from Chapter 3) 
Internal process fragmentation, functional or operational fragmentation across the contract lifecycle, 
fragmentation of contracting by type of contract or business unit 
Contract not generally algorithmic, not reducible to structured data 
Increased fragmentation of contracting due to inter-firm governance requirements for hybrid and 
hierarchical contract, relocation of contracting to large company portals and trading platforms 
The proliferation of distributed contracting 
Markets in financialized meta-commodities and commoditized criteria; fragmented knowledge (“partial, 
contradictory and differentiated”) in extended or remote production (Appadurai 1986a); substitution of 
performance 
Provisionality, overflowing and dependencies in process commoditization 
Subsitution of market price information for knowledge of the underlying (another substitution of 
performance) 
Performativity of contract, including strong Austinian performativity 
Interdependency and consequentiality of contract (including latent and non-obvious dependencies and 
consequentiality) giving rise to risk 
Networks of connected contracts that overflow bilateral analysis  
 
Table 8.1 Respecifying the problem of organizational contracting knowledge 
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8.3.3 Theorizing ICT and contract: contract as a technology of connectedness 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, empirical research on ICT, contract and knowledge is often framed 
in relation to transaction cost economics. But TCE has been qualified and criticized over the 
years (section 3.1.5). Research suggests it provides at best a partial explanation of the 
relationship of ICT and contract in the networked economy, and does not assign knowledge a 
major role (section 3.3.1).
49
 In section 3.2, I briefly surveyed several alternative theories of 
contract, in particular noting Mark Suchman’s (2003) idea of contract as a social and 
technological artefact and Collins and Teubner’s (2011) of networks as connected contracts. 
However, these theories do not address the evolving relationship between ICT and contract, and 
organizational contracting knowledge is not a particular focus. In section 8.3.2, I discussed 
contract as a performative speech act, but without making a specific link to ICT. All of these 
diverse perspectives are surely relevant to understanding ICT, contract and knowledge, but the 
co-evolution of ICT and contract I have described seems to overflow TCE and the other theories 
of contract reviewed thus far. From the preceding sections I conclude that contract is located 
between organizations, involves information exchange, is not inert and can have network effects 
beyond the contract parties. Based on this conclusion, I propose as a basis for further research a 
deliberately underspecified and open theorization of contract as a technology of connectedness, 
with possible strong Austinian performativity, in a relationship of potential convergence, 
complementarity and substitution with ICT.  
                                                          
49
 This study suggests several issues for TCE in addition to those already noted in section 3.1.5. First, I 
point out that studies of markets from economic sociology by implication directly challenge TCE’s 
continuing reliance on price as the first-order and presumptively exogenous mechanism of market 
organization. If markets are created in the way described by the economic sociologists, price can be seen 
as a highly contingent product of other more essential dynamics. In other words, price is an outcome, not 
an organizing principle – particularly when price is affected by financialized meta-commodities or 
marketized criteria. Second, this study suggests that the buy-versus-build analytical framework does not 
take account of the inherent conflict of interest created by the logic of commoditization: From the sell-
side, financialized meta-commodities and marketized criteria will tend to be privileged relative to the 
underlying, in a “substitution of performance”. Third, this study suggests that for process commodities, 
characterized by overflowing, dependencies and provisionality, buy-versus-build is a false dichotomy. 
Fourth, this study further caveats the buy-versus-build schema because it calls into question the pre-
commoditization object-quality (thing-ness) of the subject of the buy-versus-build analysis, particularly 
for process commodities. Fifth, as a corollary, this study calls TCE into question as an explanation of firm 
formation: Firm formation in the biography of CMS has nothing to do with the focus vendors as buyers 
but is all about a supply-side effort to create and aggregate demand based on a concentration of 
specialized capabilities – an attempt to generate complementarity, as in Levina and Ross (2003) or in 
accord with Richardson (1972). Sixth, the costs of “market” transactions may be understated if the costs 
of market creation and maintenance (e.g. the costs of a clearinghouse function or of technology platforms, 
including the costing of the concentrated risk associated with the clearinghouse or platform) are defined 
as out of scope by focus on the transaction as unit of analysis. In fact, it is not clear how the costs of ICT, 
which can be substantial, even prohibitive, are accounted for in the electronic markets hypothesis. Lastly, 
costs arising from the problem of organizational contracting knowledge, as respecified here, are likely 
understated; they are almost certainly unquantifiable prior to realization, when things go wrong. These 
factors argue for reduced expectations in working with TCE – as urged, in different ways, by Richardson 
(1972) and Granovetter (1985) – and in particular caveat the buy-versus-build analytical framework. 
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In putting forward this idea, I first note a possible parallel with the substitution effect between 
money and information (e.g. Power and Laughlin 1996: “Like Parson, Habermas follows the 
cybernetic insight that money encodes information and releases agents from the burden of 
communication.”). Indeed the conversion of money to digitized records (Knights et al. 2007) 
has been so complete – underpinning the banking sector but also materialized in other 
phenomena such as e-commerce, mobile phone payments and online gaming virtual currencies 
– that it seems hardly noteworthy and yet is perhaps highly consequential in ways we have yet 
to realize, or experience.  
 
Next, I note that a relationship of potential convergence, complementarity and substitution 
between contract and IT is already signalled or occurring in a number of ways. It is obliquely 
indicated in the literature on inter-firm governance (see section 3.3.2) as well as in the literature 
on supply chains and other ICT-supported contracting (see section 3.3.1). The interpenetration 
of contract and ICT is already an accomplished fact in the financial sector and in e-commerce. It 
seems inherent in Grover and Kohli’s (2012) notion of cocreation of IT value as the collective 
leveraging of IT investment. Distributed contracting in any form is a further example. In sum, I 
would argue that there is evidence of significant and growing convergence, complementarity 
and substitution, or more simply interpenetration, of contract in relation to ICT on a largely 
domain-specific basis. 
 
What would be the implications of adopting this notion as a theoretical lens for future research? 
First, by tracing the evolving interpenetration of contract and ICT across regions or industries, 
we might better understand the implications for affected organizations. For the reasons outlined 
in the preceding section, I hypothesize that this trend does not eliminate but instead potentially 
exacerbates the problem of organizational contracting knowledge, but we do not know whether 
this is true or more generally how organizational information systems design is being impacted.  
 
We might also better understand to what extent the problem of organizational contracting 
knowledge constitutes a real (though ever-shifting) limit on “contractibility” (using the term in a 
broad and literal sense to refer to what can and should be made the subject of contract). I 
hypothesize that the networked economy will not evolve according to an uncomplicated, direct 
correlation between ICT and the dissolution of the firm in favour of markets, as predicted by 
EMH and its proponents. Instead it may produce and sustain both new economic configurations 
and, because of the problem of organizational contracting knowledge and the background legal 
framework still constructed around firms and bilateral contracts, counter-tendencies and new 
motivations toward traditional or tightly bound effective vertical integration.  
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Lastly, we might better understand the nature and location of effective agency in the networked 
economy. As suggested by Granovetter (1985, 1995), our understanding of the economy tends 
to be through the lens of concepts that both assume and produce an “atomistic” ontology of 
“firms” linked through bilateral contracts. In this ontology the firm plays a central role as the 
location of profit and accountability. But this is only one way of understanding the coordination 
of economic activity. The “move to the middle” implies a possible overflowing not only of 
TCE’s unidimensional governance dimension of market-versus-hierarchy but of the “firm” as 
the (sole) central construct. Phenomena such as “business networks” (see Castells 2010, p. 178; 
Granovetter 1995; Teubner and Collins 2011) and the “cocreation of IT value” (Ceccagnoli 
2012; Grover and Kohli 2012) point toward the need for alternative conceptualizations, 
including perhaps, as suggested by Teubner and Collins, of accountability. An investigation of 
the conjoint performativity of ICT and contract holds some promise, I believe, as a way to 
approach these issues. 
 
8.4 Implications for practice  
 
In this section I draw together several implications of this study for practice. The case of CMS 
suggests that packaged software production reflects the logic of commoditization and thus 
cannot be understood solely through the lens of software engineering. Because of the logic of 
commoditization, which privileges financialized meta-commodities and marketized criteria over 
the underlying, there is a conflict of interest between vendors and customers that is more 
profound than the problem of standardization, and the interest of analysts is in maintaining the 
value of their proprietary models, such as categories, and revenue streams from vendors. Neither 
the vendors nor the analysts have a deep knowledge of user organization needs. These 
considerations are not easy to take account of in a buy-versus-build analytical framework for 
procurement. The study also suggests that the buy-versus-build model is likely to understate 
overflowing and dependencies, and, more fundamentally, takes for granted the pre-
commoditization object-quality of the thing (e.g. “CMS”) being procured: CMS was a process-
oriented software that on the one hand did not correspond to an enclosable process but on the 
other was very similar to a number of other software products; years after its introduction, users 
and vendors alike were still struggling to define, and to justify, CMS. Taken in total, the study 
points to the lack of, and need for, a stable taxonomy, analytical framework and vocabulary for 
packaged software design, procurement and investment, in the absence of which not only 
customers and analysts but also vendors and investors may be led astray by “organizing visions” 
and their market correlates, product categories. 
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8.5 Implications for the theory of performativity 
 
In section 2.3.3, I discussed the theory of performativity, first put forward by Austin (1962) to 
describe certain kinds of statements, including a contract, that do not describe the world but 
instead make the world. Butler (1990, 1993) adopted the notion to describe the effects of an 
iterative discourse that, in her argument, creates that which it purports to describe (e.g. a 
prediscursive gender); her emphasis was on classification performativity. Callon (1998a, 1998b) 
initiated the discussion of performativity in markets, arguing that economic models become 
embedded in the construction of markets and thus shape the phenomenon they purport to model. 
Subsequently the notion of performativity in markets has been extended to other disciplines and 
practices, such as marketing (Cochoy 1998, 2010), and applied to packaged software markets 
(Pollock and Williams 2009b, 2010, 2011). As part of agential realism, Barad (2007) has 
theorized a more all-encompassing “posthumanist” performativity, the essence of which is a 
break with representationalism in favour of the inseparability of matter and meaning, and which 
accords to non-humans and to matter a role in performative enactments (section 4.1.4). 
Performativity then has been invoked in a number of forms and toward a number of different 
aims, and, as discussed in section 2.3.3, MacKenzie (2004, 2006a) has, within the economics 
domain, suggested an analytic decomposition of performativity.  
 
As part of the theory of performativity, there has always been a notion that performative 
operations might not work. Austin called this “misfire”, which would occur when the 
“conditions of felicity” were absent. Callon theorized an “overflowing” of a “frame” attributable 
to the residual and latent attachments from within the frame to what it excludes, “the 
omnipresence of connections with the outside world” (Callon 1998b, 1998c). Butler suggested 
that “performative breakdown” – “when the effects of a performative operation fail to work” 
(Butler 2010, p. 150) – reveals the operation and demonstrates its limits; in Barad’s (2007) 
terms, discourse has encountered the “constitutive outside”. In this study I have taken literally 
the suggestion that breakdown is revealing (Butler 2010; MacKenzie 2004), using breakdown as 
an analytical device to trace the failure of CMS and to identify the multiple performative 
asssumptions and operations at work in the biography of CMS. The emergence of CMS 
subcategories shows how breakdown can be anomaly-resolving – generative, productive, 
corrective. 
 
This study provides a number of examples of performativity. First are the various performative 
assumptions enlisted, consciously or unconsciously, toward the making of the CMS market: 
packaged software as an information good and the generalizability of generification as a 
strategy; the organizing vision of CMS (contract management as process automation, structured 
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data as knowledge, and contract as algorithmic); classification as performative; and the 
substitution of performance through marketing. In terms of MacKenzie’s (2006a) second 
schema, I would characterize all of these as instances of effective performativity, where these 
assumptions were used as models and were materialized in product design and in strategies and 
practices of the vendors and other members of the knowledge network. They primed a cycle of 
expectations toward realization. Market participants clearly aspired to Barnesian performativity, 
especially in marketing and category construction, but – ultimately – failed. 
 
In section 7.2.5, I argued that the fundamental breakdown in the story of CMS was in 
classification performativity (cf. Butler 1993; Bowker and Star 1999). While Bowker and Star’s 
(1999) has been referred to in studies of product qualification (e.g. Sjögren and Helgesson 
2007), in this study I follow Pollock and Williams (2010, 2011) in making the relationship more 
explicit and draw upon Bowker and Star’s insights directly to describe how classification 
performativity failed here. The breakdown of the CMS software category revealed not only the 
assumptions underlying the failed instance of classification performativity but also the belief in 
classification performativity enlisted in the creation of expectations.  
 
In this study I have also described a “strong” Austinian performativity. Although in 2006 
MacKenzie adopted “Barnesian” over “Austinian” to emphasize that the performativity he was 
describing was not purely a matter of linguistics, I make the case here that Austin’s original 
insight – that an expression could effectively bring a material reality into being – is relevant to 
the theorization of contract as a technology of connectedness and to other phenomena 
characteristic of the networked economy. 
 
Contract is probably one of the best examples of Austinian performativity. A (properly formed) 
contract creates legal facts and entails direct and predictable (rule-bound or machine-like) 
material consequentiality. This study makes the point that in the networked economy contract is 
not only performative, in Austin’s original sense, it is likely to be potentially, if differentially, 
able to transmit, transform, absorb or amplify effects across the network. Contract also has a 
constitutive role in creating and sustaining network phenomena such as risk concentration and 
business networks, in ways that have yet to be understood. I have called this strong Austinian 
performativity and suggested that it is characteristic of contract as a technology of 
connectedness alongside and interpenetrating with ICT in the networked economy. 
 
Separately, but intriguingly for this study, D’Adderio (2008) has characterized computer code 
as performative. Code exhibits strong performativity in that, assuming the enforcing background 
of hardware and (as relevant) framing software such as the appropriate operating system, it 
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executes in a rule-bound, machine-like way. If code by its nature exhibits strong Austinian 
performativity, we might speculate that, like contract, it is not only performative but potentially 
transmissive and constitutive in its effects, and indeed manifestations of this quality are not hard 
to find (e.g. in computer worms or the effects of technical errors in automated trading).  
 
This strong Austinian performativity can be characterized as an attribute of those expressions 
(such a contracts or computer code) that are materialized in a rule-bound mechanistic way – that 
are, in the right environment, self-executing in a deterministic fashion, and thus potentially 
autonomous. Though originally formed (by a human, or not, as in the case of high frequency 
trading) as a statement, they take on independent, posthumanist agency. I argue that strong 
Austinian performativity is highly consequential in the networked economy, where not only 
contract and ICT in a relationship of convergence, complementarity and substitution, but related 
technologies such as accounting and “financial innovation” (see Lepinay 2007a, p. 103) give 
rise to a conjoint performativity – perhaps Castell’s “global automaton” (2010, p. xxi) – as 
demonstrated in the case of AIG and more generally in the recent financial crisis. As another 
example, strong performativity is a characteristic of classification systems that have been 
embodied in databases, when those databases have direct material consequences that are hard or 
impossible to contest or resist, such as when they are used in automated credit approval 
processes (credit scoring), to block financial account access, to determine the ability to fly in an 
airplane (no-fly lists) or to determine healthcare costs (see Bernstein 2012). In these cases, 
classification performativity takes on strong Austinian performativity. Perhaps the emergent 
“automata” merit the same type of ethical scrutiny that is being applied to other automata such 
as robots and drones (see e.g. Finn and Wright 2012; Lin et al. 2012). 
 
The instances of performativity illustrated in this study in their multiplicity support in principle 
the analytic de-composition of “performativity”, as suggested by MacKenzie with his schemas 
of 2004 and 2006. Generalizing his 2006 categories beyond the domain of economics, this case 
suggests that there may be a range of relative effectiveness within his “effective” category, and 
that his “counterperformativity” may incorporate some types of breakdown (as suggested by 
Callon 2007, p. 323), but not others. However, his Barnesian performativity, in which the 
practical use of a model makes processes more like the model they depict, does not really 
encompass the strong version of Austinian performativity I have put forward. In considering the 
examples of performativity encountered in this study, I see that performativity has been invoked 
to describe phenomena that vary significantly in terms of not only relative effectiveness, but 
also visibility, intentionality, as to whether a feedback cycle is set (or intended to be set) in 
motion, and the extent of strong Austinian performativity. I believe MacKenzie has initiated an 
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interesting project, made more interesting when Barad’s posthumanist performativity is taken 
into account, that merits further exploration. 
 
I would agree with MacKenzie that performativity, however defined and regardless of type, is at 
a minimum “empirically important” (MacKenzie 2004). It provides a productive analytical 
framework for interrogating intangible but pervasive technologies – such as marketing and 
accounting (MacKenzie 2006a), but also ICTs, money and classification systems – and 
revealing their assumptions and operative mechanisms. Performativity (whether so-called or 
not) invokes important questions of intention, consequentiality and responsibility of the type 
raised by Barad (2007), MacKenzie (2006a) and Suchman (2002). To paraphrase Walsham 
(2012): Are these technologies making the world a better place? In particular, I suggest that 
strong Austinian performativity, as a special case within the general theory, is an important 
material, traceable phenomenon, characteristic of ICT and contract (as a technology of 
connectedness) and significantly implicated in the problems of knowledge, risk, and 
responsibility in the networked economy.   
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
In this study I have investigated the case of contract management software (CMS), a packaged 
software product that promised – according to its “organizing vision” (section 5.1.3) – to 
automate the contract lifecycle across the enterprise as a closed, continuous production function 
and provide “visibility” into contracting – that is, organizational contracting knowledge. 
Designed on the basis of a generic contract lifecycle, CMS was positioned to work for all types 
of contracts and for all types of businesses, in any industry. However, despite many successful 
implementations, including one I describe in section 5.2, CMS failed to generate the levels of 
revenues and profitability that investors and analysts expected (IACCM 2007; see Forrester 
Research Inc. 2011a; Gartner Inc. 2002; see footnote 2).  
 
The failure of CMS to meet market expectations provides an opportunity to study packaged 
software, as well as the relationship of ICT, contract and knowledge in the networked economy. 
Pollock and Williams’s (2009a) biography of software approach, which they developed in 
analysing the success of ERP, provides the framework for this case of market failure. To 
develop a market perspective (Sawyer 2001) and relate the study to broader theoretical 
development not limited to the software domain, I have looked to the theory of commoditization 
(Appadurai 1986a; Kopytoff 1986) and studies of markets from economic sociology (e.g. 
Callon 1998a; Cochoy 2010; Lepinay 2007a, 2007b; MacKenzie and Millo 2003), in particular 
the notions of product qualification (referring to the processes by which products are 
standardized, stabilized and decontextualized) and of performativity in markets (referring to 
economic models, but also other market practices such as marketing, that bring into being that 
which they purport to describe). Taking breakdown – a failure of expectations associated with a 
performative assumption or operation – as potentially revealing (Butler 2010; MacKenzie 
2004), my biography of CMS is constructed around developing a table of breakdown, toward 
answering two research questions:  
(1) How can we account for the failure of CMS from a market perspective on packaged 
software? What are the implications for packaged software? 
(2) To what extent did the market failure relate to contract? What are the implications 
for ICT, contract and knowledge in the networked economy? 
 
9.1 Key findings: evidence of breakdown in the biography of CMS 
 
The biography of CMS was developed and is presented here sequentially in two versions. First, 
in Chapter 5, the biography of CMS as an organizing technology for contract is presented 
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alongside an initial table of breakdown (Table 5.4). This first version of the biography was 
based on interview and survey data, vendor selling material and material from the IACCM 
archives. In this account, CMS emerged, in “harmonic convergence”, from antecedent 
technologies organized to meet a newly defined opportunity, contract management. However, 
CMS encountered unexpected difficulties and accumulated a record of shortcomings, or 
breakdowns, at a number of levels. First, both customers and vendors struggled with rigidities in 
the product that limited its adoption. Some CMS products featured hard coding from previous 
clients, some had a buy-side or procurement bias, and there was a difficulty in generalizing from 
one industry to another (section 5.4.1). This evidence points to a failure in generification. 
 
Second, despite the organizing vision for CMS that modelled contracting as a closed and 
continuous production function, CMS did not “enclose” contracting, which remained 
fragmented by offline processes, by function across the contract lifecycle and by type of 
contract or business unit, resulting in localized or even multiple CMS implementations, and 
with a pronounced split between buy-side and sell-side (section 5.4.2). To take an example, 
even in an implementation that was considered successful by the vendor, which I describe in 
section 5.2, offline processes persisted, and there was no continuous flow of data as promised 
by CMS’s enclosing and integrating model. In addition, functional fragmentation across the 
contract lifecycle persisted: The sales force used a “product form” that bypassed contract 
management altogether, and went directly to the operations group responsible for contract 
compliance. While CMS provided a valuable working space and work management tool for the 
contract management group, the implementation was localized, and a competing solution was 
used in another part of the organization.  
 
Third, there was an expectation that CMS would make contracting “visible”, but CMS was not 
particularly successful in producing organizational contracting knowledge, for a number of 
reasons (section 5.4.3). The first was the persistent fragmentation of contracting, already noted, 
which CMS did not resolve. Customers also experienced a number of practical problems with 
the contracts repository in terms of completeness, access and searchability, and had difficulty in 
defining and extracting structured data. Data integration was limited, and users generally did not 
look to CMS to produce organizational contracting knowledge. For example, in the 
implementation I describe in section 5.2, relatively few datapoints were captured in discrete data 
fields, and there was no data integration. In that implementation, the system produced alerts for 
contract renewals, but the business sponsor did not expect CMS to produce much more in terms 
of contracting knowledge, ceding that ground to business intelligence initiatives. 
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Fourth, though CMS was supposed to work for all types of contracts, and for all types of 
businesses, in any industry, in fact it did not work equally well for all contracting environments 
(Table 5.3, p. 132). CMS was associated with large organizations, and with the buy-side. Most 
of all, CMS was associated with contracting scale (volume and standardization) and with 
contracting that could be reduced to structured data. In other words, CMS seemed to work best 
for those contracts that are “algorithmic”, at a scale where the cost of advanced, data-rich 
features could be justified. In other cases, CMS was implemented on a reduced basis, as a 
contracts repository (section 5.4.4).  
 
Lastly, CMS competed with custom software built in-house and with multi-purpose software 
platforms such as enterprise resource planning and enterprise content management systems that 
offered CMS capabilities, and it overlapped in functionality with these and other products such 
as client relationship management systems or strategic sourcing software. There was some 
confusion about what CMS was, and what it was supposed to do; given the high cost of full-
scale implementation and the overlap with other systems, the business case for CMS was weak. 
As a result, CMS was often implemented in a reduced version as a contracts repository only. In 
sum, evidence pointed to the breakdown of the CMS category (section 5.4.5), and by the end of 
the story the biographical subject begins to fracture, prompting questions about its “production”.  
 
Extending data collection and analysis to include analyst coverage and the histories of five key 
vendors (in Chapter 6) reveals a more surprising story, the second and subsuming biography of 
CMS as a commodity. What the additional data shows is that while analyst firms developed and 
supported CMS as a coherent category, five key vendors who largely defined the category were 
a disparate group – with different histories and different products (section 6.2). Four of the five 
focus vendors started with data-centric capabilities and a data-centric model of contracting. I-
Many, a “pioneer” of CMS, was in the regulated healthcare business, offering software to 
manage rebates and discounts; after trying for years to generalize its product under the contract 
management banner, it eventually retreated to the healthcare sector (section 6.2.1). Selectica 
(section 6.2.2) had a “CPQ” (configuration, pricing and quotation) capability for selling over the 
internet. When this business began to be overtaken by ERP capabilities, Selectica transitioned to 
CMS, which it built into a small, marginally cash-flow positive business. Ariba (section 6.2.3) 
targeted the professionalized procurement operation in large companies, offering a suite of buy-
side software products, which over time incorporated a CMS module. Ariba also built a supplier 
network which appears to be the basis of its current success as a “cloud” provider; as of the 
summer of 2012 Ariba had agreed to be acquired by SAP. Emptoris (section 6.2.4) offered 
strategic sourcing software for large scale, professionalized procurement, and eventually 
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acquired CMS as a complement to its main offering; Emptoris was acquired by IBM in early 
2012.  
 
All four of these companies took a strongly data-centric, or algorithmic, approach to 
contracting, which they assumed would come to dominate in e-commerce, and which they 
believed was generalizable. They targeted large company customers, looking for the scale that 
would support data-rich features of their software. Their experience shows that contract data and 
algorithmic contracting are domain-specific and even customer-specific, with Ariba and 
Emptoris marking out industry-agnostic professionalized procurement as their domain. In view 
of the histories of these four key vendors, it is not surprising that CMS was associated with 
algorithmic contracting, with large companies and with the buy-side. 
 
These four vendors experienced periods of instability, and there was conflict with other vendors 
over customers and intellectual property. Of the four, the three for which financial results are 
available were (with the exception of Ariba in recent years) unprofitable; the fourth was bought 
out by a private equity company when it could not pay a judgment in a patent litigation. Low 
margin services made up a large portion of vendor revenues, indicating that the software was 
not really severable from the vendor – and supporting the position of technology analysts (as 
outlined in the Gartner litigation I discuss in section 6.1.2) that software is only one element 
considered in rating vendors, marketing capabilities being another key attribute. Marketing costs 
for CMS were high. For I-Many, Selectica and Ariba, aggregate sales and marketing expenses 
for 2000-2007 were approximately $1.2 billion, revenues were approximately $2.9 billion, and 
there was an aggregate loss of more than $5 billion (section 6.2.6).  
 
The fifth focus vendor, Upside (section 6.2.5), took a different approach, focusing on 
documents, and it stands out among the five focus vendors for the stability of its management, 
ownership, product and vision; Upside claims to have been consistently profitable since its 
second fiscal year of operations. Even so, it does not appear to have grown very large in terms 
of revenues or profits; in 2012 Upside announced that it would be acquired by Sci-Quest, a 
provider of cloud-based procurement services, for $22 million. 
 
None of this variability among the vendors and products they offered appears in the model of 
the contract lifecycle put forward as the “organizing vision” for CMS, and it was elided in CMS 
as a software category. However, over time, what one observer characterized as the conflicts 
and tensions present at the origin, and what other interviewees remarked upon as confusion 
about CMS (section 5.4.5) – what it was, whether it was needed, whether a generalizable 
contract lifecycle existed – manifested in a category breakdown eventually acknowledged by the 
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analysts (section 6.1.3). In 2002, Gartner predicted a $20 billion market for contract 
management software and services by 2007, but by 2008 the Gartner lead analyst said that she 
had been “too easily swayed by the ‘contract lifecycle management’ rhetoric” that defined the 
industry. Gartner retired the category after 2008, and, like Forrester, has analysed the ongoing 
fragmentation of the category, with many companies competing in the low-end contracts 
repository business, encroachment by ERP vendors, and the emergence of specialty providers. 
Looking back, “CMS” has proved somewhat ephemeral, to use Pollock and Williams’s term, 
and the vendors associated with the category took different paths forward in the search for scale 
and profitability. By 2012, one of the five focus vendors had retreated to an industry niche, one 
was very small, and the remaining three were being absorbed into cloud-based procurement. 
9.2 Summary of analysis 
Pollock and Williams’s (2009a) study of ERP suggests that a successful packaged software 
market requires the mobilization of a knowledge network in support of an organizing vision 
(Swanson and Ramiller 1997), but more substantively the successful execution of a strategy of 
“generification”, to turn a particularized software product into a standardized, high margin 
information good. The first version of the biography of CMS, as organizing technology for 
contract, shows an active knowledge network in support of a coherent and compelling 
organizing vision, but indicates that generification did not work, and CMS accumulated a record 
of shortcomings. This biography begins with a technological determinist or essentialist 
assumption that the technological artefact is ontologically coherent, but by the end of the story, 
the CMS category is breaking down, and “CMS” appears to be more than one technological 
artefact; through the telling of the biography, the biographical subject fractures, calling into 
question our understanding of how it came to be. 
The second version of the biography of CMS, as a commodity, is an account of the 
“production” of CMS, and of how it broke down (see Table 7.8 for a summary). This second 
version of the biography subsumes and to a degree explains the first. CMS was associated with 
an organizing vision and its market correlate the category. The category was a site of material 
enactment, a coordinating mechanism (Law 2002) for disparate objects (the various CMS 
products and vendors) but also for investment, both financial and cognitive, across the 
knowledge network. Separately, CMS as a technological artefact was variable and unsettled, the 
subject of conflicting views, bought and sold, moving through and to different organizations, 
positioned and repositioned. While Pollock and Williams note the relative “boundedness” of 
tangible commodities as contrasted to the malleability of software, in the case of CMS this is 
more than a question of the lack of stability in software code and capabilities, the temporal 
provisionality of a technological artefact. “CMS” was not ontologically coherent.  
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The table of breakdown (Table 7.8) points to three levels of commoditization in the biography 
of CMS: the underlying product (computer code packaged as organizing technology), its 
financialized meta-commodity (equity interests in producing firms), and commoditized criteria 
(analyst ratings and rankings). The case demonstrates that financialized meta-commodities and 
marketized criteria can have a privileged role in product qualification for packaged software, 
effectively standing in for user satisfaction. I theorize this as a “substitution of performance” 
across multiple levels of commoditization, as suggested by Cochoy (2010) in another context. In 
the case of CMS, substitution of performance was effective, to a point, masking the lack of 
ontological coherency in the category and the product. 
In my analysis, I identify assumptions performatively at work in the biography of CMS – beliefs 
in packaged software as an information good and in the generalizability of generification as a 
strategy (a kind of meta-organizing vision for the packaged software industry) toward creating 
an information good; in the organizing vision of CMS (contract management as process 
automation, structured data as knowledge, and contract as algorithmic); in classification as 
performative; and in the substitution of performance through marketing. These assumptions, 
materially enacted as intentional performative operations, were the site of significant investment 
(financial and cognitive), and succeeded in creating a software category and generating 
expectations for that software category, expectations that were not ultimately realized.  
How can we account for the failure of CMS from a market perspective on packaged software? I 
argue that the fundamental breakdown was in classification performativity in product 
qualification when an attempt to classify a new technology failed (see Pollock and Williams 
2010). The category for CMS was overly abstracted and insufficiently differentiated. The 
organizing vision and its generic model of the contract lifecycle eliminated critical distinctions 
and smoothed over significant tensions inherent in the category’s disparate origins. It was a 
model based on idealization (MacKenzie 2006a), corresponding to “dreamed of states of 
commerce” (Cochoy 2010), “drawing on a world … that had not yet been realized” (Lepinay 
2007a, p. 270). Accordingly, the organizing vision broke down. Contracting resisted 
classification as algorithmic, and would not stay within the bounds of the CMS process model. 
CMS did not generally deliver the sort of “visibility” into contracting – the contracting 
knowledge – that it promised would arise from the automation of the contract lifecycle. 
Contracting and contract data were variable – across industries and as between buy-side and 
sell-side. So vendors could not execute on their strategies of generification, and CMS failed to 
become an information good. These compounding breakdowns eventually materialized in a 
divergence between market expectations – as evidenced first in the financialized meta-
commodities of equity interests in vendor firms and thereafter in the marketized criteria of 
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analyst coverage – and market performance as measured by revenues and profits. This produced 
the motivating question for this study. The multi-level breakdown analysis turns the motivating 
question upside down, from “What happened to contract management software?” to “Where did 
the expectation of market success come from?” – that is, from a question about IT product 
failure to a story about performativity and breakdown in market making. Vendors eventually 
took different paths to look for scale and profitability. However, it took some years for this to 
unfold. During those years, first financialized meta-commodities (equity interests in vendor 
firms) and then marketized criteria (in the form of favourable analyst coverage) kept the CMS 
program alive. The invested knowledge network and the organizing vision with its market 
correlate the category detached into a closed performative realm that eventually – when 
customer revenues failed to materialize – collapsed. 
With respect to the second research question, the breakdown of the organizing vision indicates 
that market failure for CMS was directly related to the nature of contract and contracting. 
Contracting is not across-the-board susceptible to algorithmic reduction; but where it is, it is 
scale that warrants the substantial cost of specialized ICT, including data management and data 
extraction. CMS was designed around an unstated assumption that contracting was algorithmic, 
and its proponents underestimated or underplayed the data management and data extraction 
requirements. Contracting is domain-specific so that, to be valuable, ICT for contracting should 
grapple with specialized knowledge and practice requirements. Contracting is fragmented inside 
organizations, both across the contract lifecycle and for different kinds of contracting, with a 
notable split between buy-side and sell-side, but internal fragmentation by type of contract may 
to some extent be explained and indeed justified by the domain-specificity of contracting, or by 
other mandates of the various “knowledge regimes” (Howard-Grenville and Carlile 2006) 
having an interest in contract (e.g. risk management, business intelligence or supply chain 
management). Organizational contracting knowledge is a problem not susceptible to simple ICT 
approaches based on process automation and structured data. 
9.3 Summary of implications of this study 
This study has implications for packaged software (section 8.1), for process commoditization 
(section 8.2), for ICT, contract and knowledge in the networked economy (section 8.3), for 
practice (section 8.4), and for the theory of performativity (section 8.5). First, based on this 
study, I question the business model for packaged software, suggesting that packaged software 
is not necessarily best understood as an information good (section 8.1.1), and that packaged 
software like CMS is a process commodity, with implications for process commoditization (see 
the next paragraph). I also suggest that the logic of commoditization in packaged software 
production gives rise to more fundamental conflicts of interest between vendors and customers 
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and between analysts and customers than may be taken account of in the buy-versus-build 
procurement model (section 8.1.2). 
With respect to process commoditization (section 8.2), this study illustrates on the one hand the 
critical importance of classification in product qualification, but suggests on the other that 
classification of process commodities is always and essentially, not contingently, provisional 
and contested. This study also suggests that process commoditization involves a different type 
of product qualification, where overflowing, dependencies and provisionality must be 
accommodated and thus may revolve around contract and information exchange rather than 
product definition.  
 
In section 8.3, I draw out several implications of this study for ICT, contract and knowledge. In 
section 8.3.1, I hypothesize that trends in ICT-enabled contracting involve further fragmentation 
of contracting and dis-location of the contract vis-à-vis the organization. In section 8.3.2, I 
discuss how not only these trends but the logic of commoditization, the phenomenon of process 
commoditization and the interdependency, consequentiality and a strong Austinian 
performativity of contract in the networked economy suggest that the problem of organizational 
contracting knowledge is more acute than has been suggested by the IS or accounting literature 
to date. From the arguments laid out in these sections, I conclude that contract is located 
between organizations, involves information exchange, is not inert and can have network effects 
beyond the contract parties. Based on this conclusion, in section 8.3.3, I offer an alternative or 
complementary theory of contract – as a technology of connectedness, with possible strong 
Austinian performativity, in a relationship of potential convergence, complementarity and 
substitution with ICT.  
In section 8.4, I draw together the implications of this study as they relate to practice – 
specifically, for packaged software design, procurement and investment. This study joins others 
in challenging the dominance of organizing visions and categories in shaping the IT 
marketplace but goes on to ground a more fundamental critique of the buy-versus-build 
analytical framework for procurement. 
Lastly, in section 8.5, I discuss the implications of this study for the theory of performativity, as 
an empirical study that applies and explores the notion of breakdown and that identifies multiple 
instances of performativity, supporting in principle an analytic decomposition of 
“performativity” as suggested by MacKenzie (2004, 2006a), but raising some questions about 
his proposed schemas. In particular I argue that Austin’s (1962) original insight into the strong 
performative effect of expressions that on execution have rule-based mechanistic or 
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deterministic material outcomes is highly relevant to the theorization of contract as a technology 
of connectedness and to other phenomena characteristic of the networked economy. 
9.4 Contribution 
This study makes a contribution in three areas. My principal contribution is to IS and 
organizations research on the topics of packaged software and the relationship of ICT, contract 
and knowledge. With respect to packaged software, I make an empirical contribution by tracing 
the logic of commoditization in the the production of packaged software, applying the 
biography of software approach developed by Pollock and Williams (2009a) and extending their 
research regarding the role of analysts in the IT marketplace (Pollock and Williams 2009b, 
2010, 2011). I challenge the common understanding of the business model for packaged 
software as an information good and theorize certain kinds of software as process commodities. 
I also theorize a “substitution of performance”, in which marketing and categories play central 
roles, in the commoditization of packaged software. I make a contribution to practice by 
drawing out the implications of the logic of commoditization in packaged software production, 
including a challenge to the buy-versus-build analytical framework for procurement. In terms of 
methodology, in this study I have extended the biography of software approach to incorporate 
the producing firms and the object of the software (contract, in this case) within the scope of 
inquiry, and I have also explored the nature of the biographical subject. 
With respect to the relationship of ICT, contract and knowledge, I have contributed an empirical 
investigation of the use of a packaged software product as an organizing technology for contract 
and in particular for organizing contracting knowledge, have identified trends that dis-locate 
contract vis-à-vis the organization, and have respecified the problem of organizational 
contracting knowledge as more acute than has been suggested by the IS or accounting literature 
to date. Concluding that TCE and other theories of contract do not directly address the evolving 
relationship of ICT and contract and the problem of organizational contracting knowledge as I 
respecify it here, I offer an alternative or complementary theory of contract as a technology of 
connectedness in a relationship of potential convergence, complementarity and substitution with 
ICT.  
I also make a contribution to economic sociology. Here, my empirical contribution is to further 
extend the study of markets into the domain of packaged software (see Pollock and Williams 
2009b, 2010, 2011). In terms of theory, my first contribution is to trace three levels of 
commoditization – financialized meta-commodities, commoditized criteria, and an underlying 
commodity – as related through a “substitution of performance”; in this respect I bring the 
performativity perspective to observations made by Appadurai (1986a) regarding “signs” as 
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commodities. I also propose a new understanding of product qualification in process 
commoditization based on provisionality, overflowing and dependencies, rather than 
standardization, stabilization and decontextualization. 
Lastly, I make a contribution to the theory of performativity. First, I develop the notion of 
breakdown as an analytical device and demonstrate the use of that device to organize and 
present findings in a table of breakdown (see Table 7.8). Second, this study contains a number 
of examples of performativity and supports, in principle, MacKenzie’s (2004, 2006a) project of 
analytical decomposition of “performativity”, but also raises some questions about his schemas. 
Linking the theoretical with the empirical, this study emphasizes the critical importance, and 
notes the ethical dimensions, of what I have termed strong Austinian performativity as relevant 
to the theorization of contract as a technology of connectedness and to other phenomena 
characteristic of the networked economy. 
 
9.5 Reflections and limitations 
 
In the investigation of commercial software, access to the software and to vendors, customers 
and analysts can be problematic, as noted by Pollock and Williams (2009a, p. 87). The 
researcher may be recruited into the “knowledge network” supporting the software product as a 
price of admission. Where access is granted, this is an element of bias that should be 
acknowledged by expressly bracketing the data sources from within the chain of production. In 
particular, both vendors and vendor-identified reference customers will tend to “sell” the 
product, and the researcher must acknowledge, reflexively, an involuntary role as “participant-
observer” in the processes of commoditization. As a practical matter, the researcher needs to be 
prepared to work with such data as is accessible, and at the same time try to make sure the scope 
of inquiry include sources not directly implicated in the chain of production.  
I promised interviewees that I would not use their names or the names of their organizations in 
my writing, so these have been anonymized, and I have not identified the source of a particular 
quote. This promise of anonymity of course does not apply to the archival material I have 
obtained from public sources. I considered whether to anonymize the names of the five 
companies I researched, which might theoretically have permitted me to link the interview 
material to the companies through code names. However, the histories of the companies are too 
easily identifiable. So I have decided to use their real names, while interview material is not 
associated to any of the five companies.  
The scope of my research is limited in a number of other respects. There is no consideration 
here of open source software, which Vitari and Ravarini noted as a competitor to the vendors of 
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the content management software they studied. The perspectives on contract are mostly based 
on the Anglo-American common law experience, though one interesting possibility is that 
cross-border ICT-enabled contracting practices might result in a de facto convergence of 
contract law, at least in some domains. Lastly, I would have liked more hands-on experience 
with the software and more direct interactions with technical staff at the vendors; that access 
would no doubt have produced a somewhat different account. 
9.6 Areas for further research 
The study suggests numerous avenues for additional research. I have mentioned several of them 
in Chapter 8 and will briefly note them again below. Preliminary to that, I offer an observation 
or suggestion, based on the case of CMS, regarding IS and organizations research. Researchers 
have recently called for a perspective of sociomateriality on technology, work and organization 
(Orlikowski and Scott 2008). This study suggests that such a perspective might incorporate 
three subjects that do not appear to have received the attention in IS and organizations research 
that might be warranted: the economic (including financial) aspects of technology and in 
particular the cost of technology (cf. MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985; Noble 1984, 1999; Yates 
2005); the weighty materiality of data (data extraction, data entry, data quality, the construction 
and consequences of databases) (cf. Poon 2007; Suchman 1996, 2002; Yates 2005); and the 
practical implications of the irreducibly multiple nature of knowledge and practice within the 
organization (cf. D’Adderio 2004; Nonaka and von Krogh 2009). All of these factors were 
highly consequential in the biography of CMS. To the same point, I note that the case of CMS 
supports the argument made by Chiasson and Davidson (2005) that industry (the “vertical”) is 
an important parameter for information systems, but relatively neglected in IS research. Perhaps 
the powerful logic of abstraction that motivates IS as an engineering discipline tends to locate 
these (literally) mundane considerations as out-of-scope. However I believe they have much 
potential to generate new insights that matter. 
In terms of further research: first, as noted in section 8.4, I have pointed out that the IS research 
and practitioner communities seem to be lacking a taxonomy, analytical framework and a 
vocabulary for software design, procurement and investment. The problem of procurement and 
the disproportionate and distorting effects of the organizing vision and its market correlate, the 
product category, are indicative of this larger issue. Further research, engaging with business 
users, IT procurement professionals, software vendors, software designers, technology analysts 
and technology investors, is warranted. 
As noted in section 8.3.3, contract as a “technology of connectedness in a relationship of 
potential convergence, complementarity and substitution with ICT” is deliberately 
underspecified and open, but with, I believe, much potential as a research agenda. An example 
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would be to trace the evolving interpenetration of contract and ICT and the rise of distributed 
contracting, within and across industries, including an analysis of the the implications for 
organizational contracting knowledge and more generally the impact on organizational 
information systems design. For example, an investigation, compilation and comparison of the 
various ways organizations are (or are not) using ICT to create organizational contracting 
knowledge, under whatever name or rubric would be of interest. I have also suggested that it 
would be interesting to know if, or to what extent, the problem of organizational contracting 
knowledge poses a limit on “contractibility” (in the broad and literal sense) or otherwise shapes 
organizational and other economic configurations.  
More ambitious would be to apply the theorization of contract as a technology of connectedness 
toward developing a better understanding of the nature and location of effective agency in the 
networked economy. There is an existing significant amount of research into outsourcing and 
supply chain management. But Granovetter (1985, 1995) and Teubner and Collins (2011) 
suggest that any analysis of the economy that does not take into account business groups may be 
missing much of the picture (cf. Castells 2010). I suggest that studying the interpenetration of 
ICT and contract and their conjoint performativity offers a path forward toward developing an 
alternative and richer understanding of the networked economy, including its ethical 
dimensions.  
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Appendix 4.1 Table of interviews (DNA = date not available; T = telephone; IP = in person; 
SV = part of site visit; SD = software demo included; R = recorded; NR = notes sent for review; 
QW = questions answered in writing; UC = user conference) 
 
 
  
Interview 
number 
Date Interviewee Organization Codes 
(see 
below) 
1 
 
Fourth 
quarter, 
2002 
CEO CMS software vendor (one of the five 
focus vendors) 
DNA, T 
2 Fourth 
quarter, 
2002 
President and CEO IACCM DNA, T 
3 Fourth 
quarter, 
2002 
UK sales director CMS software vendor (one of the five 
focus vendors 
DNA, IP, 
SV, SD 
4 January 28-
29, 2003 
Director of procurement 
and various of his 
colleagues 
Global consumer goods products company 
and CMS customer (one of the five focus 
vendors) 
IP, SV 
5 First quarter, 
2003 
Director of global 
contracting 
Global networking equipment company 
(not a CMS customer) 
DNA, IP, 
NR 
6 First quarter, 
2003 
Director of sales Document automation vendor (not one of 
the five focus vendors) 
DNA, IP, 
SV, SD 
7 February 7, 
2008 
Contract manager UK public sector research entity (not a 
CMS customer) 
IP, NR 
8 February 8, 
2008 
Contracting consultant 
(same person as interview 
5) 
Independent consulting company IP, NR 
9 February 14, 
2008 
Director for medical 
systems and business 
development 
Large Blue Cross-Blue Shield insurance 
company and CMS customer (one of the 
five focus vendors) 
T, NR 
10 February 19, 
2008 
Contracting consultant Independent consulting company T, NR 
11 February 20, 
2008 
Contract management 
software consultant (former 
lawyer)  
Independent consulting company (not 
affiliated with any of the five focus 
vendors) 
T, NR 
12 February 21, 
2008 
President and CEO (same 
person as interview 2) 
IACCM T, NR 
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Table of interviews, cont. 
13 February 22, 2008 Vice president, strategic 
sourcing and operational 
excellence 
International publishing company and 
CMS customer (one of the five focus 
vendors) 
T, 
NR 
14 March 5, 2008 Research officer IACCM T, 
NR 
15 March 11, 2008 President, CEO and 
founder 
CMS software vendor (one of the five 
focus vendors) 
T, 
NR 
16 March 13, 2008 Vice president, sales Major ERP vendor (as user of that 
vendor’s CMS product) 
T, 
NR 
17 March 18, 2008 President and CEO Independent consultant advocating 
Microsoft Sharepoint for contract 
management 
T, 
NR 
18 March 18, 2008 Senior vice president, 
marketing 
CMS software vendor (one of the five 
focus vendors) 
T, 
NR 
19 March 20, 2008 Director, sales relationship 
management solutions 
marketing 
Major ERP vendor marketing CMS 
product 
T, 
NR 
20 April 8, 2008 Manager of institutional 
contracts 
Large Blue Cross-Blue Shield insurance 
company and CMS customer – same 
company as interview 9 (one of the five 
focus vendors) 
T, 
NR 
21 April 10, 2008 Global contracts manager Global networking equipment company 
and CMS customer (one of the five focus 
vendors) 
T, 
NR 
22 April 14, 2008 Vice president, 
procurement 
Major ERP vendor – same as interview 19 
(as user of that vendor’s CMS product) 
T, 
NR 
23 April 21, 2008 Senior director, legal 
services 
Global networking equipment company 
and CMS customer (one of the five focus 
vendors) 
T, 
NR 
24 June 24, 2008 Contract manager (same 
person as interview 7) 
UK public sector research entity (not a 
CMS customer) 
IP, 
SV 
25 February 25, 2009 Vice president of                             
marketing and product 
management 
 
CMS vendor (one of the five focus 
vendors) 
T, 
NR 
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Table of interviews, cont. 
26 March 3, 
2009 
Executive director, contract 
management 
Global technology consulting firm (not 
a CMS customer) 
IP, NR 
27 March 5-
6, 2009 
Head of contract management Unit of very large US health insurance 
company and CMS customer (one of 
the five focus vendors) 
IP, SV, SD, R 
28 March 5, 
2009 
Contract manager Unit of very large US health insurance 
company – same as interview 27 
IP, SV, R 
29 March 5, 
2009 
Contract manager Unit of very large US health insurance 
company – same as interview 27 
IP, SV, R 
30 March 5, 
2009 
Contract manager Unit of very large US health insurance 
company – same as interview 27 
IP, SV, R 
31 March 5, 
2009 
Business sponsor Unit of very large US health insurance 
company – same as interview 27 
IP, SV 
32 March 5, 
2009 
In-house lawyer Unit of very large US health insurance 
company – same as interview 27 
IP, SV 
33 March 
19, 2009 
Director of IT shared services 
organization 
Global consumer products company 
and CMS customer (one of the five 
focus companies) 
IP, R 
34 March 
19, 2009 
Head of legal strategy and 
planning 
Global consumer products company 
and CMS customer – same company as 
interview 33 (one of the five focus 
companies) 
IP 
35 March 
30, 2009 
Chief operating officer and 
marketing director 
CMS vendor (not one of the five focus 
vendors) 
T, NR 
36 April 1, 
2009 
VP, operations Independent consultant advocating 
Microsoft Sharepoint for contract 
management – same company as 
interview 17 
T, SD, NR 
37 April 4, 
2009 
In-house lawyer Unit of very large US health insurance 
company – same as interview 27 
T 
38 May 12, 
2009 
Founder and principal Vendor of software for joint ventures 
and partnerships 
IP 
39 August 
31, 2009 
Contract and project manager Global farm and construction 
equipment company and CMS customer 
(one of the five focus vendors) 
 
T, NR 
 
  
276 
 
Table of interviews, cont. 
40 October 
29, 2009 
Chief operating 
officer and 
marketing 
director – same 
person as 
interview 35 
CMS vendor (not one of the five 
focus vendors) 
IP, UC 
41 May 26, 
2010 
Various 
participants at 
IACCM 
roundtable  
IACCM (EMEA conference) IP 
42 June 8, 
2010 
Head of contract 
management 
Large UK public sector entity 
and CMS customer (one of the 
five focus vendors) 
IP, SV 
43 February 
8, 2011 
Senior 
consultant to 
contract 
management 
department 
Global networking equipment  
company 
T, NR 
44 February 
9, 2011 
In-house 
attorney 
Global outsourcing company T, NR 
45 February 
15, 2011 
Lawyer and 
contract 
manager 
Global computer and IT 
consulting company 
QW 
46 February 
16, 2011 
Contract 
manager 
University-affiliated physicians 
group 
T, NR 
47 February 
22, 2011 
Director, 
contracts and 
pricing 
Global engineering company T, NR 
48 February 
24, 2011 
Principal Independent IT procurement 
consulting company 
T, NR 
49 February 
28, 2011 
In-house lawyer 
and contracts 
manager 
Global computer hardware and 
consulting company 
T, NR 
50 March 
25, 2011 
Head of contract 
management 
(same person as 
interview 27) 
Unit of very large US health 
insurance company and CMS 
customer (one of the five focus 
vendors) – same as interview 27 
T 
51 March 
29, 2011 
Founder and 
former CEO 
CMS vendor (one of the five 
focus vendors) 
T 
52 March 
30, 2011 
IT analyst who 
has tracked CMS 
One of the three key analyst 
firms 
T 
53 April 5, 
2011 
Vice president of 
sales and 
marketing 
CMS vendor (one of the five 
focus vendors) – same as 
interview 15 
T 
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Appendix 4.2 Interview protocol (second stage and third stage interviews) 
INTERVIEW regarding contracting and contract management software 
Purpose of the interview:  The interview is part of a research project on the current status of contract 
management software.  In the course of the research we are also interested in collecting observations 
about contracting and contract management, and in exploring more generally how (in what ways and in 
which circumstances) ICT (information and communications technology) can/should support contracting. 
QUESTIONS 
1. Please discuss generally your professional history, current role and activities relating to contracting 
and/or to contract management software. 
2.  When did you first hear of/what is your first involvement with contract management software?  What 
was its origin or beginnings, as you recall – relative to contract management, relative to other software or 
relative to other developments and trends as relevant? 
3. What is contract management software, as you understand it? 
4.  What has been your experience with contract management software? 
 Contracting parties (users or potential users of contract management software):  Have been 
involved in decisions about procurement?  Have you been involved in any implementations?  If so, what 
was your experience with implementation and as relevant subsequent use? 
 Software providers: Can you describe the contract software space from your perspective?  How 
have you envisioned and positioned your product, including vis-à-vis other internal software (e.g. ERP, 
CRM)?  Does your product have functionality for multiple, related contract relationships? What has been 
your experience regarding customer reaction, takeup, implementation and use, in different contexts?   
 Industry/professional analysts and consultants:  All of the above. 
5.  What do you see as the benefits of contract management software?  What organizational goals do you 
think it serves?  Are there any downsides, issues or points of conflict/controversy that you are aware of?  
Can you comment on how you think others view (react to) various aspects of contract management 
software? 
6.  Can you comment on:  the relevance of the internal installed base of ICT?  The relevance of the 
counterparty’s internal installed base?  (I.e. integration, customization requirements, standards, 
interoperability, etc.) 
Contracting and ICT support of contracting more generally:  In terms of the contracting activities you 
participate in or are familiar with, could you comment on the following: 
7.  What types of contracts do you work with?  Buy-side/sell-side/all; length and complexity of the 
contract, the contract documentation, the contract negotiation; variability from one contract to another; 
use of standard forms (if so, what is the source?); term of the contracts; how many contracts per year?  In 
force at any time?; nature of performance as between the parties; nature of the underlying counterparty 
relationships vis-à-vis the contracts; languages; global reach; types of counterparties and relative 
leverage. 
8.  In the organization(s) you work in or are familiar with, how are contracts handled, in terms of roles 
and functions?  Buy-side/sell-side/all; is there a contract management function and if so to whom does it 
report; what is the role of legal/compliance; who handles the contacts with the counterparties and does 
that change over the life of the contract; local versus central control; business unit control versus 
278 
 
enterprise control?  What are the processes (e.g. describe a typical process if that is possible including 
cycle time and approvals)?  How often do these processes change? 
9.  What ICT is presently used to support contracting?  What other ICT support of contracting do you 
think is likely to be most useful or necessary in the settings you are familiar with?  Consider:  document 
build; repositories; databases; trading, bidding or RFP spaces or platforms; collaboration or negotiation 
spaces or platforms; approvals and signatures; post-execution compliance management; integration of 
contract terms with internal ICT infrastructure; integration of contract terms with counterparty ICT 
infrastructure.  Which roles/functions (internal) and counterparties would likely see the benefit of these?  
In which settings do you believe ICT-supported contracting is most likely to be seen as valuable?     
10.  What are trends and developments in contracting and contracting relationships that you believe bear 
on these questions?  What about for example “win-win” or “trust” perspectives? 
Other comments?  Please provide any other comments/insights you may have relevant to the experience 
of contract management software to date, and more generally  the question of how you think ICT can (or 
should not) be deployed to support contracting. 
For contracting parties (customers or potential customers of contract management software):  Would your 
organization be interested in being the subject of an in-depth case study? 
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Appendix 4.3 Questions in Part 1 of the survey 
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Appendix 4.4 Questions in Part 2 of the survey 
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Appendix 4.5 Profile of the respondents 
Parameter Category Number of 
respondents – 
part 1 
Number of 
respondents – part 
2, non-vendors only 
Industry Aerospace/defense 11 9 
Banking/insurance/financial 6 4 
Education/non-profit/governmental 2 2 
Energy/resources/utilities 12 7 
Engineering/construction 12 10 
Healthcare/pharma/biotech 10 5 
IT/telecoms/software/high-tech 26 20 
Manufacturing 8 8 
Retail 3 1 
Services – other 1 1 
Services – outsourcing 2 2 
Services –professional 10 1 
Transportation/distribution/logistics 3 1 
Other 0 7 
TOTAL 106 78 
Head office location Americas 73 49 
Asia/Pacific 9 9 
EMEA 24 20 
TOTAL 106 78 
Size of business (revenues, or 
size of budget, for 
education/non-
profit/governmental) 
Less than $10 million 13 
 
5 
$10 million to $100 million 8 9 
More than $100 million to $1 
billion 
17 11 
More than $1 billion to $10 billion 30 23 
More than $10 billion 30 29 
Don’t know or n/a 8 1 
TOTAL 106 78 
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Appendix 4.6 Survey responses regarding status of CMS* 
Part 1 of survey: With respect to THIS TYPE of contract [your most important], which best describes your current 
status vis-à-vis a contract management software system (built in-house, from a CMS (contract management software) 
vendor or from another software provider)? 
Response Number of 
responses 
Percentage of 
responses 
We have a contract management software system in use, development or 
implementation for ALL OR MOST of these contracts. 
41 39% 
 
We have a contract management software system in use, development or 
implementation for SOME of these contracts only. 
21 20% 
We are considering a contract management software system for these 
contracts. 
16 15% 
We don't have and are not considering a contract management software 
system for these contracts. 
22 21% 
Other 4 4% 
I don’t know the status 2 2% 
TOTAL 106 100% 
 
*Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding in this and other Appendices.
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Part 1 of survey: With rest to this ENTIRE PORTFOLIO OF BOOK OF CONTRACTS you work with, which best 
describes any contract management software systems (built in-house, from a CMS (contract management software) 
vendor or from another software provider) you have or are working on? 
Response Number of 
responses 
Percentage of 
responses 
We have a SINGLE contract management software system in use, 
development or implementation for ALL OR MOST of these contracts. 
31 29% 
We have a SINGLE contract management software system in use, 
development or implementation which covers SOME of these contracts. 
7 7% 
We have MULTIPLE contract management software systems in use, 
development or implementation which together cover ALL OR MOST of 
these contracts. 
15 14% 
We have MULTIPLE contract management software systems in use, 
development or implementation which together cover SOME of these 
contracts. 
9 8% 
We don't have but are considering a contract management software system 
for some or all of these contracts.              
14 13% 
We don't have and are not considering a contract management software 
system for these contracts.                         
21 20% 
Other 1 1% 
I don’t know the status. 5 5% 
No response 3 3% 
TOTAL 106 100% 
 
Part 2 of survey (non-vendors only): Which best describes your current status vis-a vis a contract management 
software system (built in-house, from a CMS vendor or from another software provider)? 
Response Number of 
responses 
Percentage of 
responses 
We have a contract management software system in use. 26 
 
33% 
We have a contract management software system in development, 
implementation or rollout. 
8 10% 
We are considering a contract management software system. 8 10% 
We don’t have and are not considering a contract management 
software system. 
24 31% 
I don’t know the status 6 8% 
No response 6 8% 
TOTAL 78 100% 
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Appendix 4.7 Gartner coverage of CMS and CMS vendors (indicative; see footnote 2) 
Outsourcing: Effective Contract Management (December 1998) 
Ariba ORMS: Managing High-End E-Procurement (March 2000) 
B2B Positioning in State and Local Government and Higher Education: AMS and Ariba Launch E-Market Maker 
(March 2000) 
VeriSign Scores Big With Ariba/Amex E-Payment Venture (June 2000) 
Ariba to Acquire SupplierMarket.com (June 2000) 
Ariba to Support Financial Services Needed for Ecommerce (August 2000) 
Ariba Dynamic Trade: Beyond the Acquisition (September 2000) 
IBM/i2/Ariba: E-Marketplace Methodology or Monster? (September 2000) 
Technology Partners Chip In to Enhance Electronics EMarketplace (January 2001 
Purchase of Agile to Extend Ariba's Limited Range of Motion (February 2001) 
Ariba Aims at C-Commerce With Value Chain Management (March 2001) 
RightWorks Will Bring i2 More Procurement Capabilities and Integration Challenges (March 2001) 
Ariba After the Fall (March 2001) 
Agile After Ariba: OK for Now, but Challenges Lie Ahead (May 2001) 
E-Commerce Heavyweights: Can They Go the Distance? (May 2001) 
Economic Downturn Hits Sales Configuration Vendors Hard (May 2001) 
Ariba Buyer 7.0 (May 2001) 
Ariba on Problem Watch (May 2001) 
Selectica's Enhanced Configurator Lacks Price Maintenance (July 2001) 
Ariba No Longer on Gartner's Problem Watch (September 2001) 
Selectica: Extending TES Market Penetration for Payers (January 2002) 
Contract Life-Cycle Management: A $20 Billion Market (April 2002) 
Ariba's Outlook Is Improving (September 2002) 
Sales Configuration Vendors: 1Q03 Magic Quadrant (February 2003) 
Use Crisis and Contract Management for 409 Compliance (September 2003) 
Good Contract Management Demands Fused Business Processes (October 2003) 
Ariba to Buy Alliente, Enter the Procurement BPO Market (January 2004) 
Ariba Will Buy FreeMarkets, Raise Stakes in ERP Market (January 2004) 
Ariba's 'Invoice' Leverages Ariba E-Procurement Success (February 2004) 
Management Update: New and Increased Challenges for Contract Managers (February 2004) 
The First Law of Contract Management (March 2004) 
Vendor Rating: Selectica (May 2004) 
Selectica/I-many Merger Links Pricing, Contract Management (December 2004) 
Ariba/ePlus Settlement Could Spark More Patent Lawsuits (February 2005) 
Boost for Procurement Systems as Emptoris and diCarta Merge (April 2006) 
SAP Advances With Frictionless Buy, but SRM Weakness Remains (May 2006) 
I-many Release Refocuses on Life Sciences Contract Management (July 2007) 
MarketScope for Contract Management, 2007 (July 2007) 
Ariba Deal Will Remove a Competitor From the Market (September 2007) 
Vendor Rating: Ariba (October 2007) 
Vendor Rating: Emptoris (March 2008) 
Magic Quadrant for Sourcing Application Suites (April 2008) 
Ariba's Transformation Journey Is Not Complete (July 2008) 
Marketscope for Enterprise Contract Management (November 2008) 
Ariba Lawsuit Delivers a Moderate Blow to Emptoris (December 2008) 
The Four Axes of Contract Management: Authoring, Execution, Partner Boilerplate Support and Administration 
(January 2009) 
Key Issues for Enterprise Contract Management and Procurement  Applications, 2009 (March 2009) 
I-many Deal Will Benefit Revenue Management Software Market (June 2009) 
Vendor Managers Must Understand Outsourcing Contract Schedules to Effectively Manage the Deal (August 2009) 
Cloud-Enabled Outsourcing: New Ideas for Effective Governance and Management (August 2009) 
Vendor Management Key Initiative Overview (February 2010) 
Enterprise Contract Management Solutions Vendor Guide, 2010 (May 2010) 
IT Score Overview for IT Sourcing and IT Vendor Management (September 2010) 
Accenture-Ariba Deal Shows How SCM BPO Market May Evolve (October 2010) 
Magic Quadrant for Telecom Expense Management (December 2010) 
Rivermine Acquisition Expands Emptoris' Service Spend Capabilities (January 2011) 
Exploiting a Single Contract Life Cycle Management Solution Across the Enterprise (February 2011) 
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Appendix 5.1 Vendor versus non-vendor comparison of CMS priorities (difference in 
means not statistically significant) 
CMS feature priorities (rated from 1 (not a priority) to 5 (high 
priority) 
Vendor 
mean  
(N = 7) 
Non-
vendor  
(N = 
79) 
Total 
mean  
(N = 
86) 
Difference 
Document features Efficient production of contracts 4.29 4.22 4.22 .07 
Ability to find documents 4.86 4.54 4.57 .32 
E-records in place of contracts 3.43 2.58 2.65 .85 
Clause level management 3.43 2.82 2.87 .61 
Internal process 
features 
Reduced cycle time 4.57 4.25 4.28 .32 
Internal control 4.43 4.24 4.26 .19 
Standardization 4.29 3.76 3.80 .53 
Match buy-side to sell-side 3.71 3.13 3.17 .58 
Internal 
information and 
knowledge 
capabilities 
Data integration 3.57 3.73 3.72 -.16 
Supporting contract personnel 4.43 4.20 4.22 .23 
Match contract terms to outcome 4.43 4.13 4.15 .30 
Holistic view of counterparties 3.71 3.37 3.40 .34 
Analytics, scenario planning 3.14 3.48 3.45 -.34 
Outward-facing 
information and 
knowledge 
capabilities 
Counterparty and network risk 2.86 3.03 3.01 -.17 
Counterparty and network value creation 2.43 2.84 2.8 -.41 
Information available to auditors, regulators and 
the like 
4.00 3.34 3.40 .66 
Counterparty and contract governance 3.57 3.22 3.24 .35 
E-commerce, social networking or industry 
trading platforms or exchanges 
2.57 2.05 2.09 .52 
  
314 
 
Appendix 5.2 Scope of CMS implementation (from Part 2 of survey – 29 users) 
Which best describes the implementation of your contract management system? (select one) 
Response Number of 
responses 
Percentage of 
responses 
The implementation is NOW IN EFFECT enterprise-wide. 11 38% 
The implementation is INTENDED TO BE enterprise-wide. 3 10% 
The implementation is specific to one or more functions or business units, 
but there are no competing solutions (other contract management software 
systems). 
5 17% 
The implementation is specific to one or more functions or business units, 
and there are competing solutions (other contract management software 
systems). 
4 14% 
Hasn’t been decided. 1 3% 
Other 2 7% 
Don’t know 1 3% 
No response 2 7% 
TOTAL 29 100% 
 
Appendix 5.3 Access to CMS (from Part 2 of survey – 29 users) 
Response Number of 
responses 
Percentage of 
responses 
Quite open access 0 0% 
Relatively wide access but on a views- and permissions-
controlled basis 
9 
 
31% 
Multiple functions but on need-to-know basis only 10 34% 
Tightly controlled, single function or business unit access only 7 24% 
Don’t know 1 3% 
No response 2 7% 
TOTAL 29 100% 
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Appendix 5.4 Type of most important contract as related to risk-shifting (P < .05; 2 cells 
(22.2%) have expected count less than 5); risk-shifting by type of contract and relationship 
to CMS adoption (sell side ONLY: P< .05) 
 Risk shifting 
AWAY FROM 
respondent 
firm 
Risk is shared 
or not material 
Risk is shifted 
TO respondent 
firm 
TOTAL 
Important 
contract is buy-
side, sell-side 
or other 
Buy-side 12 (43%) 12 (43%) 4(14%) 28 (100%) 
Sell-side 7(15%) 22 (46%) 19 (40%) 48 (100%) 
Other 4 (36%)   6 (55%) 1 (9%) 11 (100%) 
TOTAL 23 (26%) 40 (46%) 24 (28%) 87 (100%) 
 
 
 
Type of contract 
Status of CMS adoption  
 
Total 
Does not have and is not 
considering CMS 
Using, implementing or 
considering CMS 
Other Risk shared or shifted away 
from respondent 
1 
10% 
9 
90% 
10 
Risk shifted to respondent 0 
0% 
1 
100% 
1 
Total 1 
9% 
10 
91% 
11 
Buy-
side 
Risk shared or shifted away 
from respondent 
2 
9% 
21 
91% 
23 
Risk shifted to respondent 0 
0% 
4 
100% 
4 
Total 2 
7% 
25 
93% 
27 
Sell-
side 
Risk shared or shifted away 
from respondent 
5 
20% 
20 
80% 
25 
 
Risk shifted to respondent 10 
56% 
8 
44% 
18 
 
Total 15 
35% 
28 
65% 
43 
316 
 
Appendix 5.5 CMS features expected to be used within 1 year of implementation (italicized 
features are those fewer than 10 of 29 users expect to use within 1 year of implementation) 
CMS features expected to be used within 1 year of implementation Frequency (N = 29) 
Documents features Automated document creation 18 (62%) 
Full text search 16 (55%) 
Linking related documents 16 (55%) 
Repository (documents database) 14 (48%) 
Clause level management 12 (41%) 
Clause library 11 (38%) 
Records management features  10 (34%) 
Modular construction of contracts 9 (31%) 
Internal process and information 
features 
Amendments and change orders 22 (76%) 
Alerts 18 (62%) 
Dashboard 16 (55%) 
Reports 15 (52%) 
Workflow for approvals 14 (48%) 
Data integration 4 (14%) 
Modelling/analytics 3 (10%) 
Counterparty collaboration features Redlining 12 (41%) 
Milestones monitoring 8 (28%) 
Strategic sourcing 6 (21%) 
Data-sharing 6 (21%) 
Shared workspace 5 (17%) 
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Appendix 5.6 Precise definition of contract performance as related to data discreteness 
(whether a contract can be easily represented with discrete datapoints (i.e. numbers, dates, 
ratings, checkboxes; P =.107 so not statistically significant) 
 Data 
discreteness 
(below the 
mean) 
Data 
discreteness 
(above the 
mean) 
TOTAL 
Whether contract performance is precisely 
defined and compliance easy to measure; 
few implicit elements of performance 
Below the mean 29 (55%) 24 (45%) 53 
(100%) 
Above the mean 19 (39%) 30 (61%) 49 
(100%) 
TOTAL 48 (47%) 54 (53%) 102 
(100%) 
 
Appendix 5.7 Capture of contract data generally as related to CMS adoption  
Response 
category 
Response Does not have 
and is not 
considering 
CMS 
Considering, implementing or using 
CMS 
TOTAL Significance 
(Pearson Chi-
square) 
Part 1 – 
number of 
data points 
captured for 
most 
important 
contract 
None to 10 17 (45%) 21 (55%) 38  P < .001 
11 to 20 0 (0%) 27 (100%) 27  
More than 
20 
4 (12%) 29 (88%) 33  
TOTAL 21 (22%) 77 (78%) 99  
Part 2 – 
enterprise-
wide 
capture of 
contract 
data? 
Yes 9 (23%) 30 (77%) 39  P < .01 
No or don’t 
know 
14 (56%) 11 (44%) 25  
TOTAL 23 (36%) 41 (64%) 64  
 
  
318 
 
Appendix 5.8 Particular contract datapoints captured as related to CMS adoption 
Datapoints captured Frequency (percentage of 100 
respondents) 
Significant relationship to CMS 
adoption? 
Expiry, renewal or other dates 85 (85%) P < .001* 
Price, discount, rebate 65 (65%) P < .01 
Governing law 56 (56%) NO 
Quantities, delivery or milestones 54 (54%) NO 
Internal ownership, approvals 5 (53%) P < .005 
Disputes 47 (47%) NO 
IP (intellectual property) 39 (39%) NO 
Corporate affiliation of 
counterparty 
38 (38%) P < .005 
Change in control (respondent’s 
firm) 
35 (35%) P < .10 
Change in control (counterparty’s) 27 (27%) NO 
Systemic risk  20 (20%) NO 
Counterparty credit risk 15 (15%) NO 
Currency risk  15 (15%) NO 
Country risk 14 (14%) NO 
NO DATAPOINTS 10 (10%) P < .005 (negative association) 
*1 cell (25%) has expected count less than 5. 
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Appendix 5.9 Other IT systems to CMS adoption (no significant association found for MDM 
(master data management) (P = .170), DMS/RMS (documents or records management) (P = 
.142), SCM (supply chain management) (P = .144) or a general risk management function (P = 
.607)) 
Other IT system 
or initiative not 
specific to 
contracting 
Responses 
(percentage of total 
responses (66)) (yes 
indicates box ticked; 
no indicates box not 
ticked 
Of the positive 
responses: Does not 
have and is not 
considering CMS 
(percentage of 
positive responses) 
Of the positive 
responses: Using, 
implementing or 
considering CMS 
(percentage of positive 
responses) 
Significance 
(Pearson Chi-
square) 
ERP (enterprise 
resource 
planning) 
45 yes (68%) of 
responses) 
 
9 (20%) 36 (80%) P < .001 
21 no (32%) 15 (71%) 6 (29%) 
CRM (customer 
relationship 
management) 
34 yes (52%) 9 (26.5%) 25 (73.5%) P < .10 
32 no (48%) 15 (47%) 17 (53%) 
SRM (seller 
relationship 
management) 
10 yes (15%) 1 (10%) 9 (90%) P < .10* 
56 no (85%) 23 (41%) 33 (59%) 
BI (business 
intelligence) 
25 yes (38%) 2 (8%) 23 (92%) P < .001 
41 no (62%) 22 (54%) 19 (46%) 
Business process 
or workflow 
29 yes (44%) 6 (21%) 23 (79%) P < .05 
37 no (56%) 18 (49%) 19 (51%) 
ECM (enterprise 
content 
management) 
13 yes (20%) 0 (0%) 13 (100%) P < .01* 
53 no (80%) 24 (45%) 29 (55%) 
Office 
productivity 
collaboration 
(Sharepoint) 
29 yes (44%) 6 (21%) 23 (79%) P < .05 
37 no (56%) 18 (49%) 19 (51%) 
Automated 
document 
creation 
13 yes (20%) 2 (15%) 11 (85%) P < .10* 
53 no (80%) 22 (41.5%) 31 (58.5%) 
*1 cell (25%) has expected count less than 5. 
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Appendix 5.10 Factors important when selecting CMS (from Part 2 of survey – 29 users) 
In terms of your contract management software system selection decision, rate the importance of the following (from 
5 (very important) to 1 (not important). 
 
Factor in CMS selection decision (29 users) Average score  
Fitting into overall organization information or IT strategy 4.00 
Minimizing ongoing dependence on vendor and/or consultant/reseller/systems 
integrator 
3.73 
Vendor expertise and experience in your industry 3.61 
Customer recommendations 3.61 
Part of a suite or extension of larger applications (e.g. SAP) 3.41 
Analyst research, ranking and recommendations 3.36 
Minimizing ongoing dependence on internal IT department 3.32 
Consultant/reseller/systems integrator recommendations 2.74 
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Appendix 5.11 CMS selection among pure-play vendors, other software vendors and built 
in-house  
From Part 1 of survey: If you have (in use, development or implementation) a contract management system for THIS 
TYPE [your most important type] of contract, the system is: 
Type of system Number of 
responses 
Percentage of 
responses 
From a vendor specializing in contract management software 23 30% 
Home-grown/built in-house 20 26% 
From a documents, records or enterprise content management 
system provider 
8 10% 
From an ERP provider (e.g. Oracle or SAP) 8 10% 
From an office productivity suite provider (e.g. Microsoft 
Sharepoint) 
7 9% 
From a word-processing or document automation provider 2 3% 
Other 6 8% 
Don’t know 3 4% 
TOTAL 77 100% 
 
From Part 2 of survey (27 users with CMS currently in use or in process of implementation): The contract 
management system you have is: 
Type of system Number of 
responses 
Percentage of 
responses 
From a vendor specializing in contract management software 11 41% 
An in-house system (no outside vendor) 10 37% 
From an ERP provider (e.g. Oracle or SAP) 2 7% 
From an office productivity suite provider (e.g. Microsoft 
Sharepoint) 
2 7% 
From a documents, records or enterprise content management 
provider 
1 4% 
Other 1 4% 
TOTAL 27 100% 
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Appendix 5.12 The business case for CMS – three perspectives 
[Global networking equipment company] have studied contract management software quite 
extensively and are fans of what it does. But they have a major problem because they have so 
many existing tools that overlap with it. These are 1) For tendering – a common sales platform 
which manages configuration options (SAP), 2) An ERP – SAP, and 3) a sales workflow tool 
that runs a gated system for approvals, based on limits of authority tied to the risk identified. 
(They are consolidated with their US parent company for financial accounting purposes so need 
to demonstrate Sarbanes-Oxley compliance.)  
What is missing are: 1) A contract-drafting tool, 2) A contracts database, and 3) A claims and 
change management tool. Given tight budget constraints they are trying to figure out how to 
meet these needs without a lot of expense.  
They do have standard contract templates but most of the time they have to use the customer’s 
template. They have a document management system they from OpenText Enterprise Content 
Management, and their contracts are in that system – it was a standard product that was 
customized for them, similar to Documentum. It is just an electronic store for documents. There 
is full text search but it doesn’t help you find things, it throws up too much. Also it is set up to 
match the company structure. They are starting to look at Sharepoint.  
The general problem is that everything is needs-driven, just set up to meet particular needs. 
There is guidance on how to put things into the DMS but nobody follows it. Right now they are 
trying to create a contracts database. SAP has some contract data for ordering and invoicing but 
it captures minimal terms, and no contract wording. For example, it may say that payment is in 
30 days but it doesn’t say anything about the conditions for prepayment. So they are trying to 
work out a cheap way of building a database with a depository for the documents and a 
searchable summary for each. This would be poor in comparison to say [CMS from two of the 
five focus vendors]. But what those vendors offer overlaps too much with what our company 
already has, so it is hard to make the case.  
Each of the existing systems has been created to meet the needs of a particular department rather 
than to create an overview.  The documents repository would be a library in their existing DMS, 
where they would put the document in whatever form, Word or pdf. Then there is a list of about 
80-90 datapoints that the contract management professionals would like to capture. Ideally, the 
contract would be broken up against these datapoints but they don’t have the workforce to do 
that. They would do this going forward for contracts and for a selection of their existing 
contracts (not all). About 60-70% of the contracts need to be in the database. He expects many 
companies that have grown up in this way are in a similar position.  
The software companies keep calling him to see the demos. You can’t translate the ideal 
situation from the software demos into the mess that is there. The CM professionals would like 
CMS, but the challenge is why they should have it just to fill in the gaps. The ERP system has 
been growing out since the merger of [former parent companies]. It has been hard to adapt into 
one company and taken lots of effort. The end of 2011 is the target for that. Now they have 
purchased [another company], another big chunk is coming in. The need to harmonize these 
companies takes up the resources and the “nice to have” get left behind. SAP has a CM module 
that maybe could be used. Right now SAP is mostly used for ordering and invoicing/accounting. 
It is hard to know how these various SAP modules are harmonized. They also use the SAP 
CRM module but it is mostly about contacts, and is not linked to contracts. You could find the 
contracts by going back through the workflow approvals but it isn’t that easy.  
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A long-time contract manager assessed CMS against a “pyramid” of capabilities. At the bottom 
was a spreadsheet of basic contract information. “You can do a lot of this with Excel.” The next 
level would be document management capabilities, including document creation and routing for 
approvals. But he thought that when focus shifted to this, people sometimes lost sight of the 
need to track simple contract information, such as expiry dates. For most companies, he thought 
that these two capabilities would be enough. Grafted onto this by some vendors was a push to 
automate purchasing and reduce costs through reverse auctions and the like. In his view, this 
was a way to shift power toward buyers, and it worked very well for commodity purchasing but 
not for other contracting. “It just doesn’t work for global procurement, for outsourcing, for 
offshoring of complex technology. For buying sheet metal, oil, coal and for commodities like 
these it can be pretty slick. It is good at picking up the incremental commodity opportunity. You 
can’t use it to automate the buying of components and assembly services in China or Taiwan. 
…” At the highest level of the pyramid were the industry-specific contracting data and 
practices. “Pick any industry, there’s a special set of considerations. … So the idea of a unified 
industry software for standard business processes of contracting – it just may not be there.” 
(emphasis added)  
He described the CMS concept as the product of a “harmonic convergence” – workflow, 
document automation, reverse auctions – but “sellers looked at it and said there’s nothing in it 
for us other than decreased margins and lost opportunities to sell based on value, not just cost. 
There is a comparable trend on the sales side around CRM systems, which are sold to shift 
relationship and historical power back to sellers. Purchasing communities vary across the 
spectrum in terms of the importance of cost versus other attributes.   
Workflow doesn’t work at the high end. Interfaces to other core transactional systems was 
difficult to achieve and difficult to maintain. “SAP for example is pretty tightly wound.”  
CMS implementation would also be variable depending on company culture, particular attitudes 
toward centralized control. “[XCo] was very de-centralized and had set up some bizarre 
management incentives which set up various operations in competition with one another. So 
they did not share information internally. Compare [YCo], which is a tightly centralized 
organization for capital acquisitions. At their headquarters they run something like a battlefield 
fortress. If staff don’t comply with established processes they are terminated or you are 
reassigned to buying roofing for warehouses. So that’s another aspect; you have very different 
company cultures. If a company is very centralized, so that if you don’t comply you hit the road 
– you are going to have a very different implementation. If a corporation is decentralized, it may 
be important to the people in Chicago to pretend that they are in charge of the operations in 
China. That doesn’t make any sense, if you are in China you need local managers.”  
He summed up the dilemma for CMS: “It’s hard to make a lot of money in the basic 
transactional stuff that a programmer can do with Access. Then on the document management 
side, you’ve got MS Word which has really gotten to be very good in terms of managing 
documents and templates. So CMS had two big hurdles: industry-unique characteristics and the 
difficulty of integrating with core operating systems.” 
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A contract manager in the healthcare industry had migrated through a series of applications for 
contract management and followed developments in the CMS market over the last 10 years. For 
a number of years he worked with a medical records specialist provider that was able to manage 
the legacy contracts migration problem for the customer and understood the information 
requirements for the domain. But this system was quite limited, and most contracting activity 
was taking place outside the system. For example, there was no place to store notes or 
correspondence. When he looked again at the CMS market in 2007, he was troubled by the fact 
that so many of the earlier applications had “morphed into different products”. He also noted 
that some of the public companies seemed focused on shareholder value, not their products, 
while many vendors were no longer around. In 2011 when he was in the market again he found 
that there were lots of vendors in the market, some with niche products, but demos took a lot of 
time, and were not all that informative. He had contacted [one of the five focus vendors] but 
they did not seem interested, probably because he would have been a relatively small account. 
He was considering offerings from the legal case management market, and was also looking at 
one company that promised automated data abstraction and at another that offered data 
abstraction by lawyers working in India. 
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Appendix 6.1 Magic Quadrants) 
 
Magic Quadrant template from Gartner Inc. (2008a; with permission; see footnote 2)  
326 
 
[Excerpts from Gartner Magic Quadrant for Telecom Expense Management removed as 
copyright is owned by Gartner Inc.] 
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Appendix 6.2 Aberdeen marketing communications and categories 
Because I had registered to obtain materials on Aberdeen’s website, I was on their mailing list for marketing 
communications. In June 2011, I received 8 invitations to participate in surveys, 11 invitations to webinars, 34 offers 
of complimentary research reports, 3 invitations to conferences, and 4 weekly research recaps. Screenshots included 
with permission of Aberdeen Group. 
Screenshot of invitation to participate in a survey: 
 
Survey invitations for June 2011: 
June 6, 2011 – The Higher Education WLAN Challenge: Network-Readiness for the Smart Device Invasions 
June 7, 2011 – 360 Degree Customer View: Maximize Up-Sell and Cross-Sell Potential 
June 7, 2011 – Dynamic Procurement Management: CPO as Innovator, Collaborator and Strategist 
June 9, 2011 – Integrated Transportation Management 
June 13, 2011 – Effective Disclosure Management 
June 15, 2011 – Enterprise Mobility Management 2011 
June 20, 2011 – Can Your Organization Afford To Hire The Wrong Talent? 
June 27, 2011 – Sales and Operations Planning: Key Lever for Enabling Business Profitability for the Chief Supply 
Chain Officer 
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Invitation to a webinar: 
 
Offers of a complimentary report:
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Invitation to a conference: 
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Weekly research recap: 
 
 
The Weekly Research Recap, Powered by Aberdeen Group Complimentary Research, divides research 
reports into four categories: Sales, Marketing, and Services; Supply Chain, Procurement and Sourcing; 
Manufacturing and Product Development; and Information Technology and Communications. 
As of May 2012, Aberdeen’s research categories (as listed on its website) were: Business Intelligence, 
Communications, Enterprise Resource Planning, Financial Management and GRC, Global Supply 
Management, Human Capital Management, IT Infrastructure, IT Security, Manufacturing, Marketing 
Effectiveness and Strategy, Networking and App. Performance, Product Innovation and Engineering, 
Retail & Consumer Markets, Sales Effectiveness & Strategy, Service Management, and Supply Chain 
Management. 
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Appendix 6.3 Gartner blog on the contract lifecycle 
Finishing up this year’s iteration of the MarketScope for Contract Management (which is soon to go into 
final editing – hurrah!) has really made me think long and hard about what makes a contract a contract – 
and hence, what makes a contract management system a contract management system. I can certainly say 
this year that I have expanded my view, and it’s about time. I’ve been too easily swayed by the “contract 
lifecycle management” rhetoric that has defined the industry that I cover. 
Please indulge me with a personal example. Yesterday morning, I reviewed and signed a contract with a 
ski area, authorizing them to rent my ski condo when I am not using it. I’ve had this arrangement for 
many years and it provides a wonderful means to offset some of the costs of owning this property, and it 
keeps the condo spotlessly clean. I’ve had a long history negotiating contracts – I was employed in my 
teens in my family business as a rental manager for an apartment complex – so naturally, I changed some 
of the terms that I didn’t care for. The ski area home owner manager immediately called me to question 
the changes. I think it’s fairly safe to say that they rarely if ever have condo owners attempt to negotiate 
their rental agreements!    
Many contracts are handled without any expectation of negotiation. Mobile phone agreements. Non-
disclosure agreements. Leases. When I worked in purchasing, I had my terms and conditions printed on 
the back of the hard-copy purchase order forms. And here at Gartner – I bet that the only thing that gets 
negotiated on our subscription contracts is the price and type of subscription. The point is – why should 
we tell everyone they need a “lifecycle management” solution when the lifecycle of many contracts 
consists of send, sign and file?  It’s time we recognize in the contract management applications industry 
that there is a variety of contract types, and one that is signed ‘as is’ is no less a contract than one that is 
heavily negotiated. The logical conclusion of this assertion is that ‘simple’ contract management 
functionality is necessarily really simple, but perhaps right-sized to a contract type that we all know and 
love. (Wilson 2008; with permission of Gartner Inc.; see footnote 2) 
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Appendix 6.4 I-Many financial overview (in millions of dollars, except for employees and 
stock prices) 
Year 
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($
) 
1995 $1.2 
           
$(2.2)  
            
$(4.3) 
                
$.8  
                        
-    
        
$.3  n/a     
1996 $3.4 
            
$(.5)      
            
$(4.8) 
             
$2.3  
                        
-    
         
$.3  46     
1997 $7.5 
              
$.3    
            
$(6.3) 
             
$4.7  
                        
-    
      
$1.9  67     
1998 $13.5 
             
$1.9  
              
$5.3 
           
$11.6  
                        
-    
      
$5.1  n/a     
1999 $19.4 
           
$(5.2)  
                 
$.2 
           
$27.2  
                        
-    
    
$15.3  167     
2000 $36.5 
          
$(24.2) 
            
$68.8 
           
$85.4  
                
$10.1 
           
$50.6  348 
        
$27.38  
          
$7.75  
2001 $56.1 
          
$(21.2) 
            
$75.3 
           
$92.0  
                
$34.8  
           
$36.0  373 
        
$22.75  
          
$1.86  
2002 $54.7 
          
$(27.5) 
            
$66.2 
           
$84.6  
                
$30.1  
           
$36.0  358 
          
$9.36  
          
$1.08  
2003 $39.4 
          
$(39.7) 
            
$29.2 
           
$49.6  
                  
$8.5  
          
$21.9  198 
          
$1.72  
          
$0.68  
2004 $38.4 
            
$(7.3) 
            
$25.9 
           
$44.2  
                  
$8.7  
          
$17.7  176 
          
$1.68  
          
$0.68  
2005 $32.6 
            
$(9.3) 
            
$18.4 
           
$38.5  
                  
$8.7  
          
$16.8  164 
          
$1.77  
          
$1.28  
2006 $29.6 
          
$(15.8) 
            
$11.5 
           
$37.0  
                  
$8.7  
          
$17.2  185 
          
$2.43  
          
$1.36  
2007 $40.6 
            
$(9.8) 
              
$4.6 
           
$47.7  
                  
$8.7  
          
$28.6  199 
          
$3.34  
          
$1.64  
2008 $34.4 
          
$(15.6) 
            
$(8.7) 
           
$31.2  
                  
$9.8  
            
$9.3  167 
          
$3.17  
          
$0.13  
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Appendix 6.5 Excerpts from I-Many agreement with Procter and Gamble 
[Excerpts from the strategic relationship agreement with Procter & Gamble dated May 2000 are available as Exhibit 
10.23 to I-Many’s S-1 filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission June 30, 2000.] 
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Appendix 6.6 I-Many strategic acquisitions 
Date, type of 
transaction and 
consideration 
Company/asset Capabilities, contribution Rationale 
May 2000; 
strategic alliance 
incorporating 
product license, 
warrants and 
royalty payments 
Procter and Gamble Joint development of 
consumer packaged goods 
purchasing capability 
Expand into new 
vertical – food and 
consumer products 
industry (purchasing) 
October 2000; 
joint venture 
Distribution Market 
Advantage 
To jointly develop a food 
service market portal 
Vertical expansion in 
food service 
October 2000; 
consulting contract 
Hale Group Obtain advice on the food 
service industry needs 
Vertical expansion in 
food service 
November 2000; 
acquisition; $11.1 
million in cash and  
stock and with 
possible earn-out 
of $ $4.6 million 
 
Chi-Cor: Trade Funds 
Management System, 
Deductions Management 
System and 
SettleLink.net, “the first 
Internet-based exchange 
for collaborative trade 
funds and deductions 
management” 
Trade promotions, 
deductions, and online 
portal for B2B settlement; 
70 customers “in a variety 
of vertical markets, 
including consumer 
packaged goods, chemicals, 
electronics, building 
products, pharmaceuticals 
and apparel makers; $3.5 
million in revenues 
“Rapidly expand its 
presence in the 
consumer product 
goods (CPG) market, 
fortify its position in 
the healthcare industry, 
and fuel its penetration 
into additional vertical 
markets” 
 
January 2001; 
acquisition; $1.1 
million cash and 
stock 
Vintage Software Competing product sold to 
mid-market pharmaceutical 
companies 
Market consolidation 
March 2001; 
acquisition; $2.8 
million cash and 
stock 
Intersoft International Markets software to 
companies and brokers in 
the food service industry 
Expansion in the food 
service industry 
April 2001; 
acquisition; $12 
million cash and 
stock 
BCL Vision, based in 
London 
Global collection and 
dispute management 
solutions 
“opportunity to extend 
into markets such as 
financial services, 
telecoms, publishing, 
high-tech, industrial 
products, and 
chemicals, where BCL 
has already established 
a strong presence” as 
well as international 
expansion 
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I-Many strategic acquisitions, cont. 
Date, type of 
transaction and 
consideration 
Company/asset Capabilities, 
contribution 
Rationale 
April 2001; marketing 
alliance; Accenture 
received warrants at 
$9.725 with 
opportunity to earn 
more based on 
revenues from 
Accenture clients 
Accenture I-Many to be 
Accenture’s preferred 
provider of automated 
contract management 
solutions for one year; 
Accenture to be I-
Many’s preferred 
business integration 
provider 
Marketing partner 
August 2001; 
acquisition; $16 
million stock and 
warrants 
Provato Contract management 
and compliance 
solutions 
Focus on “contract 
management”, contract 
management 
capabilities  
March 2002; 
acquisition; $97 
million cash and stock 
with possible $3 
million earnout 
Menerva Technologies 
Inc. 
Buy-side contract 
management 
Building out the 
offering to include 
contract management 
capabilities and the buy-
side 
March 2002; asset 
acquisition; $3.4 
million cash and stock, 
plus possible $2 
million earnout 
NetReturn, LLC Government pricing 
compliance software 
Extension of 
pharmaceutical 
compliance offerings 
July 2003; planned 
asset sale; $20 million; 
DEAL 
TERMINATED 
DECEMBER 2003 
Neoforma (purchaser) I-Many’s health and life 
sciences business; pro 
forma revenues for I-
Many would drop to $3 
million per quarter from 
$10 million per quarter 
Focus on non-
healthcare markets; 
monetize healthcare 
business 
April 2004; 
acquisition; $1.2 
million cash and 
possible earnout 
Pricing Analytics Pricing optimization or 
pricing strategy 
software 
Product offering 
enhancement 
December 2004; 
planned merger; 
approximately $70 
million ($1.55 per 
share); DEAL VOTED 
DOWN BY I-MANY 
STOCKHOLDERS IN 
MARCH 2005 
Selectica Contract management 
and pricing engine 
Industry consolidation 
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I-Many strategic acquisitions, cont. 
Date, type of 
transaction and 
consideration 
Company/asset Capabilities, 
contribution 
Rationale 
October 2005; 
marketing partnership  
xoomworks.com Procurement and 
finance professional 
services company 
European 
implementation partner 
November 2005; 
advisory relationship  
Liolios Investor relations 
advice 
Improve 
communications with 
investors, financial 
media and target 
markets 
4Q 2007; accelerated 
product development 
agreement with a 
customer  
Pfizer Accelerated product 
development for a 
customer 
Specialist product 
development in core 
offering; delivered in 
2008 
January 2008; asset 
acquisition; $2.2 
million cash 
Global Healthcare 
Exchange 
Claimright software 
business and customers 
Purchase of competing 
software development 
project and 
incorporation of its 
functionality into I-
Many products 
May 2008; acquisition; 
$5.1 million cash  
Edge Dynamics “a leading provider of 
channel demand 
management solutions 
for the life sciences 
industry” 
Consolidation of 
product offerings in the 
health care segment
50
 
March 2009; 
marketing partnership  
CSC Global IT services “Together, I-many and 
CSC are working to 
help pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology 
companies prepare for 
Medicare Part D 
compliance audits.” 
 
 
                                                          
50
 “According to Hussain Mooraj, research director at AMR Research (Boston), ‘Pharma companies 
sometimes spend more in rebates and chargebacks than they do in R&D, yet their confidence in how well 
they are managing it, and how well they are maintaining regulatory compliance, remains low.’ The 
addition of Edge Dynamics technology will help I-many customers reduce more of these risks and 
associated costs. For example, Edge’s chargeback solution can enable I-many CARS® to verify 
chargebacks against channel sales data, and identify missing chargebacks and negative chargebacks. In 
addition, by incorporating Edge Dynamics products and data into its own solution, I-many will be able to 
provide customers with more insight on product demand and the actual movement of products from the 
factory to the patient.” 
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I-Many strategic acquisitions, cont. 
Date, type of 
transaction and 
consideration 
Company/asset Capabilities, 
contribution 
Rationale 
February 2010; 
strategic alliance 
Polaris Contracting 
Solutions, a leading 
management consulting 
firm providing 
pharmaceutical and 
medical device 
companies with health 
care law compliance, 
consulting services and 
solutions 
Business process 
outsourcing for an 
outsourced government 
pricing solution 
Improve product 
offerings for 
government pricing 
May 2010; strategic 
partnership 
Alliance Life Sciences 
Consulting Group 
“asset-based solutions 
to address the revenue 
and customer 
management challenges 
that pharmaceutical 
manufacturers face 
today” 
 
More depth in pharma 
offerings 
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Press release on the acquisition of Chi-Cor: 
[See I-Many press release dated November 6, 2000, filed as Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8K filed with the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission November 8, 2000.] 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
339 
 
Appendix 6.7 Excerpt from I-Many investor conference call at time of sale of company in 
2009 
[See transcript of the I-Many investor conference call of April 29, 2009, filed as Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8K 
filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission May 1, 2009.]     
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Appendix 6.8 I-Many business description at year end 2008 and when acquired in June 
2009 
At year end 2008 I-Many management had defined their business broadly, consistent with the CMS organizing vision 
(I-Many Annual Report on Form 10K for 2008). 
 
We provide software and related professional services that allow our clients to manage important aspects of 
their contractual relationships, including:  
Contract compliance management for verification of compliance and accuracy of orders, shipments, 
invoices, chargebacks, rebates and payments, both against contractual documents and correlated by the 
physical movement of product through channels, to ensure error-free operations and proper performance-
based incentives 
Contract creation, repository, actionable terms tracking, date and event monitoring and reporting  
Cash collection, deductions management and dispute resolution, often based on analysis of agreed to 
contract terms and conditions  
Visibility into key aspects of the existing contract portfolio to include key performance measurements for 
existing contracts, related transactions against those contracts and operational aspects of the contracting 
process, and, decision support for planned contracting activity to optimize chosen key performance 
indicators such as revenue, profitability and market share with new additions to the contract portfolio 
Support for distribution relationships to enable fee for service calculations and insight into the actual 
movement of product through the channel for the optimization of inventory levels, and  
Evaluation of the effectiveness of contracts and business operations. 
 
But the new owners laid out a rather narrower brief. 
 
An investment in I-Many offers LLR the chance to partner with a valuable franchise and a core team of 
capable executives. Together, LLR Partners and I-Many will work to leverage the company’s domain 
knowledge and technical capability for the benefit of I-Many’s existing customers and prospects in 
pharmaceutical development/manufacturing, medical devices and other industries where increased 
regulatory oversight and the need for enhanced compliance requires leading edge solutions for enhanced 
data management, data processing and business intelligence. (I-Many press release April 29, 2009) 
(emphasis added) 
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Appendix 6.9 I-Many segment reporting 
 
Segment reporting for 2000-2002 was in three categories: life sciences, consumer packaged goods and 
food services (representing the Procter and Gamble market), and other. For 2003-2004, the categories 
were health and life science, and other. Starting in 2005, “other” was renamed “industry solutions”.  
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1995 $1.2 $(2.2) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1996 $3.4 $(0.5) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1997 $7.5 $0.3 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1998 $13.5 $1.9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1999 $19.4 $(5.2) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2000 $36.5 $(24.2) $36.1 99% $0.3 1% $0 0% 
2001 $56.1 $(21.2) $44.9 80% $9.9 20% $0 0% 
2002 $54.7 $(27.5) $37.4 68% $11.8 21% $5.5 10% 
2003 $39.4 $(39.7) $26.0 66% n/a n/a $13.4 34% 
2004 $38.4 $(7.3) $27.9 73% n/a n/a $10.5 27% 
2005 $32.6 $(9.3) $24.6 76% n/a n/a $8.0 24% 
2006 $29.6 $(15.8) $21.9 74% n/a n/a $7.7 26% 
2007 $40.6 $(9.8) $31.4 77% n/a n/a $9.2 23% 
2008 $34.4 $(15.6) $29.1 85%   $5.3 15% 
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Appendix 6.10 I-Many revenue classification 
Revenues were split between products and services through 2006, and then categorized as recurring, 
services and licenses. 
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1995 $1.2 $(2.2) $0.3 27% $0.9 73% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1996 $3.4 $(0.02) $2.1 63% $1.3 37% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1997 $7.5 $0.3 $5.0 67% $2.5 33% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1998 $13.5 $1.9 $8.5 63% $5.0 37% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1999 $19.4 $(5.2) $9.2 48% $10.1 52% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2000 $36.5 $(24.8) $15.6 43% $20.8 57% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2001 $56.1 $(21.2) $30.0 54% $26.0 46% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2002 $54.7 $(27.5) $30.8 56% $23.9 44% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2003 $39.4 $(39.7) $14.3 36% $25.1 64% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2004 $38.4 $(7.3) $11.2 29% $27.1 71% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2005 $32.6 $(9.3) $6.2 19% $26.3 81% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2006 $29.6 $(15.8) $4.0 13% $25.6 87% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2007 $40.6 $(9.8) n/a n/a $13.5 33% $19.7 49% $7.3 18% 
2008 $34.4 $(15.6) n/a n/a $10.6 31% $20.5 60% $3.3 10% 
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Appendix 6.11 Selectica financial overview (in millions of dollars, except for employees and 
stock prices; Selectica’s financial reporting year ends March 31 (i.e. fiscal year 2003 runs from 
April 2002 through March 2003)) 
 
*In February 2010, the board approved a one-for-twenty reverse stock split. 
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1997 
(partial 
year) 
$.1 $(.3) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1998 $.2 $(3.1) $.9 $1.4 $.1 $.5 n/a n/a n/a 
1999 $3.4 $(7.5) $.7 $3.2 
 
$.1 - 92  n/a n/a 
2000 $16.1 $(30.8) $214.1 $242.4 - $215.80 439 (139 
in India) 
n/a n/a 
2001 $53.9 $(49.9) $182.5 $219.8 $12.6 $137.20 753 (364 
in India) 
$86.50 $4.40 
2002 $47.2 $(26.4) $153.4 $174.4 $10.0 $126.10 524 (243 
in India) 
$6.32 $2.40 
2003 $35.6 $(29.7) $113.1 $137.1 n/a $109.20 456 (235 
in India) 
$4.42 $2.13 
2004 $40.0 $(8.8) $112.0 $126.4 n/a $97.30 320 (140 
in India) 
$5.55 $2.69 
2005 $31.1 $(14.7) $97.7 $107.6 n/a $93.30 270 (139 
in India) 
$5.60 $3.16 
2006 $23.4 $(17.5) $78.3 $85.9 n/a $74.00 170 (81 
in India) 
$3.72 $2.48 
2007 $14.7 $(20.9) $49.9 $63.6 n/a $57.50 129 (66 
in India) 
$2.88 $1.61 
2008 $16.0 $(23.9) $27.3 $40.2 n/a $35.20 67 (6 in 
India) 
$2.07 $1.20 
2009 $16.4 $(8.4) $17.3 $33.3 n/a $23.50 51 (0 in 
India)  
$1.56 
($31.20)
* 
$.29 
($5.80)
* 
2010 $15.2 $(4.6) $12.0 $22.5 n/a $17.20 58 $10.00 $3.80 
2011 $14.5 $(1.5) $10.7 $20.6 n/a $17.0 51 $6.30 $4.19 
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Appendix 6.12 Selectica segment reporting (revenues in millions of dollars) 
Date Segment description Revenue 
breakdown by 
segment 
Original S-1 
filed 
December 10, 
1999 
A single segment: internet selling software (ISS) for electronic commerce n/a 
2000 10K Same as above n/a 
2001 10K Same as 2000 n/a 
2002 10K Same as 2001 n/a 
2003 10K Same as 2002 n/a 
2004 10K A single segment: configuration, pricing management and quoting solutions 
for ecommerce 
n/a 
2005 10K Same as 2004 n/a 
2006 10K One business segment, in which they develop, market, sell and support 
software that helps companies with multiple product lines and channels of 
distribution to effectively configure, price, quote new business and manage 
the contracting process for their products and services 
n/a in 2006 but 
broken out by 2007: 
Sales execution 
$22.9 Contract 
lifecycle 
management $.6 
2007 10K The business is focused towards delivering software and services under two 
operating segments (1) Sales Execution, (SE) and (2) Contract Lifecycle 
Management, (CLM). The SE segment provides products that enable 
customers to increase revenues and reduce costs through web-enabled 
automation of quote-to-contract business processes. The CLM segment 
provides products that enable customers to create, manage and analyze 
contracts in a single, easy to use repository.  
Sales execution 
$12.9 Contract 
lifecycle 
management $1.9 
2008 10K The business is focused towards delivering software and services under two 
operating segments (1) Sales configuration, (SCS) and (2) Contract 
management, (CM). The SCS segment provides products that enable 
customers to increase revenues and reduce costs through web-enabled 
automation of quote-to-contract business processes. The CM segment 
provides products that enable customers to create, manage and analyze 
contracts in a single, easy to use repository.  
Sales configuration 
$10.2 Contract 
management $5.8 
2009 10K The business is focused towards delivering software and services under two 
operating segments (1) contract management, and (2) sales configuration. 
Sales configuration 
$6.5 Contract 
management $9.9 
2010 10K Same as 2009 Sales configuration 
$5.7 Contract 
management $9.5 
2011 10K The Company operates as one business segment and therefore segment 
information is not presented 
n/a 
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Appendix 6.13 Selectica customers 
Year 
Revenues- 
Millions ($) 
% revenues for 5 (3) 
largest customers 
% revenues for 10 
largest customers 
Customers > 10% of 
revenues 
1999 $3.4 85% 96% BMW 60%, Olicon 10% 
2000 $16.1 53% 76% 
LVMH 12%, 3Com 10%, 
Fireman’s Fund 10%, 
Samsung 12% 
2001 $53.9 55% 67% 
Samsung 17%, Dell 16%, 
Cisco 14% 
2002 $47.2 32% 50% A 11% 
2003 $35.6 53% 65% A 14%, B 25% 
2004 $40.0 78% 88% B 20%, C 39% 
2005 $31.1 67% 86% 
C 23%, D 14%, E 12%, F 
11% 
2006 $23.4 67% 80% C 23%, D 22% 
2007 $14.7 61% 75% C 11%, G 30%, H 12% 
2008 $16.0 52% (3 largest 45%) 65% G 25%, H 12% 
2009 $16.4 (3 largest 33%) n/a G 18% 
2010 $15.2 (3 largest 33%) n/a G 15% 
2011 $14.5 (3 largest 28%) n/a  G 16% 
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Appendix 6.14 Selectica revenue classification 
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1999 $3.4 ($7.5) $1.7 50% $1.8 50% 
2000 $16.1 ($30.8) $9.2 57% $6.9 43% 
2001 $53.9 ($49.9) $23.9 44% $30.0 56% 
2002 $47.2 ($26.4) $16.7 35% $30.5 65% 
2003 $35.6 ($29.7) $10.2 29% $25.4 71% 
2004 $40.0 ($8.8) $16.9 42% $23.1 58% 
2005 $31.1 ($14.7) $9.1 29% $22.0 71% 
2006 $23.4 ($17.5) $4.4 19% $19.0 81% 
2007 $14.7 ($20.9) $1.4 10% $13.4 90% 
2008 $16.0 ($23.9) $4.6 29% $11.4 71% 
2009 $16.4 ($8.4) $3.6 22% $12.9 78% 
2010 $15.2 ($4.6) $3.2 21% $12.0 79% 
2011 $14.5 ($1.5) $2.4 17% $12.1 83% 
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Appendix 6.15 Ariba financial overview (in millions of dollars, except for employees and 
stock prices; Ariba’s financial reporting year ends September 30 (i.e. fiscal year 2003 runs from 
October 2002 through September 2003)) 
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1997 $0.8 $(4.7) $14.5  $16.8  n/a $15.5  n/a n/a n/a 
1998 $8.4 $(11.0) $10.0 $19.2 n/a $13.9 n/a n/a n/a 
1999 $45.4 $(29.3) $122.2 $170.0 n/a $98.1 386 $99.32  $30.50 
2000 $279.0 $(792.8) $3498.2 $3815.9 $3287.1 $280.2 1680 $168.75  $36.87* 
2001 $408.8 $(2681.0) $925.9 $1288 $877.8 $217.9 1124 $141.52  $1.42 
2002 $229.8 $(638.7) $311.0 $624.6 $176.5 $157.2 836 $7.82 $1.30 
2003 $236.7 $(106.3) $216.9 $459.1 $181.0 $127.1 845 $4.7  $1.30 
2004 $245.8 $(25.2) $646.4 $933.9 $574.7 $111.3 1686 $24.00 $7.27* 
2005 $323.0 $(349.6) $329.5 $590.6 $328.7 $111.4 1506 $17.5 $5.40 
2006 $296.0 $(47.8) $333.0 $586.9 $326.1 $138.8 1676 $10.89 $5.70 
2007 $301.7 $(15.0) $351.1 $583.6 $326.1 $145 1669 $11.18 $7.15 
2008 $328.1 $(41.1) $391.0 $627.5 $406.5 $86.8 1740 $18.58 $8.26 
2009 $339.0 $8.2 $434.1 $668.2 $406.5 $143.1 1632 $14.00 $6.00 
2010 $361.1 $16.4 $499.0 $721.7 $406.5 $200.8 1804 $19.06 $10.74 
 
*2 for 1 stock splits were made in November 1999 and March 2000; in July 2004 there was a 6 for 1 
reverse stock split.  
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Appendix 6.16 Ariba strategic transactions  
Date, type of 
transaction and 
consideration 
Company/asset Capabilities, 
contribution 
Rationale 
January 2000; 
$465 million 
stock acquisition 
TradingDynamics, Inc. “a leading provider of 
business-to-business 
Internet 
trading applications” 
B2B ecommerce applications 
(business-to-business Internet trading 
applications, including business-to-
business auction, request for quote 
("RFQ"), reverse auction, and bid/ask-
style exchange mechanisms) – 
purchased for product offerings and 
R&D teams 
March 2000; $2.3 
billion stock 
acquisition 
TRADEX 
Technologies 
“a leading provider of 
solutions for Net 
Markets” 
B2B ecommerce applications – 
purchased for product offerings and 
R&D teams 
August 2000; 
$607 million 
stock acquisition 
SupplierMarket.com “a provider of online 
collaborative sourcing 
technologies” 
B2B ecommerce applications that 
allow buyers and suppliers of direct 
and indirect materials to locate new 
trading partners, negotiate purchases 
and collaborate on the Internet– 
purchased for product offerings and 
R&D teams 
December 2000; 
sale of interest by 
subsidiary for 
$40 million 
40% interest in Nihon 
Ariba sold to Softbank 
Partner for Japanese 
business 
International expansion partner 
January 2003; 
$3.3 million cash 
acquisition 
Goodex “a privately-held 
European sourcing 
services provider” 
“The acquisition was made to allow the 
Company to expand its sourcing 
services and to implement customers’ 
strategic sourcing business processes.” 
January 2004; 
$10 million cash 
acquisition 
Alliente “Alliente provided 
procurement outsourcing 
services to companies 
based on Ariba 
technology.” 
Consolidation 
April 2004; $81 
million cash 
acquisition 
Softface “a spending performance 
management company 
offering data enrichment 
solutions complementary 
to Ariba’s products” 
Consolidation 
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Ariba strategic transactions, cont. 
Date, type of 
transaction and 
consideration 
Company/asset Capabilities, 
contribution 
Rationale 
July 2004; 
$549.5 million 
stock and cash 
merger 
Freemarkets “FreeMarkets provided 
companies with 
software, services and 
information for global 
supply management.” 
 “Through our merger with FreeMarkets and 
acquisition of Alliente, we have enhanced the 
Ariba Solutions Delivery organization during the 
past year both by adding professionals with 
strategic sourcing expertise, business process re-
engineering expertise, specific commodity 
expertise and best practices expertise, and by 
adding a procurement outsourcing capability.” 
December 2007; 
$103.2 million 
cash and stock 
acquisition 
Procuri “Procuri is a provider 
of on-demand supply 
management 
solutions.” 
Consolidation, especially into on-demand space 
November 2010; 
sale of sourcing 
services business 
for $51 million 
cash  
Accenture Sourcing services 
including business 
process outsourcing 
Concentrate on supplier network 
January 2011; 
$150 million cash 
and stock 
including a 
deferred payment 
portion 
Quadrem Supplier network 
located in Europe 
Grow supplier network 
May 2012; 
announced $4.3 
billion cash 
acquisition by 
SAP 
SAP Dominant ERP vendor SAP to acquire supplier network and strategic 
move into the cloud 
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Appendix 6.17 Ariba revenue classification 
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1999 $45.4 $(29.3) $26.8 59% $18.6 41% n/a n/a 
2000 $279.0 $(792.8) $198.8 71% $80.2 29% n/a n/a 
2001 $408.8 $(2681.0) $269.3 66% $139.6 34% n/a n/a 
2002 $229.8 $(638.7) $98.4 43% $131.4 57% n/a n/a 
2003 $236.7 $(106.3) $103.1 44% $133.6 56% n/a n/a 
2004 $245.8 $(25.2) $65.7 27% $95.7 39% $84.5 34% 
2005 $323.0 $(349.6) $47.8 15% $121.8 38% $151.8 47% 
2006 $296.0 $(47.8) $23.9 8% $126.6 43% $145.5 49% 
2007 $301.7 $(15.0) $18.2 6% $140.6 47% $142.8 47% 
2008 $328.1 $(41.1) $0 0% $187.2 57% $140.9 43% 
2009 $339.9 $8.2 $0 0% $222.2 66% $116.8 34% 
2010 $361.1 $16.4 $0 0% $240.8 67% $120.4 33% 
 
From 2008 10-K: “These different revenue streams also carry different gross margins. Revenue from 
subscription and maintenance fees tends to be higher-margin revenue with gross margins typically around 
75% to 80%. Subscription and maintenance fees are generally based on software products developed by 
us, which carry minimal marginal cost to reproduce and sell. Revenue from labor-intensive services and 
other fees tends to be lower-margin revenue, with gross margins typically in the 20% to 40% range. Our 
overall gross margins could fluctuate from period to period depending upon the mix of revenue. For 
example, a period with a higher mix of license revenue versus services revenue would drive overall gross 
margin higher and vice versa.” 
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Appendix 6.18 Ariba 2010 business description 
 [In lieu of excerpts, see Sections entitled “Ariba Collaborative Business Commerce Solutions”, “Ariba 
Network”, and “Ariba Services” in Ariba’s Annual Report on Form 10K for 2010, filed with the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission November 23, 2010.] 
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Appendix 6.19 Emptoris spend analysis solution from June 2009 website: granularity and 
scale (Courtesy of International Business Machines Corporation, © International Business 
Machines Corporation) 
Emptoris Spend Analysis Solution 
 
 
Emptoris Spend Analysis is a robust software solution that may be deployed quickly and 
flexibly to meet your unique requirements. 
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Spend Analyzer 
The Spend Analyzer provides reports, dashboards, and multi-dimensional analysis for users 
to quickly and dynamically analyze their spend data to drive better business decisions. 
Capabilities Benefits 
Instantaneously slice, dice, and 
analyze spend across multiple 
dimensions 
Empower hundreds of users 
Analyze spend along dozens of 
dimensions, including commodity, 
cost center, GL account, geography, 
time, payment terms, UNSPSC code, 
supplier diversity status, and more 
Ask system questions to identify new 
savings opportunities 
Micro-analyze 100's of savings 
opportunities simultaneously 
Refine analysis on-the-fly (without 
writing reports or complex queries) 
Rapidly drill down to transaction and 
line item details 
Create reports and cross tabs on-the-
fly 
Leverage 50 standard reports from a 
central dashboard & easily add new 
reports, as needed 
Analyze 100+ million transactions 
from dozens of data sources in a 
single, integrated view 
Track user adoption by frequency and 
depth of analysis 
Gain visibility into supplier 
performance 
Control violations and alignment 
between contract terms and actual 
spending 
Identify opportunities to negotiate 
new contracts in high spend 
categories where currently none 
exists 
Reduce off-contract "maverick" 
spending 
Discover areas to maximize 
purchasing leverage through demand 
aggregation and supplier 
consolidation 
Instantly identify all suppliers 
currently providing needed goods and 
services 
Select suppliers to participate in 
sourcing activities based on enriched 
supplier attributes (e.g., preferred or 
minority-owned vendor, credit risk 
and performance rating) 
Improve negotiating position by 
leveraging all spend with a supplier, 
not just spend related to one 
negotiation 
Understand how much spend is with 
poor performing suppliers and 
identify opportunities to move spend 
from poor performing suppliers to 
good performing suppliers 
Track spend against low and high 
performing suppliers to develop 
focused supplier development 
strategies for high spend/low 
performing suppliers 
Ensure that actual spending across 
the enterprise matches contractual 
levels and terms 
Reduce off-contract “maverick” 
spending 
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Spend Data Manager 
The Spend Data Manager leverages Emptoris knowledge bases to deliver automated 
enrichment and categorization that is both accurate and granular. The Spend Data 
Manager can be leveraged in two ways. It is offered as a service with Emptoris Spend 
Analysts using the software on your behalf and returning the enriched spend data directly to 
your database or making it available via the Spend Analyzer. It is also offered as software; 
we train your team to use it, load the appropriate knowledge bases, and empower you to 
manager your spend data directly. 
Benefits Capabilities 
Achieve high accuracy in your spend 
classification 
Improve insight with enriched vendor 
and item information leveraging 
Emptoris knowledge bases 
Empower in-house resources to 
frequently enrich and categorize your 
spend data 
Adhere to corporate data security 
policies to keep spend data on 
premise 
Multiple auto-classification algorithms 
to classify all types of spend—direct, 
indirect, and MRO, including 
Bayesian, natural 
language processing and nearest 
neighbor 
Continuous improvement through 
closed-loop feedback mechanisms 
and learning, including feedback 
driven rules and machine learning 
Taxonomy independant classification 
to support your business needs, 
including: UNSPSC, eClass, eOTD, 
proprietary, and other taxonomies 
Automatic web crawling to integrate 
external information from, for 
example, supplier catalogs 
Vendor knowledge base 
Item knowledge base, based on 
UNSPSC 
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Real-Time Spend Classifer 
The Real-Time Spend Classifier ensures more accurate categorization immediately at the 
point-of-entry by integrating with transactional procurement or purchase order systems 
(e.g., SAP, Oracle, Ariba Buyer, home-grown purchasing systems). 
Benefits Capabilities 
Classify spend accurately at point-of-
entry (e.g., line items in requisitions 
and purchase orders) 
Continuously improve accuracy of 
spend classification 
Reduce misclassified and “other” 
spend 
Improve spend visibility to identify 
more savings opportunities 
Web service that integrates with your 
transactional purchasing system 
(e.g., SAP, Oracle, Ariba Buyer) for 
real-time classification 
Multiple auto-classification algorithms 
to classify all types of spend 
Taxonomy independant classification 
Vendor knowledge base 
Item knowledge base, based on 
UNSPSC 
The Emptoris Compliance solution builds upon Emptoris Spend Analysis to deliver 
additional value, such as spend and contract visibility and procure-to-pay contract 
monitoring. As well, Emptoris offers the following value-added services to help its customers 
make the most of their investment in Emptoris Spend Analysis and ensure that it delivers 
against their business objectives. 
FastTrack 
FastTrack implementations provide the necessary education, knowledge transfer, and 
program design to get Emptoris Spend Analysis deployed quickly—typically in three months 
or less—and in a manner that ensures rapid adoption. In addition to delivering software 
implementation and user training, FastTrack looks at your spend analysis program holistically 
to ensure that you will be able to realize your business objectives. In pursuit of that goal, 
FastTrack may include: 
 Analysis of current "as-is" state, including inventory of available systems and data 
 Collection and synthesis of reporting needs across various stakeholders 
 Development of rapid implementation plan, leveraging spend analysis best practices 
 Development of data gathering requirements to maximize the value for purchasing, 
sourcing, and compliance initiatives 
Data Extraction 
With individual customers aggregating spend data from over 110 sources, Emptoris 
understands that data gathering can be a hurdle for many companies looking to improve 
their spend visibility. Under the Emptoris Data Extraction service, we work with you to ensure 
your data is properly extracted, transformed and loaded into the Spend Data Manager in a 
consistent and timely manner. 
Opportunity Assessment 
This value-added service, offered as part of our consulting services, helps you leverage 
spend data analysis to identify and prioritize sourcing opportunities, leveraging the Spend 
Analyzer and other secondary inputs. This includes opportunity modeling, presentation and 
report development, opportunity prioritization assistance, and program planning. The service 
is designed to transfer knowledge and expertise, so opportunity assessment can become an 
internal core competency within your team. 
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Customer Success with 
Emptoris Spend Analysis 
 
 
Emptoris customers have delivered substantial value to their businesses with Emptoris 
Spend Analysis. In the area of sourcing and supply management, it commonly enables 
12% cost reduction through more informed strategies, as a result of being able to: 
 Identify and prioritize sourcing initiatives 
 Aggregate demand across business units and geographies 
 Rationalize suppliers 
 Monitor for and obtain supplier rebates 
 Plan post-merger procurement integration 
Emptoris Spend Analysis also enables companies to monitor spending across the 
enterprise and: 
 Reduce maverick spend 
 Increase contract compliance 
 Ensure budget compliance 
 Reduce e-procurement bypass 
 Reduce purchasing card bypass 
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Our customer’s results speak for themselves: 
 
$350 million saved 
 
A Global 1000 grocery retailer needed to 
reduce its not-for-resale costs as a 
percentage of sales across 1,400 stores. 
They used Emptoris Spend Analysis to 
identify new savings opportunities and save 
$350 million—which was vouched for by 
finance as hard, bottom-line cost savings. 
The analyzed over $4 billion that spanned 
across: 
  
 3.7 million transactions 
 33 currencies 
 25,000 vendors records 
 42,000 material master items 
 
$40 Million Saved In Year 1 
 
A chemical company with one global instance 
of SAP business data warehouse thought 
their spend data was “beyond repair.” They 
needed to turn it into useful information to 
meet aggressive savings targets. They turned 
to Emptoris Spend Analysis to improve the 
quality of the information in their data 
warehouse. They accurately and granularly 
classified 95% of their spend and saved $40 
million in the first year alone. They analyzed 
$6.4 billion that included: 
  
 3.7 million transactions 
 33 currencies 
 25,000 vendors records 
 42,000 material master items 
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Data Aggregation for Complete Coverage 
of Enterprise Spend 
 
 
Enterprises today are looking for visibility across all their spend enterprise-wide 
regardless of source system, language, or currency. Doing so empowers them to 
aggregate demand, improve compliance across business units and geographies, 
improve volume-driven leverage during supplier negotiations, and more. 
 
Whether you have a single integrated data warehouse or spend data scattered across dozens 
of systems, Emptoris can help you achieve visibility across all your spend. Emptoris 
customers aggregate spend data from numerous systems, including: 
 PeopleSoft 
 SAP 
 Oracle 
 ACH 
 JD Edwards 
 Homegrown A/P 
 P-Card 
 EFT systems 
 GEAC 
 Ariba Buyer 
 HR systems 
 T&E systems 
 VAR/Vendor feeds 
 Purchase Order 
Moreover, our customers' visibility extends beyond just vendor and commodity to provide 
additional insights and dimensions of analysis. Emptoris leverages all the detail in your 
spend transactions and integrates external item and vendor information. Over a third of our 
customers analyze their spend data along more than 15 different dimensions, which often 
include: 
 Vendor 
 Commodity 
 Time 
 Geography 
 General ledger 
 Cost center 
 Supplier diversity status 
 Preferred supplier 
status 
 Spend range 
 On/off contract 
 ISO certified supplier  
Learn how the Spend Data Manager and Data Extraction empower customers to achieve 
visibility into all their spend. 
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Case in point: 
 
Global food company aggregates data from 19 SAP systems in 
10 countries and languages 
 
A global food leader had spend scattered 
across 19 SAP systems in 10 countries and 
in 10 languages. They had no way to pull 
this together and get a comprehensive view 
of their spending. Emptoris partnered with 
them to aggregate, normalize, and cleanse 
the spend data from all these source 
systems. Over the course of a 90-day 
FastTrack implementation, the following 
was achieved: 
  
 1.2 million transactions representing $1.9 
billion in spend was aggregated 
 64,000 vendors were grouped and 
consolidated into to 32,700 “families” of 
related companies. 
 Spend was mapped to 14 dimensions (e.g., 
vendor, commodity, vendor status, 
geography, etc.) 
 95% of spend was accurately categorized 
across 400 unique commodity codes and 
185,000 uniquely identified items 
 
Learn More: 
Emptoris invites you to learn more about the Emptoris enterprise spend analysis solution 
through the following content: 
On Demand Webcasts 
Building a Business Case for a Spend Analysis System at Your Company 
In this webcast, hosted by Paul Teague, Editor-in-Chief of Purchasing Magazine, hear Mitch 
Plaat, Vice President of Procurement at Con-way Inc. and Bill DeMartino, Director of Spend 
Analysis at Emptoris, share their insights on how to get a new spend analysis initiative 
funded at your company. 
Books and Whitepapers 
“Spend Analysis: The Window into Strategic Sourcing” – Co-authored by byKiritPandit 
and Dr. HaralambosMarmanis, this comprehensive book on spend analysis provides a 
complete overview of spend analysis best practices and technologies, including dozens of 
case studies of spend analysis implementations at leading global companies. 
“High Performance Through Procurement: The Role of Technology” – Co-authored Emptoris 
and Accenture, this whitepaper highlights the processes and technology that businesses 
employ to become procurement masters. 
For additional data about how companies benefit from Emptoris technology, visit 
ournewsroom. 
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Accurate Spend Categorization 
 
 
In order to make the most of their spend visibility, companies need it to be both 
accurate and granular. By accurate, we mean that each dollar, euro, yen, etc. of 
spend is assigned to the correct item in your chosen taxonomy, be it UNSPSC, eClass, 
proprietary, or another taxonomy. By granular, we mean that each transaction is categorized 
to the lowest level of detail possible. Being more granular can mean the difference between 
knowing what you’ve spent on “Information Technology” (common level 1) vs. “Notebook 
Computers” (common level 4). 
How granular do you want your spend visibility to be? Emptoris customers achieve deep 
granularity enabling their sourcing and finance professionals to make more informed 
business decisions. 
 
Taxonomy Granularity 
 
To achieve accurate and granular categorization, companies need robust data enrichment 
and classification software. And, Emptoris delivers. The Emptoris difference includes: 
 Multiple auto-classification algorithms to classify all types of spend 
o Bayesian 
o Natural language processing 
o Nearest neighbor 
 Continuous improvement through closed-loop feedback mechanisms and learning 
o Feedback driven rules 
o Machine learning 
 Taxonomy independant categorization to support your business needs 
o UNSPSC 
o eClass 
o eOTD 
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o Proprietary taxonomies 
 Automatic web crawling to integrate external information from, for example, supplier 
catalogs 
 Vendor knowledge base 
 Item knowledge base, based on UNSPSC 
 Domain & category expertise 
Learn how the Spend Data Manager empower customers to achieve accurate and granular 
spend visibility. 
 
  
Learn More: 
Emptoris invites you to learn more about the Emptoris enterprise spend analysis solution 
through the following content: 
On Demand Webcasts 
Building a Business Case for a Spend Analysis System at Your Company 
In this webcast, hosted by Paul Teague, Editor-in-Chief of Purchasing Magazine, hear Mitch 
Plaat, Vice President of Procurement at Con-way Inc. and Bill DeMartino, Director of Spend 
Analysis at Emptoris, share their insights on how to get a new spend analysis initiative 
funded at your company. 
Books and Whitepapers 
“Spend Analysis: The Window into Strategic Sourcing” – Co-authored by byKiritPandit 
and Dr. HaralambosMarmanis, this comprehensive book on spend analysis provides a 
complete overview of spend analysis best practices and technologies, including dozens of 
case studies of spend analysis implementations at leading global companies. 
“High Performance Through Procurement: The Role of Technology” – Co-authored Emptoris 
and Accenture, this whitepaper highlights the processes and technology that businesses 
employ to become procurement masters. 
For additional data about how companies benefit from Emptoris technology, visit 
ournewsroom. 
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Appendix 6.20 Upside company description 
 
2000 a leading provider of electronic billing solutions for the business-to-business marketplace  
2001 Upside Software provides integrated enterprise solutions that help streamline financial and 
business operations for companies of any size. 
2002 Upside Software provides integrated enterprise solutions that help streamline financial and 
business operations for companies of any size. The company's web-based solutions focus on 
electronic billing, contract management, expense claim management and time-based resource 
booking management and are based on Microsoft technologies. 
2003 Upside Software provides the leading Contract Management Software solution in the market – 
UpsideContract – as well as other integrated business solutions to handle Invoice and Billing 
Management, Project Management, and Travel & Entertainment Expense Management. 
UpsideContract and UpsideContract-LITE are well suited to Enterprise (e.g. Fortune 500, Global 
2000), Public sector (Federal, State/Provincial, Municipal and Health Care) and the Small and 
Medium (SME) sector customers. Through improved business processes and leveraged business 
intelligence, Upside Software’s customers can reduce operating costs and improve customer and 
supplier relationships. The company’s Corporate and ASP implementations are delivered to 
customers in as little as 3 days and provide a full return-on-investment (ROI) in less than one 
year. Upside Software is a profitable company with a very mature and comprehensive Contract 
Management Software product.  The company has extensive experience delivering real value to 
a large number of public- and private-sector customers of every size including small and 
medium enterprises and large global customers (ranked in the Fortune 20). 
2004 Upside Software provides the leading Contract Management Software solution in the market – 
UpsideContract – as well as other integrated business solutions to handle Sourcing & 
Procurement, Invoice and Billing Management, and Project & Resource Management. Upside 
Software’s products are well suited to Enterprise (e.g. Fortune 500, Global 2000), Public sector 
(Federal, State/Provincial, Municipal and Health Care) and the Small and Medium Enterprise 
(SME) sector customers.  Upside Software’s customers realize significant cost savings and 
improve customer and supplier relationships. The company’s Corporate and ASP 
implementations are delivered to customers in as little as 3 days and provide a full return-on-
investment (ROI) in much less than one year. Upside Software is a profitable, growing company 
with a very mature and comprehensive product suite.  The company has extensive experience 
delivering real value to customers of every size and in many industry verticals. 
2005 Same as above except now “most” industry verticals. 
2006 Same as 2005. 
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Upside company description, cont. 
2007 Upside Software is the worldwide leader in Contract Lifecycle Management (CLM) solutions. 
Customers around the globe use UpsideContract and other integrated business solutions to 
confidently perform Contract Management, Sourcing & Procurement, and Invoice & Billing 
Management activities throughout their organizations. Upside Software’s products address the 
needs of Enterprise (e.g. Fortune 500, Global 2000), Public sector (Federal, State/Provincial, 
Municipal and Health Care), and Small & Medium Enterprise (SME) customers. Customers 
realize significant cost savings while improving customer and supplier relationships. Upside 
Software’s solutions are deployed in as little as 3 days and typically provide a full return-on-
investment (ROI) in under a year. Founded in 2000, Upside Software is a profitable, growing 
company with an advanced, yet mature, and comprehensive product suite. The company has 
extensive experience delivering real value to customers of every size and in most industry 
verticals 
2008 Upside Software is the worldwide leader in Contract Management Software solutions around the 
globe. Upside Software’s products address the needs of Enterprise (e.g. Fortune 500, Global 
2000), Public sector (Federal, State/Provincial, Municipal and Health Care), and Small & 
Medium Enterprise (SME) customers. Customers realize significant cost savings while 
improving customer and supplier relationships. Upside Software’s solutions typically provide a 
full return-on-investment (ROI) in under a year. Founded in 2000, Upside Software is a 
profitable, growing company with an advanced, yet mature, and comprehensive product suite. 
The company has extensive experience delivering real value to over 200 customers of every size 
and in most industry verticals globally. 
2009 Same as 2008. 
2010 Same as 2008. 
2011 Upside Software is the worldwide leader in Contract Lifecycle Management (CLM) solutions 
with hundreds of deployments in about 180 countries. Upside’s award winning product suite, 
including their UpsideContract solution, offers a fully automated contract management process 
that starts from collaborative contract creation, negotiation and award, and includes risk, 
performance, compliance and deliverable tracking and management, financial processing (e.g. 
invoices and payments), and on-going event monitoring and management. UpsideContract also 
includes a wizard-like request entry function, amongst the best Microsoft Word integration, and 
extensive security and business intelligence features. 
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Appendix 6.21 Ariba on marketing, training and support (2008 10K) 
[See sections entitled “Marketing” and “Customer Service, Training and Support” in Ariba’s Annual Report 
for 2008 on Form 10-K filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission on November 19, 2008.] 
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Appendix 6.22 Pictures of the contract lifecycle and contract management (Upside) 
[Images removed as copyright is owned by Upside.] 
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Appendix 6.23 Upside’s UpsideLive 
[Images removed as copyright is owned by Upside.] 
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Appendix 6.24 Mentions of IACCM and analysts in press releases (Emptoris and Upside) 
Emptoris press release dates and mentions of IACCM or analysts 
October 2001 - Forrester 
July 2002 - AMR 
November 2002 - AMR 
September 2003 - AMR, Aberdeen 
May 2004 - Aberdeen 
January 2005- Aberdeen 
February 2005- Gartner 
November 2005 - Forrester 
July 2006 - Forrester 
November 2006 - Gartner 
February 2007 - Forrester 
August 2007 - Gartner 
February 2008 - AMR 
March 2008- Gartner 
March 2008 - IACCM 
March 2008 - IACCM 
April 2008 - Gartner 
June 2008 - Forrester 
June 2008 - Gartner 
July 2008 - IACCM 
August 2008 - Forrester 
December 2008 - Gartner 
January 2009 – AMR, Gartner 
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Upside press release dates and mentions of IACCM or analysts 
December 2001 – Goldman Sachs 
April 2002 – Goldman Sachs, Gartner 
September 2002 - Gartner 
December 2002 - Gartner 
February 2003 - AMR 
June 2003 - IACCM 
July 2003; August 2003 (twice); September 2003 – Gartner, Aberdeen 
November 2003 – IACCM, Aberdeen, Gartner 
February 2004 (twice) – Aberdeen, Gartner 
May 2004 - Aberdeen 
October 2004 - Aberdeen 
July 2005 - Aberdeen 
April 2006 - Aberdeen 
June 2006 - Aberdeen 
January 2007 - Aberdeen 
February 2007 - Aberdeen 
April 2007 - IACCM 
March 2008 - IACCM 
April 2008 - IACCM 
May 2008 - AMR 
August 2008 - Forrester 
October 2009 - AMR 
April 2010 - Forrester 
May 2010 - AMR 
January 2011 – Gartner, Forrester 
March 2011 - Gartner 
June 2011 - Forrester 
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Appendix 6.25 Targeted web ads (Ariba, March 14 and March 22, 2011) 
 
[Images of targeted web ads for Ariba (by Google) removed as they may contain copyrighted 
material owned by other organizations.] 
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Appendix 6.26 Sales and marketing and research and development expenditures for I-
Many, Selectica and Ariba 
I-Many sales and marketing expenses and research and development expenses (in millions of 
dollars): 
 
Year 
N
et re
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1995 $1.2 $(2.2) $.3  22%    $1.0  86% $(4.3) 
1996 $3.4 $(0.5)        $.4  13%    $1.3  40%      $(4.8) 
1997 $7.5 $0.3     $1.2  16%    $1.5  20%       $(6.3) 
1998 $13.5 $1.9    $3.7  27% $2.3  17%         $5.3  
1999 $19.4 $(5.2)     $6.6  34% $8.2  42%            $.2  
2000 $36.5 $(24.8)  $21.6  59%   $12.8  35%       $68.8  
2001 $56.1 $(21.2)   $21.0  37%  $14.8  26%       $75.3  
2002 $54.7 $(27.5)   $21.3  39%  $17.2  31%       $66.2  
2003 $39.4 $(39.7)   $16.1  41% $16.7  42%       $29.2  
2004 $38.4 $(7.3)     $9.0  23%   $11.9  31%       $25.9  
2005 $32.6 $(9.3)     $8.6  26%  $11.3  35%       $18.4  
2006 $29.6 $(15.8)         $9.2 31%   $12.6  43%       $11.5  
2007 $40.6 $(9.8)   $10.1  25%   $15.6  39%         $4.6  
2008 $34.4 $(15.6)         $8.9  26%   $13.6  40%       $(8.7) 
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Selectica sales and marketing expenses and research and development expenses (in millions of 
dollars): 
Year 
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1999 $3.4 ($7.5)  $4.4  424%  $3.9  115%  $.7 
2000 $16.1 ($30.8) 
        
$17.0  106% 
         
$7.3  45%  $214.1  
2001 $53.9 ($49.9)  $50.7  92%  $21.8  39%  $182.5  
2002 $47.2 ($26.4)  $25.2  53%  $15.3  32%  $153.4  
2003 $35.6 ($29.7)  $19.4  54%  $13.2  37%  $113.1  
2004 $40.0 ($8.8)  $14.5  36%  $13.5  34%  $112.0  
2005 $31.1 ($14.7)  $11.9  38%  $12.4  40%  $97.7  
2006 $23.4 ($17.5)  $6.7  29%  $8.8  38%  $78.3  
2007 $14.7 ($20.9)  $6.9  46%  $7.4  50%  $49.9  
2008 $16.0 ($23.9)  $6.7  42%  $5.0  31%  $27.3  
2009 $16.4 ($8.4)  $6.3  38%  $4.2  26%  $17.3  
2010 $15.2 ($4.6)  $4.5 30%  $3.3  22%  $12.0  
2011 $14.5 ($1.5) $4.4 30% $4.5 31%  $10.7 
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Ariba sales and marketing expenses and research and development expenses (in millions of 
dollars): 
Year ended 
September 
30, 
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1997 $.8 $(4.7) $2.2 275% $1.9 238% $14.5 
1998 $8.4 $(11.0) $10.3 123% $4.5 54% $10.0 
1999 $45.4 $(29.3) $33.9 75% $11.6 26% $122.2 
2000 $279.0 $(792.8) $207.2 74% $39.0 14% $3498.2 
2001 $408.8 $(2681.0) $269.7 66% $90.9 22% $925.9 
2002 $229.8 $(638.7) $81 35% $64.4 28% $311.0 
2003 $236.7 $(106.3) $80.4 34% $53.8 23% $216.9 
2004 $245.8 $(25.2) $74.3 30% $54.1 22% $646.4 
2005 $323.0 $(349.6) $83.3 26% $47.2 15% $329.5 
2006 $296.0 $(47.8) $78.1 26% $50.1 17% $333.0 
2007 $301.7 $(15.0) $93.9 31% $51.2 17% $351.1 
2008 $328.1 $(41.1) $110.8 34% $48.9 15% $391.0 
2009 $339.9 $8.2 $103.7 31% $43.3 13% $434.1 
2010 $361.1 $16.4 $120.8 33% $46.0 13% $499.0 
 
 
 
 
